Sanhedrin 76a — the Talmud in English

The first refutation is against the very basis of the derivation, even regarding the warning:

What is the case with her,

with the other relatives of his wife [his mother’s mother], in which there is a stringency,

for her mother is subject to burning,

and therefore it is logical that one should be stringent with her and prohibit her.

Can you say so with him,

with his relative, concerning whom the Torah was lenient,

for his mother is subject to stoning!

And therefore it is impossible to derive that his mother’s mother is prohibited.

And furthermore,

we have a second refutation with which to refute: Since it was established in its place, we must say:

He is like her.

Just as she —

you did not distinguish within her between her daughter and her mother’s mother,

and she is liable to burning in both cases,

so he —

you should not distinguish within him between his daughter,

whose liability is burning,

and his mother’s mother,

and you should also make her liable to burning.

But this matter is not possible, for it is impossible to make one liable to burning for his mother’s mother while for his mother he is liable to stoning, since burning is more severe than stoning!

And according to the one who says that stoning is more severe

than burning, and according to him the first refutation does not exist,

from this difficulty,

the second one,

it is not discussed;

it is impossible to derive his mother’s mother from his mother.

And now the Gemara continues to discuss, following the words of the beraita, why we should not say: Just as we equated the males with the females, so too let us equate the female “relative” with the “other male relatives,” and let the other relatives of his wife be prohibited to him like his own relatives:

If so, just as his daughter-in-law is prohibited, so too she—her daughter-in-law

[even if she is not his son’s wife, but rather she is her son’s wife, who is called “the wife of his stepson”] shall be

prohibited.

Abaye said: The verse says

concerning a daughter-in-law,

“your son’s wife

she is.”

The word “she” comes to exclude and to say: Only

because of your son’s wife do you make him liable, but you do not make him liable because of her son’s wife.

Rava said:

There is no need for the exclusion of the verse; rather,

whether according to the one who says, “derive from it and from it,” or according to the one who says, “derive from it and establish it in its place,”

it does not come.

For

according to the one who says, “derive from it and from it,”

the derivation must be as follows:

“Derive from it”:

Just as his daughter-in-law is prohibited,

so too she as well—her daughter-in-law is prohibited.

And from it: Just as he,

his daughter-in-law, is

subject to stoning,

so too she as well,

her daughter-in-law, is

subject to stoning.

And from now,

according to the one who says that stoning is more severe —

there is room to refute

with two refutations:

The first, against the very law prohibiting his wife’s daughter-in-law:

What is the case with him,

whose other relative is stringent,

for his mother is subject to stoning. Can you say so with her,

whose other relative is lenient,

for her mother is subject to burning,

which is less severe than stoning; and it is impossible to derive the prohibition of the lenient other relative from the stringent other relative.

And furthermore,

there is a refutation against the derivation of the punishment of stoning: Is it possible that

her daughter is subject to burning,

the less severe punishment,

and her daughter-in-law is subject to stoning,

the more severe punishment!?

And the Gemara rejects this refutation:

He himself proves it: His daughter,

who is closer to him than his daughter-in-law, her law is

burning,

the less severe punishment,

and

if

his daughter-in-law,

who is more distant than his daughter, were liable

to stoning,

the more severe punishment!

Rather,

this is the second refutation: You cannot derive from it and from it with regard to the punishment, and make his wife’s daughter-in-law liable to stoning, because:

Just as, with regard to him, you did not distinguish between his mother and his daughter-in-law,

to make him liable to stoning in both cases,

so too she —

you should not distinguish within her between her mother and her daughter-in-law.

It is impossible to impose burning for his wife’s mother and stoning for her daughter-in-law.

And according to the one who says that burning is more severe,

according to whom the first refutation against the very prohibition does not exist,

from this difficulty,

the second one,

they are not discussed,

even not in order to prohibit her. Since it is impossible to derive from it and from it and make her liable to stoning, the entire derivation is now nullified, and it is impossible to derive even only the matter of prohibiting her.

And Rava continues and explains:

And according to the one who says, “derive from it and establish it in its place,”

the derivation must be as follows:

“Derive from it”:

Just as his daughter-in-law is prohibited,

so too her daughter-in-law is prohibited.

And establish it in its place: There,

with regard to his daughter-in-law,

it is he who is subject to stoning. But here,

with regard to his wife’s daughter-in-law,

she is subject to burning, as we find with her mother,

that is, establish it in its place, so that the law of his wife’s daughter-in-law will be like the law of his wife’s mother [with burning], just as the law of his daughter-in-law is like that of his mother [with stoning].

And from now,

according to the one who says that stoning is more severe —

there is room to refute

with two refutations:

The first, against the very prohibition:

What is the case with him,

whose other relative is stringent,

for his mother is subject to stoning,

the more severe punishment;

can you say so with her —

for her mother is subject to burning,

the less severe punishment.

And furthermore,

there is a refutation against the derivation of the punishment, on the basis of “establish it in its place”:

From where do you know to say that, on the basis of “establish it in its place,” the death of his wife’s daughter-in-law should be equated with the death of his wife’s mother, corresponding to the equating of the law of his daughter-in-law with the law of his mother?

And why should we not say the opposite, that on the basis of “establish it in its place” one should distinguish between the death of the daughter-in-law and the death of the mother, and say as follows:

Just as, with regard to him, you distinguished between his daughter,

for whom he is liable to burning,

and his daughter-in-law,

for whom he is liable to stoning,

so too, with regard to her, distinguish between her daughter

for whom one is liable to burning,

and her daughter-in-law,

for whom they should be liable to stoning, the more severe punishment, and not to burning, the less severe punishment.

And according to the one who also says that burning is more severe,

according to whom the first refutation does not exist,

from this difficulty,

the second one,

they are not discussed.

And the Gemara continues to discuss:

His daughter from a woman whom he raped—from where

is it known that he is liable to the punishment of burning for her? For the verse concerning the raped woman speaks only of his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter, and not of his own daughter.

And the Gemara explains:

He said,

for Abaye said:

By a kal va-chomer: If he is punished for his daughter’s daughter, is it not all the more so for his daughter?!

And the Gemara asks:

But can punishments be derived from an inference?

But it is an established principle for us that punishments are not derived from an inference, that is, from a kal va-chomer. As we find concerning his sister: The Torah prohibited and explicitly punished a sister who is his paternal half-sister but not his maternal half-sister, and explicitly prohibited a sister who is his maternal half-sister but not his paternal half-sister; but it did not explicitly prohibit or punish a sister who is his sister both from his father and from his mother. It is impossible to derive her law by a kal va-chomer from them, because punishments are not derived from an inference.

And the Gemara answers: With regard to the derivation concerning his daughter, this is not a derivation by a kal va-chomer, but merely

a mere revealing of the matter.

That is, everything for which his son’s daughter or his daughter’s daughter is prohibited is by virtue of the relationship of the daughter, since they are related to their mother’s father through their mother, who is his daughter. Therefore, no kal va-chomer derivation is needed with regard to the daughter.

But his sister from his father and from his mother is not prohibited by virtue of the relationship of a paternal half-sister or a maternal half-sister; rather, her prohibition is an independent prohibition, because she is his sister from his father and from his mother. This prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, and therefore it is impossible to punish for it by a kal va-chomer.

But

Rava said

to answer:

Rabbi Isaac bar Avdimi said to me:

His daughter from a woman whom he raped

comes

first through a gzera shava of

“here” —

“here,”

for with regard to his relative it says “here,” and with regard to his wife’s relative it also says “here”; and just as with regard to his wife’s relative, her daughter is like her daughter’s daughter, so too with regard to his relative, his daughter from a woman whom he raped is like his daughter’s daughter. And from now his daughter from a woman whom he raped has been included for burning like his daughter’s daughter, because she

comes

through a gzera shava of

“lewdness” —

“lewdness”

for the punishment of burning.

The father of Rabbi Avin taught: Since we did not learn explicitly from the Torah concerning his daughter from a woman whom he raped

that they are liable to burning for her, therefore

the verse had to say

[Leviticus 21]

“And the daughter of a man who is a priest,”

and it could not say merely “the daughter of a priest.”

That is, the intention of the verse in adding the word “man” is to teach that if the daughter of a man from a woman whom he raped [that is, the daughter of a man who is not his wife’s daughter] engages in fornication with her father, her law is burning.

And the Gemara asks: If so, let us say:

If, concerning the daughter of a priest,

a married woman who engages in fornication with another man, only

she is subject to burning and her paramour is not subject to burning, so too concerning his daughter from a woman whom he raped,

who engages in fornication with her father, only

she is subject to burning, and her paramour is not

[her father]

subject to burning!?

He said,

Abaye said: The verse says

[there]

“She has profaned her father” —

one who profanes her father

is subject to burning, and her paramour is not subject to burning;

this one is excluded,

his daughter, who engages in fornication with her father,

for her father profanes her.

Rava said

to answer: For this reason, it is impossible to say that when one has intercourse with his daughter, only she is burned and her father is not:

For

granted, there,

with regard to a married [or betrothed] daughter of a priest who engages in fornication with another man,

you removed him,

the verse removed the law of the paramour

from the law of the daughter of a priest,

for he is not subject to burning like her,

and established him according to the law

and placed him under the law of one who has intercourse with a married woman

who is the daughter of an Israelite,

for he is subject to strangulation, since one who has intercourse with a married daughter of a priest also has intercourse with a married woman.

But

here,

with regard to a father who engaged in fornication with his daughter, where the basis of the punishment is the relationship, if we remove the father from the category of the daughter’s punishment of burning and do not punish him on account of the relationship as the daughter is punished,

according to whose law do you establish him?

According to what law of another paramour shall we establish him—

according to the law of an unmarried woman shall you establish him!?

Shall we establish him according to the law of one who has intercourse with an unmarried woman who is not his relative, and acquit him!?

Rather, necessarily, it is impossible to say that the law of one who has intercourse with his daughter differs from the law of his daughter, as the law of one who has intercourse with a married daughter of a priest differs from the law of the daughter of a priest.

And the Gemara continues and discusses: After we have heard the punishment for his daughter from a woman whom he raped, it still must be learned:

The warning concerning his daughter from a woman whom he raped—from where?

Granted, according to Abaye

who learns her law by a kal va-chomer,

and Rava

who learns it by a gzera shava, then

, from where they derive the punishment, from there they derive

also the

warning.

But according to the teaching of the father of Rabbi Avin,

who learns the punishment from the verse concerning the daughter of a priest,

what

is the source for the warning concerning his daughter from a woman whom he raped!?

Rabbi Ilaa said: The verse says

[Leviticus 19]

“Do not profane your daughter by making her engage in fornication.”

Its meaning is: Do not profane your daughter by engaging in fornication with her yourself.

Rabbi Jacob, the brother of Rav Aha bar Jacob, challenged him:

But is

this

verse of

“Do not profane your daughter by making her engage in fornication” really what it comes for?

For

this

verse

is needed for that which was taught: “Do not profane your daughter by making her engage in fornication.” Could the verse be speaking of a priest who gives his daughter in marriage to a Levite or an Israelite?

That is, he profanes her by preventing her from eating teruma as long as she is under his authority.

The verse says, “by making her engage in fornication” — -

the verse is speaking of profanation through fornication,

that is,

one who hands over his daughter

for intercourse of fornication

not for the purpose of marriage.

And the Gemara answers:

If so, let the verse say, “Do not profane”;

what is the meaning of “Do not profane”? —

Infer from it two matters.

For the word “profane” signifies two acts of profanation.

And the Gemara discusses:

And Abaye and Rava, what do they do with this verse, “Do not profane your daughter by making her engage in fornication”?

Rabbi Mani said: This refers to one who gives his daughter in marriage to an old man,

who is not desirable to her, and he causes her to engage in fornication while she is under his authority.

As it was taught: “Do not profane your daughter by making her engage in fornication” —

Rabbi Eliezer says: This refers to one who gives his daughter in marriage to an old man.

Rabbi Akiva says: This refers to one who keeps his mature daughter unmarried,

and therefore she engages in fornication, because she has no husband.

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: There is no poor man in Israel

[as will be explained below]

except for a “wicked cunning man,” and one who keeps his mature daughter unmarried. —

And the Gemara asks:

Is that so?

And is

one who keeps his mature daughter unmarried not a “wicked cunning man”?

But he too practices his wickedness cunningly: He does not marry her to a man and causes her to engage in fornication, because he wants her to perform work for him and serve him, and he will not have to purchase a maidservant.