Sanhedrin 76a (עו.) — the Talmud in English

The first refutation is directed against the very derivation, even against the warning:

What is the basis for this?

The other relatives of his wife [his mother's mother], which involve a greater stringency,

as her mother is liable for burning,

and therefore it is reasonable to be stringent with regard to her and prohibit her.

Can you say the same with regard to him,

his relative, with regard to whom the Torah was lenient,

as his mother is liable for stoning!

Therefore, it is impossible to derive that his mother's mother is prohibited.

Furthermore,

we can raise a second refutation: Since the matter has been restored to its original context, we must say:

He is like her.

Just as she—

you did not distinguish with regard to her between her daughter and her mother's mother,

and she is liable for burning in both cases,

so he—

you should not distinguish with regard to him between his daughter,

who is liable for burning,

and his mother's mother,

but should likewise make her liable for burning.

But this is impossible, since one cannot make him liable for burning for his mother's mother while making him liable for stoning for his mother, as burning is more stringent than stoning!

And according to the one who says that stoning is more stringent

than burning, and according to him the first refutation does not exist,

from this objection

the second

is not discussed;

it is impossible to derive the law of his mother's mother from that of his mother's mother-in-law.

The Gemara now continues its discussion following the words of the beraita: Why should we not say that just as we equated the male relatives with the female relatives, so too we should equate the female relatives of his wife with his male relatives, and his wife's daughter-in-law should be prohibited to him just as his own daughter-in-law is?

If so, just as his daughter-in-law is prohibited, so too her daughter-in-law

[even if she is not his son's wife, but rather her son's wife, who is called the wife of his stepson] should be

prohibited.

Abaye said: The verse states

with regard to a daughter-in-law,

“Your son’s wife

she is.”

The word “she” comes to exclude and teach: Only

because she is your son’s wife do you make him liable, but you do not make him liable because she is his son’s wife.

Rava said:

There is no need for the exclusion in the verse. Rather,

whether according to the one who says: Derive from it and from it, or according to the one who says: Derive from it and restore it to its original context—

it cannot be derived.

For

according to the one who says: Derive from it and from it,

the derivation must be as follows:

Derive from it:

Just as his daughter-in-law is prohibited,

so too, her daughter-in-law is prohibited.

And from it: Just as he

is liable for his

daughter-in-law by stoning,

so too, she

is liable for her

daughter-in-law by stoning.

And from this point,

according to the one who says that stoning is more stringent,

two refutations can be raised

against it:

The first concerns the very law prohibiting his wife's daughter-in-law:

What is the basis for this with regard to him,

whose relatives are more stringent,

as his mother is liable for stoning? Can you say the same with regard to her,

whose relatives are less stringent,

as her mother is liable for burning,

which is less stringent than stoning? One cannot derive the prohibition of the less-stringent relative from the more-stringent relative.

Furthermore,

there is a refutation of the derivation of the punishment of stoning: Is it possible that

her daughter is liable for burning,

the less-stringent punishment,

while her daughter-in-law is liable for stoning,

the more-stringent punishment!?

The Gemara rejects this refutation:

He himself proves it: His daughter,

who is closer to him than his daughter-in-law, is

liable for burning,

the less-stringent punishment,

while

if

his daughter-in-law,

who is more distant than his daughter, were liable

for stoning,

the more-stringent punishment!?

Rather,

this is the second refutation: You cannot derive from it and from it with regard to the punishment and make his wife's daughter-in-law liable for stoning, because

just as with regard to him you did not distinguish between his mother and his daughter-in-law,

but made him liable for stoning in both cases,

so too with regard to her—

you should not distinguish between her mother and her daughter-in-law.

It is impossible to make him liable for burning for his wife's mother and for stoning for her daughter-in-law.

And according to the one who says that burning is more stringent,

according to whom the first refutation against the very prohibition does not exist,

from this objection

the second

is not discussed

even for the purpose of prohibiting her. Since it is impossible to derive from it and from it and make her liable for stoning, the entire derivation is nullified, and it is impossible to derive even the prohibition alone.

Rava continues and explains:

And according to the one who says: Derive from it and restore it to its original context,

the derivation must be as follows:

Derive from it:

Just as his daughter-in-law is prohibited,

so too, her daughter-in-law is prohibited.

And restore it to its original context: There,

with regard to his daughter-in-law,

he is liable for stoning. But here,

with regard to his wife's daughter-in-law, he is liable

for burning, as we find with regard to her mother,

that is, restore it to its original context, so that the law of his wife's daughter-in-law should be like the law of his wife's mother [burning], just as the law of his daughter-in-law is like that of his mother [stoning].

And from this point,

according to the one who says that stoning is more stringent,

two refutations can be raised

against it:

The first concerns the very prohibition:

What is the basis for this with regard to him,

whose relatives are more stringent,

as his mother is liable for stoning,

the more-stringent punishment?

Can you say the same with regard to her—

as her mother is liable for burning,

the less-stringent punishment?

Furthermore,

a refutation can be raised against the derivation of the punishment based on “restore it to its original context”:

From where do you know that, based on “restore it to its original context,” the death of his wife's daughter-in-law should be equated with the death of his wife's mother, analogous to the equation of the law of his daughter-in-law with that of his mother?

And why not say the opposite: that based on “restore it to its original context,” a distinction should be made between the death of the daughter-in-law and the death of the mother, and say as follows:

Just as with regard to him you distinguished between his daughter,

for whom he is liable for burning,

and his daughter-in-law,

for whom he is liable for stoning,

so too with regard to her you should distinguish between her daughter

for whom he is liable for burning,

and her daughter-in-law,

for whom he should be liable for the more-stringent stoning rather than the less-stringent burning.

And according to the one who also says that burning is more stringent,

according to whom the first refutation does not exist,

from this objection

the second

is not discussed.

The Gemara continues its discussion:

His daughter born of a woman whom he raped—from where

is it established that he is liable for burning for her? For the verse concerning a raped woman speaks only of his son's daughter and his daughter's daughter, and not of his own daughter.

The Gemara explains:

But he said,

as

Abaye said: By means of a kal va-chomer: If he is punished for his son's daughter, is it not all the more so for his daughter!

The Gemara asks:

But can punishments be derived from an inference?

We have an established principle that punishments are not imposed on the basis of an inference, that is, a derivation by means of a kal va-chomer. As we find with regard to his sister: The Torah explicitly prohibited and punished intercourse with his paternal sister but not with his maternal sister, and explicitly prohibited and punished intercourse with his maternal sister but not with his paternal sister; yet it did not explicitly prohibit or punish intercourse with his sister who is his sister both paternally and maternally. Her law cannot be derived from them by means of a kal va-chomer, because punishments are not imposed on the basis of an inference.

The Gemara answers: With regard to the derivation concerning his daughter, this is not a derivation by means of a kal va-chomer, but merely

a disclosure of the matter alone.

That is, the fact that his son's daughter and his daughter's daughter are prohibited is because of their relationship as daughters, since they are related to their mother's father through their mother, who is his daughter. Therefore, no kal va-chomer derivation is needed with regard to his daughter.

But his sister who is both paternal and maternal is not prohibited because of the relationship of a paternal sister or a maternal sister. Rather, her prohibition is an independent prohibition, because she is his sister both paternally and maternally. Since this prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, it is impossible to punish for it by means of a kal va-chomer.

Whereas

Rava said

to answer:

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to me:

His daughter born of a woman whom he raped

is derived

first by means of the gzera shava of

“here”—

“here,”

for “here” is stated with regard to his relative, and “here” is also stated with regard to his wife's relative. Just as with regard to his wife's relative, her daughter is like her daughter's daughter, so too, with regard to his relative, his daughter born of a woman whom he raped is like his daughter's daughter. Thus, his daughter born of a woman whom he raped is included as liable for burning like his daughter's daughter, because it

is derived

by means of the gzera shava of

“lewdness”—

“lewdness”

with regard to the punishment of burning.

The father of Rabbi Avin taught: Since we had not learned explicitly from the Torah that his daughter born of a woman whom he raped

is liable for burning,

the verse had to say

[Leviticus 21]

“And the daughter of a man who is a koen,”

rather than merely saying, “the daughter of a koen.”

That is, the intention of the verse in adding the word “man” is to teach that if the daughter of a man born of a woman whom he raped [that is, the daughter of a man who is not the daughter of his wife] commits fornication with her father, her punishment is burning.

The Gemara asks: If so, let us say:

If, with regard to the daughter of a koen,

a married woman who commits adultery with another man,

she alone is liable for burning, but the one who has intercourse with her is not liable for burning, so too with regard to his daughter born of a woman whom he raped,

who commits fornication with her father,

she alone is liable for burning, but the one who has intercourse with her

[her father]

is not liable for burning!?

He said,

Abaye said: The verse states

[there]

“She has profaned her father,”

one who profanes her father

is liable for burning, but the one who has intercourse with her is not liable for burning;

this one is excluded,

his daughter who commits fornication with her father,

as her father profanes her.

Rava said

to answer: For this reason, it is impossible to say that when a father has intercourse with his daughter, only she is burned and her father is not:

For

granted, there,

with regard to a married [or betrothed] daughter of a koen who commits adultery with another man,

you excluded him,

the one who had intercourse with her, from

the law of the daughter of a koen,

so that he is not liable for burning like her,

and established him according to the law

of one who has intercourse with a married woman

who is the daughter of an Israelite,

for which he is liable by strangulation, since one who has intercourse with a married daughter of a koen has also had intercourse with a married woman.

But

here,

with regard to a father who commits fornication with his daughter, where the basis of the punishment is their kinship, if we exclude the father from the burning imposed on the daughter and do not punish him because of the kinship as the daughter is punished,

according to whose law will you establish him?

According to what law of another man who has intercourse with her will we establish him? Will we establish him

according to the law of one who has intercourse with an unmarried woman!?

Will we treat him like one who has intercourse with an unmarried woman who is not his relative, and exempt him!?

Rather, it must necessarily be impossible to say that the law of one who has intercourse with his daughter differs from the law of his daughter, as the law of one who has intercourse with a married daughter of a koen differs from the law of the daughter of a koen.

The Gemara continues its discussion: Having heard the punishment for his daughter born of a woman whom he raped, it still remains to determine:

From where is the warning for his daughter born of a woman whom he raped?

Granted, according to Abaye,

who derives her law by means of a kal va-chomer,

and Rava,

who derives it by means of a gzera shava; if so,

from the place from which they derive the punishment, from there they also derive

the

warning.

But according to the father of Rabbi Avin,

who derives the punishment from the verse concerning the daughter of a koen,

what

is the source of the warning for his daughter born of a woman whom he raped!?

Rabbi Ilaa said: The verse states

[Leviticus 19]

“Do not profane your daughter by making her commit fornication.”

Its meaning is: Do not profane your daughter by committing fornication with her yourself.

Rabbi Yaakov, the brother of Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov, challenged this:

But is

this

verse,

“Do not profane your daughter by making her commit fornication,” really intended for this purpose?

But

this

verse

is needed for that which was taught in a beraita: “Do not profane your daughter by making her commit fornication.” Could the verse be speaking of a koen who marries his daughter to a Levite or an Israelite?

That is, that he profanes her by causing her to lose the right to eat teruma while she is married to him.

The verse therefore states: “By making her commit fornication”— -

the verse speaks of profanation through fornication,

that is,

one who gives his daughter

to intercourse for the sake of fornication

not for the purpose of marriage.

The Gemara answers:

If so, let the verse say, “Do not profane,”

what is the significance of “Do not profane”?

Conclude from it two matters.

The word “profane” indicates two forms of profanation.

The Gemara asks:

And Abaye and Rava, what do they make of this verse, “Do not profane your daughter by making her commit fornication”?

Rabbi Mani said: It refers to one who marries his daughter to an old man,

who is unsuitable for her, causing her to commit fornication while married to him.

As it was taught in a beraita: “Do not profane your daughter by making her commit fornication”—

Rabbi Eliezer says: This refers to one who marries his daughter to an old man.

Rabbi Akiva says: This refers to one who keeps his daughter unmarried after she has reached maturity,

and she therefore commits fornication because she has no husband.

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: There is no poor person in Israel

[as will be explained below]

except for an “unscrupulous schemer,” and one who keeps his daughter unmarried after she has reached maturity.—

The Gemara asks:

Is that so?

Is it true that

one who keeps his daughter unmarried after she has reached maturity is not an “unscrupulous schemer”?

But he too acts with cunning in his wickedness: He does not marry her to a man and causes her to commit fornication because he wants her to perform labor for him and serve him, so that he will not need to purchase a maidservant.