Sanhedrin 69a — the Talmud in English

And Rabba concludes his exposition:

And the Merciful One said:

and if there is no

man redeemer, and it did not say: “and if there is no “his” redeemer,” in order to teach us: “And if” there is no redeemer “of the man,” concerning

a man

you are uncertain whether he has a redeemer or not, and therefore

you must go back over it, whether he has redeemers and, if not,

and until you are certain that he has no redeemer, you cannot remove the redeemer’s right and give it to a kohen,

and until you are certain that he has no redeemer, you cannot remove the redeemer’s right and give it to a kohen—

Whereas

with regard to a minor, you do not need to go back over it,

because

it is known

that he has no redeemers.

And without investigation you give the principal and the fifth to the kohen .

And this is Rabba’s exposition, that “a minor does not beget.”

Abaye challenged him:

Abaye raises an objection to Rabba from a beraita taught concerning a designated maidservant.

It is stated in the Torah (Leviticus 19): “And if a man lies with a woman with an emission of seed, and she is a maidservant designated to a man… there shall be an inquiry.”

And the Sages expounded: “There shall be an inquiry”—she is liable for lashes.

The one who has intercourse is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as it is stated there: “And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord” .

We learned in a beraita: If it had been stated in the Torah

“man,”

I would have only

that the maidservant is liable for lashes

but a man—

an adult of thirteen—

a son of nine years and one day, who is fit for intercourse, from where

that the woman is liable for lashes on account of his intercourse?

The verse teaches:

therefore the Torah wrote

“and”

“man,”

the vav comes to include a son of nine .

Thus the beraita held that a son of nine is fit for intercourse?

He said to him

Rabba said to Abaye: There is no difficulty here, and the statements do not contradict one another, because

he has

he is indeed fit for intercourse, but

he does not beget.

And an example of this is:

he is like

incomplete grain

that has not produced a third,

for if you sow it, it does not sprout; so too, a son of nine does not beget.

The school of

in the academy of

Hezekiah

taught: It is stated in the Torah in the section concerning a murderer (Exodus 21):

“And when a man acts presumptuously,”

and the Torah could have written: “And when a man is found guilty”; therefore we expound yazid in the sense of cooking, as will be explained—

A man is mezid

his emission of seed becomes cooked

and he emits seed, but a minor is not mezid and does not emit seed.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: From where is it inferred that this

“mezid”

is a term of cooking?

For it is written

(Genesis):

“And Jacob cooked a stew,”

he cooked a dish.

And we raise an objection from the words of Rabbi Ishmael, to prove that a minor does beget.

But Rabbi Ishmael taught:

It is stated in the Torah: “When a man has a “son,” and we expound:

a son and not a father. [This exposition of Rabbi Ishmael is not the statement of Rav Hisda. For Rav Hisda is speaking of a minor who begot: the “son” does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, whereas Rabbi Ishmael is speaking of a minor who begot: the “father” does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.]

And the one who raised the objection understood that Rabbi Ishmael’s intention was to expound that if he has already fathered a son, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

The one who raised the objection understood Rabbi Yishmael’s intention to be that if a son has already been born to him, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

What are the circumstances?

In what manner was Rabbi Ishmael speaking?

If you say

if it is as you say, that a minor does not beget, it must be said

that she became pregnant

that his wife became pregnant by him when he was

after

he had passed

after he had brought

that he had brought

two hairs,

and the nine months of birth passed,

and he begot

and a son was born to him

before

before

his beard encircled,

for afterward he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, and Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition came to exclude him on account of his having a son—

It is impossible to say this, because

is there such a length of time as all that?

Is there such a long period between the growth of two hairs and the encircling of the beard?!

But Rabbi Krospe dai said: All the days of a stubborn and rebellious son

from the growth of two hairs until the encircling of the beard

are only three months,

as will be explained.

And consequently it is impossible to say this, that in such a manner the Torah exempted him, for without the birth of a son he is exempt because his beard has already encircled; why, then, was it necessary to exempt him because he had already fathered a son?

Rather, is it not

the case

that she became pregnant

his wife became pregnant by him

before

before

he brought

he brought

two hairs, and he begot

and his son was born

before him

before

his beard encircled,

whereas because of his age [his age] he would become a stubborn and rebellious son, and Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition came to exempt him because he had fathered a son.—

And learn from it: A minor begets!

The Gemara’s objection is based on the assumption that Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition, “a son and not a father,” and Rabbi Krospe dai’s statement, “all the days of a stubborn and rebellious son are only three months,” are two separate matters. Therefore they asked: How is it possible within three months to impregnate a woman and beget?

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Krospe dai’s statement is indeed the exposition of Rabbi Ishmael. That is, a minor does not beget, and the Torah did not come to exclude a son who has already fathered a child, since such a case does not exist in reality. Rather, it excludes and limits the time to three months, which is the time after which, if his wife is pregnant, her pregnancy is apparent, for the pregnancy becomes recognizable after three months. And it is a decree of the verse that if a period equal in length to the time from the beginning of pregnancy until the pregnancy becomes recognizable has passed over him, he is exempt , and from here is the source for Rabbi Krospe dai’s statement.

And we answer

No,

there is no proof here that a minor begets, and the case is one in which

she became pregnant after

after

he had brought two hairs, and he begot after his beard had encircled—

And what is difficult to you

and what you objected from the statement

of Rabbi Krospe dai,

its explanation is—

When

when

Rav Dimi

arrived from the Land of Israel,

he said: They say in the West

in the Land of Israel:

A son

a stubborn and rebellious son

and not

one whose wife is pregnant and whose pregnancy has become recognizable, and who is

fit to be called

to be called

a father,

and they learn that recognition of the pregnancy is at three months from what is stated concerning Tamar (Genesis 38): “And it came to pass after about three months, and it was told Judah, saying: Tamar your daughter-in-law has committed harlotry.” That is, her pregnancy had become recognizable .

The body of the matter

We learned in the body of the sugya:

Rabbi Krospe dai said in the name of Rabbi Shabbatai: All the days of a son

stubborn and rebellious are only three months.

And we object:

But we learned

behold, we learned in our Mishna:

from when he grows two hairs until his beard encircles,

and not specifically three months .

And we answer: There are two limitations here—

His beard encircled,

which we learned in our Mishna and which is derived from “to a man a son”—a son close to the strength of a man; and if the beard has encircled,

even though three months have not been completed,

he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

Three months have been completed,

which is Rabbi Krospe dai’s statement, derived from Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition: “a son”—and not “one fit to be called a father”; and if three months have been completed,

even though his beard has not encircled,

he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

Rabbi Krospe dai said that a woman whose period of pregnancy is nine months has her pregnancy become recognizable at the end of the third month.

The Gemara discusses a woman whose period of pregnancy is seven months

And there is a practical halakhic difference: A woman is required—by an enactment of the Sages—to delay her marriage between one husband and another for three months [“months of discernment”], in order to distinguish concerning the offspring that will be born to her whether they are the child of the first or of the second. For if she does not delay, the child born to her will not be known to be whose son he is, and this has implications for many laws of the Torah. And when she delays three months, her pregnancy will become recognizable if she is pregnant by the first, and her non-pregnancy by the first if she is not pregnant by him.

A woman violated the enactment of the Sages, did not delay, married, and became pregnant; her pregnancy became recognizable after two months and one-third from her marriage to the second, and she gave birth at the completion of seven months from her marriage to the second. From now, if recognition of the pregnancy of one who gives birth after seven months is at two months and one-third, then the child is in doubt, perhaps from the second and perhaps from the first. But if recognition of the pregnancy is after three months, there is no doubt here, and the child is certainly from the first.

Sat

he sat,

Rabbi Yaakov of Nehar Pekod [a place name]

before

Ravina

as a student before his teacher,

and he sat and said in the name

in the name

of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

Infer from this

it may be inferred

from the

words of

Rabbi Krospe dai in the name of Rabbi Shabbatai,

who says that the time of recognition of the pregnancy is three months:

one who gives birth after seven months does not have her pregnancy recognizable at one-third of her period

which is two months and one-third—

And how is this inferred?

For if it enters your mind that her pregnancy becomes recognizable at one-third of her period, why do I need

to say that the days of a stubborn and rebellious son are

three

months? After all,

two and one-third

in two months and one-third

is sufficient,

it is sufficient to be the period of a stubborn and rebellious son.

That is, if the Torah said, through Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition, that his days extend from the period when he is fit to beget until the period when the pregnancy becomes recognizable, why should we not reduce this time in accordance with one who gives birth after seven months? After all, the Torah did not establish a “time,” but a period; why should we not attribute this period to the possibility that “if” he impregnated a woman who gives birth after seven months, her pregnancy would become recognizable in less than three months?

Rather, it follows that even one who gives birth after seven [months]—the recognition of her fetus is after three months.

[And according to these words, it follows that, alongside the fact that the fetus is recognizable after two and one-third months, if a stubborn and rebellious son performs his disgraceful acts during the two-thirds of the third month after the appearance of two hairs, he will not be made a stubborn and rebellious son.]

He said to him

Ravina to Rav Yaakov of Nehar Pekod: Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua’s proof is not a proof, for

you can always say

it is truly possible to say: one who gives birth after seven months

her fetus is recognizable after one-third of her days—

and nevertheless, if he performs his disgraceful acts during the two-thirds of the third month, he will indeed be made a stubborn and rebellious son, for who told you to follow the possibility, “if” there was a woman who gives birth after seven months,

go after the majority

we go after the majority, and the majority of women give birth after nine [months], and we do not take into consideration a possibility that is not so usual, and exists only among a minority of women.

The Sages said

the students stated Ravina’s refutation

before Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua.

But he did not agree to this—

He said to [

them]

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua:

And in capital cases, do we go after the majority?

The Torah said: “And the assembly shall judge” “

and the assembly shall rescue,”

it is incumbent upon the judges to do everything in their power to rescue the defendant, and this stubborn and rebellious son, who performed his disgraceful acts at the end of the third month, could have been rescued from stoning by claiming that his time is determined in accordance with one who gives birth after seven months —

And you say

and you say:

go after the majority?!

The amoraim discuss this question: If in capital cases we go after the majority stringently—that is, in a place where, as a result of following the majority, the defendant will become liable to death, whereas if they follow the minority he will be exempt from death—do we go after the majority, just as we go after the majority in the other laws of the Torah, or not, on account of “and the assembly shall rescue”?

The Sages returned

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua’s words

before Ravina.

He said to them

Ravina:

And in capital cases do we not go after the majority?!

And we learned

we learned a Mishna from which it is to be proven that even in capital cases we go after the majority:

The Mishna is speaking of the interrogations of witnesses, witnesses in capital cases, for if they contradict one another, their testimony is void and the defendant is acquitted—

The two witnesses testify concerning an event that occurred [for example] on one day of the week, but when they interrogate them concerning the days of the month—

one

of the witnesses

says: On the second of the month, and one says: On the third

of the month—

Their testimony stands

and they do not contradict one another, because we reconcile their words:

this one

who says on the second of the month

knows the intercalation of the month,

for the preceding month had thirty-one days, and therefore according to his—true—calculation, the event was on the second of the month.

And

if

this one

who says on the third

does not know the intercalation of the month

and according to his—mistaken—calculation, it was on the third of the month. And there are many people who do not know the intercalation of the month .

And if it should enter your mind

if it is as you say, that

we do not go after the majority

in capital cases,

let us say

let us say:

these

witnesses did not err, but

are testifying precisely

they are testifying exactly,

and it is that they are contradicting one another

and denying one another. And it would be proper for us to say so in order to rescue the defendant from death—

Rather

why do we not say so? Is it

not because we say: Go after the majority, and the majority of people do err

it happens that they err and do not know

the intercalation of the moon . And we combine their testimony to obligate the defendant to death .

We therefore combine their testimonies and sentence the defendant to death.

This is the proof that we go after the majority even in capital cases.

Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti said: We too have learned

we learned another Mishna from which it is to be proven that even in capital cases we go after the majority.

The Mishna lists and proceeds through laws concerning a minor girl from when she is three years old until she becomes an adult. The general rule in all these laws is: One younger than three years old is not at all capable of intercourse, but rather it is like one placing a finger in an eye; and when she is three years old, intercourse with her is intercourse, except that she is not subject to punishments.

Three years old and one day:

She is betrothed through intercourse.

A minor has no “agency” with which to become betrothed, and her actions are considered nothing. Her father, however, can give her over for betrothal to another man, through betrothal by money, a document, or intercourse. If the man betroths her with money or a document, she is fully acquired by him, and she is a married woman in every respect, even while she is younger than three years old. But if he gives her over to another man for betrothal through intercourse, she is not betrothed while she is younger than three years old, for this is not intercourse, but only from the time she is three years old.

And if a levir has intercourse with her—

he acquires her.

If she was married to a man through her father’s betrothal, as stated above, and her husband died without children, she requires levirate marriage like every levirate woman.

And if a levir has intercourse with her, for betrothal through intercourse is the betrothal of a levirate woman [by Torah law], he acquires her, and she is his wife for all the laws of the Torah: to inherit her—to inherit her property when she dies—and to inherit the property of her deceased husband, and to become impure for her if he is a koen and she dies; and she no longer requires levirate marriage—which is why he divorces her with a bill of divorce and not through chalitza.

But if she is younger than three years old, her intercourse is not intercourse, and she requires levirate marriage or chalitza, like every woman who is “awaiting levirate marriage.”

And one is liable on her account for a married woman.

If her father married her off, as stated above, and another man has intercourse with her, his intercourse with her is intercourse, and he becomes liable on her account as with every married woman. [She is exempt, for she is not subject to punishments.] And if she is younger than three years old, one is not liable on her account.

And he imparts impurity [

and she imparts impurity]

to her one who has intercourse with her, to impart impurity to the lower bedding as to the upper.

A menstruating woman imparts impurity to her bedding [coverings and the like], and they become a primary source of impurity, to impart impurity to people and utensils; that is, if people and utensils touch her bedding, they become impure. This law applies even to a one-day-old infant girl.

The one who has intercourse with a menstruating woman becomes impure, as the Torah said: “And her menstrual impurity shall be upon him.” But he is not as severe as she is, and his bedding becomes only a first degree of impurity, and it does not impart impurity to people and utensils as a menstruating woman does, but only to food and drink. [This impurity was called by the Sages: “the lower as the upper,” and their intention is to emphasize that his lower bedding does not become a primary source of impurity like the impurity of the menstruating woman’s bedding itself, but rather a first degree “like the upper surface of one who experiences a flux”].

The stated matter, that the one who has intercourse with a menstruating woman imparts impurity to lower bedding as to upper, applies only when she is three years old, for her intercourse is intercourse; but if she is younger than three years old, he is merely like one who touches a menstruating woman, and he becomes impure with a light impurity, which is an impurity lasting until evening.

If she marries a koen, she eats teruma.

An Israelite woman married to a koen eats teruma. By Torah law she eats it from her betrothal, whereas the Sages decreed that she should not eat it until her entry under the wedding canopy.

This wedding canopy depends upon intercourse; that is, if her intercourse is intercourse, her wedding canopy grants her the right to eat teruma. Therefore, a three-year-old girl whose father accepted betrothal for her from a koen, and brought her under the wedding canopy: since her intercourse is intercourse, her wedding canopy enables her to eat teruma. But one younger than three years old, whose intercourse is not intercourse—her wedding canopy is not a wedding canopy, and she does not eat teruma.

If one

of any

of those disqualified has intercourse with her, he disqualifies her from the priesthood.

A woman with whom a gentile, a chalal, a netin, or a mamzer has had intercourse is forbidden to marry a koen, and she is disqualified from the priesthood.

This law applies only to a three-year-old girl, whose intercourse is intercourse, and not to one younger than this.

And if one of all the forbidden relations stated in the Torah has intercourse with her

such as her father, her brother, her father-in-law, or her brother-in-law—

they are put to death on her account,

for they are liable to death, while she is exempt, since she is not subject to punishments.

And if she is younger than three years old, they too are exempt, for this is not intercourse.