Sanhedrin 61b — the Talmud in English

What is the difference between him and our own [gods], that we should worship him!?

By what is he different from us, that we should worship him

? And the “no” that they say -

they are mocking him.

And what they answered him, “Yes,” was laughter that they made of his words.

And our Mishna,

and the contradiction between the statements of the Mishnayot, we shall resolve:

Here,

the Mishna below, which holds one liable for speech, speaks

of a single person who was incited,

whose agreement with the words of the inciter is an absolute agreement, from which he will not retract, and therefore he is liable for his speech. Whereas the Mishna

here

which says “the one who worships,” implying that the one who says [he will worship] is exempt, speaks

of many who were incited,

who, even after they agreed, are accustomed to regret it and retract; therefore, the agreement of many is not considered like one who “consented and listened.”

And the Gemara explains the distinction between a single person who was incited and many who were incited:

A single person -

does not reconsider,

he does not retract from his agreement to worship,

and he errs after him.

And he follows him in error. But

many reconsider,

they regret it after some time,

and they did not err after him.

Rav Yosef said: From where do I say it

that even according to Rabbi Yehuda one is liable for mere speech?

As it is written

concerning the prohibition against listening to an inciter:

“You shall not consent to him, and you shall not listen to him.”

And it implies:

if he consented and listened -

he is liable

for his agreement in speech, even if he has not yet performed an act.

Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef

against his answer, to distinguish between the Mishnayot between a single person and many:

Is it different, between many who were incited and a single person who was incited?

And it was taught in a baraita: “When your brother, the son of your mother, incites you” -

both a single person who was incited and many who were incited

[in an apostate city].

However,

the verse excluded a single person from the category of many, and many from the category of a single person.

The verse excluded

a single person from the category of many -

to be stringent concerning his body,

to obligate him in stoning, which is stringent,

and to be lenient concerning his property,

which does not go to waste.

And the verse excluded

many

in an apostate city,

from the category of a single person -

to be lenient concerning their bodies,

for their death is by the sword, which is lenient in comparison with stoning,

and to be stringent concerning their property,

which goes to waste.

And Abaye infers from the baraita:

In this matter -

it is that they differ

between many and a single person.

But in all matters \-

they are equivalent!

And it is proven from the baraita that there is no distinction between a single person who was incited and many who were incited.

Rather, Abaye said,

this is how the two Mishnayot should be distinguished:

Here,

our Mishna, which exempts the one who says [he will worship], speaks

of one incited by his own mouth,

whom no person incited, but who said on his own, “I shall worship.” Whereas

here,

the Mishna below, which holds liable the one who says “I shall worship,” speaks

of one incited by the mouth of others.

And Abaye explains the reason for the distinction: One incited

by his own mouth -

reconsiders,

he is destined to regret it, and his agreement is not absolute; therefore he is exempt concerning it. But one incited

by the mouth of others -

is dragged after them,

he is dragged after them and does not retract from his decision.

Abaye said: From where do I say it

that one incited by the mouth of others is liable for his completed decision even without an act?

As it is written, “You shall not consent to him, and you shall not listen to him,”

if he consented and listened -

he is liable.

Rava said

to resolve the contradiction between the Mishnayot:

Both this and that,

the two Mishnayot, speak

of one incited by the mouth of others.

Rather, there is a distinction in the form of the incitement:

This

which holds him liable for a statement speaks of a case

where he said to him

the inciter to the one incited:

“So it eats,”

this idolatry,

“so it drinks, so it benefits, so it harms.”

For then the one incited is convinced and does not retract from his agreement to worship. But

this,

our Mishna, which exempts him for a statement, speaks of a case

where he did not say to him, “So it eats, so it drinks, and so on,”

for then, since the one incited did not hear from the inciter its praise, he retracts from his agreement to worship, and therefore he is not liable on account of “he consented and listened.”

Rava said: From where do I say it? -

As it is written

in the passage concerning an inciter,

“from the gods of the peoples that are around you, those near to you

or those far from you.”

What difference is there to me between those near and those far?

Why did the verse mention this?

Rather,

this is what it says to you: From the goodness of

idols

that are near,

which you recognize and know that they neither eat nor drink,

you learn what is the goodness of

idols

that are far,

which the inciter mentions, praising them.

And Rava infers:

Is it not that he said to him

the inciter to the one incited: This idolatry,

“so it eats, so it drinks, so it benefits, so it harms”?

Conclude from it

that the liability of the one incited for his statement, “I shall worship,” is only in this manner.

Rav Ashi said: The latter clause

which holds liable the one who says “I shall worship” speaks

of an Israelite who has become apostate,

who is not destined to regret it.

Ravina said:

In fact, both Mishnayot speak of an Israelite who has not become apostate, and for one reason; rather, by the method of

“not only this, but also this,” it was taught,

the two Mishnayot. First the tan[n]ay taught in our Mishna “the one who worships,” and afterward he taught the Mishna of “the one who says,” to teach you that not only one who worships is liable, but even one who says [he will worship].

It was stated: One who worships idolatry

intentionally, with warning, or unintentionally, in a manner in which he does not intend to accept it upon himself as a deity, and he does not do this because he wishes to worship it for its sake, but rather does this

out of love

for a particular person, who wishes to give him pleasure by bowing to his idolatry,

and out of fear,

or he does this out of fear of a person, being afraid lest he harm him if he does not bow to it.

And he did this intentionally, or he was mistaken in thinking that it is permitted to worship idolatry when he does so out of love or fear of a person.

Abaye said: He is liable

to death if this was intentional and with warning, and he is liable for a sin-offering if he thought it was permitted to worship in this manner.

Rava said: He is exempt

from anything, both from death when intentional and from a sin-offering when unintentional, since he did not perform at all an act of worship for idolatry, as he did this because of love of a person and fear of him, and did not do this for the sake of its divinity.

And the Gemara explains their words:

Abaye said: He is liable, for he worshiped it.

And the very act of ritual worship makes him liable, even without the intention to worship it for the sake of its divinity.

Rava said: He is exempt,

because only

if he accepted it upon himself as a deity -

yes,

then he is liable. But

if not,

if he worshiped without accepting its divinity -

no.

He is not liable, because he did nothing.

And the Gemara brings the three sources of Abaye, and gives them

a mnemonic: Avad, Yishtahaveh, Lemashiah.

And Abaye said: From where do I say it

that one is liable for idolatry even in this manner?

As we learned

in our Mishna:

“One who worships idolatry” -

whether one who worships,

or one who sacrifices, or one who burns incense.

And seemingly it is difficult: after all, the one who sacrifices and the one who burns incense are included among those who worship; why did the tan[n]ay state in his language, “whether one who worships, whether one who sacrifices, and whether one who burns incense”?

Is it not

necessarily that we should say that his intention is to say:

“whether one who worships out of love or out of fear!”

And thus the tan[n]ay said: whether one who worships even out of fear and love, and whether one who sacrifices for the sake of the divinity of idolatry. And the latter clause, “whether one who sacrifices and whether one who burns incense,” comes to reveal concerning the first clause, “whether one who worships,” that he worships even out of love and fear, and nevertheless he is liable.

And Rava would say to you: No,

there is no proof from the language of the Mishna as you say; rather, it should be established

as Rabbi Yirmeya explains

[on the previous page] the words of the Mishna: “the one who worships” is every worship in its usual manner, while “the one who sacrifices” and “the one who burns incense” are worship not in its usual manner. But the entire Mishna speaks of one who worships for the sake of divinity, for otherwise there is nothing in it.

Further

Abaye said: From where do I say it? -

As it was taught:

[Exodus 20]

“You shall not bow down to them.”

The verse teaches by the word “them” that only

to them,

to the sun, the moon, and the entire host of the heavens,

may you not bow down. But you may bow down to a person like yourself.

One might have thought

that it would be permitted to bow down

even

to a person who made himself into an object of idolatry, and who is

worshiped

by people,

like Haman -

The verse states

[Exodus 20]

“And you shall not worship them.”

From the redundancy of the verse we learn that it is forbidden to bow down to a person who made himself an object “worshiped.”

And Abaye infers:

But Haman,

only

out of fear

of the king who commanded that one bow to him

was he worshiped,

and nevertheless the Torah said, “You shall not worship them.”

And Rava

holds that there is no proof from here for Abaye, for this is what the tan[n]ay in the baraita intends to say: one may not bow down to one who is worshiped

like Haman -

but not like Haman

in actuality.

Like Haman -

for he himself was idolatry,

and therefore it is forbidden to bow down to him.

But not like Haman -

for as for Haman,

they would bow down to him

out of fear,

and this is not considered worship.

But

if

here,

the baraita that forbids worshiping a person who is worshiped

were not

speaking of worship

out of fear,

but of worship for the sake of divinity.

And

further

Abaye said: From where do I say it? -

We learned in tractate Horayot:

a. An individual who sinned unintentionally brings a sin-offering - a female sheep or a female goat.

b. The community that sinned unintentionally as a result of an erroneous ruling of the great court in Jerusalem, for example, the court erred and thought that the fat of the stomach is not considered forbidden fat, but is merely ordinary fat permitted for eating -

the community [or the court, as will be explained in tractate Horayot] is liable to bring a bull as a sin-offering. This offering is called “the bull for the concealed matter of the community.”

In such a case, only this sin-offering bull alone atones, and each individual does not bring a female sheep or female goat as a sin-offering for his error.

c. A High Priest who sinned unintentionally does not bring a sin-offering of a female sheep or female goat, like an individual who sinned; rather, he is liable to bring a bull for his sin-offering.

The offering of the High Priest is called “the bull for the concealed matter of the anointed priest.”

d. The priest brings the bull as a sin-offering for his error only if the error resulted from an erroneous ruling in halakha, in which the High Priest erred and instructed himself to act accordingly. But if the High Priest erred in an unintentional act, like an Israelite individual who sinned unintentionally, he is entirely exempt from an offering.

This law is learned from the words of the verse, “If the anointed priest sins - to the guilt of the people.” Here the verse equated the sin of the priest with the sin of the community, to say that the High Priest brings his bull for the “concealed matter” only if the law was concealed from him, and by virtue of the concealment of the law he sinned. Like the community, which brings a bull for a concealed matter only if it sinned because of the erroneous ruling of the court.

e. When do these words apply? When the sin was in the other mitzvot, concerning which the Torah said that the High Priest does not bring an offering for his sin, a female sheep or female goat like an individual, but brings a bull for a concealed matter.

But if the sin was in the law of idolatry, the High Priest brings an offering like an individual Israelite who sinned in idolatry unintentionally, who brings only a female goat as a sin-offering.

f. A community that sinned unintentionally in idolatry on the basis of an erroneous ruling of the great court, for example, the court erred and ruled concerning a certain act of worship that it is not the customary manner of worship of idolatry, brings a male goat as a sin-offering and a bull as a burnt-offering.

As it was taught:

What is the law of a

anointed priest

who sinned unintentionally

in idolatry -

Rabbi says:

Since the offering of the High Priest for an unintentional act of idolatry is equal to the offering of an individual who sinned in idolatry, a female goat, and differs from the offering of the community, which brings a male goat as a sin-offering and a bull as a burnt-offering, it is proven from here that the law of the High Priest was compared to the law of the community in idolatry only with regard to the other mitzvot. Therefore, in idolatry the priest is liable to bring an offering for his sin

for an unintentional act,

and it is unnecessary that his error be specifically due to an erroneous ruling.

And the Sages say:

Only with regard to the type of offering is the High Priest equal to an individual in idolatry, but not with regard to the manner of the error in performing the sin. Therefore, even in idolatry the High Priest brings a sin-offering only if his error was

through concealment of a matter,

that he erred in his ruling and acted upon it; for example, he erred concerning a certain type of worship and thought that this worship is not considered worship for the idolatry that he worshiped.

And they agree

Rabbi and the Sages, concerning the type of sin-offering brought by the High Priest who sinned in idolatry,

that

his law is

with a female goat -

like an individual.

That is, even the Rabbis, who hold that the law of the High Priest differs from the law of an individual with regard to liability for the offering, so that the High Priest is liable only when he erred in a ruling, agree that he brings the type of offering brought by an individual, only a female goat.

And they agree

Rabbi and the Rabbis, concerning a High Priest who is uncertain whether he sinned unintentionally in a transgression for which one is liable for a sin-offering,

that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering

like an uncertain individual.

And now Abaye argues and proves:

This “unintentional act”

without an unintentional ruling

of idolatry,

for according to Rabbi the High Priest is liable for it for a sin-offering like an ordinary individual,

what are the circumstances?

If he thought

the High Priest mistakenly concerning a house of idolatry that

it was a synagogue, and bowed down to it,

inside it, to the Almighty -

What of it!?

After all, his heart

was to bow

to Heaven,

and he did not worship idolatry at all! If so, what is there in this person’s error or mistake to obligate him for a sin-offering? After all, even if he had been intentional, knowing that it was a house of idolatry, and had bowed down inside it to Heaven, he would also have been exempt, since he worshiped not idolatry but bowed to the Almighty; if so, how can we obligate him for a sin-offering when he erred and did not know that this house was a house of idolatry!?

Rather,

necessarily, it speaks of a case

where he saw a statue,

he saw a statue made in the likeness of the king. There are statues that are worshiped as idolatry, and there are statues that are only for the honor of the king, and one who bows to them honors the king but does not worship him as idolatry. The High Priest saw a statue that people worshiped as idolatry, but he did not know that this statue was among the statues that are worshiped,

and he bowed down to it,

And Abaye argues:

If he accepted it

the likeness of the king’s statue

as a deity,

and because of his acceptance of it as a deity he bowed down to it, then

he is intentional,

and he is liable for death, not for a sin-offering!