Sanhedrin 74a (עד.) — the Talmud in English

3.

Rav Pappa said:

The Mishna is speaking

of one who was seduced

when the brother seduced his sister, and did not rape her; [and one who seduces also pays a fine] —

and

there is no need to establish the Mishna as the opinion of a single authority, Rabbi Yehuda; rather,

it is according to everyone,

as even the Sages agree that if the young woman does not care at all about the stigma, she cannot be saved by taking the pursuer’s life.

4.

Abaye said:

Actually, it is speaking of a rape, and it is speaking

of

a situation in which the rescuer

can save

the woman

by

cutting off

one of the pursuer’s limbs

of the rapist, thereby preventing him from carrying out his desire—for example, cutting off his leg so that he cannot run after her—

and if he can indeed do so, he is obligated to do it, and it is prohibited to kill him.

And therefore he pays a fine, since he is not liable to receive the death penalty.

And

the Mishna is

the teaching of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul,

who holds accordingly.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says: If a pursuer was pursuing another person in order to kill him

or a woman forbidden as a result of a sexual offense,

and

the rescuer—whether the pursued person or another man—

could save him

by cutting off

one of his limbs, but did not save him

by cutting off a limb, but instead killed him—

he is put to death for it

as a murderer, since he was not permitted to kill him .

The Gemara clarifies Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul’s reasoning through an exposition of the verses.

What is the reason of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul?

As it is written (

Exodus 21):

“And when men quarrel

with one another, intending to strike his fellow,

and they strike a pregnant woman

one of them struck a woman,

and her children emerge, and there is no calamity

to the woman—

he shall surely be punished

to pay the value of the miscarried offspring to the husband …

But if there is a calamity

to the woman,

‘then you shall give a life for a life.’”

And what is the meaning of “then you shall give a life for a life”?

Rabbi Elazar said: The verse is speaking of a case carrying a death penalty

in which he intended to kill his fellow deliberately, but killed the woman,

as it is written: “But if there is a calamity, then you shall give a life

of the murderer

for a life

of the woman.”

And

even though he was pursuing his fellow in order to kill him, and had rendered himself liable to death under the law of a pursuer—

even so, the Merciful One said: “And there shall be no calamity —

he shall surely be punished.”

And he pays the value of the miscarried offspring.

But why? After all, he is liable to both death and payment simultaneously.

Granted, if you say

that if one

can save the pursued by cutting off one of his limbs,

he cannot be saved by taking his life—

then you can find it

and it is therefore possible

that he will be punished

financially, because it is speaking

of a case where the rescuer can

save

the pursued

and that rescuer is the second man,

by

cutting off

one of the limbs

of the pursuer—

and since he is not liable to receive the death penalty, he pays the value of the offspring.

But if you say

that even if one

can save the pursued by cutting off one of his limbs,

he can nevertheless be saved by taking his life, and killing him, this is difficult—

and he may be killed, this is difficult—

How can you find it

How is it possible

that he will be punished

by payment for the offspring, when he is liable to receive the death penalty?

From here Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul derived that when one can save the pursued by cutting off one of his limbs, he cannot be saved by taking his life.

The Gemara rejects the proof.

Perhaps

he pays because

this case is different

its law is different, since

the death penalty is for this one

the pursued person

and the payment is for that one

the husband—

That is, even if we maintain that when one can save the pursued by cutting off one of his limbs, he can nevertheless be saved by taking his life, the rule of “he is liable for the greater penalty” does not apply here, since the two liabilities do not arise together: the death penalty and the payment are not owed to the same person. Therefore, he cannot be exempt from payment to the husband on the grounds that he is liable to receive the death penalty for an entirely different person.

The Gemara rejects this rejection.

It makes no difference

whether the liability for death and payment is owed to one person or whether the liability for death is owed to one person and the payment to another; in either case he is exempt from payment, as will be explained .

Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul’s proof therefore returns, and he pays the value of the offspring because he is not liable to receive the death penalty, since the rescuer could have saved the pursued by cutting off one of his limbs.

The Gemara supports what it said, “it makes no difference,” and that in any case he is exempt from payment.

As Rava said

Rabba:

If a pursuer was pursuing another person

to kill him,

and

during his pursuit

he broke vessels

that were in his path,

whether

the vessels were

those of the pursued person or those of another person—

he is exempt

even though the death penalty is owed to the pursued person while payment is owed to the owner of the vessels—

What is the reason?

Because

he has rendered himself liable with regard to his life;

his life has been made subject to execution, and he is exempt from payment.

Rava states a second law [and it is unrelated to the preceding discussion]:

And if the pursued person broke vessels

while fleeing from the pursuer [and escaped and was not killed]—

if the vessels were

the pursuer’s—

he is exempt

from paying for the vessels.

But if they were

those of any other person—

he is liable.

Rava’s reason is as follows: when the vessels are

the pursuer’s, he is

exempt,

because

his property should not be dearer to him than his body ,

that is, it is not reasonable that it is permitted to kill him and his body has been made subject to execution, while it is prohibited to damage his property.

But if the vessels are those of any other person and the pursued person broke them— \-

those of any other person

—

he is liable, for he is saving himself by means of another’s property,

that is, even if he broke them “in order to escape,” he would have been prohibited from doing so and would in any event have been liable to pay for them [as explained in tractate Bava Kamma]; all the more so if he broke them while fleeing.

Rava states a third law, namely—

If the rescuer—and Rava calls him

“a pursuer who was pursuing the pursuer” in order to save him—

broke vessels, whether

they were

those of the pursuer, those of the pursued, or those of any other person—

he is exempt.

And he is not exempt by law—

he is exempt .

Rather, he is exempt by rabbinic ordinance, because

if you do not say so—

and require him to pay—

you will have no person who saves his fellow from the hand of a pursuer,

as he will say: “What concern is this of mine? I will become liable to pay for the damage I cause while saving the pursued person.”

We learned in our Mishna:

But in the case of one who pursues an animal, one who desecrates Shabbat, or one who worships idolatry,—

they may not be saved by taking their lives.

This is the opinion of the tanna of our Mishna, whereas in a beraita the tannaim disagree concerning one who pursues the performance of idolatry and one who pursues the desecration of Shabbat.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: One who worships idolatry—

may be saved by taking his life—

and this is learned through the exposition of

kal va-chomer.

And just as

with regard to one who pursues a forbidden sexual act, which is

a defect affecting man, and this is its leniency—

its law is nevertheless so severe that

he may be saved by taking his life—

idolatry, which is more severe, since it is

a defect affecting the Most High,

as one denies God—should it

not all the more so

be treated stringently, so that he may be saved by taking his life?

And we raise an objection:

But may one impose a punishment on the basis of a kal va-chomer?!

By means of a kal va-chomer, one may derive laws, prohibitions, and obligations, but not punishments.

And we answer: Indeed,

he holds

that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai holds:

one may impose a punishment on the basis of a kal va-chomer!

And further,

it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: One who desecrates Shabbat may be saved by taking his life.

And the reason is:

he follows the opinion of his father,

his father Rabbi Shimon, who says that one who worships idolatry is saved by taking his life—

and it is derived

and learned that

Shabbat is analogous through

a gzera shava

of “desecration” and “desecration” from idolatry.

With regard to Shabbat it is stated (Exodus 31): “Those who desecrate it shall surely be put to death,” and with regard to idolatry it is stated (Leviticus 18): “And you shall not give any of your offspring to pass through to Molekh, and you shall not desecrate.” Just as in the case of idolatry he may be saved by taking his life, so too in the case of Shabbat he may be saved by taking his life.

The following discussion concerns the law of “sanctification of the Name.”

One who is coerced to violate one of God’s mitzvot—for example, gentiles coerce him, and if he does not violate it, they will kill him—

must he surrender his life to be killed rather than violate the mitzva, or should he violate it in order to preserve his life?

There are circumstances in this law in which one is obligated to be killed and circumstances in which he may violate the mitzva; there is also a distinction according to which mitzvot he was coerced to violate.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak:

There were differing opinions concerning this matter;

they were counted,

they took a vote,

and they concluded

the ruling

in the upper chamber of Beit Nitzah

the name of the person

in

the city of

Lod,

where they deliberated on this matter, and they decided:

With regard to

all the transgressions that are

written

in the Torah, if a person is told: “Transgress! And

then

do not be killed”—

he should indeed do so:

he should transgress and not be killed,

because the Torah says (Leviticus 18): “You shall observe My statutes and My laws, which a person shall perform and live by them; I am the Lord.” That is, the statutes and laws of the Torah were given for “and live by them”—and not that he should die by them.

Except for

these three transgressions:

idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and murder,

as will be explained below .

The Gemara explains and discusses the statement that with regard to idolatry one must be killed rather than transgress.

And we challenge this:

But with regard to idolatry, may he not

transgress?!

But was it not taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Yishmael said: From where

do we learn

that if a person is told: “Worship idolatry and do not be killed,” he should worship it and not be killed?

The verse states: “And live by them”—

“and not that he should die by them.”

If so,

could

I say:

even in

a situation in which this coercion took place

in public,

in the presence of many people, he should also worship idolatry?

The verse states (

there, 22):

“And you shall not profane My holy Name, and I shall be sanctified

among the Children of Israel.” And in public there is a desecration of God’s Name, since everyone learns from him to profane the sanctity of God; and the Torah says, “and I shall be sanctified”—surrender your life out of love for your Creator!

It follows that in the case of idolatry performed in private, he should transgress and not be killed?

And we answer: Rabbi Yishmael indeed holds this way, whereas the halakha was decided in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, who disagrees with him. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the distinction the Torah makes between public and private applies to the other mitzvot, but with regard to idolatry—even in private, he must be killed rather than transgress.

They

those Sages who took a vote and concluded the ruling in the upper chamber of Beit Nitzah in Lod

who said

their ruling

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

The Torah says (Deuteronomy 6):

“And you shall love the Lord y

our God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might.”

“And you shall love” means that you shall not exchange Him for an idol. And it must be explained:

If it says

“with all your soul,”

why does it say “with all your might,”

and if it says “with all your might,”

why does it say “with all your soul?”

If the Torah intends to say that one should love God as the thing most precious to him, let it state whichever of the two is more precious .

Rabbi Eliezer answers: The Torah spoke to all types of people:

If you have a person whose body is dearer to him than his property,

he must love God with his body—that is, surrender his life to be killed out of love for God

; therefore it says, “with all your soul”—

and if you have a person whose property is dearer to him than his body ,

he must love God with all his property—that is, surrender his property in order to refrain from idolatry ,

and therefore it says: “with all your might,”

which is the thing most “mighty”—most precious—to him.

And according to Rabbi Eliezer, one is obligated to surrender his life rather than engage in idolatry; therefore, these Sages held in accordance with him.

We have thus learned that, in the case of idolatry, one must be killed rather than transgress—

And from where do we learn the same law regarding

forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed

that one must be killed rather than transgress?

As

the

Rabbi

taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi says:

The Torah says in the passage concerning the rape of a betrothed maiden (Deuteronomy 24): “But to the maiden you shall do nothing; the maiden has no sin worthy of death,

for just as a man rises against his fellow and murders him—

so is this matter.”

And this is difficult:

What, then, have we learned from a murderer?

Why did the Torah offer the “parable” of a murderer? It is obvious that the maiden is exempt, since she was coerced. [This was explained above (73a).]

And the explanation is:

Behold,

the law of a murderer

comes to teach

about the betrothed maiden,

and it is consequently learned

from her as well.

The Torah juxtaposes

and compares

a murderer to a betrothed maiden

in order to teach us:

Just as a betrothed maiden may be saved at the cost of the pursuer’s life—

so too, a murderer may be saved at the cost of his life. [This exposition is brought here incidentally and was explained above.]

And

further,

it juxtaposes a betrothed maiden with a murderer

in order to teach us:

Just as a murderer

if a gentile says to him: “Murder! Take a life! And if not, I will kill you!”—his ruling is that he must

be killed rather than transgress—

so too, a betrothed maiden

and likewise any woman involved in a forbidden sexual relationship, if a gentile says to her: “Submit to a man to whom you are forbidden by a prohibition of forbidden relations, and if not, they will kill you”—her ruling is that she must

be killed rather than transgress.

And for this law the Torah juxtaposed the betrothed maiden with a murderer.

And the Gemara clarifies:

The murderer himself,

from whom we learned the law of the betrothed maiden,

from where do we derive it?

From where do we know that his ruling is that he must be killed rather than transgress?

It is a matter of logic:

One may not set aside another person’s life for his own, for if he kills his fellow, there are two wrongs here: the loss of his fellow’s life and the murderer’s violation of the prohibition against murder. But if the gentile kills him, although a life is lost, there is no violation by a Jew of the prohibition against murder.

For even if the Torah said, “And you shall live through them,” and not die through them, that applies only when, if he transgresses, no Jewish life will actually be lost. But if a Jewish life will be lost either way, why should he transgress the prohibition against murder?

And who knows whose life is more precious in the eyes of his Creator, may His Name be blessed? Who says that his life is more precious? Therefore, the Torah’s command, “You shall not murder,” may not be set aside, and he must be killed rather than transgress!

And the Gemara relates an incident in which this logic was expressed.

There was

an incident involving a certain man,

who came

and came

before

and said to him:

Rabba, and said to him

to Rabba:

“The master of my town said to me,

the gentile ruler of the city in which I reside: “

Go

and

kill so-and-so

kill a certain person

! And if not,

if you do not do so,

I will kill you

I will kill you.” And he asked Rabba what he should do.

He said to him

Rabba:

Let yourself be killed

allow him to kill you,

but do not kill

and you must not kill! For—

What did you see

why does it appear to you

that your blood is redder

that your blood is redder,

perhaps

it may be that

the blood of that man

the blood of the man whom the ruler of the city commanded you to kill—

is redder

is redder?

In other words, Rabba answered rhetorically: Is killing you a greater wrong than killing him? Do you know that your blood is more precious and dear before the Holy One, blessed be He, your Creator, than the blood of your fellows?!

And this is the logic that requires one to surrender his life in the case of bloodshed, and from it we learn the law of the betrothed maiden.

The Gemara continues to explain the conditions under which they said that one should transgress rather than be killed.

When

he arrived,

Rabbi Dimi

from Eretz Yisrael,

he said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: They taught

that in the case of other transgressions one should transgress rather than be killed,

only when it is not during

a time of persecution

the royal decree; but

if the gentile coerces him

during a time of the royal decree

to transgress

even

a

a minor mitzva [And below it will be explained what constitutes a minor mitzva]—

he must be killed rather than transgress!

So that the gentiles will not train themselves to harden the hearts of the Jewish people.

When Ravin arrived, he said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Even when it is not a time of a royal decree, they did not say

that in the case of other transgressions one should transgress rather than be killed,

except

when the gentile coerces him to transgress

in private; but

if he is

in public ,

even

if he coerces him to transgress

a minor mitzva—

he must be killed rather than transgress!

And we clarify:

What is a minor mitzva?