Sanhedrin 75b (עה:) — the Talmud in English

Abaye said: This is what he is saying,

the tanna when he says “males like females”:

From where do we make the kinship [

the relationship of his daughter]

descending from him [

namely, his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter, who are not his wife’s daughters but rather the daughters of a woman whom he raped]

like the kinship [

the relationship of a daughter]

descending from her [

from his wife, namely, his wife’s son’s daughter and his wife’s daughter’s daughter, when they are not his own but only his wife’s descendants], so that they are liable to burning just as the kinship descending from her is liable to burning, as we derived it by means of a gzera shava? -

It is stated here, “depravity,” and it is stated there, “depravity,” and so on.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But with regard to his kinship,

in the verse prohibiting intercourse with his daughter born of a woman whom he raped, and with his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter,

“depravity” is not written in it!

Rava said: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi said to me: It is derived through “they are, they are,”

first, we derive it by means of the gzera shava of “they are, they are.” For in the verse concerning the kinship descending from him [his daughter born of a woman whom he raped, his son’s daughter, and his daughter’s daughter], it says, “They are your nakedness.” And in the verse concerning the kinship descending from her, it says, “They are her blood relatives.” Thus, it is as though “depravity” were also stated with regard to the kinship descending from him. Once “depravity” has also been stated with regard to the kinship descending from him,

it is derived

by means of the gzera shava of

“depravity, depravity,”

to teach from one’s mother-in-law that the punishment is burning.

The Gemara now explains the second obscure statement in the beraita:

b.

The Master said: From where do we make the lower like the upper.

The Gemara asks:

What is meant by “the lower like the upper”?

If you say

that the tanna intends to say: From where do we derive the obligation of burning for

his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter like his daughter,

that is, from where do we know that the lower generations among “the kinship of his daughter” [his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter] are subject to burning, like the upper one, his daughter, who is closer to him in kinship and is therefore considered “upper” in the order of his relationship to them—

it cannot be said so, for all of them

come together!

They are all derived through one gzera shava from his mother-in-law, since they are all included in the same verse, in which “depravity” is written.

Rather,

perhaps the tanna intends to say: From where do we derive the obligation of burning for

his father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother like his mother-in-law?

That too cannot be said! For

this one,

is this called

“the lower like the upper”?

The order of the generations is from above downward. If so, if the question is from where we know that his father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother are subject to burning like his mother-in-law, then

it would be “the upper like the lower”!

The Gemara answers: Indeed, it cannot be said in this manner. Rather, the beraita must be changed to the reverse, and therefore

teach

that the beraita should read as follows: From where do we make

the upper [

his father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother]

like the lower [

like his mother-in-law]?

But the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so,

what is the derivation that the tanna stated concerning this:

“It is stated here, ‘depravity,’ and it is stated there, ‘depravity’”!

And now, if they themselves are not written,

they themselves are not written in the verse, and you still have no source either for the warning or for the punishment concerning them,

is their “depravity” written!?

If they themselves are not written in the Torah, how can it be said that “depravity” is written with regard to them?

Abaye said: This is what he is saying,

the tanna in the beraita:

From where do we make

the prohibition of

three generations above

one’s wife—that is, his father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother, who are considered the third generation above his wife—

like three generations below

one’s wife, such as his wife’s son’s daughter and his wife’s daughter’s daughter, who are the third generation below his wife, and with regard to whom both a warning and the punishment of burning are stated? -

It is stated below,

with regard to his wife’s daughter,

“depravity”

[“They are her blood relatives; it is depravity”]

and it is stated above,

with regard to his mother-in-law, “When a man takes a woman and her mother,

it is depravity

”;

just as below,

with regard to his wife’s daughter, there is a warning and a punishment of burning for

three generations

below,

so above,

with regard to his mother-in-law, there is a punishment of burning for

three generations

above.

This entire derivation, however, concerns the punishment of burning and not the prohibition itself, for the “depravity” written above, with regard to his mother-in-law, was stated only in relation to the punishment of burning, but not with regard to the warning.

Therefore, the beraita continues and states its third obscure law, which the Gemara now explains:

c.

And concerning the punishment: what was done below,

namely, his daughter, his son's daughter, and his daughter's daughter, so that they should receive the punishment of burning,

like above,

as is the law with his mother-in-law, who is subject to burning.

So too concerning the warning, what was done above,

his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law's mother, and his father-in-law's mother,

like below,

so that they are all included in the warning.

Rav Ashi said: Actually,

there is no need to reverse the wording of the beraita [in its second part]; rather, it should be altered

as it is taught:

Just as there, below is like above, so too here, below is like above.

And as for what we challenged—that if his father-in-law's mother and his mother-in-law's mother are to be treated like his mother-in-law, this is from above to below, since that is the order of the generations, and is not below like above—one can say:

And what is meant by “below”—

below with regard to the prohibition.

For if his mother-in-law's mother and his father-in-law's mother are considered to be at a lower level of severity of prohibition, since they are more distant from him than his mother-in-law, nevertheless we learn that the law of those “below” is as stringent as that of his mother-in-law, who is “above” in the degree of prohibition.

Ulla interprets the continuation of the beraita in accordance with Abaye.

Up to this point, the Gemara explains the obscure wording of the beraita; from here it continues to discuss the matter on the basis of the beraita's words.

If so,

perhaps you might say: Since the beraita stated that the other relatives on his side are to be compared to the other relatives on her side, then, accordingly, let us also say:

Just as she,

with regard to the prohibition of kinship on account of his wife,

her mother

is prohibited, so too he,

with regard to the prohibition of kinship on his side,

his mother's mother is prohibited!

Abaye said: The verse states: “She is your mother.”

The word “she” comes to exclude, and to say that only

because of his mother do you hold him liable, but you do not hold him liable because of his mother's mother.

Rava said:

There is no need for the exclusion “She is your mother.” Rather, it can be explained that it is impossible to derive the prohibition of his mother's mother through a gzera shava from his wife's mother's mother, because

according to the one who says: Derive from it and from it,

when one matter is learned from another through a gzera shava, all of its laws are learned from the source that teaches it, and the law of the original matter is not applied to it at all; according to this opinion, it would ostensibly follow that one is liable to burning for his mother's mother, just as he is for his wife's mother's mother,

and according to the one who says: Derive from it, but establish it in its place,

only the fundamental law is learned from the source that teaches it, while the original matter is still treated according to its own law; according to this opinion, only the prohibition itself concerning his mother's mother can be learned from his wife's mother's mother, but not the liability to burning—

it cannot be derived!

It is impossible to learn it through a gzera shava.

For

according to the one who says: Derive from it and from it,

we should derive through a gzera shava the law of his mother's mother from the law of his wife's mother's mother, both with regard to the warning and with regard to burning, as follows:

Derive from it:

Just as she,

his wife,

her mother's mother is prohibited,—

so too he, his mother's mother is prohibited.

And from it—

just as she is subject to burning, so too he is subject to burning

for his mother's mother.

This derivation can be refuted:

according to the one who says

that death by

burning is more severe

than stoning,

there are grounds to refute it

with three refutations:

a.

What is distinctive about “she”?—

Her mother's mother is subject to burning; can you say the same about “he”—

whose mother is subject to stoning?

And one cannot derive a lenient matter from a stringent one.

b.

Furthermore,

it can be refuted: Is it conceivable that

his mother is subject to stoning,

whereas

his mother's mother

would be

subject to burning,

which is more severe than stoning!?

c.

Furthermore,

since we say, “Derive from it and from it,” we should learn as follows:

Just as in her case you did not distinguish between her mother and her mother's mother

with regard to the punishment, and there is an equal liability for both, burning,

so too in his case you should not distinguish between his mother and his mother's mother,

and there should be an equal liability for both, stoning.

And according to the one who says that stoning is more severe,

and therefore the first two refutations do not apply, nevertheless,

this objection,

by virtue of the third refutation,

cannot be entertained;

it is impossible to derive the law of his mother's mother from that of his wife's mother's mother.

And

if

according to the one who says: Derive from it, but establish it in its place,

the derivation must necessarily apply only to the warning, as follows:

Derive from it:

Just as her mother's mother is prohibited—

so too his mother's mother is prohibited,

and establish it in its place: There,

with regard to her mother's mother,

she is subject to burning. But here,

with regard to his mother's mother,

he is subject to stoning, as we find with his mother

[namely, “establish it in its place”].

Rava explains that according to this derivation it can be refuted as follows:

According to the one who says that burning is more severe

than stoning,

there are grounds to refute it

with two refutations: