Sanhedrin 68a (סח.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara asks:

But

this matter,

Rabbi Akiva learned from Rabbi Yehoshua

and learned

it

—this matter of uprooting cucumbers—yet below it is demonstrated that this is not so?

And it was taught in a beraita: When Rabbi Eliezer fell ill, Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues entered to visit him. He was sitting in

the midst of

his canopy [A canopy consists of four posts with a covering spread over them.]

[a canopy consists of four posts, with a curtain spread over them].

And they were sitting in his reception hall

because they did not know whether they were permitted to enter his presence on account of his illness

. And that day was the eve of Shabbat. And his son Hyrcanus entered to remove

the

tefillin

of his father. Because he thought that Shabbat is not a time for tefillin. And if so, it is prohibited to put them on, lest he go out wearing them into the public domain, thereby transferring an object from one domain to another.

His father, Rabbi Eliezer, rebuked him,

and

he went out

the son

under reprimand. He said to

Hyrcanus

to

Rabbi Akiva and

his colleagues

who were waiting there:

I imagine that my father's mind has become confused,

and he is close to death. For had his mind been settled, he would have removed the tefillin and would not have sent me out under reprimand!

Rabbi Eliezer heard this and

said to them:

It is not my mind that has become confused, but

his mind and his mother's mind have become confused.

And why? —

How can they set aside

the

prohibition carrying a punishment of stoning,

meaning that they are not occupied with matters of Shabbat whose violation incurs stoning,

and

instead

are occupied with

a matter that entails only

a rabbinic prohibition.

Since one who wears tefillin on Shabbat does not perform prohibited labor. Even if he goes out into the public domain, there is no labor of carrying involved here; it is prohibited only by rabbinic decree.

When the Sages saw that his mind was settled, they entered and sat before him at a distance of four cubits

for he had been placed under a ban, and it is prohibited to sit within four cubits of a person under a ban.

He said to them,

Rabbi Eliezer:

Why have you come?

They said to him: We have come to study Torah.

He said to them: And until now, why did you not come? They said to him: We did not have time. He said to them: I wonder

I wonder

whether they will die their own deaths

by natural means, or whether they will be put to death through suffering!

Rabbi Akiva said to him: What will be my death?

Meaning, by what means will I die?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Your death

will be more difficult than theirs.

For you are my disciple and your heart is open like a hall. Had you come to me to study, you would have learned much Torah!

Rabbi Eliezer took

his

two arms and placed them upon his heart

and

said: Woe to you, my two arms, which are like two Torah scrolls that are being rolled up,

concealing everything written in them. So too, the Torah in my heart will disappear and be concealed, because they did not accept it or learn from me.

Rabbi Eliezer continued:

I studied much Torah, and I taught much Torah.

I studied much Torah —

and I did not detract from my teachers

anything of what they possessed in excess of me; that is, I reduced the gap between them and me only slightly —

even

as a dog lapping from the sea.

He further said:

I taught much Torah, and my students did not detract from me

—

they did not accept from my wisdom and did not reduce the gap between them and me

except as

what a

brush

placed

in a tube draws out.

can remove.

Moreover, I teach three hundred halakhot concerning bright baheret,

in the laws of the appearances of afflictions,

and no person ever asked me anything about them,

meaning that no one was able to descend to the depths of my understanding and ask me about these laws.

Moreover, I teach three hundred halakhot, and some say

that Rabbi Eliezer said:

three thousand halakhot concerning

the practices of sorcery involving

the planting of cucumbers

—that is, concerning this act of sorcery by which an entire field is filled with cucumbers,

and no person ever asked me anything about them, except Akiva ben Yosef!

And this was the matter:

Once, he and I were walking along the road. He said to me,

Akiva ben Yosef:

Rabbi, teach me

how

cucumbers are planted

through sorcery.

I said one statement

of this sorcery,

and the entire field was filled with cucumbers!

He said to me: Rabbi, you have taught me how to plant them

through sorcery. Now

teach me how to uproot them!

I said one statement, and they all gathered

all the cucumbers

in one place!

They asked him

the Sages who were with him, what is the status of

the ball

—a ball covered with leather, whose interior is filled with compacted wool.

And the mold

—something like a leather shoe, densely packed inside with wool and hair and closed on all sides. It was used as a form by shoemakers, and they made shoes over it.

And the amulet

—something like a small leather pouch, filled inside, which they hung around the neck for adornment.

And the bundle of pearls

—the pearl is sewn inside leather, and this is hung around the animal's neck for healing.

And a small weight

—a weight made of lead, wrapped in leather so that it would not wear down and become diminished in measure.

All of these,

what

is their status?

For Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disputed this matter in the Order of Tohorot [Tractate Kelim, chapter 23]: whether a leather utensil made to remain permanently filled, such as these, which are designed always to be filled, contracts impurity or not. The opinion of the Sages is that they do not contract impurity, since they are made to be filled and therefore are not considered to have a receptacle.

Rabbi Eliezer's opinion, by contrast, is that they do contract impurity. For Rabbi Eliezer holds that anything that has a receptacle contracts impurity, even if that receptacle was made with the intention that it be filled.

Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages also disputed the matter when the ball and the mold became torn and the cavity within them became visible. The Sages agree that these utensils contract impurity, since once they have been torn they have a receptacle.

They now disputed the matter of immersing these utensils: Does the compacted wool inside them constitute an interposition with regard to immersion, or does it not constitute an interposition?

The opinion of the Sages is that it constitutes an interposition. Rabbi Eliezer, by contrast, holds that it does not constitute an interposition, because both the outer leather and the wool inside are one utensil.

The Sages now asked Rabbi Eliezer what the status of all these items was. Had Rabbi Eliezer maintained his opinion, or did he now concede to the Sages?

Rabbi Eliezer said to them:

All these utensils made of leather are

impure,

and their purification,

meaning their immersion, is

with what they are.

They are immersed as they are, even though the wool is inside. The wool is not an interposition. I maintain my position, and I do not concede here to the Sages who disputed me.

They asked him further:

A shoe

made over the mold, which is already prepared and can be removed from it, but

that

is still

on the mold—what is its status,

does it contract impurity?

They also disputed this matter. The opinion of the Sages is that it contracts impurity, since it is already complete and does not require the work of a craftsman, as even an ordinary person can remove it from the mold. Rabbi Eliezer, however, holds that it is pure, because as long as it has not been removed from the mold, its manufacture is not complete and it does not contract impurity.

Rabbi Eliezer said to them: It,

the shoe, is

pure, and his soul departed in purity!

Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: The vow has been released, the vow has been released!

The ban under which they had placed Rabbi Eliezer had been lifted.

On the conclusion of Shabbat,

he encountered

Rabbi Akiva

on their way

from Caesarea to Lod,

where they were carrying the bier of the deceased and accompanying him.

And

Rabbi Akiva was striking his flesh

because of his grief,

until his blood flowed to the ground.

He began a lament over him

in which they all stood around the deceased for the eulogy,

and said: [II Kings 2:12]

“

My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and its horsemen.”

I have many coins, but I have no money changer to put them into circulation.

That is, I have many questions, but I have no one to ask!

And from all this we learn:

It is evident

from here that Rabbi Akiva

learned it from Rabbi Eliezer,

that he learned the laws of planting cucumbers from Rabbi Eliezer and not from Rabbi Yehoshua, as was brought in the Mishna.

And the Gemara answers: Indeed,

he learned it from Rabbi Eliezer but did not understand it,

he learned it without understanding the matter.

Afterward

he

learned it

and

Rabbi Yehoshua explained it to him,

explaining his understanding of the matter.

The Gemara asks:

How could he do this,

how could Rabbi Eliezer perform an act involving the planting of cucumbers,

when we learned

in our Mishna:

One who performs an act —

is liable?!

And the Gemara answers: Since he did this

in order to teach,

to teach Rabbi Akiva these matters and not as an act of sorcery,

it is different,

and it is permitted.

As the Master said: [Deuteronomy 18:9–10]

“

You shall not learn to do.”

In order

to do —

you may not learn.

But you may learn in order to understand and to instruct

the matter to students.

We shall return to you, chapter “The Four Forms of Capital Punishment.”

Its nature

A wayward and rebellious son is a son who deviates from the proper path; and “rebellious” means that he refuses to heed his father’s words. He is a glutton and a drunkard, and after he is admonished and flogged, he does not retract and continues in his rebelliousness—he is liable to stoning.

As the Torah says (Deuteronomy 21): “If a man has a son who is wayward and rebellious, he does not hearken to the voice of his father or the voice of his mother, and they admonish him, but he does not hearken to them. Then his father and his mother shall seize him and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of his place. And they shall say to the elders of his city: ‘This son of ours is wayward and rebellious; he does not hearken to our voice; he is a glutton and a drunkard.’ And all the men of his city shall pelt him with stones and he shall die; and you shall eradicate the evil from your midst, and all Israel shall hear and fear.”

Its rationale

The Ramban, of blessed memory, wrote in his commentary on the Torah: “Behold, there are two punishments applicable to him. The first is that he demeans his father and mother and rebels against them; and the second is that he is a glutton and a drunkard—he violates what we were commanded: ‘You shall be holy’ (Leviticus 19)! And it is further stated (Deuteronomy 13): ‘You shall serve Him, and cleave to Him...’ We were commanded to know God in all our ways, whereas a glutton and a drunkard does not know the way of God.”

In general, he has not yet committed a capital offense, but he is judged on account of his ultimate end, as our Sages mentioned. This is the meaning of “and all Israel shall hear and fear”: He was not executed because of the magnitude of his sin, but in order to discipline the community through him and prevent him from becoming a stumbling block to others.

Its warning

From where is there a warning concerning a wayward and rebellious son? The verse says (Leviticus 19): “You shall not eat over the blood” (Sanhedrin 63a).

Rashi explained: Do not eat an eating for which you will be put to death.

The Rambam wrote (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 195): “He warned us against being gluttonous and drunken in food and drink during the period of youth and under the conditions specified in the law of the wayward and rebellious son. This is what He said: ‘You shall not eat over the blood.’”

The explanation is that a wayward and rebellious son is among those liable to a court-imposed death penalty, and the Torah’s stated mode of execution for him is stoning. It has already been explained... that everyone who is liable to a court-imposed death penalty is subject to a negative commandment... Therefore, once we know that a gluttonous and drunken son—under the aforementioned conditions—is sentenced to stoning, we necessarily know that this act is what he was warned against, and the punishment has thereby been explained.

Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the warning, since the Torah does not punish unless it first warns.

And what is the warning? The wording of the Gemara of Sanhedrin is: “From where is there a warning concerning a wayward and rebellious son? The verse says: ‘You shall not eat over the blood’”—that is to say: Do not eat an eating that leads to the shedding of blood.

This is the eating of the wayward and rebellious son for which he is liable to death; and when he eats that evil meal in those improper ways, he has already violated a negative commandment.

Its laws

The laws of the wayward and rebellious son—when and how he becomes liable to stoning, as explained in this chapter—are numerous and apply only under specific, highly restrictive conditions. So much so that there are tanna’im who maintain: “There never was and never will be a wayward and rebellious son; why, then, was this written? Expound it and receive reward!”

These restrictive laws, some of which appear unreasonable, are derived from a scriptural decree, as they said in the Jerusalem Gemara (halakha 1):

Rabbi Yasa said: All these matters do not accord with reason but are the reverse [all the matters stated concerning the wayward and rebellious son are contrary to logical reasoning; logically, we would have said the opposite of these matters—Penei Moshe].

It was taught: You can know that this is so. Who would logically be liable—the son or the daughter? You must say: the daughter [it is logically more appropriate to hold the daughter liable, since this behavior is not characteristic of her, than the son, for whom it is characteristic—Penei Moshe]. Yet the Torah exempted the daughter and held the son liable!

Who would logically be liable—the minor or the adult? You must say: the adult [that is, the older one; logically, he should be held more liable than one younger than he—Penei Moshe]. Yet the Torah exempted the adult and held the minor liable!

Who would logically be liable—the one who steals from others or the one who steals from his father? You must say: the one who steals from others [for this is the more severe form of bad upbringing—Penei Moshe]. Yet the Torah exempted the one who steals from others and held liable the one who steals from his father and mother, to teach you that all these matters are solely a royal decree [and you are not permitted to question it or seek the rationale for the matter—Penei Moshe].

Our Mishna explains who becomes a wayward and rebellious son, and at what time [age].