Sanhedrin 78a — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said to Mar bar Rav Ashi

And if it is not his force

according to your words, if so,

let it go downward

[let it fall opposite it]!?

Rather, it is a weak force

that is to say: its force is not strong, but some force of his is present here. And that which it did not go upward is because the force of the strength of the throwing was exhausted and the stone returns to the earth; but it nevertheless continues onward through a remnant of his force.

The Sages taught:

If they struck

a person

ten people with ten clubs, and he died:

Whether

all ten struck him

at one time, or whether

they struck him

one after the other,

they are all

exempt.

Rabbi Judah ben Beteira says:

One after the other, the last one is liable,

even though the first ones struck him blows sufficient to kill, and

because the last one brought near

the man

his death.

He said—

that is,

Rabbi Yohanan explained: And both of them

the Rabbis and Rabbi Judah ben Beteira—

expounded one verse:

as it is written [Leviticus 24:17]: “

And if a man strikes any human life

he shall surely be put to death.” And so each of them expounded:

The Rabbis hold: “

any life,”

to teach that he is not liable

until there is “

any life.” And since the first ones initially assisted in killing him, this is not the striking of “any life” through the blow of the last one.

”—that is, unless the blow itself affects the entire person. Since the first people had already assisted in killing him, the last person’s blow did not strike the entire person.

And Rabbi Judah ben Beteira holds: “

any life”

comes to teach: even if he struck only

any part of a life,

he shall surely be put to death.

Rava said:

Everyone agrees concerning one who kills a

person who is

a tereifa

such as when the esophagus was perforated or the membrane of the brain was perforated,

that he is exempt,

because once his vital signs are visibly cut, he is a “dead man,” and one is not liable on his account.

And everyone agrees

concerning one who is dying by the hands of Heaven

and another came and killed him,

that he is liable,

for no act was initially done to him.

They disagree:

Only concerning one who is dying by the hands of man,

such as one who is close to death because of the blows, but was not made a tereifa through them.

One—

the Rabbis—

likens him to a tereifa,

and just as one who kills a tereifa is exempt, so one who kills this person is exempt.

And the other—

Rabbi Judah ben Beteira—

likens him to one dying by the hands of Heaven,

for one who kills him is liable on his account.

And we explain:

The one who likens him to a tereifa—what is the reason that he does not liken him to one dying by the hands of Heaven

[why does he liken him to a tereifa more than to one dying]!?

Because

one dying by the hands of Heaven has no act been done to him

[no act was done to him], but

this one

whom the first ones struck—

an act was done to him

[an act was done to him].

The Gemara further explains:

And the one who likens him to one dying by the hands of Heaven—what is the reason that he does not liken him to a tereifa!?

Because

a tereifa has his vital signs cut

of him, but

this one does not have his vital signs cut.

A tanna taught before Rav Sheshet:

It is written: “

And if a man strikes any human life

, he shall surely be put to death.” For this reason “any life” was stated:

to include one who strikes his fellow and it is not sufficient to kill him, and

again

another came

and killed him, that he is liable.

And we challenge: If the first one struck him with a blow that

is not sufficient to kill,

then

it is obvious

that the second, who killed him, is liable!?

Rather,

this is how you should teach it:

To include one who strikes his fellow and

it is sufficient to kill, and another came and killed him, that he is liable, and the plain sense of this

beraita is

according to Rabbi Judah ben Beteira,

who makes the last one who struck liable after the first ones struck him blows sufficient to kill, because he expounds “any life” to include any part of a life.

Rava said:

One who kills a tereifa

is

exempt,

because he killed a “dead man,” as above.

And a tereifa who killed:

if he killed

before a court,

and they did not require witnesses, he is

liable.

But if

not before a court

he killed, but witnesses testified against him that he killed, he is

exempt.

It is written [Deuteronomy 19:16–19]: “When a malicious witness rises against a man to testify against him a perversion. Then both the men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord, before the priests and the judges who will be in those days. And the judges shall inquire thoroughly, and behold, the witness is a false witness; he has testified falsely against his brother. You shall do to him as he plotted to do to his brother, and you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.” And the Sages learned: testimony that you can refute and through which you can fulfill in them “You shall do to him as he plotted to do to his brother” is testimony; but testimony that you cannot refute is not testimony.

The Gemara asks: If

before a court

he killed,

he is liable; what is the reason?

Because

it is written “

And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.”

But if

not before a court

but he killed on the basis of witnesses, he is

exempt,

because

it would be

this testimony

testimony that you cannot refute,

for if they were refuted, they would not become liable, since they came to kill a tereifa,

and all testimony that you cannot refute is not called testimony.

And

further

Rava said

a similar law concerning a tereifa who committed bestiality with a male:

One who commits bestiality with a

male who is

a tereifa

is

liable.

But

a tereifa who committed bestiality with

the male:

If

before a court

he committed bestiality, he is

liable;

but if

not before a court

he committed bestiality, but witnesses testified against him, he is

exempt.

And we explain the reason:

If

before a court

he committed bestiality, he is

liable,

because

it is written “

And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.”

And if

not before a court

he committed bestiality, he is

exempt;

for it would be—

the testimony of the witnesses testifying that the tereifa committed bestiality—

testimony that you cannot refute,

and all testimony that you cannot refute is not testimony.

And we challenge Rava:

This also—

the two statements concerning a tereifa who killed and a tereifa who committed bestiality—

why do I need it!?

And

behold,

it is the same thing,

they have one reason!?

And we answer: Indeed, the principal novelty of Rava’s second statement is not what he said concerning a tereifa who committed bestiality, but rather

“

one who commits bestiality with a tereifa

is

what was necessary for him

What might you have said: let

the one who commits bestiality with a tereifa

be like one who has intercourse with

a

dead

[one who commits bestiality with a dead male],

and let him be exempt.

It teaches us

Rava

that it is because of pleasure

that every one who commits bestiality is liable,

and this one

who commits bestiality with a tereifa—also

has pleasure,

and only one who has intercourse with the dead is exempt, because once he died, his warmth and moisture passed away, he became cold, and there is no pleasure here.

And

further

Rava said:

Witnesses who testified concerning a tereifa

that he is liable for death,

and were refuted, they are not

they

killed,

for they came to kill a tereifa, who is a dead man.

But

witnesses of a tereifa

[witnesses who themselves are tereifot]

who were refuted

concerning testimony through which they came to make the person liable for death, these are

killed,

because it is stated, “And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.”

Rav Ashi said:

Since witnesses who testify that a person is fatally ill are not executed, then

even witnesses who testify falsely about a fatally ill person, and are refuted, are not executed;

and the reason is:

because they are not subject to the law of witnesses who refute those who refute them, that is: the testimony that refuted them is testimony that cannot itself be refuted. For if those witnesses were refuted, they would not become liable for execution, since they had plotted to have witnesses executed who were fatally ill, rather than fully viable witnesses.

And

further

Rava said:

If an ox that is fatally ill kills

a person, it is

liable

to be stoned.

But

if

the ox of a person who is fatally ill kills

a person, it is

exempt.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

It is because

the verse says

concerning an ox that killed a person: “

The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death,”

the Torah compared the execution of the ox to the execution of its owner, to teach:

Wherever the words “

and its owner shall also be put to death”

apply to him, the words “

the ox shall be stoned”

also apply to it.

But wherever the words “

and its owner shall also be put to death”

do not apply to him, since the owner cannot be found liable to a court-imposed execution through the testimony of witnesses because he is fatally ill,

the words “

the ox shall be stoned”

do not apply to it.

Rav Ashi said:

Even an ox

that is

fatally ill, if it too kills

a person, is

exempt.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Since, if the owners

were fatally ill like the ox, they

would be exempt

[they would be exempt because it is impossible to testify against them],

the ox too,

if it is fatally ill, is

exempt,

because the execution of the ox was compared to the execution of its owner.

We learned in the Mishna:

If one incited a dog against another person

or incited a snake against him, he is exempt; if he caused the snake to bite him [he took hold of the snake, brought it over, and caused it to bite the person’s flesh], Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable, and the Sages exempt him:

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: When you examine the matter carefully,

when you analyze the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages in our Mishna, you find that this is the basis of their dispute:

According to Rabbi Yehuda:

The snake’s venom remains between its teeth,

and bringing the snake over to another person is like thrusting a knife into his abdomen, and

therefore, the one who causes it to bite is executed by the sword, but

if

the snake

were the killer, it would be exempt from stoning, since the snake itself did nothing.

According to the Sages:

The snake’s venom, by itself—

the snake’s venom—

it expels

when it bites, and when this person caused it to bite, the venom still did not have the power to kill,

and therefore the snake is stoned,

since it was the snake that bit and expelled the venom,

whereas

if

the one who caused the bite

were the killer, he would be

exempt,

since this is merely indirect causation.

Mishna:

If one strikes another person, whether with a stone or with a fist, and the court assessed him

the injured person

as liable to die

because of that blow,

but the injured person improved

from the condition

he had been in,

and they reassessed him as likely to live,

but afterward his condition worsened and he died,

the one who struck him

is liable.

Rabbi Neḥemya says:

The one who struck him is

exempt, because

there is

evidence supporting the matter

that he did not die because of the blow, since his condition initially improved.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: Rabbi Neḥemya expounded this verse:

It is written: “When men quarrel and one strikes another with a stone or with a fist, and he does not die but takes to his bed.

If he rises and walks outside—”