Sanhedrin 73b (עג:) — the Talmud in English

Because this

boy

is not accustomed to it, whereas

the girl

is disgraced by it -

But as for the other forbidden sexual relations, which are customary

to engage in

and their disgrace is not so great

their disgrace is not as great as the disgrace of “the betrothed maiden.”

As for the other forbidden sexual relations, although it is clear that they involve disgrace, the disgrace is not as great. For if they are unmarried women [not betrothed] who are virgins, or even married women who have already had intercourse, their disgrace is not comparable to that of a betrothed maiden, who is cherished and attractive in the eyes of her betrothed [“the groom”], and now that she has been disgraced, she becomes repulsive to him.

We might say

we would say

they were not

given over to be saved at the cost of their pursuer’s life -

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote: “sin”

to include even the other forbidden sexual relations, for which one may save the person being pursued at the cost of the pursuer’s life.

And

likewise,

if the Merciful One had written “sin” -

I would have thought

we would say that every case of “sin” includes even

those liable for lashes

for forbidden sexual relations, where there is no death by a court, such as a widow with a High Priest, or a divorcee or a woman released by halitza with an ordinary priest -

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote: “death”

to teach us to “exclude” those liable for lashes, who were not given over to be saved at the cost of their pursuer’s life.

And

likewise,

if the Merciful One had written “death” -

I would have thought

we would say that only those involving “death,” namely,

those liable for death by a court -

yes,

indeed, one may save them at the cost of their pursuer’s life, whereas

those liable for karet

who do not involve “death”—which means death by a court—were not given over to be saved at the cost of their pursuer’s life. Therefore

the Merciful One wrote “sin”

to “include” even those liable for karet, who were given over to be saved at the cost of their pursuer’s life.

We have thus expounded the entire apparently superfluous verse and learned all the laws of our Mishna concerning those whom one may save at the cost of their pursuer’s life.

And we challenge: There are still superfluous words in this verse. For -

let the Merciful One write

it would have sufficed for the Torah to write only

“sin death” [“

there is no sin involving death”],

and it need not

and there would be no need to write

“boy, girl.”

For both are liable to stoning, and they are included by what the Torah wrote,

“sin death”?

And we answer:

That is indeed so,

indeed, there is no need to expound them -

But then,

why did the Torah write

“boy, girl” -

One

of the two expressions serves as a derivation and comes

to exclude one who worships idolatry,

although it is a more severe transgression than the forbidden sexual relations, nevertheless one may not save him at the cost of his pursuer’s life.

And one

the second derivation comes

to exclude

one who pursues

an animal,

although his transgression resembles the forbidden sexual relations,

and

one who pursues someone to desecrate

Shabbat .

It is explained below that Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai disagrees with our Mishna and maintains that one who pursues someone to worship idolatry may be saved at the cost of his life. But regarding one who pursues someone to desecrate Shabbat, he agrees that one may not save the pursued person at the cost of the pursuer’s life.

Whereas Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, maintains that even one who pursues someone to desecrate Shabbat may be saved at the cost of his life.

Therefore we challenge:

But

according to the words of

Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai, who said: One who worships idolatry may be saved at the cost of his life,

and it was not excluded, so no derivation was needed to exclude it, this is difficult -

Why do I need

why did the Torah write “boy, girl”?

And we answer: According to Rabbi Shimon,

one,

one derivation comes

to exclude an animal,

as stated above, although its transgression resembles the forbidden sexual relations -

and one

the second derivation comes

to exclude Shabbat -

And why was it necessary to exclude it?

It might enter your mind -

it might occur to you

to say

that

we should derive

the desecration of

Shabbat from

the gezeira shava

“desecration, desecration,” from idolatry,

as Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, indeed expounds in this manner at the end of the sugya, as will be explained there; and since according to Rabbi Shimon one who pursues someone to worship idolatry may be saved at the cost of his life, we would derive that the same applies to one who pursues someone to desecrate Shabbat] -

Therefore the second derivation comes to “exclude” desecration of Shabbat, and one may not save the pursued person at the cost of the pursuer’s life.

And we challenge:

But

according to the words of

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who said:

even

one who desecrates Shabbat may be saved at the cost of his life -

Because

it is derived

we derive

Shabbat from

the gezeira shava

“desecration, desecration,” from idolatry -

what is there to say

what can be answered? Why are two derivations necessary?

And we answer: According to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

one exclusion

one derivation comes

to exclude an animal,

as stated above -

And the other

the second was not written for the purpose of a derivation and in order to “exclude” -

Rather,

since

because

the Merciful One wrote “boy

” to teach us that even one who pursues a male, although it is inapplicable to say that he is disgraced, may be saved at the cost of his pursuer’s life , therefore

He also wrote “girl.” That is, what we read as “girl” is not for the purpose of a derivation; rather, “boy” was written to include the male, while we read “girl” in its plain sense, because the passage is speaking of a betrothed maiden.

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even in the case of a woman who says, “Leave him alone,” so that he will not kill her

one may not save her at the cost of the pursuer’s life].

It follows that the first tanna maintains that one may save her at the cost of the pursuer’s life.

And the Gemara clarifies:

With regard to what do they disagree?

What rationale is the basis of their dispute?

Now, if the woman does not care at all about her disgrace, the Sages certainly do not disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, and agree that one may not save her at the cost of the pursuer’s life, since there is no disgrace here, only a transgressive act. And it has already been explained that the Torah was concerned with her disgrace and not with the transgressive act, for even in the case of idolatry and desecration of Shabbat, which are more severe transgressions, one may not save the pursued person at the cost of the pursuer’s life.

It certainly concerns a woman who cares about her disgrace, but because she fears that he may kill her, she says: “Leave him alone.”

Rava said:

They disagree

with regard to a woman who cares about her disgrace but lets him proceed,

that is, she says to leave him alone so

that he will not kill her -

The Rabbis hold that the Merciful One was concerned about disgrace,

about her disgrace,

and behold, she cares about her disgrace,

as explained;

therefore, the Merciful One was concerned about her disgrace,

and they maintain that one may save her honor by killing the pursuer -

whereas Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees and maintains that the reason the Torah said to kill one who pursues a person for forbidden sexual relations is not that the Torah was concerned about her disgrace, but rather -

The reason the Merciful One said, “Kill him”

kill the pursuer

is because she has surrendered herself to be killed

there are modest women who surrender themselves to be killed—so that he should kill them rather than have intercourse with them. Therefore the Torah said: Kill the assailant and save the woman from “death.” -

But

this

woman, who says, “Leave him alone” so that he may carry out the transgression -

has not surrendered herself to be killed, and because of

her coercion she is prepared to submit to him and is not in mortal danger. Therefore the Torah did not say to save her by killing him .

Rav Pappa said to Abaye:

According to the Sages, who maintain that the reason the Torah said to kill the pursuer is the woman’s disgrace, this is difficult -

A widow with a High Priest -

is she not also disgraced by it?

Why, then, did the Torah exclude such cases and say that one may not save her at the cost of the pursuer’s life? She is disgraced through forbidden intercourse.

He said to him

Abaye said to Rav Pappa:

With regard to substantial disgrace,

such as the forbidden sexual relations involving the severe transgressions for which one is liable to karet or death by a court, where the woman’s disgrace is great and she becomes a prostitute if she has intercourse, and if she bears a child from this intercourse, the child is a mamzer,

the Merciful One was concerned -

But

with regard to lesser disgrace,

a lesser disgrace than that, such as a widow with a High Priest, where she does not become a prostitute, but only a halala, and the child is not a mamzer, with regard to this -

the Merciful One was not concerned .

We learned in the beraita above:

“Sin”—these are those liable for karet,

for whom one may save the pursued person at the cost of the pursuer’s life.

And we raise a contradiction:

This beraita is contradicted by the words of the Mishna in tractate Ketubot, concerning the law of “one who rapes a virgin.”

The Torah says (Deuteronomy 22): “If a man finds a maiden, a virgin who is not betrothed, and he seizes her and lies with her,

the man who lies with her shall give the maiden’s father fifty silver coins, and she shall be his wife, because he violated her; he may not send her away all his days.”

That is, if she is a virgin—a single woman—and is not a married woman, and he is not liable for death by a court, he incurs two punishments: he must pay a “fine,” and he must marry her without divorcing her.

And the Sages expounded that the fine [fifty silver coins to her father] is not contingent upon the obligation to marry her. Even where it is forbidden for him to marry her, such as one who rapes his sister, he nevertheless pays a fine.

And likewise we learned:

And these are the maidens who have a fine: One who has intercourse with his sister.

That Mishna maintains that the principle “he is subject to the greater penalty” does not apply, meaning that where there is liability for death, one is exempt from monetary payments, except where there is actual death at the hands of a person—death by a court. But one who has intercourse with his sister, where there is no death by a court, only karet, which is at the hands of Heaven, is liable for monetary payments.

Now this is difficult: If those liable for karet were given over to be saved at the cost of their pursuer’s life, then one who has intercourse with his sister may be put to death by anyone. If so, why does he pay a fine, and why is he not exempt under the principle “he is subject to the greater penalty”? [

And although he was not killed and is now before us, nevertheless, since he was “liable” for death, he is also exempt from monetary payments, as explained above (73a) with regard to one who enters through a tunnel.

The Gemara offers several answers.

The Rabbis stated

the following answer

before

before

Rav Hisda:

In the case of one who has intercourse with his sister, the death—for which he is “liable” to anyone who sees him—and the monetary payment do not arise simultaneously, at one moment. The liability for death applies only at the beginning of intercourse, at the stage of initial penetration, when she is partially disgraced; from that point onward, one may not save her at the cost of the pursuer’s life in order to prevent completion of the intercourse. The liability for the fine, by contrast, applies at the completion of intercourse, when her virginity is ruptured, for which the Torah imposed the fine . [See Rashi for the definition of completion of intercourse.]

And since the two liabilities do not arise simultaneously, and the liability for the fine concerns acts he performed after he was no longer liable for death to everyone, he pays a fine.

From the moment of initial penetration, when she is disgraced -

he is exempt from death,

whereas

he does not pay the money until completion of intercourse.

And we challenge:

This works

this answer is satisfactory

according

to

the one who says: Initial penetration,

which the Torah calls “intercourse” with regard to all forbidden sexual relations [except a betrothed maidservant] -

is a mere contact,

and this is the intercourse that the Torah prohibited and for which it imposes karet, and it is the intercourse that disgraces her. Since it is the beginning of intercourse and the rupture of the hymen has not yet occurred, the matter is properly resolved -

But according

to

the one who says: Initial penetration,

which the Torah calls “intercourse,”

is insertion of the crown; what

can be said,

the matter is not properly resolved, for if so, both the “intercourse” that disgraces her and obligates anyone to kill him, and the rupture of the hymen occur simultaneously .

And the question returns: Why is he liable for a fine? At the time of the act, he is liable for death to everyone.

The Gemara offers four possible settings to establish the Mishna’s statement, “One who has intercourse with his sister has a fine,” so that the question of “he is subject to the greater penalty” will not arise.

In all four settings, the Mishna speaks of a case in which he is not liable for death to everyone, and one may not save her at the cost of his life.

The resolution is that the Mishna says that he is liable for a “fine” only in these circumstances, since they do not involve death.

a.

Rather, Rav Hisda said:

The Mishna is speaking, for example,

when

he had already

had intercourse with her

the brother, or another man

in an unusual manner [

not in that place], and she had already been disgraced,

and he again had intercourse with her

the brother

in the usual manner.

For this second intercourse he pays a fine, since he is not liable to death for it, as she had already been disgraced .

That is, if he performed two acts of intercourse and both were in the usual manner, he does not pay a fine for the second, since she was no longer a virgin from the time of the first intercourse. But since the first was in an unusual manner and she was still a virgin, he pays a fine for the second, which was in the usual manner.

b.

Rava said:

The Mishna is speaking

of a woman who lets him proceed,

saying, “Leave him alone,” out of fear

that he will not kill her, and

the Mishna of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who maintains that when she says this, one may not save her at the cost of the pursuer’s life. Since he is not liable for death to everyone, he pays a fine.