Sanhedrin 62b (סב:) — the Talmud in English

This is what

Rabbi Zakkai

taught in the presence of

Rabbi Yohanan:

There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat over other mitzvot, and a stringency with regard to other mitzvot over Shabbat.

The stringency with regard to Shabbat—

that with regard to Shabbat,

if he

performed

in it

two

acts of labor

in one lapse of awareness—

he is liable for each and every one.

Which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot.

As the Gemara will explain below.

The stringency with regard to other mitzvot—

that with regard to other mitzvot,

if

he sinned unwittingly without intending to do the act,

meaning that he did not intend to perform this act, but intended to perform another act, and this act resulted from his action,

he is liable. Which is not the case with regard to Shabbat.

As the Gemara will explain below.

The Master said: There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat, that with regard to Shabbat, if he performed two acts

in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one, which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot.

And the Gemara discusses this:

What are the circumstances? If we say that he performed

in one lapse of awareness

reaping and grinding,

which are two distinct primary categories of labor,

then, with regard to other mitzvot,

the case

would be that he ate forbidden fat and blood,

it cannot be said so, because

here he is liable to bring two offerings, and here he is liable to bring two offerings!

Rather, with regard to other mitzvot, where he is liable to bring only one offering, what are the circumstances?

That he ate forbidden fat, and

then, again, during that same lapse of awareness, he ate

forbidden fat.

Then, correspondingly, with regard to Shabbat,

the case would be that he performed reaping and reaping.

That too cannot be correct, because

here he is liable to bring one offering, and here he is liable to bring one offering!

And this is what

Rabbi Yohanan said to Rabbi Zakkai:

Go teach this outside!

Teach it outside, as it is not correct.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

What is the difficulty? Perhaps I could say that he performed

with regard to Shabbat

reaping and grinding,

and what we said,

“which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot,”

where he is liable to bring only one offering—

refers to idolatry, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami.

As Rabbi Ami said: If one slaughtered an animal, burned incense, and poured a libation, all in one lapse of awareness,

he is liable to bring only one offering.

But the Gemara rejects this:

The matter cannot be established for him

in this baraita of Rabbi Zakkai, where it says, “which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot,”

as referring to idolatry,

because

it teaches in the latter clause: There is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot, that with regard to other mitzvot, if he sinned unwittingly without intending to do the act—

he is liable.

Ordinary unwitting transgression is when he thought that a piece of forbidden fat was permitted fat, took it, and ate it. “Unwittingly without intending to do the act,” by contrast, is when there was melted forbidden fat in his mouth and he thought it was saliva, and swallowed it. This is called mitasek, and one is liable for it when eating forbidden fat [and likewise with regard to forbidden sexual relations], because he derives pleasure.

In the case of unwittingly without intending to do the act with regard to idolatry, what are the circumstances?

If he thought it was a synagogue and bowed to it—

his heart was directed toward Heaven,

and it turns out that he bowed to Heaven; there is no transgressive act here at all.

Rather, the case is that he saw a statue and bowed to it.

If he accepted it upon himself as a deity—

he acted intentionally; but if he did not accept it upon himself—

it is nothing.

Rather,

the case of unwittingly without intending to do the act with regard to idolatry is one in which he worshipped idolatry

out of love or fear

of a person—he erred in thinking that it was permitted to bow to idolatry when doing so out of love or fear of a person. He did not intend to worship idolatry; rather, he bowed because of his love or fear of a person.

This works well according to Abaye, who says that he is liable.

But according to Rava, who says that he is exempt,

what can be said?

Rather,

the Gemara establishes that the case is one

of one who says that it is permitted

to worship idolatry—an error of this sort is called “not intending,” as he is entirely unaware of the prohibition of idolatry.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Correspondingly, it is stated in the baraita with regard to Shabbat:

“Which is not the case with regard to Shabbat”—

as he is entirely exempt.

And if you establish that the baraita is speaking of one who entirely says that it is permitted, the following difficulty arises:

Rava did not ask Rav Naḥman

in the case of

a lapse of awareness of both matters,

a lapse of awareness regarding Shabbat and a lapse of awareness regarding the prohibition of the acts of labor on Shabbat [which corresponds to one who entirely says that it is permitted with regard to idolatry],

anything other than whether he is liable to bring one offering or whether he is liable to bring two offerings;

but

that he is entirely exempt—there is no one who says that!

The Gemara rejects this:

What is the difficulty?

Perhaps I could say that the first clause

of the baraita taught by Rabbi Zakkai speaks

of idolatry. And

whereas the

latter clause

speaks

of other mitzvot.

And he sinned unwittingly without intending to do the act—

as he thought: It is saliva, and he swallowed it.

Which is not the case with regard to Shabbat, as he is exempt—

he intended to lift an object that had already been detached

on Shabbat

but cut something attached to the ground; he is exempt.

And this is in accordance with what Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: One who engages in an unintended act involving forbidden fat or forbidden sexual relations—

is liable, since he derives pleasure. One who engages in an unintended act on Shabbat—

is exempt, as the Torah prohibited only purposive labor.

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yohanan,

who did not agree to establish Rabbi Zakkai’s baraita in this manner, follows

his own reasoning, as he does not establish a baraita

in divergent ways, such that the

first clause has one rationale, and the latter clause has another rationale,

as we find

that Rabbi Yohanan said: Whoever translates for me

the Mishna of

“barrel”

according to a single tanna—

I will carry his garments after him to the bathhouse.

I will follow him with all his belongings to the bathhouse; that is, I will accept his authority and be prepared to serve him.