Sanhedrin 75a (עה.) — the Talmud in English

And if so

if a Noahide is obligated to submit himself to be killed

he should not have said to him:

He should not have said to him, “Go in peace.” And why did Elisha acknowledge him? This proves that a Noahide is not obligated to submit himself to death for the sanctification of the Name.

The Gemara rejects the proof: Since Naaman, who was “forced,” bowed in private, as there were no Israelites in the House of Rimmon, and the Israelites were commanded only to sanctify the Name among Israelites, but not among gentiles.

This is in private:

Naaman did this in private; therefore, he was not obligated to submit himself to death

and this is in public display:

Our question concerned public display—whether one is obligated to submit himself—and it cannot be resolved from Naaman, who bowed in private.

The Gemara returns to the law concerning a Jew.

We learned that one of the mitzvot for which one must submit himself to death is forbidden sexual relations. Concerning this, the Gemara relates an incident.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: There was an incident involving a certain man who directed his eyes toward a certain woman,

in order to have relations with her,

and

he became ill from his overwhelming love, until

his heart became feverish

his heart grew numb and withered—

And they came and asked the physicians, and the physicians said: There is no remedy for him

to cure him

until she has relations with him

And they came and asked the Sages.

The Sages said: Let him die! And let her not have relations with him!

The physicians said: At least,

let her stand naked before him!

The Sages said:

Let him die! And let her not stand naked before him!

The physicians said: At least,

let her converse

speak

with him,

while she stands

behind a fence

so that he will not see her!

The Sages said:

Let him die! And let her not converse with him from behind a fence!

Regarding the explanation of this incident,

two amoraim disagree

They are

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi and Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani—

One

of them

said:

The woman

was a married woman,

and therefore they prohibited her from doing so.

And the other

the second one

said: She was unmarried,

and nevertheless the Sages prohibited her from doing so. [As will be explained.]

And we clarify:

Granted, according to the one who said: She was a married woman—

it is well

It is understandable why the Sages prohibited her from doing so, because this involves forbidden sexual relations, which is not permitted even when taking a Jewish life is at stake.

But

it is difficult

according to the one who said: She was unmarried; why all this

Why were they so stringent?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: It was due to the disgrace of the family

The Sages were stringent because of the woman’s family, as her family would be embarrassed by this.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:

They were so stringent

so that the daughters of Israel would not become promiscuous with regard to forbidden sexual relations,

to engage in such disgraceful acts.

And we challenge the opinion that she was unmarried:

Then let him marry her

Let them give her to him permissibly, through marriage. There would be no concern for the daughters of Israel if it were stated that, in all such cases, under these special circumstances—in a situation of illness—they should give the women to the men in marriage and thereby save a Jewish life.

And we answer: It would not help, and he would not be cured, because

his mind would not be settled

His mind would not be settled, since this great desire is granted to transgressors, and he would be cured of his illness only if she did this in violation of the prohibition—

As

well

said

by

Rav Yitzhak—

As Rabbi Yitzhak said: From the day the Temple was destroyed

strength has waned because of the abundance of troubles, and a man no longer has the spirit to desire his wife who is permitted to him. Therefore,

the pleasure of intercourse was removed—

and given to transgressors

whom the evil inclination overwhelms and whose desire it intensifies,

as it is stated (

Proverbs 9):

“Stolen waters are sweet, and hidden bread is pleasing,”

meaning that bread is a euphemism for a woman, as it is stated concerning Potiphar (Genesis 39): “For nothing is withheld from me except the bread that he eats.” And when it is done “in secret,” it is pleasing.

We have completed the chapter of the Wayward and Rebellious Son

Introduction

The punishment of death by burning applies in two cases:

The first: a man who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter.

The second: a betrothed or married daughter of a kohein who commits adultery while married.

In the passage “After the Death,” the Torah states the prohibitions of forbidden relations, including the prohibition of “a woman and her daughter,” as the verse says [Leviticus 18:17]: "

The nakedness of a woman and her daughter -

you shall not uncover."

The verse adds and says: "

The daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter -

you shall not take to uncover her nakedness.

They are her blood relatives;

it is depravity."

The prohibition against uncovering the nakedness of “a woman and her daughter” means the prohibition against having intercourse with one’s wife’s daughter [even if she is not his own daughter], and it also includes the prohibition against having intercourse with one’s mother-in-law. For both “his wife’s daughter” and “his mother-in-law” are included in the definition of “a woman and her daughter.”

As for the punishment of burning for this transgression, the Torah states it later, in the passage “Holy Ones” [Leviticus 20]: "

And a man who takes a woman and her mother -

it is depravity!

They shall burn them in fire -

both him and them."

The punishment of burning is stated explicitly in the Torah only with regard to one’s mother-in-law. However, the Sages derived from it by means of a gzera shava that it also applies to one’s wife’s daughter, as well as to seven other forbidden relations prohibited on account of the kinship of “a woman and her daughter.”

Mishna:

And these are the ones subject to burning:

One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter.

The Gemara cites a dispute between Abaye and Rava as to which case the Mishna is discussing.

According to Rava, the text should read: “One who has intercourse with a woman whom he married’s daughter,” meaning one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law.

Abaye, however, understands the Mishna’s text as it stands. According to him, the Mishna is speaking of one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law’s mother [“a woman”], and also one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law [“her daughter”]. Regarding both of them, the verse explicitly states [“they shall burn him and them”] that one who has intercourse with either is subject to burning.

And

she too is subject to burning:

a daughter of a kohein who commits adultery.

The Mishna now returns to its first halakha, concerning the obligation of burning for one who has intercourse with “a woman and her daughter,” and explains it. According to the version in our Mishna, Abaye [in the Gemara] explains the Mishna’s statement as follows:

Included among

those subject to burning for the prohibition of intercourse with

“a woman and her daughter,”

namely, his mother-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law [who are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, and one who has intercourse with either is subject to burning], are additional women who are also included in the prohibition of “a woman and her daughter.” This is so even though the Torah does not explicitly state that their punishment is burning. They are:

a. One who has intercourse with

his daughter,

who is not his wife’s daughter, but rather the daughter of a woman whom he raped.

b.

And

likewise, one who has intercourse with

his daughter’s daughter, and

with

his son’s daughter,

that is, with his granddaughters born of a woman whom he raped.

c. Likewise, one who has intercourse with

his wife’s daughter,

whether she is his daughter, or whether she is a daughter whom his wife had from another man [i.e., his stepdaughter].

d.

And

likewise, one who has intercourse with

his wife’s daughter’s daughter, and

likewise one who has intercourse with

his wife’s son’s daughter.

e. Likewise, one who has intercourse with

his mother-in-law, and

likewise one who has intercourse with

his mother-in-law’s mother.

g.

And

likewise one who has intercourse with

his father-in-law’s mother.

The Gemara will explain this passage.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter.

The Gemara now infers from the language of the Mishna that when the tanna said “a woman and her daughter,” he necessarily meant two women, one who has intercourse with either of whom is liable to burning. These two women are “his mother-in-law’s mother” and “his mother-in-law.” Accordingly, the man’s wife is not included in the tanna’s expression “a woman and her daughter.”

This inference is based on three points:

First, on the fact that later in the Mishna the tanna says that all the other women mentioned in the Mishna are included in “a woman and her daughter.” This indicates that there is a “woman and her daughter” explicitly mentioned in the Torah as subject to burning, namely, his mother-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law, and that the other women mentioned are derived from them. Therefore, it is impossible to say that “a woman and her daughter” means his wife and his wife’s daughter, since the Torah does not explicitly state the obligation of burning with regard to his wife’s daughter. Necessarily, the tanna’s intention is his mother-in-law, with regard to whom burning is explicitly stated.

Second, because it is impossible to say that “a woman and her daughter” means his wife and his mother-in-law, for if so, the tanna should have said: “One who has intercourse with a woman and her mother.”

Third, because it is impossible to say that “a woman and her daughter” means one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law and his wife. For if so, the tanna should have said: “One who has intercourse with a woman whose daughter he married,” rather than “one who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter,” since he incurs no liability at all for intercourse with his wife [his mother-in-law’s daughter].

Rather, necessarily, this is what the tanna said: One who has intercourse with a “woman,” who is his mother-in-law’s mother, or one who has intercourse with “her daughter,” who is his mother-in-law, is liable to burning for each one individually. "

One who has intercourse with a woman whose daughter he married,"

that is, one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law,

it does not teach.

Rather,

this is what it teaches: "

One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter."

And

from

this language it is learned

that both are prohibited.

That is, the meaning of this language is that each of these two women is forbidden to him. It is not speaking of his mother-in-law, who is only one forbidden woman, but of two forbidden women, for intercourse with either of whom he is liable to burning.

And who are they,

who are the two forbidden women, each of whom is forbidden under “a woman and her daughter,” and with regard to whom the Torah explicitly states that one is liable to burning?

Necessarily, they are

his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother.

For it is only with regard to them that the verse explicitly states that one is liable to burning, whereas with regard to all the other women in the Mishna, the obligation of burning is not stated explicitly, but is derived from his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother.

And it teaches: “Included in a woman and her daughter,”

from them the law is derived for all the other women listed in the Mishna, that one is liable to burning for intercourse with them.

And

from

this you learn

that both,

these two women, his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother, are

explicitly written,

stated explicitly in the verse,

whereas

these,

the others,

the obligation of burning for them

comes through exposition,

being derived by means of a gzera shava.

The Gemara now discusses the matter:

This works well for Abaye, who says

below, with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva, that

“the difference between them is how to expound the verses,”

how to expound the verse “them,”

is the difference between them.

He maintains that everyone agrees that the punishment for his mother-in-law’s mother is burning; the difference is that Rabbi Akiva holds that his mother-in-law’s mother is explicitly mentioned in the verse [by the word “them”], whereas Rabbi Yishmael holds that she is not mentioned in the verse but is derived through an exposition [as will be explained below]. According to him, it can properly be said that

whose view is the Mishna,

according to whose method is our Mishna stated?

It is Rabbi Akiva’s.

But according to Rava, who says

below that everyone agrees that his mother-in-law’s mother is not explicitly mentioned in the Torah, and that the only

difference between them is the case of his mother-in-law after death,

that Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree only over whether the obligation of death by burning for intercourse with one’s mother-in-law continues even after the death of her daughter, the man’s wife, or whether, after the death of his wife, intercourse with his mother-in-law incurs no liability to death and she is henceforth prohibited to him only by an ordinary prohibition—if so, since everyone agrees that the obligation of burning for his mother-in-law’s mother is not explicit in the Torah,

the Mishna,

which indicates that the obligation of burning for his mother-in-law’s mother is explicit in the Torah—

whose view is it!?

According to whose method is it stated!?

Rava could have said to you:

Indeed, there is no such version, and therefore the Mishna must be amended as follows:

Teach: One who has intercourse with a woman whose daughter he married.

That is, one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law, since it is only with regard to her that the law of burning is stated explicitly.

The Gemara continues to discuss and explain:

We learned later in the Mishna that

“included in ‘a woman and her daughter’

are women with regard to whom the punishment of burning is not stated explicitly, but is derived by means of a gzera shava from “a woman and her daughter,” which are explicitly stated in the Torah, and these are

his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother."

This wording is difficult both according to Abaye and according to Rava.

According to Abaye, “a woman and her daughter” are his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother themselves, who are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, and it is impossible to say of them that they are “included in a woman and her daughter.”

And according to Rava, who amended the language of the Mishna and taught in it “one who has intercourse with a woman whose daughter he married” [that is, one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law], the difficulty is: How could the tanna say later in the Mishna that his mother-in-law is included among the women derived from “one who has intercourse with a woman whose daughter he married”?

The Gemara explains:

According to Abaye, since

incidentally

he needed to teach

since the tanna needed to teach

his father-in-law’s mother,

whose obligation of burning is not stated explicitly in the Torah,

he also taught

incidentally

his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother.

But

according to Rava,

one can answer that

since he needed to teach "

his father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother,"

who are not explicitly stated in the Torah,

he also taught

incidentally

his mother-in-law.

The Gemara now discusses the source of the obligation of burning for those women with regard to whom the Torah does not explicitly state that their punishment is burning:

From where are these matters derived?

As the Sages taught:

It is stated in the passage “Holy Ones” [Leviticus 20:14]:

“And a man who takes a woman and her mother

—it is depravity; they shall burn him and them in fire.”

I have only

the obligation of burning

for

one who has intercourse with

a woman and her mother.

One who has intercourse with

his wife’s daughter, his wife’s daughter’s daughter, or his wife’s son’s daughter—from where

do we know that he too is liable to burning?

It is stated here,

with regard to the punishment of burning for one’s mother-in-law,

“depravity.”

And it is stated there,

with regard to the warning against intercourse with one’s wife’s daughter: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter. You shall not take the daughter of her son or the daughter of her daughter to uncover her nakedness; they are her blood relatives

, depravity

it is.” Therefore, by means of the gzera shava of “depravity, depravity,” it is derived that all the prohibitions of kinship on account of one’s wife’s daughter are subject to burning, like one’s mother-in-law:

Just as there,

with regard to the warning against one’s wife’s daughter,

her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter

are stated in the verse,

so here,

with regard to the punishment of burning [derived through the gzera shava of “depravity, depravity”]—

her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter

are all subject to burning.

The beraita now states three obscure points, which the Gemara will explain:

a.

From where do we make males like females? -

It is stated here, “depravity,” and it is stated there, “depravity.” Just as there -

males are like females, so here -

males are like females.

b.

From where do we make the lower like the upper? -

It is stated here, “depravity,” and it is stated there, “depravity.” Just as there -

the lower is like the upper, so here -

the lower is like the upper.

c.

And just as here the upper is like the lower -

so there the upper is like the lower.

The Gemara now explains the three obscure statements made by the beraita:

a.

The Master said

in the beraita:

“From where do we make males like females?”

The Gemara asks:

What

is the explanation of

“males like females”?

If you say

that when the beraita says “males like females,” its intention is to say: From where do we derive the obligation of burning for

his son’s daughter

—the “males” of his wife—

like his daughter’s daughter

—the “females”—

it cannot be said so! For the obligations of burning for his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter

come together!

Both are derived at once, since both are included in the verse together with his wife’s daughter, concerning which “depravity” is stated, and the punishment is derived through the gzera shava of “depravity, depravity” from one’s mother-in-law.

Rather,

perhaps the tanna intends to say: From where is the source for the punishment of burning for

his father-in-law’s mother

—the “males”—

like his mother-in-law’s mother

—the “females”?

That too cannot be said! For

now,

the obligation of burning for

his mother-in-law’s mother has not yet been established,

as this law has not yet “arisen” for the tanna as an explicit law in the Torah. For the opening of his statement indicates that the verse “And a man who takes a woman and her mother” is understood according to its plain meaning, referring to one who takes a woman and then takes his wife’s mother [his mother-in-law], and we have no explicit source for his mother-in-law’s mother. If so, is it conceivable to say that

his father-in-law’s mother is being sought in addition to it!?

It is impossible that before the tanna knows the source for burning his mother-in-law’s mother, he should seek to know the source for burning his father-in-law’s mother like his mother-in-law’s mother!