Sanhedrin 73a — the Talmud in English

After we learned the law of “one who comes by tunneling,” that it is permitted for every person to kill the pursuer who seeks to kill, in order to save the pursued, the Mishna comes to teach us that there are additional transgressions whose law is that whoever comes to commit them may be killed by every person, and this is learned from the verses of the Torah.

Mishna:

And these are the ones whom they save

the perpetrators of the transgression

at the cost of their lives

by taking their lives; that is, it is permitted for every person to kill them in order to save them from the transgression:

One who pursues his fellow to kill him,

as we learned in the preceding Mishna.

And

the one who pursues

a male.

And

the one who pursues

a betrothed young woman

in order to violate her; and the same law applies to the other forbidden sexual relations, as will be explained in the Gemara.

But one who pursues an animal

in order to mate with it,

and one who desecrates

who wishes to desecrate

Shabbat

and one who serves

who wishes to serve

idolatry—

they are not saved at the cost of their lives.

Rather, they are brought before the court, and they punish them.

The tannai mentioned idolatry, which is a severe transgression, and likewise the desecration of Shabbat, which is like serving idolatry, to teach us that even in a severe transgression that is among the foundations of the faith, they may not be saved at the cost of their lives [indeed, there are tannaim who hold that idolatry and Shabbat are subject to saving at the cost of their lives]—and all the more so in the other transgressions, those punishable by karet and those punishable by death at the hands of the court.

And what was permitted—to save them at the cost of their lives—when a person wishes to commit a transgression applies only to the prohibitions of forbidden sexual relations.

And not to all forbidden sexual relations, but only to those in which there is “defilement” and disgrace for the pursued; but one who pursues an animal in order to mate with it—although its prohibition resembles the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations—may not be saved at the cost of his life, since “defilement” and disgrace are not applicable to an animal.

Gemara:

The Gemara brings a beraita that derives the law of the Mishna from the verses of the Torah.

The Sages taught: From where

do we learn

the

law of

one who pursues his fellow to kill him, that he may be saved at the cost of his life?

The verse states

the Torah said (Leviticus 19):

“Do not stand by the blood of your fellow,”

and we expound: Do not stand by while his blood is being spilled; rather, do everything within your ability, even by killing the pursuer.

And we raise an objection:

And

is it so that

this

verse

comes for this purpose

to teach us this exposition?!

But

this

verse

is needed

to be expounded

for

another exposition—

as

in

as it was taught:

as we learned in another beraita:

From where

do we learn

that one who

sees

his fellow

drowning in a river, or an animal dragging him

to kill him,

or bandits coming upon him—

that he is obligated to save him?

The verse states: “Do not stand by the blood of your fellow”

Do not stand by! Rather, save him!

If so, from where do we learn that it is permitted to save him by killing the pursuer?

And we answer:

Indeed it is so,

the verse “Do not stand by the blood of your fellow” indeed comes to teach us merely the obligation to save—

But rather

there still needs to be clarification—

the law of

“he may be saved at the cost of his life”—

from where

is it derived?

From this exposition:

It is derived

by learning

from

the exposition of

“kal va-chomer,” from

the law of

the betrothed young woman

who may be saved at the cost of her life [as will be explained below]—

And what

is the law of

the betrothed young woman,

which is lenient, and in what is its leniency?

That he did not come

to kill her,

but rather

he came

to defile her

to shame and disgrace her,

the Torah said: She may be saved at the cost of his life—

One who pursues his fellow,

whose case is more severe, in that he comes

to kill him, all the more so

that he may be saved at the cost of his life.

Now, this exposition of kal va-chomer, although it is reasonable, has a deficiency because of the principle “we do not impose punishments on the basis of an inference.” That is, kal va-chomer can teach the law, or part of the components of the law, but it does not have the power to bring about punishment. And in our matter, they wished to make him liable to death on the basis of the exposition of kal va-chomer.

Therefore the Gemara asks:

But do we impose punishments on the basis of an inference?!

And we answer: Indeed, it is not an exposition of kal va-chomer, but rather—

In the house of

the academy of

Rabbi, teach: It is an analogy.

The law of a murderer is learned from the betrothed young woman through an “analogy,” meaning that the Torah compared them to one another; therefore, it is as though it were explicit in the verse, and it may consequently also be derived with regard to punishment.

And what is the analogy?

The Torah said (Deuteronomy 22): “If there be a virgin young woman betrothed to a man, and a man finds her… But if the man finds the betrothed young woman in the field, and the man seizes her and lies with her—the man who lay with her shall die alone.

But to the young woman you shall do nothing; there is no sin of death upon the young woman, for just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.

For he found her in the field; the betrothed young woman cried out, and there was no savior for her.”

And it is difficult Why did the Torah need to bring an “analogy”: “Just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter”? Did the Torah not explain well that she is exempt because she was coerced? [An “analogy” is brought for something that is not so readily understood; the analogy brings it closer to comprehension, whereas in the case of the betrothed young woman the matter is readily understood in its plain sense.]

Therefore the Sages expounded that the Torah came to compare them—“to equate them”—so that they might be learned from one another, and each might be learned regarding the other. That is, from the law of a murderer the law concerning the laws of the betrothed young woman is learned [as will be explained on the following page, the law of “he must be killed rather than transgress”].

And from what the Torah wrote: “Just as” he “rises,” “so” is this matter, the Torah came to equate them completely, so that we may also learn from the betrothed young woman regarding the law of a murderer.

This method of exposition is called: “This comes to teach, and is found to have been learned.” That is, the murderer, who came to teach about the betrothed young woman, is found to have learned from her the law of “he may be saved at the cost of his life.”

And likewise we learned: The Torah said:

“For just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him”—and what have we learned from a murderer from now on?

This comes to teach, and is found to have been learned: It compares a murderer to the betrothed young woman. Just as the betrothed young woman may be saved at the cost of his life

as will be explained—

so too a murderer may be saved at the cost of his life.

And the Gemara clarifies:

And the betrothed young woman herself,

the very law that she may be saved at the cost of his life, [from which the law of a murderer is learned]—

from where?

As

in

that which was taught in the academy of

the academy of

Rabbi Ishmael—

that which was taught in the academy of Rabbi Ishmael:

The Torah said: “The young woman cried out

and there was no savior for her”—

this implies that

if there is a savior,

he must save her, and the Torah did not limit by what means he should save her. It follows that there is no limit to the matter, and

by anything that can save her,

even by killing him.

It follows that the betrothed young woman may be saved at the cost of his life, and from her the law of a murderer is learned.

Before the Gemara continues to explain the Mishna and to expound the verses from which the law of a pursuer is learned, it clarifies the beraita that we learned concerning the law of “Do not stand by the blood of your fellow.”

The matter itself

we learned in the body of the discussion:

From where is it derived regarding one who sees his fellow drowning in a river, or an animal dragging him, or bandits coming upon him, that he is obligated to save him? The verse states: “Do not stand by the blood of your fellow.”

And we raise an objection:

And

is it that

this

law

is derived from here,

learned from this verse? But

it is derived from there,

we learned it from another verse?

We learned in a beraita:

The loss of his person,

such as one who has drowned in a river,

from where

is it derived that you are commanded to restore him, just as you are obligated to return his lost property to him?

The verse states

in the section concerning the returning of lost property (there): “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep straying and ignore them; you shall surely return them to your brother. And if your brother is not near you and you do not know him, then you shall gather it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother seeks it, and you shall return it to him.”

The words

“and you shall return it to him”

which are superfluous come for an exposition: Return his body to himself.

And if so, it is difficult: Why did the Torah need to say, “Do not stand by the blood of your fellow”?

And we answer:

If from there,

if only “and you shall return it to him” had been stated,

one might have thought

we would say,

these matters

that he is obligated to return his life to him apply only

with his person [

in Rashi:

with his life]

he himself, the one who sees him, if he has the ability, is obligated to save him,

but exerting oneself

if he must trouble himself,

and hiring workers

or if he must hire rescuers with his money,

let it be said

we would say:

not

obligated—

It comes to teach us

the Torah comes to teach us: “Do not stand by the blood of your fellow”—do not stand by, but pursue every possibility within your ability; exert yourself! And hire rescuers! So that the blood of your fellow should not be lost.

The Gemara returns to expound the laws of the Mishna from the verses.

The Sages taught: One

whether

one who pursues his fellow to kill him, or one who pursues a male, or one who pursues a betrothed young woman, or one who pursues

forbidden sexual relations that are

liable to death at the hands of the court, or one who pursues

forbidden sexual relations that are

liable to karet—

they are saved at the cost of their lives.

But

a widow to a High Priest,

a High Priest who pursues a widow in order to violate her, and likewise

a divorced woman or a woman released by halitza to an ordinary priest,

although they are forbidden sexual relations and there is defilement in this transgression, for the woman becomes a “chalala”—

they are not saved at the cost of their lives,

since they are not liable to death at the hands of the court or karet, but only to a negative commandment.

When do these words apply, that they are saved at the cost of their lives? If through the killing they will save the woman so that she will not be defiled. But if

the transgression has already been committed against her

and she has already been defiled—

they do not save her at the cost of his life.

If

there is a savior for her

by some other means without killing, such as restraining him or wounding him—

they do not save her at the cost of his life,

for the Torah did not command specifically to kill, but to save her by every possible means, and certainly it is preferable to do so without killing.

Rabbi Judah says: Even

the woman

who says

to those saving her:

“Leave him”

and do not pursue him,” and she does not say this willingly, but is coerced to say so out of fear

that he will kill her

the pursuer, before they reach him—they do not save her at the cost of his life. [And its reason will be explained in the Gemara.]

And we clarify:

From where [are] these words [derived],

from where do we derive these matters?

The verse says (

there):

"And to the maiden you shall do nothing; there is no sin of death for the maiden."

For "there is no one to save her," and it follows: if there is someone to save her, in whatever way he can save her, they are obligated to save her.

Now, it has already been stated: "And to the maiden you shall do nothing"; why did the Torah write: "There is no sin of death for the maiden"? These words are superfluous for exposition.

And there is likewise here an exposition of "Scripture and received reading," for in the Torah it is written "boy," but we read "maiden."

And we expound:

"Boy" —

this is a male.

"Maiden" —

this is a betrothed maiden.

"Sin" —

these are those liable to excision.

"Death" —

these are

those liable to death by the court.

And the Torah comes to include all these, and to teach us that they may be saved at the cost of the pursuer's life.

And seemingly, why was it necessary to include all these? For the Torah could have written this with regard to one of them, and we would have learned the rest from it?

And we answer:

They are necessary;

the Torah needed to write all these, because it is impossible to learn them from one another —

for if the Merciful One had written

only

"boy",

we would have said: the Torah was particular only with regard to a boy,

because it is not his way,

for it is not his way to be penetrated, and there is thereby great shame and disgrace; therefore, they save him at the cost of the pursuer's life —

but a maiden, whose way it is,

it being her way, and the way of all the world, to be penetrated —

we might say

that

not

one may save her at the cost of the pursuer's life. Therefore, the Torah wrote: "maiden," to make known to us that even a maiden is saved at the cost of the pursuer's life.

And

on the other hand —

if the Merciful One had written "maiden"

and not boy, we would have said: the Torah was particular only with regard to a maiden,

because he causes her a blemish,

for the one who has intercourse with her damages her virginity and disgraces her in relation to her husband —

but a boy, whom he does not cause a blemish,

to whom "blemish" does not apply —

we might say,

we would say,

not

one may save him at the cost of the pursuer's life. Therefore, the Torah wrote: "boy," to make known to us that even a boy is saved at the cost of the pursuer's life.

And

likewise.

If the Merciful One had written

only

these

boy and maiden,