Sanhedrin 78a (עח.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said to Mar bar Rav Ashi:

And if it is not the force of his throw

, as you say, then

it should go downward

[fall directly beneath it]!?

Rather, it is a weak force

, meaning: It is not a strong force, but some force remains here. The reason it did not travel upward is that the force of the throw’s strength was exhausted and the stone returns to the ground; nevertheless, it still travels by virtue of some of his force.

The Sages taught:

If they struck

a person

ten people with ten staffs, and he died:

Whether

all ten struck him

simultaneously, or whether

they struck him

one after the other

, they are all

exempt.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says:

If they struck him one after the other, the last one is liable

, even though the first ones struck him with blows sufficient to kill,

because the last one brought forward

the time of

his death.

Rabbi Yohanan

explained:

And both

—the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira—

expounded one verse

, as it is written [Leviticus 24:17]: “

And if a man strikes any human soul

, he shall surely be put to death”; and each of them expounded it as follows:

The Rabbis maintain: The phrase “

any soul

” teaches that he is not liable

unless there is

“

any soul.” Since the first ones initially assisted in killing him, the last one’s blow is not a striking of “any soul.”

And Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira maintains: The phrase “

any soul

” comes to teach that even if he struck only

any remnant of a soul

, he shall surely be put to death.

Rava said:

Everyone agrees that one who kills a

person who is a

tereifa

, such as one whose esophagus was perforated or whose membrane of the brain was perforated,

is exempt

, because once his vital organs have visibly been severed, he is a “dead man,” and one is not liable for killing him.

And everyone agrees

with regard to one who is dying by the hand of Heaven

and another person comes and kills him,

that he is liable

, since no act had initially been done to him.

They disagree:

Only with regard to one who is dying by the hand of man

, such as one who is close to death because of blows, but was not rendered a tereifa by them.

One

—the Rabbis—

compare him to a tereifa

, and just as one who kills a tereifa is exempt, so too one who kills this person is exempt.

And the other

—Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira—

compares him to one dying by the hand of Heaven

, for one who kills such a person is liable.

And we explain:

With regard to the one who compares him to a tereifa, what is the reason that he does not compare him to one dying by the hand of Heaven

[why does he compare him to a tereifa rather than to one who is dying]!?

Because

one dying by the hand of Heaven has not had an act performed upon him

[no act was done to him], whereas

this one

—whom the first ones struck—

has had an act performed upon him

[an act was done to him].

The Gemara further explains:

And with regard to the one who compares him to one dying by the hand of Heaven, what is the reason that he does not compare him to a tereifa!?

Because

a tereifa has its vital organs severed

, while this one does not have its vital organs severed.

in this case, his vital signs are not severed.

A tanna taught before Rav Sheshet:

It is written: “

And if a man strikes any human soul

, he shall surely be put to death.” For this reason the phrase “any soul” is stated:

to include one who strikes his fellow when the blow is not sufficient to kill him, and

then

another person comes

and kills him, that he is liable.

And we challenge this: If the first person struck him with a blow

that is not sufficient to kill

him, it is

obvious

that the second person who killed him is liable!?

Rather

, teach it this way:

To include one who strikes his fellow and

the blow is sufficient to kill him, and another person comes and kills him, that he is liable; and the anonymous

beraita

is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira

, who holds the last person liable when he struck after the first ones had struck him with blows sufficient to kill, because he expounds “any soul” to include any remnant of a soul.

Rava said:

One who kills a tereifa

is

exempt

, because he killed a “dead man,” as stated above.

And a tereifa who killed

: If he killed

in the presence of a court

and the court did not require witnesses, he is

liable.

But if he killed

not in the presence of a court

, and witnesses testified against him that he killed, he is

exempt.

It is written [Deuteronomy 19:16–19]: “If a false witness rises against a man to testify against him with wrongdoing. Then both the men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord, before the priests and the judges who will be in those days. And the judges shall investigate thoroughly, and behold, the witness is a false witness; he has testified falsely against his brother. You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his brother, and you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.” And the Sages learned: Testimony that can be refuted and through which “you shall do to him as he schemed to do to his brother” can be fulfilled is testimony; but testimony that cannot be refuted is not testimony.

The Gemara asks: If he killed

in the presence of a court

,

he is liable; what is the reason?

Because

it is written: “

And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.”

But if

not in the presence of a court

he killed, but rather according to the testimony of witnesses, he is

exempt

, because

it would be

this

testimony that cannot be refuted

, since if the witnesses were refuted they would not become liable, as they had come to kill a tereifa,

and any testimony that cannot be refuted is not called testimony.

And

further,

Rava

stated a similar law with regard to a tereifa who had intercourse with a male:

One who has intercourse with a

male who is a

tereifa

is

liable.

But

a tereifa who has intercourse

with a male:

If he had intercourse

in the presence of a court

, he is

liable;

but if he had intercourse

not in the presence of a court,

and witnesses testified against him, he is

exempt.

And we explain the reason:

If he had intercourse

in the presence of a court

, he is

liable

, because

it is written: “

And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.”

And if

not in the presence of a court

he had intercourse, he is

exempt

, for it would be

—the testimony of the witnesses testifying that the tereifa had intercourse—

testimony that cannot be refuted

, and any testimony that cannot be refuted is not testimony.

We challenge Rava:

This additional statement

—the two statements concerning a tereifa who killed and a tereifa who had intercourse—

why do I need it!?

And

they

are the same thing

, as they have one reason!?

And we answer: Indeed, the principal novelty of Rava’s second statement is not what he said concerning a tereifa who had intercourse. Rather, it was

“one who has intercourse with a tereifa

, is liable,” which

was necessary

for Rava to state; and it is a novelty, because:

One might have said that he should be

—one who has intercourse with a tereifa—

like one who has intercourse with

a

dead

[one who has intercourse with a dead male],

and should be exempt.

Rava teaches us

that

it is because of pleasure

that anyone who has intercourse is liable,

and this one

—one who has intercourse with a tereifa—also

has pleasure. It is only one who has intercourse with a dead person who is exempt, because once he died, his warmth and moisture passed away; he became cold, and there is no longer pleasure here.

and only one who has intercourse with the dead is exempt, because once he died, his warmth and moisture passed away, he became cold, and there is no pleasure here.

And

further,

Rava

said:

Witnesses who testified concerning a tereifa

that he was liable to receive the death penalty, and they were refuted, are not

themselves

executed

, since they had come to kill a tereifa, who is a “dead man.”

But

witnesses of a tereifa

[witnesses who themselves are tereifot]

who were refuted

with regard to testimony by which they had come to make a person liable to death, they

are executed

, because it is stated: “And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.”

Rav Ashi said:

; and:

Since witnesses who testified concerning a tereifa are not executed, if so,

even witnesses who testified concerning a tereifa and were found to be conspiring witnesses are not executed;

and the reason is:

because they are not subject to conspiring witnesses of conspiring witnesses, meaning: the testimony that rendered them conspiring witnesses is testimony that cannot be rendered conspiring testimony, because if those witnesses were themselves found to be conspiring witnesses, they would not be liable to execution, since they plotted to have witnesses who were tereifot, rather than fully viable witnesses, executed.

This passage continues the explanation.

And

Rava

said

further:

A tereifa ox that killed a person is

liable

to stoning.

And

if

a person who was a tereifa’s ox killed,

it is

exempt.

This passage continues the explanation. ; and:

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

the verse states with regard to an ox that killed a person: “

The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death

,”

the Torah juxtaposed the death of the ox to the death of its owner, to teach:

Wherever we can apply to him “

and its owner shall also be put to death,”

we can apply to it “

the ox shall be stoned”;

also apply to it.

but wherever we cannot apply to him “

and its owner shall also be put to death,”

because the owners cannot be rendered liable to execution by a court through the testimony of witnesses since they are tereifot,

we cannot apply to it “

the ox shall be stoned.”

do not apply to it.

Rav Ashi said:

; and:

Even an ox

that is

a tereifa that killed,

it is

exempt.

This passage continues the explanation. ; and:

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Since, if the owners

were tereifot like the ox,

they would be exempt

[they would be exempt because it is impossible to testify against them],

the ox, too,

which is a tereifa, is

exempt,

because the death of the ox was juxtaposed to the death of its owners.

We learned in the Mishna:

If one incited a dog against another person,

if he incited a snake against him, he is exempt; if he caused a snake to bite him [he seized the snake, led it to him, and caused the snake to bite his flesh], Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Sages deem him exempt:

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: When you examine the matter,

when you scrutinize the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages in our Mishna, you will find that this is the basis of their dispute:

According to Rabbi Yehuda:

The snake’s venom remains between its teeth,

and bringing the snake against another is like driving a knife into his abdomen, and

therefore, the one who causes the bite is executed by the sword, and

if

the snake,

it is exempt from stoning, since the snake itself did nothing.

According to the Sages:

The snake’s venom, by itself—

that of the snake—

it expels

through its bite, and when this person caused it to bite him, it still did not contain enough venom to kill;

therefore, the snake is stoned,

since it was the snake that bit and expelled the venom,

and

if

the one who causes the bite,

he is

exempt,

since this is merely an indirect cause.

Mishna:

One who strikes his fellow, whether with a stone or with a fist, and they assessed him

the court

to be destined to die

as a result of that blow,

and the injured person improved

from

his previous condition,

and they reassessed him as likely to live,

but afterward his condition deteriorated and he died,

the one who struck him is

liable.

This passage continues the explanation. Rashi . According to the Sages: The snake’s venom, by itself—that of the snake—it expels through its bite, and when this person caused it to bite him, it still did not contain enough venom to kill; therefore, the snake is stoned, since it was the snake that bit and expelled the venom, and if the one who causes the bite, he is exempt, since this is merely an indirect cause. Rashi wrote: “Therefore, the snake is stoned, as the law of an ox that killed, since every animal and wild beast is like an ox [in that Scripture obligates it to be stoned when it kills]; it is only that Scripture spoke of the usual case.” According to Rashi, who wrote: “Therefore, it is merely an indirect cause, even though he knows that ultimately it will expel the venom; nevertheless, the person does not die through his force.” And Maimonides [Laws of Murder 2:10] wrote: “But one who binds his fellow and leaves him in hunger until he dies; or who causes a snake to bite him, and needless to say, if he incited a dog or snake against him—in all these cases, the court does not execute him, but he is a murderer, and the Avenger of blood demands his blood";; thus, he is considered a murderer, and even in the case where he incited a snake against him, Maimonides called him a murderer. Mishna: One who strikes his fellow, whether with a stone or with a fist, and they assessed him the court to be destined to die as a result of that blow, and the injured person improved from his previous condition, and they reassessed him as likely to live, but afterward his condition deteriorated and he died, the one who struck him is liable. But if they initially assessed him as likely to live, he is exempt even according to the Rabbis, as will be explained below, Rashi.

Rabbi Neḥemya says:

The one who struck him is

exempt, since

there is

circumstantial support

that he did not die as a result of the blow, since his condition initially improved.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: Rabbi Neḥemya expounded this matter:

It is written: “And when men quarrel and one man strikes his fellow with a stone or with a fist, and he does not die but falls into bed.

If he rises and walks about outside—”