Sanhedrin 69a (סט.) — the Talmud in English

And Rabba concludes his exposition:

And the Merciful One said

“and if he has no

man

as a redeemer,” and it did not say, “and if he has no “redeemer,” in order to teach us: “and if” “the man” has no redeemer, concerning

a man

you are uncertain whether he has a redeemer or not, and therefore

you must investigate whether he has redeemers, and if not;

and until you are certain that he has no redeemer, you cannot remove the redeemer’s right and give it to the kohen -

But with regard to

a minor, you do not need to investigate him,

because it is

known

that he has no redeemers.

And without investigation, you give the principal and the additional one-fifth to the kohen .

And this is Rabba’s exposition, that a minor cannot father children.

Abaye raised an objection to him:

Abaye challenges Rabba from a beraita taught with regard to a designated maidservant.

It is stated in the Torah (Leviticus 19): “And if a man lies with a woman with an emission of semen, and she is a maidservant designated for a man … there shall be an inquiry.”

And the Sages expounded: “There shall be an inquiry” means that she is liable for lashes.

The man who has intercourse with her is obligated to bring a guilt-offering, as it is stated there: “And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord” .

We learned in a beraita: If the Torah had stated

“man”,

I would know

only that the maidservant is liable for lashes

when the man

is an adult, thirteen years of age;

with regard to a boy of nine years and one day, who is fit for intercourse, from where

do we know that the woman is liable for lashes for intercourse with him?

The verse states:

Therefore the Torah wrote

“and”

“man”,

the additional vav comes to include a boy of nine years of age .

The beraita thus maintains that a boy of nine is fit for intercourse?

He said to him:

Rabba said to Abaye: There is no difficulty here, and the statements do not contradict one another, because

he has

indeed become fit for intercourse, but

he cannot father children.

And an analogy for this is

like produce

that is not fully developed,

which has not reached one-third of its growth,

for if you sow it, it will not grow; so too, a boy of nine cannot father children.

In the school of

the academy of

Hezekiah

a tanna taught: It is stated in the Torah, in the passage concerning a murderer (Exodus 21):

“And when a man acts intentionally”,

and the Torah could have written, “And when a man is found guilty.” Therefore, we expound “acts intentionally” as related to cooking, as will be explained -

An intentional man

has semen that has become mature

and produces seed, whereas a minor does not act intentionally and produce seed.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: What indicates that this

“intentional”

is an expression of cooking?

As it is written (Genesis):

in Genesis:

“And Jacob cooked a stew”,

he cooked a dish.

The Gemara raises an objection from the words of Rabbi Yishmael, to prove that a minor can father children.

But Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is stated in the Torah: “When a man has a “son,” and we expound:

“A son, but not a father.” [

Rabbi Yishmael’s exposition is not the statement of Rav Hisda. Rav Hisda is discussing a minor who fathered a child: the “son” does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. Rabbi Yishmael, however, is discussing a minor who fathered a child: the “father” does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.]

The one who raised the objection understood Rabbi Yishmael’s intention to be that if he has already fathered a son, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

What are the circumstances?

In what manner did Rabbi Yishmael speak?

If you say,

if it is as you say, that a minor cannot father children, it must be that

his wife became pregnant

when he was

after

the time

that he had brought

he had grown

two pubic hairs,

and nine months of gestation passed,

and he fathered a child

and a son was born to him

before

he

developed a surrounding beard,

for afterward he would no longer become a stubborn and rebellious son, and Rabbi Yishmael’s exposition came to exclude this case, because he has a son -

This cannot be said, because

is there such a long interval? Is there such an extended period between the appearance of two pubic hairs and the development of a surrounding beard?!

Is there such a great amount of time between the growth of two pubic hairs and the development of a beard?!

But Rabbi Kruspedai said: The entire period during which a stubborn and rebellious son can be

from the appearance of two pubic hairs until the development of a surrounding beard

is only three months,

as will be explained.

And consequently, this cannot be said: In such a case the Torah exempted him, for without the birth of a son he would already be exempt because he had developed a surrounding beard. Why, then, was it necessary to exempt him because he had already fathered a son?

Rather, is it not

the case

that his wife became pregnant

his wife became pregnant from him

before

the time

that he brought

he developed

two pubic hairs, and he fathered a child,

and his son was born

before him

before he

developed a surrounding beard?

But based on his age he would have become a stubborn and rebellious son, and Rabbi Yishmael’s exposition came to exempt him because he had fathered a child. -

And conclude from it: A minor can father children!

The Gemara’s question is based on the assumption that Rabbi Yishmael’s exposition, “a son but not a father,” and Rabbi Kruspedai’s statement, “the entire period during which a stubborn and rebellious son can be is only three months,” are two separate matters. Therefore they asked: How could a woman become pregnant and give birth within three months?

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Kruspedai’s statement is indeed Rabbi Yishmael’s exposition. That is, a minor cannot father children, and the Torah did not come to exclude a son who had already fathered a child, since such a case does not exist. Rather, it excludes and limits the period to three months, the length of time after which, if his wife is pregnant, her pregnancy becomes discernible, since the pregnancy is recognizable after three months. And the Torah’s decree is that if a period has passed equal in length to the time from the beginning of pregnancy until the pregnancy becomes recognizable, he is exempt ; and from here is the source for Rabbi Kruspedai’s statement.

And we answer

No,

there is no proof here that a minor can father children, and the case is one in which

his wife became pregnant after

after

he had brought two pubic hairs, and he fathered a child after he developed a surrounding beard -

And as for what is difficult for you,

and your difficulty from the statement

of Rabbi Kruspedai,

its explanation is -

When

when

Rav Dimi

arrived from Eretz Yisrael,

he said: In the West

in Eretz Yisrael:

A son

a stubborn and rebellious son

but not

one whose wife is pregnant and whose pregnancy has become recognizable, and he is

fit to be called

called

a father,

and they derive that a pregnancy becomes recognizable after three months from what is stated concerning Tamar (Genesis 38): “And it came to pass after about three months that Judah was told, saying: Tamar your daughter-in-law has played the harlot.” That is, her pregnancy had become recognizable .

As for the matter itself,

we learned in the body of the discussion:

Rabbi Kruspedai said in the name of Rabbi Shabbetai: The entire period during which a

stubborn and rebellious son can be is only three months.

And we raise an objection:

But we learned

this in our Mishna:

From the appearance of two pubic hairs until he develops a surrounding beard,

and not specifically three months .

And we answer: There are two limitations here -

He developed a surrounding beard,

as we learned in our Mishna, and this is derived from “to a man a son,” meaning a son close to the strength of manhood; and if he developed a surrounding beard,

even though three months have not elapsed,

he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

Three months have elapsed,

and this is Rabbi Kruspedai’s statement, derived from Rabbi Yishmael’s exposition: “A son” but not “one fit to be called a father”; and if three months have elapsed,

even though he has not developed a surrounding beard,

he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

Rabbi Kruspedai said that in the case of a woman whose gestation lasts nine months, her pregnancy becomes recognizable at the end of the third month.

The Gemara discusses a woman whose gestation lasts seven months

This has a practical halakhic consequence: By rabbinic ordinance, a woman must delay her marriage between one husband and another for three months, the “months of discernment,” in order to determine, regarding the child who will be born to her, whether he is the son of the first husband or the second. For if she does not wait, it will not be known whose son the child is, and this has ramifications for many Torah laws. When she waits three months, her pregnancy will become recognizable if she is pregnant by the first husband, and her lack of pregnancy by the first husband will become evident if she is not pregnant by him.

A woman violated the Sages’ ordinance, did not wait, married, and became pregnant. Her pregnancy became recognizable after two months and one-third from her marriage to the second husband, and she gave birth at the completion of seven months from her marriage to the second husband. Now, if the pregnancy of a woman who gives birth after seven months becomes recognizable after two months and one-third, the child is of uncertain status, possibly the son of the second husband and possibly the son of the first. But if a pregnancy becomes recognizable only after three months, there is no uncertainty here, and the child is certainly the son of the first husband.

Rabbi Yaakov of Nehar Pekod

sat

before Ravina

[a place name],

before Ravina

as a student before his teacher,

and sat and said in the name

in the name

of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

Conclude from this

we hear

from

the words of

Rabbi Kruspedai, who said in the name of Rabbi Shabbetai,

who says that the time at which a pregnancy becomes recognizable is three months:

The pregnancy of a woman who gives birth after seven months is not recognizable after one-third of her gestation period,

which is two months and one-third -

And how do we hear this?

If it enters your mind that her pregnancy becomes recognizable after one-third of her gestation period, why do I need

to say that the period of a stubborn and rebellious son is

three

months? After all,

two and one-third

two months and one-third

would suffice,

it would be sufficient to constitute the period of a stubborn and rebellious son.

That is, if the Torah stated, according to Rabbi Yishmael’s exposition, that his period extends from the time when he becomes capable of fathering children until the time when a pregnancy becomes recognizable, why not reduce this period in accordance with a woman who gives birth after seven months? After all, the Torah did not establish a fixed “time,” but rather a period; why not define this period according to the possibility that, “if” he were to impregnate a woman who gives birth after seven months, her pregnancy would become recognizable in less than three months?

Rather, it follows that even one who gives birth after seven months—the recognition of her fetus occurs after three months.

According to these words, it follows that although the fetus is recognizable after two and one-third months, if a ben sorer u-moreh performs his disgraceful acts during the final two-thirds of the third month after the appearance of two pubic hairs, he would not be made a ben sorer u-moreh.

Ravina said to

Rav Yaakov of Nehar Pekod: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua’s proof is not a proof, because

I can always say

that it is truly possible to say: One who gives birth after seven months

has her fetus recognized after one-third of her term—

Nevertheless, if he performs his disgraceful acts during the final two-thirds of the third month, he is indeed made a ben sorer u-moreh, because who told you to follow the possibility that the case involves a woman who gives birth after seven months?

Follow the majority:

follow the majority, and the majority of women give birth after nine months. We do not take into consideration a possibility that is not so common, occurring only among a minority of women.

The Sages stated

Ravina’s refutation

before Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

He did not agree with it—

He said to

them,

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

Do we follow the majority in capital cases?

The Torah said: “And the congregation shall judge”

“and the congregation shall save,”

the judges are obligated to do everything within their power to save the defendant. And this ben sorer u-moreh, who performed his disgraceful acts at the end of the third month, could have been saved from stoning by arguing that his period is determined in accordance with one who gives birth after seven months.

And you say

and you say:

“Follow the majority”?!

The amoraim are discussing this question: In capital cases, do we follow the majority stringently—that is, where following the majority results in the defendant being sentenced to death, while following the minority would exempt him from death? Do we follow the majority, as we do in the rest of the laws of the Torah, or not, on account of “and the congregation shall save”?

The Sages repeated

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua’s statement

before Ravina.

He said to them,

Ravina:

Do we not follow the majority in capital cases?!

But didn’t we learn

a Mishna from which it can be proven that even in capital cases we follow the majority:

The Mishna is discussing the examinations of witnesses—witnesses in capital cases—where, if they contradict one another, their testimony is invalidated and the defendant is acquitted—

The two witnesses testify concerning an event that occurred, for example, on one day of the week. However, when they are questioned concerning the days of the month,

one

of the witnesses

says: On the second of the month, and one says: On the third

of the month.—

Their testimony stands

and they do not contradict one another, because we reconcile their statements:

This one,

the one who says that it was on the second of the month,

knows about the intercalation of the month,

because the preceding month had thirty-one days, and therefore, according to his—and correct—calculation, the event occurred on the second of the month.

And

if

this one,

the one who says that it was on the third,

does not know about the intercalation of the month,

then according to his—and mistaken—calculation it was on the third of the month. There are many people who do not know about the intercalation of the month.

And if it enters your mind,

if it is as you say, that

“we do not follow the majority”

in capital cases,

let us say

the following:

These

witnesses did not err; rather,

they testified precisely,

they are testifying accurately,

and they are contradicting one another

and denying each other’s statements. It would be appropriate for us to say this in order to save the defendant from death.—

Rather,

why do we not say this? Is it

not because we say: “Follow the majority, and the majority of people are accustomed to err”,

that it sometimes happens that they err and do not know

about the intercalation of the month ? And we combine their testimony in order to sentence the defendant to death.

We therefore combine their testimonies and sentence the defendant to death.

Here, then, is proof that we follow the majority even in capital cases.

Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti said: We too have learned

another Mishna from which it can be proven that even in capital cases we follow the majority.

The Mishna enumerates laws concerning a minor girl, from when she is younger than three years old until she reaches majority. The general principle in all these laws is: A girl younger than three years old is not considered to have had intercourse at all; it is like placing a finger in an eye. Once she is three years old, intercourse with her is considered intercourse, although she is not subject to punishment.

Three years and one day old:

She can be betrothed through intercourse.

A minor has no legal capacity to effect betrothal, and her actions have no legal significance. Her father, however, can give her over for betrothal to another man, through betrothal by money, by a document, or through intercourse. If the man betroths her with money or a document, she is fully acquired by him and is a married woman in every respect, even when she is younger than three years old. But if he gives money to her father for betrothal through intercourse, she is not betrothed when she is younger than three years old, since that is not considered intercourse; it becomes effective only once she is three years old.

And if a yavam has intercourse with her—

he acquires her.

If she had been married to a man through her father’s betrothal, as stated above, and her husband died without children, she requires levirate marriage like any yevama.

If a yavam has intercourse with her, since intercourse is the means by which a yevama is betrothed [by Torah law], he acquires her, and she is his wife with regard to all the laws of the Torah: he may inherit her property if she dies, she may inherit the property of her deceased husband, and, if he is a koen and she dies, he becomes impure for her sake. She no longer requires levirate marriage—which is why he divorces her with a get and not through chalitza.

But if she is younger than three years old, intercourse with her is not considered intercourse, and she requires levirate marriage or chalitza, like any woman awaiting levirate marriage.

And one is liable on her account for the prohibition of a married woman.

This is if her father married her off, as stated above. If another man has intercourse with her, intercourse with her is considered intercourse, and he becomes liable on her account as he would for any married woman. [She herself is exempt, since she is not subject to punishment.] If she is younger than three years old, one is not liable on her account.

And he renders impure [

and she renders impure ]

the man who has intercourse with her, so that he renders the lower bedding impure like the upper.

A menstruating woman renders her bedding impure [covers and the like], and it becomes a primary source of ritual impurity, rendering people and vessels impure; that is, if a person or vessels touch her bedding, they become impure. This law applies even to a girl one day old.

A man who has intercourse with a menstruating woman becomes impure, as the Torah says: “Her menstrual impurity shall be upon him.” But he is not as severe as she is, and his bedding becomes only a first-degree source of impurity; unlike a menstruating woman, it does not render people and vessels impure, but only food and drink. [The Sages called this impurity “lower like upper,” meaning to emphasize that his lower bedding does not become a primary source of ritual impurity, as does the bedding of the menstruating woman herself, but only a first degree “like the upper garment of a man with a flux.”]

The statement that a man who has intercourse with a menstruating woman renders lower bedding impure like upper applies only to a girl who is three years old, since intercourse with her is considered intercourse. If she is younger than three years old, he is merely like one who touches a menstruating woman, and he becomes lightly impure, an impurity that lasts until evening.

If she marries a koen, she may eat teruma.

A daughter of Israel married to a koen may eat teruma. By Torah law she may eat it from the time of her betrothal, but the Sages decreed that she may not eat it until she enters the wedding canopy.

This wedding canopy is dependent on intercourse: that is, if intercourse with her is considered intercourse, her wedding canopy entitles her to eat teruma. Therefore, when a girl who is three years old has been betrothed by her father to a koen and he brings her under the wedding canopy, since intercourse with her is considered intercourse, her wedding canopy enables her to eat teruma. But a girl younger than three years old, with whom intercourse is not considered intercourse—her wedding canopy is not a valid wedding canopy, and she may not eat teruma.

If one man has intercourse with her

from among

those disqualified, he disqualifies her from the priesthood.

A woman who has had intercourse with a gentile, a chalal, a Natin, or a mamzer is prohibited from marrying a koen, and she is disqualified from the priesthood.

This law applies only to a girl who is three years old, with whom intercourse is considered intercourse, and not to one younger than that.

And if one man has intercourse with her, from among all the forbidden relations mentioned in the Torah,

such as her father, her brother, her father-in-law, or her brother-in-law—

they are put to death on her account,

for they are liable to death, while she is exempt, since she is not subject to punishment.

If she is younger than three years old, they too are exempt, since this is not considered intercourse.