Sanhedrin 62b — the Talmud in English

This is what the tanna taught

Rabbi Zakkai

before

Rabbi Yohanan:

There is greater stringency with regard to Shabbat than with regard to the other mitzvot, and greater stringency with regard to the other mitzvot than with regard to Shabbat.

The greater stringency with regard to Shabbat —

that Shabbat,

if

he performed

on it

two

acts of labor

in one lapse of awareness —

he is liable for each and every one.

Which is not so with regard to the other mitzvot.

And as the Gemara will explain below.

The greater stringency with regard to the other mitzvot —

for with regard to the other mitzvot,

if

he erred without intending,

that he did not intend to perform this act, but rather intended to perform another act, and this act came about through him,

he is liable. Which is not so with regard to Shabbat.

And as the Gemara will explain below.

The Master said: There is greater stringency with regard to Shabbat, for if on Shabbat he performed two acts of labor

in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one, which is not so with regard to the other mitzvot.

And the Gemara discusses:

What are the circumstances? If we say that he performed

in one lapse of awareness

reaping and grinding,

which are two distinct primary categories of labor,

what is its equivalent with regard to the other mitzvot

is meant,

that he ate forbidden fat and blood,

behold, it is impossible to say so, for

here he is liable for two, and here he is liable for two!

Rather, with regard to the other mitzvot, where he is liable for only one, what are the circumstances? —

That he ate forbidden fat, and

he returned once more, in that same lapse of awareness, and ate

forbidden fat.

What is its equivalent with regard to Shabbat —

that he performed reaping and reaping.

But this too is not correct, for

here he is liable for one, and here he is liable for one!

And this is what he said to him

Rabbi Yohanan to Rabbi Zakkai:

Go teach this outside!

Teach this outside, since this is not correct.

But the Gemara is astonished:

What difficulty is there? Perhaps I will say to you that he performed

on Shabbat

reaping and grinding, and what we said,

“

which is not so with regard to the other mitzvot,”

that he is liable for only one —

we have arrived at idolatry, in accordance with Rabbi Ami.

For Rabbi Ami said: If he slaughtered, burned incense, and poured a libation, in one lapse of awareness —

he is liable for only one.

But the Gemara rejects this:

It cannot be established for him

for this beraita of Rabbi Zakkai, what it said, “which is not so with regard to the other mitzvot,”

with regard to idolatry,

because

it teaches in its latter clause: There is greater stringency with regard to the other mitzvot, for with regard to the other mitzvot, he erred without intending —

he is liable.

Ordinary inadvertence is when he thought that a piece of forbidden fat was permitted fat, and he took it and ate it. But “he erred without intending” is when there was melted forbidden fat in his mouth, and he thought it was saliva, and swallowed it. This manner is called mitasek, and he is liable for it in eating forbidden fat [and likewise with forbidden sexual relations], because he derives benefit.

What are the circumstances of one who erred without intending with regard to idolatry?

If he thought it was a synagogue and bowed to it —

behold, his heart was directed toward Heaven,

and it turns out that he bowed to Heaven, and there is no act of transgression here at all.

Rather, it is a case where he saw a monument and bowed to it.

If he accepted it upon himself as a deity —

he is intentional; but if he did not accept it upon himself —

it is nothing.

Rather,

one who erred without intending with regard to idolatry is, for example, one who served idolatry

out of love or fear

of a person, for he erred in this, thinking that it was permitted to bow to idolatry when he does so out of love or fear of a person; and he did not intend to serve idolatry, but bowed because of love or fear of a person.

This works out well according to Abaye, who says that he is liable.

But according to Rava, who says that he is exempt —

what can be said?

Rather,

the Gemara establishes that it is speaking

of one who says: It is permitted

to serve idolatry. For such an error is called “without intending,” since he does not know at all about the prohibition of idolatry.

And the Gemara is astonished: Correspondingly, it is stated in the beraita with regard to Shabbat:

which is not so with regard to Shabbat —

for he is entirely exempt.

And if you establish that the beraita is speaking of one who entirely says, “It is permitted,” the difficulty is: After all,

Rava did not ask Rav Naḥman

in the case of

unawareness of both this and that,

unawareness of Shabbat and unawareness of the prohibition of labors on Shabbat [which is the equivalent of one who entirely says “It is permitted” with regard to idolatry],

except whether to make him liable for one or to make him liable for two,

but

that he is entirely exempt—there is no one who says so!

And the Gemara rejects this:

What difficulty is there?

Perhaps I will say to you that, in fact, the first clause

of the beraita taught by Rabbi Zakkai is speaking

with regard to idolatry. And

whereas

the latter clause

is speaking

with regard to the other mitzvot.

And he erred without intending —

for he thought: It is saliva, and he swallows it.

Which is not so with regard to Shabbat, for he is exempt —

for he intended to lift the object that had already been detached

on Shabbat,

but he cut something attached, he is exempt.

And this is in accordance with what Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel, for he said: One who acts unintentionally with regard to forbidden fats and forbidden sexual relations —

is liable, since he derives benefit. One who acts unintentionally with regard to Shabbat —

is exempt, for the Torah prohibited a deliberate labor.

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yohanan,

who did not agree to establish Rabbi Zakkai’s beraita in this manner, follows

his own view, for he does not establish a teaching

in separate ways, so that its

first clause follows one rationale, and its latter clause follows one rationale,

as we find

that Rabbi Yohanan said: Whoever explains to me

the Mishna of

“barrel”

according to a single tanna —

I will carry his garments after him to the bathhouse.

I will take his garments after him to the bathhouse; that is, I will accept his authority upon myself and be prepared to serve him.