Sanhedrin 62a — the Talmud in English

And if he did not accept it upon himself as a deity,

but bowed to it for the honor of the king, if so

it is nothing!

And why should we obligate him to bring a sin-offering?

Rather, is it not so

that necessarily, the case is one in which he bowed to it knowing that it was worshipped, but he did not do so as an acceptance of divinity,

but out of love and fear

of a human being. And he erred in thinking that there is no prohibition against worshipping something that is worshipped when he does so out of love for a human being, or because of his fear of him.

And this is called “an unwitting act,” and not unawareness of the matter, because his error is not concerning the fundamental prohibition of idolatry, but rather he thinks that there is no prohibition when he does so out of love or fear of a human being. His error is considered “unawareness of the matter” only when he errs concerning the fundamental prohibition of idolatry—for example, when he errs and thinks that a particular form of worship is not prohibited at all.

And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi, because they hold that a High Priest is not liable to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting act concerning idolatry, but only for unawareness of the matter, as with the other mitzvot.

And Abaye proves from here his statement, that for unwitting idolatry out of love and fear, one is liable.

And Rava could say to you: No!

You cannot bring proof from here, because if he erred and thought that it was permitted to worship idolatry out of love for a human being or fear of him, since he did not accept it upon himself as a deity, this is not idolatry, and everyone is exempt for it. Rather, the beraita is speaking

of “one who says, ‘It is permitted.’”

He thought that it was permitted to worship an idol.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

“One who says, ‘It is permitted’”—

that is unawareness of the matter!

And not an unwitting act; and concerning unawareness of the matter of a High Priest regarding idolatry, the Rabbis and Rabbi did not disagree, for he is liable!?

And Rava explains his statement: When I said that the beraita is speaking of one who says, “It is permitted,” I meant to say

of one who says, “It is entirely permitted.”

He thinks that there is no prohibition of idolatry at all in the Torah, and the Rabbis hold that such an error is not included in “unawareness of the matter” for which a High Priest is liable.

For

“unawareness of the matter”

is only in a case of

upholding part and annulling part,

where he knows some of the prohibitions of forms of worship of idolatry, but errs concerning one of them—for example, he thinks that bowing was not prohibited. Only then is a High Priest liable for it, according to the Rabbis. Whereas Rabbi considers “one who says, ‘It is entirely permitted’” an unwitting act, and he is liable for it.

Rabbi Zakkai taught before Rabbi Yoḥanan:

The prohibition against worshipping idolatry, in all forms of worship, is included in the Torah under one general prohibition: [Exodus 20,] “You shall not worship them.” Therefore, one who performs several forms of worship, for example,

slaughtered

[slaughtered a sacrifice]

and burned incense, and poured a libation, and bowed,

if he performed all these forms of worship

in one period of unawareness—

he is liable only

for one

sin-offering.

Because the Torah did not divide the forms of worship into separate prohibitions.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him,

to Rabbi Zakkai, who had taught this beraita before him:

Go out and teach it outside!

Go out and teach it outside; that is to say, you are mistaken, and you should not teach it before me.

Rabbi Abba said: That which Rabbi Zakkai said—

the matter depends on the

dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Natan

concerning the division of sin-offerings for distinct labors of Shabbat.

As it was taught:

The labor of

kindling

on Shabbat, which the Torah prohibited as a separate prohibition: “You shall not kindle fire in any of your settlements on the day of Shabbat” —

was singled out for a prohibition,

to say that it was removed from the general category of the severe labors of Shabbat stated in the verse, “You shall not do any labor,” for which one is liable to karet and death, and it is prohibited only by a prohibition, for which one receives lashes but is not liable to death,

the words of Rabbi Yosei.

And Rabbi Natan says:

Kindling

was singled out to divide.

It was not removed from the general category so that it would be divided from it. Rather, on the contrary, it was singled out to be discussed separately, in order to teach from it concerning all the labors of Shabbat, that each primary category of labor on Shabbat should be considered a separate labor in its own right. Therefore, if one performs several distinct primary categories of labor on Shabbat in one period of unawareness, he is liable for each primary category of labor, a separate sin-offering for each one.

And Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Natan disagree concerning everything that was included in a general category and was singled out from the general category: whether it was singled out to teach about itself, or whether it was singled out to teach about the entire general category.

And Rabbi Abba explains:

According to the one who says

[Rabbi Yosei]

that kindling was singled out for a prohibition—

bowing

to idolatry

was also singled out for a prohibition.

According to the one who says

[Rabbi Natan]

that kindling was singled out to divide—

bowing was also singled out to divide.

For here too they disagree over the same matter: when something was included in a general category, and Scripture removed it from the general category and wrote it separately, whether it was singled out to teach about itself, that it is removed from the general category and is not included in the liability for death; or whether it was singled out to teach about the entire general category, to say that there is a division of sin-offerings for each act in its own right.

Because the prohibition against bowing to idolatry is stated in the Torah three times. Once it is stated concerning bowing to idolatry in its customary manner of worship, and the second time concerning bowing in a manner that is not its customary manner of worship. And concerning the third time, Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Natan will disagree whether it comes to divide the liability for sin-offerings for each separate act of worship, or whether it comes to remove bowing from the general category of forms of worship derived from the verse, “You shall not worship them,” and to say that one is liable for bowing only by a prohibition and not by karet, and therefore there is no liability of a sin-offering for it.

Therefore, the tanna of Rabbi Zakkai, who holds that there is no division of sin-offerings for idolatry, holds that bowing

Rab Yosef challenges it: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei said only there

in that case,

on Shabbat, where

kindling was singled out for a prohibition,

because

he derives from it

that Rabbi Yosei derives from it the teaching of

the division of labors,

to make one liable for a sin-offering for each labor and labor, from the words of the verse in the passage of the sin-offering [Leviticus 4,]

“from one of them.”

Therefore, only concerning Shabbat does Rabbi Yosei hold that kindling was singled out for a prohibition, because there is no need for it to teach about the division of sin-offerings. But concerning idolatry, where there is no teaching about the division of sin-offerings, perhaps Rabbi Yosei will hold that bowing was singled out to divide, to teach about the division of sin-offerings, and was not singled out for a prohibition!

As it was taught, Rabbi Yosei says:

It is stated in the passage of the sin-offering,

“And he performs one of them.”

The verse teaches that there are

times when one is liable

for one sin-offering

for all of them,

for many acts—for example, one whose unwitting error was “an unwitting error concerning Shabbat,” who knew all the prohibitions of the labors on Shabbat, but erred concerning that particular day of Shabbat, thinking that it was a weekday. Therefore, he brings one sacrifice for the unwitting error concerning Shabbat, because one error caused him to perform many acts of labor.

And there are

times when one is liable

for a sin-offering

for each one individually,

for example, when he knows that today is Shabbat and knows some of the labors of Shabbat, but does not know another part of the labors of Shabbat, and performed many labors because he did not know them. In that case he is liable for a sin-offering for each labor and labor, because there are many errors here.

And Rabbi Yonatan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei?

How did Rabbi Yosei expound his statement from this verse?—

As it is written, “And he performs one of them.”

But Scripture could have said, “And he performs one of them,” without needing to say “from one.”

Or Scripture could have said, “And he performs from them,” without writing “one” at all.

Or Scripture could have said, “And he performs one,” without writing “of them.”

Rather, this verse comes to be expounded from it as follows:

He is liable for

“one,”

and he is also liable for

“from one.”

He is liable for

“them,”

and he is also liable for

“of them.”

And from the juxtaposition of the words, one can also learn that:

There are times when one is liable for many sin-offerings for the prohibition of labor on Shabbat—that is, one

“one” that is “of them.”

And

there are times when he is liable for

“them,” which is “one.”

And Rabbi Yonatan explains his statement:

He is liable for

“one”—

the intention is to a person who writes one complete word on Shabbat, such as one who writes

“Shimon.”

And sometimes he is liable for

“from one,”

for part of the word that he intended to write—this is one who writes the first two letters of the word Shimon,

who writes “there” from Shimon,

and he is liable for them, just as he is liable for “one,” even though his labor is not completed, since he intended to write Shimon.

And this liability applies specifically because the word “there” has meaning as part of Shimon. But if he intended to write the word Naftali, and wrote only its first two letters, “naf,” he is not liable, since the word “naf” has no meaning at all.

He is liable for

“them”—

primary categories

of labor on Shabbat.

He is also liable for

“of them”—

derivative categories

of the labors of Shabbat, which are derived from the primary categories of labor; and this is “of them,” because they resemble them.

And what I said,

“one that is of them,”

that one is liable for many sin-offerings for one transgression of labor on Shabbat, refers to

intentional awareness of Shabbat,

where he knows that today is Shabbat,

and unwittingness concerning the labors,

“them that is one”—

an unwitting error concerning Shabbat and intentional awareness concerning the labors.

And Rav Yosef concludes his statement:

But here,

concerning idolatry,

where he does not derive the division of labors from another place,

for I have no source from which to learn the division of sin-offerings for different forms of worship—

everyone

holds that

bowing was singled out to divide,

and was not singled out for a prohibition!

And now the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Abba, who establishes the statement of Rabbi Zakkai according to Rabbi Yosei, and holds that bowing was singled out for a prohibition and not to divide, and therefore one is liable for several forms of worship only one sin-offering:

The division of labors concerning idolatry should also be derived

from that same exposition of

“from one of them,”

for this teaching was not stated only concerning Shabbat, but was stated concerning liability for a sin-offering, and it was stated as follows:

“One”

—that he performed one act of worship of

slaughtering.

“From one,”

that he slaughtered the animal only

one sign

of the two signs, and thereby performed only part of the act of worship.

“Them”

—primary categories,

which are

slaughtering, burning incense, pouring a libation, and bowing,

which are explicitly explained in the Torah.

“Of them”

—derivative categories,

such as a derivative of slaughtering, when he

breaks a stick before it,

for breaking the stick resembles breaking the neck. And similarly, when this was its customary practice.

“One” that is “them”

—there are times when one is liable for many sin-offerings for one act of worship of idolatry, as when there was

intentional awareness of idolatry,

where he knew that it was prohibited to slaughter for idolatry,

and unwittingness concerning the forms of worship,

where he thought that only slaughtering was prohibited, but the other forms of worship were not prohibited, and he performed them.

“Them that is one,”

there are times when one is liable for one sin-offering for many forms of worship, when he had

an unwitting error concerning idolatry and intentional awareness concerning the forms of worship,

as the Gemara will explain below.

And the Gemara discusses:

This unwitting error concerning idolatry,

in which you wished to establish the words of the verse in the passage of the sin-offering,

what are the circumstances?

How is it possible!? For it is impossible to establish the verse, “And he performs one of them,” also concerning idolatry, and consequently you cannot derive from there anything concerning the division of forms of worship in idolatry!

For

if he thinks it is a synagogue, and bows to it—

his heart is toward Heaven,

Rather, it is that he saw a statue

of the king

and bowed to it,

and bowed to it.

If he accepted it upon himself

as a deity, then

he is intentional,

and not unwitting!

If he did not accept it upon himself—

it is nothing.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the case is one in which he worshipped it

out of love and fear.

That works well according to Abaye, who says that he is liable.

But according to Rava, who says that he is exempt, what can be said!?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the case is one of

one who says, “It is permitted,”

to worship idolatry, because he thinks that there is no prohibition of idolatry in the Torah. And this indeed is not “an unwitting error concerning idolatry and intentional awareness concerning the forms of worship,” which we wished to state; rather, he has unawareness of both matters. Nevertheless, it is possible to establish the words of the verse, “them that is one,” in this manner, to say that he is liable for one sin-offering for many forms of worship.

If so, this is difficult:

resolve

from here that which

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: “If he has unawareness of both matters, what is the law?”

Resolve

from here

that he is liable only one!

And the Gemara answers:

This is not difficult, and resolve it!

But the Gemara argues:

Can you establish these verses—

“one” and “them,” stated concerning the sin-offering—

with regard to idolatry!?

For here,

concerning liability for a sin-offering for all the mitzvot,

it is written concerning the anointed priest

that he is obligated to bring

a bull, and concerning a ruler a goat, and concerning an ordinary individual a female sheep or female goat.

Whereas concerning idolatry, we learned: “And they agree

that the anointed priest and the ruler

are as an ordinary individual with regard to a female goat”!?

And nothing more!

This is an objection for which there is no answer!

When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came, he said: