Sanhedrin 73a (עג.) — the Talmud in English

After we learned the law of “one who enters through a breach,” that everyone is permitted to kill the pursuer who seeks to kill, in order to save the pursued person, the Mishna comes to teach us that there are additional transgressions whose law is that anyone who seeks to commit them may be killed, as derived from verses of the Torah.

Mishna:

And these are the ones whom they save

the perpetrators of the transgression

by taking their lives

by taking their lives; that is, everyone is permitted to kill them in order to save them from committing the transgression:

One who pursues another to kill him,

as we learned in the previous Mishna.

And

one who pursues

a male.

And

one who pursues

a betrothed maiden

in order to rape her; and the same law applies to the other forbidden sexual relationships, as will be explained in the Gemara.

But one who pursues an animal

in order to have intercourse with it,

and one who desecrates

who seeks to desecrate

Shabbat

and one who worships

who seeks to worship

idolatry—

they are not saved by taking their lives.

Rather, they should be brought before the court, and the court will punish them.

The tanna mentioned idolatry, which is a severe transgression, and desecration of Shabbat, which is like idolatry, to teach us that even in the case of a severe transgression that is among the foundations of the faith, the perpetrator cannot be saved by taking his life [indeed, there are tannaim who maintain that one who worships idolatry or desecrates Shabbat may be saved by taking his life]—and all the more so in the case of other transgressions, those punishable by karet or by death imposed by the court.

And the permission to save a person by taking his life when he seeks to commit a transgression applies only to the prohibitions involving forbidden sexual relationships.

And not to all forbidden sexual relationships, but only to those in which the pursued person would suffer “defilement” and disgrace. But one who pursues an animal in order to have intercourse with it, despite the fact that its prohibition is similar to the prohibition of forbidden sexual relationships, cannot be saved by taking his life, since “defilement” and disgrace are not applicable to an animal.

Gemara:

The Gemara cites a beraita that derives the law of the Mishna from verses of the Torah.

The Sages taught: From where

do we learn

the

law of

one who pursues another to kill him, that he may be saved by taking his life?

The verse states

the Torah says (Leviticus 19):

“You shall not stand by the blood of your fellow,”

and we derive: Do not stand by while his blood is being shed; rather, do everything in your power, even by killing the pursuer.

And we raise an objection:

And

does

this

verse

come for this purpose

to teach us this interpretation?!

But

this

verse

is needed

to be expounded

for

another interpretation—

As

it is

taught:

as we learned in another beraita:

From where

do we learn

concerning

one who

sees another

drowning in a river, or an animal dragging him

in order to kill him,

or bandits coming upon him—

that he is obligated to save him?

The verse states: “You shall not stand by the blood of your fellow”—

do not stand by! Rather, save him!

If so, from where do we learn that it is permitted to save him by killing the pursuer?

And we answer:

Indeed, it is so,

the verse “You shall not stand by the blood of your fellow” does in fact come to teach us the obligation to save him alone—

Rather,

this still requires clarification—

The law of

“he may be saved by taking his life”—

from where

is it derived?

It is derived from this interpretation:

It is derived

by means

of

the interpretation

“kal va-chomer,” from

the law of

a betrothed maiden

who may be saved by taking the pursuer’s life [as will be explained below]—

And

the law of

a betrothed maiden

is lenient, and in what respect is it lenient?

He did not come

to kill her,

but

came

to defile her

to shame and degrade her,

yet the Torah said: She may be saved by taking his life—

One who pursues another

is more serious, in that he comes

to kill him; all the more so

he may be saved by taking his life.

Now, although this kal va-chomer interpretation is compelling, it has a deficiency based on the principle that “one does not impose punishment on the basis of a logical inference.” That is, a kal va-chomer can teach the law, or some component of the law, but it cannot bring about punishment. In our case, they sought to make him liable to death on the basis of the kal va-chomer.

Therefore the Gemara asks:

But does one impose punishment on the basis of a logical inference?!

And we answer: Indeed, this is not a kal va-chomer interpretation, but rather—

In the academy of

Rabbi

Rabbi taught: It is an analogy.

The law of a murderer is derived from that of a betrothed maiden through a hekesh, that is, the Torah equated them, and it is therefore as though it were explicitly stated in the verse; consequently, it may also be derived with regard to punishment.

And what is the analogy?

The Torah says (Deuteronomy 22): “If there be a virgin maiden betrothed to a man, and another man finds her… And if the man finds the betrothed maiden in the field, and the man seizes her and lies with her, then only the man who lay with her shall die.

But to the maiden you shall do nothing; there is no sin deserving death for the maiden, for just as a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.

For he found her in the field; the betrothed maiden cried out, but there was no one to save her.”

And this is difficult

Therefore, the Sages interpreted this as teaching that the Torah came to make an analogy between them—to equate them—so that each may be learned from the other, and each may teach the law applicable to the other. That is, from the law of a murderer we derive a law concerning the halakhot of a betrothed maiden [as will be explained on the following page, the law of “let him be killed and not transgress”].

And from the Torah’s writing “just as” he rises and “so” is this matter, the Torah came to equate them completely, so that we may also derive the law of a murderer from that of a betrothed maiden.

This method of interpretation is called: “It comes to teach, but is found to have been taught.” That is, the murderer, who came to teach a law concerning the betrothed maiden, is found to have learned from her the law that “he may be saved by taking his life.”

And so we learned: The Torah says:

“For just as a man rises against his fellow and murders him”—and what have we now learned from the murderer?

It comes to teach, but is found to have been taught: The Torah draws an analogy between a murderer and a betrothed maiden. Just as a betrothed maiden may be saved by taking his life

as will be explained—

so too, a murderer may be saved by taking his life.

And the Gemara clarifies:

And the betrothed maiden herself,

the very law that she may be saved by taking his life [from which the law of a murderer is derived]—

from where is it derived?

As

it is

taught in the academy of

Rabbi

Yishmael—

as it was taught in the academy of Rabbi Yishmael:

The Torah says: “The maiden cried out,

but there was no one to save her”—

this implies that

if there is someone to save her,

he must save her, and the Torah did not limit the means by which he should save her. This indicates that there is no limit, even

by anything that can save her,

including killing him.

Thus, a betrothed maiden may be saved by taking his life, and from her we derive the law of a murderer.

Before the Gemara continues to explain the Mishna and expound the verses from which the law of a pursuer is derived, it clarifies the beraita that we learned concerning the law of “You shall not stand by the blood of your fellow.”

The essential matter

we learned in the body of the discussion:

“From where is it derived that one who sees another drowning in a river, or an animal dragging him, or bandits coming upon him, is obligated to save him? The verse states: ‘You shall not stand by the blood of your fellow.’”

And we raise an objection:

And

does

this

law

emerge from here

and is it learned from this verse? But

it emerges from there,

for we learned it from another verse.

We learned in a beraita:

The loss of his person

such as when he is drowning in a river—

from where

is it derived that you are commanded to restore him, just as you are obligated to return his lost property to him?

The verse states

in the passage concerning the return of lost property (Deuteronomy 22): “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep straying and ignore them; you shall surely return them to your brother. And if your brother is not near you, and you do not know him, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall remain with you until your brother seeks it, and you shall return it to him.”

The words

“and you shall return it to him”

are superfluous and come for purposes of interpretation: Return his person to himself.

If so, it is difficult: Why did the Torah need to say, “You shall not stand by the blood of your fellow”?

And we answer:

If it were derived from there,

if only “and you shall return it to him” had been stated,

one might have thought

we would say,

these matters

—that one is obligated to restore his life to him—apply only

with his person [

Rashi:

with his life]

meaning that the person who sees him, if he has the ability, is obligated to save him;

but exerting himself,

if he must trouble himself,

and hiring workers,

or if he must hire rescuers with his own money,

one might say

we would say:

no,

he is not obligated—

It comes to teach us

the Torah comes to teach us: “You shall not stand by the blood of your fellow”—do not stand by; rather, pursue every possible course! Exert yourself! Hire rescuers! So that the blood of your fellow will not be lost.

The Gemara returns to deriving the laws of the Mishna from verses.

The Sages taught: Whether

it is

one who pursues another to kill him, or one who pursues a male, or one who pursues a betrothed maiden, or one who pursues

forbidden sexual relationships that are

liable to death imposed by the court, or one who pursues

forbidden sexual relationships that are

liable to karet—

they are saved by taking their lives.

But

a widow to a High Priest,

a High Priest who pursues a widow in order to rape her, and likewise

a divorcee or a woman released through halitza to an ordinary priest,

although these are forbidden sexual relationships and the transgression involves defilement, as the woman becomes a “disqualified woman”—

they are not saved by taking their lives,

since they are not liable to death imposed by the court or to karet, but only to a negative commandment.

When do these words, that they are saved by taking their lives, apply? When by killing him they will save the woman from becoming defiled. But if

the transgression has already been committed against her

and she has already become defiled—

she is not saved by taking his life.

If

she has someone to save her

by another means without killing, such as restraining him or wounding him—

she is not saved by taking his life,

for the Torah did not specifically command that he be killed, but that she be saved by every means available, and it is certainly preferable to do so without killing.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even

the woman

who says

to those rescuing her:

“Leave him alone

and do not pursue him,” although she does not say this willingly, but is coerced into saying it out of fear

that he will kill her

the pursuer before they reach him—is not saved by taking his life. [Its rationale will be explained in the Gemara.]

there):