Sanhedrin 68b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

A wayward and rebellious son.

From when does one become a wayward and rebellious son?

From

the time

that he produces two pubic hairs,

which are signs of “majority” for all the mitzvot of the Torah, but not before that, since he is a “minor” and has not yet entered the obligation of the mitzvot.

And

until when does he remain capable of becoming a wayward and rebellious son?

Until the lower beard surrounds him,

when the entire area is surrounded by hair,

the lower

area in that place,

and not the upper one; rather,

why did the Sages use the generic expression “the beard”? Because

the Sages spoke in refined language.

And from where do we derive that his time is limited until the lower beard surrounds him?

As it is stated:

“When a man has a son,”

Before the Mishna concludes the exposition, it incidentally cites another exposition:

“Son”—

and not a daughter.

The law of the wayward and rebellious son does not apply to a daughter.

The Mishna now expounds the law stated above, that once the lower beard has surrounded him, he no longer becomes a wayward and rebellious son, from what is stated:

“Son,”

and we expound:

“and not a man,”

and one whose lower beard has surrounded him is a “man.”

Although once he produces two pubic hairs he is already a “man” with regard to all the mitzvot of the Torah, and if so, why do we not exclude him as soon as he produces two pubic hairs? The Gemara answers that we expound: “A son of a man”—a son close to attaining the strength of a man, that is, at the beginning of his becoming a “man.”

And why do we not expound “son” in its plain sense, meaning that he must remain a son until he becomes a man, until he produces two pubic hairs, for as long as he is a “minor”? The Mishna explains that this cannot be said, since—

a minor is exempt,

because

he has not entered the obligation of the mitzvot.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses:

From where do we know that a minor is exempt?

From where do we learn that he does not become a wayward and rebellious son?

We raise an objection:

From where do we know this?

Is it not as the reason is taught,

for the Mishna has already explained:

“He has not entered the obligation of the mitzvot”?

And furthermore,

there is another difficulty: We do not find anywhere else among the laws of the Torah that a minor becomes liable for the Torah’s punishments. If so, why did it occur to the questioner to seek a scriptural exposition to exempt a minor, and in what way does the law of the wayward and rebellious son differ from the other laws of the Torah?

Where do we find

a case among the other punishments of the Torah

where the verse punished

a minor—

that here,

in the case of the wayward and rebellious son,

a verse would be required

for the questioner to derive from Scripture

his exemption?

We answer: The law of the wayward and rebellious son differs from the other laws of the Torah, and there is a rationale for holding even a minor liable [thus the second question is answered], although he has not entered the obligation of the mitzvot [and the first question is answered].

We,

who raised the question, “From where do we know that a minor is exempt?”,

this is what we meant:

:

Is it so

that

—

is he killed for his sin?!

By eating a large portion of meat and drinking a great deal of wine, he has not yet committed an offense for which he is liable to stoning. Why, then, is he actually killed?

Because of his ultimate end,

as explained later in the chapter: The Torah descended to the end of his intentions. He will ultimately consume his father’s property, and seek the habits of gluttony and drunkenness to which he has become accustomed. Having no money with which to purchase them and being unable to do without them, he will sit at the crossroads and rob people. The Torah therefore says: “Let him die while he is still innocent, and let him not die after becoming guilty.”

And since he is killed because of his ultimate end,

we might have reasoned:

even a minor, too.

Granted, with regard to the other punishments of the Torah, a person is punished for his present offense, whereas now he is a minor and is not responsible for his actions. But a wayward and rebellious son is punished for the future. What difference does it make whether he is presently an adult or a minor?

And furthermore,

there is another reason why we might have thought that a wayward and rebellious son is liable even as a minor: We expound

“son”—

and not a man,

and the meaning of “son”

implies a minor;

the Torah held a “son” liable, and a minor is “a son and not a man.”

Therefore, we asked: “From where do we know that a minor is exempt?” We answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The verse states: ‘When there shall be’

‘to a man a son,’

and we expound:

“A son close to attaining the strength of a man,”

as explained: at the beginning of his becoming a man.

Although there is a rationale for holding him liable even as a minor, nevertheless the Torah excluded him and exempted him.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And until the lower beard surrounds him.”

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught

in his Mishna:

“Until the corona is surrounded.”

What does this teach us?

When

из

Rav Dimi

arrived from Eretz Yisrael,

he said

that he interpreted Rabbi Ḥiyya’s Mishna:

“The surrounding of the shaft, but not the surrounding of the testicles,”

as the surrounding of the testicles occurs at a later age.

Rav Ḥisda said: A minor who fathered a child—his son does not become a wayward and rebellious son. [

Rav Ḥisda maintains that a minor who has not produced two pubic hairs can father a child; later in the discussion, amora’im dispute him and maintain that such a situation is impossible].

As it is stated: “When there shall be to

‘a man’

a son,”

and we expound: “and not

to a son a son.”

We challenge this: How can Rav Ḥisda expound the verse in this manner?

This

verse

is needed

for us

to

expound

as

he expounded,

Rav Yehuda said that Rav,

who expounds “to a man a son” with regard to the wayward and rebellious son himself, that he must be a son close to attaining the strength of a man?

We answer:

If so,

since it was needed for the exposition of Rav Yehuda who said that Rav,

let the verse say

simply:

“When there shall be a son of a man,”

which would mean: When the son becomes a man, having entered the status of a man.

Why

did the Torah write:

“When there shall be to a man a son,”

which means that a son will exist “to a man”?

Infer from this

that the Torah comes to teach us

to

expound

as

he expounded,

Rav Ḥisda:

A son will exist “to a man”—but not a son to a son.

We challenge this:

But perhaps,

it is possible to say:

the entire

verse

comes for this purpose,

to teach only Rav Ḥisda’s exposition, “but not a son to a son,” and we should not derive Rav Yehuda’s exposition that Rav taught. From where, then, do we know that a minor is exempt?

We answer:

If so,

if the verse were intended solely for Rav Ḥisda’s exposition,

let the verse say: “A son of a man” [

as a construct phrase], which would be understood to mean: a son of a man, and not a son of a minor.

Why

did the Torah write and place first:

“To a man a son,”

and furthermore add the letter lamed, rather than writing “a son of a man”?

Infer two things:

the two expositions. From the phrase “a son to a man,” the lamed teaches Rav Yehuda’s exposition: a son close to “the strength of a man”; and from the fact that it says “to a man a son” rather than “a son to a man,” we derive Rav Ḥisda’s exposition: a son to a man, but not a son to a son.

And

what Rav Ḥisda said—that a minor who fathered a child is exempt, and that such a situation exists—

disagrees with Rabba,

who maintains that a minor cannot father a child.

As Rabba said: A minor cannot father a child.

And he derives this from what is stated in the passage concerning the robbery of a convert.

The Torah says (Numbers 5): “When a man or a woman commits any of the sins of man, acting treacherously against the Lord, and that soul is guilty, they shall confess their sin that they committed, and he shall restore his guilt offering in its principal amount, and add its fifth to it, and give it to the one to whom he is liable.

And if the man has no redeemer

to whom to restore the guilt offering, the guilt offering that is restored to the Lord shall belong to the koen.”

This is difficult:

Can you find a person in Israel who has no redeemer?!

If he has no close redeemer, he has a distant redeemer, as long as the descendants of Jacob our forefather have not ceased to exist.

Rather, the verse speaks of

a robbery from

the convert,

who indeed has no redeemer. If one robbed him, swore falsely to him, and the convert died without a redeemer to whom the robber could return the stolen property [the principal] and its fifth, the Torah obligates him to return it to the koen.