Sanhedrin 75a — the Talmud in English

And if it is so

that a Noahide has an obligation to surrender himself to be killed

he should not have said to him

he should not have said to him: “Go in peace.” And why did he concede to him? It is proven that a Noahide has no obligation to surrender himself for the sanctification of the Name.

The Gemara rejects the proof: Since Naaman, the “coerced” one, bowed in private, because there were no Israelites in the house of Rimmon, and the Israelites, too, were commanded only to sanctify the Name among Israelites, and not among gentiles.

This is in private

Naaman did so in private; therefore he was not obligated to surrender himself to be killed

this is in public,

our question was about public display, whether he is obligated to surrender himself, and it is impossible to resolve it from Naaman, who bowed in private.

The Gemara returns to the law concerning an Israelite.

We learned that one of the mitzvot for which one is obligated to surrender his life is forbidden sexual relations. And concerning this the Gemara relates an incident.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: There was an incident involving a certain man who cast his eyes upon a certain woman,

to have intercourse with her

and

he became ill from the intensity of his love, until

his heart became inflamed

his heart became stupefied and withered—

And they came and asked the physicians, and the physicians said: There is no remedy for him

to be healed

until she has intercourse with him

And they came and asked the Sages.

The Sages said: Let him die! And let her not have intercourse with him!

The physicians said: At least

let her stand before him naked!

The Sages said:

Let him die! And let her not stand before him naked!

The physicians said: At least

let her speak

let her converse

with him,

and let her stand

behind the fence

so that he will not see her!

The Sages said:

Let him die! And let her not speak with him from behind the fence!

Concerning the explanation of this incident

they disagree

two amoraim, and they are

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi and Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani—

One

one of them

said:

the woman

was a married woman,

therefore they prohibited her from doing so.

And one

and the other

said: She was unmarried,

and nevertheless the Sages prohibited her from doing so. [As will be explained.]

And we clarify:

Granted, according to the one who says: She was a married woman—

well,

it is understood why the Sages prohibited her from doing so, because it is a prohibition of forbidden sexual relations, which was not permitted even in a case of taking an Israelite life.

But

it is difficult:

according to the one who says: She was unmarried, why all this

why were they so stringent?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: Because of the blemish to the family

the woman’s family—the Sages were stringent. For her family would be ashamed of this.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Ika, said:

therefore they were so stringent

so that the daughters of Israel would not become promiscuous with regard to forbidden sexual relations,

to do these disgraceful things.

And we challenge the one who says: She was unmarried:

Let him marry her

that they should give her to him permissibly, through marriage. And there would be no concern regarding the daughters of Israel, if we were to say with regard to all of them that in this special case—in a situation of illness—they should give them to them in marriage, and we would save an Israelite life.

And we answer: It would not help, and he would not be healed, because

his mind would not be settled

his mind would not be settled, for this great desire was given to transgressors, and he will be healed of his illness only if she does so in prohibition—

as

as

said

said

Rabbi Isaac—

For Rabbi Isaac said: From the day that the Temple was destroyed

strength weakened from the abundance of worries, and a man no longer has the spirit to desire his permitted wife; therefore

the pleasure of intercourse was removed—

and given to transgressors

for the evil inclination overpowers them and increases their desire,

as it is stated (

Proverbs 9):

“Stolen waters are sweet, and bread of secrecy is pleasant,”

that is, bread, which is a designation for a woman, as it is stated concerning Potiphar (Genesis 39): “Except for the bread that he eats.” And when it is done in “secrecy”—it is pleasant.

We have returned to you, chapter “The Wayward and Rebellious Son.”

Introduction

The punishment of death by burning applies in two matters:

The first: a man who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter.

And the second: a betrothed or married daughter of a koen who committed adultery while married.

In the section “After the Death,” the Torah stated the prohibitions of forbidden relations, including the prohibition of “a woman and her daughter,” and so the verse says [Leviticus 18:17]: "

The nakedness of a woman and her daughter —

you shall not uncover."

And the verse added and said: "

The daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter —

you shall not take to uncover her nakedness.

They are her kin,

it is depravity."

The prohibition of uncovering the nakedness of “a woman and her daughter” is the prohibition against having intercourse with one’s wife’s daughter [even if she is not his daughter], and it is also the prohibition against having intercourse with one’s mother-in-law. For “his wife’s daughter” and “his mother-in-law” are both included in the definition of “a woman and her daughter.”

But concerning the punishment of burning for this transgression, the Torah stated later, in the section “Holy” [Leviticus 20]: "

And a man who takes a woman and her mother —

it is depravity!

They shall burn in fire —

him and them."

The punishment of burning is stated explicitly in the Torah only concerning one’s mother-in-law; however, the Sages learned from it by a gzera shava also concerning one’s wife’s daughter, and likewise concerning seven additional forbidden relations prohibited because of the kinship of “a woman and her daughter.”

Mishna:

And these are those who are burned:

One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter.

The Gemara brings a dispute between Abaye and Rava concerning what the Mishna is discussing.

According to Rava, the Mishna should be read: “One who has intercourse with a woman whom he married whose daughter he then married,” meaning one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law.

But Abaye establishes the reading of the Mishna as it stands. According to him, the Mishna is speaking of one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law’s mother [“a woman”], and likewise one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law [“her daughter”], concerning both of whom the verse stated explicitly [“they shall burn him and them”] that one who has intercourse with either of them is subject to burning.

And

she too is subject to burning,

a daughter of a koen who committed adultery.

And now the Mishna returns to the first halakha, concerning liability to burning for one who has intercourse with “a woman and her daughter,” and explains it: according to the reading in our Mishna, Abaye [in the Gemara] explains the words of the Mishna as follows:

Included among

those who are burned for the prohibition of one who has intercourse with

“a woman and her daughter,”

that is, his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother [who are explicitly stated in the Torah, so that one who has intercourse with either of them is subject to burning], are also additional people who are included in the prohibition of “a woman and her daughter.” This is despite the fact that it was not stated explicitly in the Torah that their punishment is burning. And these are they:

a. One who has intercourse with

his daughter,

who is not from his wife, but is the daughter of his raped partner.

b.

And

likewise one who has intercourse with

his daughter’s daughter, and

with

his son’s daughter,

that is, one who has intercourse with his granddaughters who were born to him from his raped partner.

c. And likewise one who has intercourse with

his wife’s daughter,

whether she is his daughter, or whether she is a daughter whom his wife has from another man [who is his stepdaughter].

d.

And

likewise one who has intercourse with

her daughter’s daughter, and

likewise one who has intercourse with

her son’s daughter.

e. And likewise one who has intercourse with

his mother-in-law, and

likewise one who has intercourse with

his mother-in-law’s mother.

f.

And

likewise one who has intercourse with

his father-in-law’s mother. And the Gemara will explain this passage.

The Gemara will explain this passage.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter.

The Gemara now infers from the wording of the Mishna that necessarily, when the tannai said “a woman and her daughter,” he meant two women, one who has intercourse with each one of whom is liable to burning. These two women are “his mother-in-law’s mother” and “his mother-in-law.” Accordingly, the man’s wife is not included in the tannai’s wording “a woman and her daughter.”

And this inference is based on three matters:

The first is that later in the Mishna the tannai says that all the other women mentioned in the Mishna are included in “a woman and her daughter.” From this it follows that there is a “woman and her daughter” explicitly stated in the Torah as subject to burning, namely his mother-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law, and the other women mentioned are learned from them. Therefore it is impossible to say that “a woman and her daughter” means his wife and his wife’s daughter, for concerning his wife’s daughter liability to burning was not stated explicitly in the Torah. Necessarily, the tannai’s intention is his mother-in-law, concerning whom burning was stated explicitly.

The second is that it is impossible to say that “a woman and her daughter” means his wife and his mother-in-law, for if so, the tannai should have said: “One who has intercourse with a woman and her mother.”

And the third is that it is impossible to say that “a woman and her daughter” means one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law and his wife, for if so, the tannai should have said: “One who has intercourse with a woman whom he married whose daughter he then married,” and not “one who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter,” since for intercourse with his wife [the daughter of his mother-in-law] he is liable for nothing.

Rather, necessarily, the tannai said as follows: One who has intercourse with “a woman,” who is his mother-in-law’s mother, or one who has intercourse with “her daughter,” who is his mother-in-law, is liable to burning for each one of them. "

One who has intercourse with a woman whom he married whose daughter he then married,"

that is, one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law,

it does not teach.

Rather,

this is what it teaches: "

One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter."

And behold,

from

this wording one learns

that both are prohibited.

That is, the meaning of this wording says that each of these two women is prohibited to him. It is not speaking of his mother-in-law, who is only one prohibited woman, but of two prohibited women, for intercourse with each of whom he is liable to burning.

And who are they,

who are the two prohibited women, each one prohibited under “a woman and her daughter,” concerning whom it was stated explicitly in the Torah that one is liable to burning for them?

Necessarily, they are

his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother.

For only concerning them did the verse state explicitly that one is liable to burning for them, whereas concerning all the other women in the Mishna liability to burning was not stated explicitly, but is learned from his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother.

And it teaches: “Included in a woman and her daughter,”

from them the law is learned for all the other women taught in the Mishna, that one is liable to burning for them.

And

from

this you learn

that both,

these two women, his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother,

are written explicitly,

stated explicitly in the verse,

whereas

those

others,

the other women mentioned in the Mishna, liability to burning for them

comes by exposition,

is learned by a gzera shava.

And now the Gemara discusses:

This works for Abaye, who says

below, concerning the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva,

“the meaning of the expositions,”

how to expound the verse “them,”

is what they differ about.

For he holds that according to everyone, liability for his mother-in-law’s mother is burning, but Rabbi Akiva holds that his mother-in-law’s mother was stated explicitly in the verse [through the word “them”], whereas Rabbi Ishmael holds that she was not stated in the verse, but is learned by exposition [as will be explained below]. According to him, it can properly be said:

Whose method is the Mishna,

according to whose method is our Mishna stated? —

It is Rabbi Akiva’s.

But according to Rava, who says

below that according to everyone his mother-in-law’s mother was not stated explicitly in the Torah, and only the law of

his mother-in-law after death is what they differ about,

for Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagreed only over whether the liability of death by burning for one’s mother-in-law continues even after her daughter, his wife, has died, or whether after his wife’s death there is no liability of death for his mother-in-law, but from then on she is prohibited to him only by an ordinary prohibition — if so, according to everyone liability to burning for his mother-in-law’s mother is not explicit in the Torah,

the Mishna,

which indicates that liability to burning for his mother-in-law’s mother is explicit in the Torah —

whose method is it!?

According to whose method is it stated!?

Rava could say to you:

Indeed, there is no such method, and therefore the Mishna must be amended differently:

Teach: One who has intercourse with a woman whom he married whose daughter he then married.

That is, one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law, concerning whom alone the law of burning was stated explicitly.

And the Gemara continues to discuss and explain:

We learned later in the Mishna that

included in “a woman and her daughter,”

that is, there are women concerning whom the punishment of burning was not stated explicitly, but is learned by a gzera shava from “a woman and her daughter,” which are stated explicitly in the Torah, and these are

his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother.

And this wording is difficult both according to Abaye and according to Rava.

According to Abaye, “a woman and her daughter” are his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother themselves, who are explicit in the Torah, and it is impossible to say concerning them that they are “included in a woman and her daughter.”

And according to Rava, who amended the wording of the Mishna and taught in it “one who has intercourse with a woman whom he married whose daughter he then married” [that is, one who has intercourse with his mother-in-law], it is difficult: how could the tannai say later in the Mishna that his mother-in-law is included among the women learned from “one who has intercourse with a woman whom he married whose daughter he then married”?

And the Gemara explains:

According to Abaye, since

incidentally

he needed to teach

since the tannai needed to teach

his father-in-law’s mother,

whose liability to burning was not stated explicitly in the Torah,

he also taught

incidentally, also

his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother.

But

according to Rava

one can explain and say that

since he needed to teach “

his father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother”

which are not explicit in the Torah,

he also taught

incidentally, also

his mother-in-law.

And now the Gemara discusses the source for liability to burning for those women concerning whom it was not stated explicitly in the Torah that their punishment is burning:

From where are these matters?

For the Sages taught:

It is stated in the section “Holy” [Leviticus 20:14]:

“A man who takes a woman and her mother

it is depravity; they shall burn him and them in fire.”

I have only

liability to burning

for

one who has intercourse with

a woman and her mother.

One who has intercourse with

a woman’s daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter — from where

do we know that he too is liable to burning?

It is stated here,

in the punishment of burning for one’s mother-in-law,

“depravity.”

And it is stated there,

in the warning concerning one’s wife’s daughter, “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter. You shall not take her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter to uncover her nakedness; they are her kin,

depravity

is it.” Therefore, by the gzera shava of “depravity, depravity,” one learns that all the prohibitions of kinship because of one’s wife’s daughter have the status of burning, like one’s mother-in-law:

Just as there,

in the warning concerning one’s wife’s daughter,

her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter

were stated in the verse,

so here,

concerning the punishment of burning [learned by the gzera shava of “depravity, depravity”] —

her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter

are all subject to burning.

And now the beraita says three obscure matters, which the Gemara will explain:

a.

From where [do we know] to make males like females? —

It is stated here “depravity,” and it is stated there “depravity”; just as there —

males are like females, so here —

males are like females.

b.

From where [do we know] to make those below like those above? —

It is stated here “depravity,” and it is stated there “depravity”; just as there —

those below are like those above, so here —

those below are like those above.

c.

And just as here those above are like those below —

so there those above are like those below.

And now the Gemara explains the three obscure matters stated by the beraita:

a.

The master said

in the beraita:

From where [do we know] to make males like females?

And the Gemara asks:

What

is the explanation of

“males like females”?

If you say

that when the beraita says “males like females,” its intention is to say: from where do we derive liability to burning for

his son’s daughter

[the “males”] of his wife

like his daughter’s daughter

[the “females”],

it is impossible to say this! For the liabilities to burning for his son’s daughter and his daughter’s daughter

come together!

Both are learned together, from the fact that both are included in the verse together with his wife’s daughter, concerning which “depravity” is stated, and the punishment is learned by the gzera shava of “depravity, depravity” from his mother-in-law.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the tannai’s intention is to say: from where do we derive the source for the punishment of burning for

his father-in-law’s mother

[the “males”]

like his mother-in-law’s mother

[the “females”].

This too cannot be said! For

now,

at present, the liability to burning of

his mother-in-law’s mother has not yet become known to us,

this law has not yet “arisen” for the tannai as something explicit in the Torah, for it follows from the beginning of his words that the verse “And a man who takes a woman and her mother” speaks according to its plain meaning, of one who takes a woman and afterward takes his wife’s mother [his mother-in-law], and we have no explicit source for his mother-in-law’s mother. And if so, is it possible to say that

his father-in-law’s mother is being sought concerning it!?

For it is impossible that before the tannai knows the source for burning his mother-in-law’s mother, he should seek to know the source for burning his father-in-law’s mother like his mother-in-law’s mother!