Sanhedrin 61b (סא:) — the Talmud in English

Why is he different from our god?

Why is he different from ours, that we should worship him?

And the “no” that they said—

they were mocking him.

And their response of “yes” was simply their making fun of his words.

And as for our Mishna,

we shall resolve the contradiction between the two mishnayot:

Here,

the following Mishna, which holds one liable for mere speech, is speaking

of a single person who was incited,

whose agreement with the words of the inciter is absolute and from which he will not retract; therefore, he is liable for his speech. Whereas the Mishna

here

which says “one who worships,” implying that one who says he will worship is exempt, is speaking

of many people who were incited,

who even after agreeing are accustomed to regret their decision and retract it. Therefore, the agreement of many is not considered equivalent to “he desired and listened.”

The Gemara explains the distinction between a single person who was incited and many who were incited:

A single person—

does not reconsider,

he does not retract his agreement to worship,

and he follows after him.

He follows after him in error. But

many reconsider,

they regret their decision after some time,

and they do not follow after him in error.

Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this

that even according to Rabbi Yehuda one is liable for mere speech?

As it is written

[Deuteronomy 13], concerning the prohibition against listening to an inciter:

“You shall not desire him, nor listen to him.”

And it follows:

If he desired and listened—

he is liable

for his agreement expressed in speech, even if he has not yet performed an act.

Abaye raised an objection

to Rav Yosef, against his resolution distinguishing between the mishnayot on the basis of a single person versus many:

Is there a difference between one who was incited from among many and one who was incited individually?

But it was taught in a beraita: “If your brother, the son of your mother, incites you”—

this applies both to a single person who was incited and to many people who were incited

in an apostate city.

However,

the verse excluded a single person from the category of many, and many from the category of a single person.

The verse excluded

a single person from the category of many—

to be stringent with regard to his body,

to make him liable to stoning, which is severe,

and lenient with regard to his property,

which is not destroyed.

And the verse excluded

many

in an apostate city

from the category of a single person—

to be lenient with regard to their bodies,

as their execution is by the sword, which is less severe than stoning,

and stringent with regard to their property,

which is destroyed.

Abaye infers from the beraita:

In this matter

is there a difference

between many and a single person.

But in every other matter—

they are equivalent!

It is thus evident from the beraita that there is no distinction between a single person who was incited and many who were incited.

Rather, Abaye said,

the two mishnayot must be distinguished as follows:

Here,

our Mishna, which exempts one who merely says he will worship, is speaking

of one incited on his own initiative,

whom no one incited; rather, he said on his own, “I will worship.” Whereas

here,

the following Mishna, which holds one who says “I will worship” liable, is speaking

of one incited by others.

Abaye explains the reason for the distinction: One incited

on his own initiative—

reconsiders;

he is destined to regret his decision, and his agreement is not absolute; therefore, he is exempt for it. But one incited

by others—

is drawn after them;

he is drawn after them and does not retract his decision.

Abaye said: From where do I say this

that one incited by others is liable for his firm decision, even without performing an act?

As it is written: “You shall not desire him, nor listen to him”;

if he desired and listened—

he is liable.

Rava said

to resolve the contradiction between the mishnayot:

Both this and that,

both mishnayot, are speaking

of one incited by others.

Rather, there is a distinction in the form of the incitement:

This

which holds one liable for speech is referring to a case

where he said to him

the inciter said to the one incited:

This is how it eats,

this idolatrous object,

this is how it drinks; this is how it benefits, and this is how it harms.

In that case, the one incited is convinced and does not retract his agreement to worship. But

this

our Mishna, which exempts one for speech, is referring to a case

where he did not say to him, “This is how it eats, this is how it drinks,” and so on,

for since the one incited did not hear the inciter praise the idolatrous object, he retracts his agreement to worship, and therefore he is not liable on the basis of “he desired and listened.”

Rava said: From where do I say this?—

As it is written

in the passage concerning an inciter [Deuteronomy 13]:

“From the gods of the nations that are around you, near to you

or far from you.”

What difference is there to me between those that are near and those that are far?

Why did the verse mention this?

Rather,

this is what it is saying to you: From the qualities of

idolatrous objects

that are near,

which you know and recognize do not eat or drink,

you can learn the qualities of

idolatrous objects

that are far,

which the inciter mentions while praising them.

Rava infers:

Is it not that he said to him

the inciter said to the one incited: This idolatrous object,

this is how it eats, this is how it drinks; this is how it benefits, and this is how it harms.

Conclude from this

that the one incited is liable for his statement “I will worship” only in such a case.

Rav Ashi said: The latter clause

which holds one who says “I will worship” liable is speaking

of an apostate Jew,

who is not destined to regret his decision.

Ravina said:

In fact, both mishnayot are speaking of a Jew who is not an apostate, and they have the same rationale. Rather, they were taught in the manner of

“not only this, but even that”:

the tanna first taught in our Mishna “one who worships,” and afterward taught the Mishna of “one who says,” to teach you that not only one who worships is liable, but even one who merely says so.

It was stated: One who worships idolatry

intentionally, with warning, or unintentionally, in a manner in which he does not intend to accept it as a deity and does not do so because he wishes to worship it for its own sake, but does so

out of love

for a particular person, wishing to please him by bowing to his idolatry,

or out of fear,

or because he fears a person and is concerned that the person may harm him if he does not bow to it.

He did so intentionally, or he acted unintentionally, believing that it is permitted to worship idolatry when doing so out of love or fear of a person.

Abaye said: He is liable

to execution if he did so intentionally and with warning, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering if he mistakenly believed that it was permitted to worship in this manner.

Rava said: He is exempt

from everything—both from execution when acting intentionally and from a sin-offering when acting unintentionally—since he did not perform an act of worship at all for the idolatry, as he did so because of love or fear of a person, and not for the sake of its divinity.

The Gemara explains their opinions:

Abaye said: He is liable, for he worshipped it.

The very act of ritual worship renders him liable, even without the intention of worshipping it for the sake of its divinity.

Rava said: He is exempt,

because only

if he accepted it upon himself as a deity—

yes,

then he is liable. But

if not,

if he worshipped it without accepting its divinity—

no.

He is not liable, because he did nothing.

The Gemara cites Abaye’s three sources and provides

a mnemonic: Avad, Yishtahaveh, Lemashiah.

And Abaye said: From where do I say this

that one is liable for idolatry even in this manner?

As we learned

in our Mishna:

“One who worships idolatry”—

whether one who performs a form of worship,

or one who sacrifices, or one who burns incense.

And seemingly, this is difficult: sacrificing and burning incense are included among acts of worship. Why, then, did the tanna phrase it: “whether one who performs a form of worship, whether one who sacrifices, and whether one who burns incense”?

Is it not

necessarily the case that his intention was to say:

whether one who worships out of love or fear!

And this is what the tanna said: Whether one who worships even out of fear or love, or one who sacrifices for the sake of the divinity of the idolatry. The latter clause, “whether one who sacrifices and whether one who burns incense,” comes to clarify the first clause, “whether one who performs a form of worship”: He worships even out of love or fear, and nevertheless he is liable.

And Rava would say to you: No,

there is no proof from the wording of the Mishna as you have argued; rather, it should be understood

as Rabbi Yirmeya explains

the words of the Mishna [on the previous page]: “one who worships” means any act of worship in its customary manner, while “one who sacrifices” and “one who burns incense” refer to worship not performed in its customary manner. However, the entire Mishna is speaking of one who worships for the sake of its divinity, since otherwise he has accomplished nothing.

Furthermore,

Abaye said: From where do I say this?—

As it was taught:

[Exodus 20]

“You shall not bow down to them.”

The verse teaches, by stating “to them,” that only

to them,

to the sun, the moon, and the entire heavenly host,

may you not bow down. But you may bow down to a person like yourself.

One might have thought

that it would be permitted to bow down

even

to a person who made himself into an object of worship, and who was

worshipped

by people,

like Haman —

The verse states

[Exodus 20]

“Nor shall you worship them.”

From the apparently superfluous wording of the verse we learn that it is forbidden to bow down to a person who made himself into an object of worship.

Abaye infers:

But Haman—

he

was worshipped only out of fear

of the king, who commanded people to bow to him,

and nevertheless he was worshipped,

and the Torah nevertheless said, “Nor shall you worship them.”

But Rava

maintains that this is not proof for Abaye, because this is what the tanna of the beraita intended to say: One may not bow down to an object of worship

like Haman—

but not like Haman

in the literal sense.

Like Haman—

who himself was idolatry,

and therefore it is forbidden to bow down to him.

But not like Haman—

for had it been Haman,

people would have bowed to him

out of fear,

and this is not considered worship.

But

if

here,

the beraita that prohibits worshipping a person who is worshipped

were not

speaking of worship

out of fear,

but of worship for the sake of divinity.

And

further,

Abaye said: From where do I say this?—

We learned in tractate Horayot:

a. An individual who sins unintentionally brings a sin-offering—a female sheep or a female goat.

b. A community that sins unintentionally as a result of an erroneous ruling by the Great Court in Jerusalem—for example, the court erred and believed that the forbidden fat of the stomach was not considered forbidden fat but merely ordinary fat, which is permitted to eat—

the community [or the court, as will be explained in tractate Horayot] is liable to bring a bull as a sin-offering. This offering is called “the bull for the unwitting error of the community.”

In such a case, this sin-offering alone provides atonement, and each individual does not bring a female sheep or female goat as a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression.

c. A High Priest who sins unintentionally does not bring a sin-offering of a female sheep or female goat, as does an individual who sins; rather, he is liable to bring a bull as his sin-offering.

The offering of the High Priest is called “the bull for the unwitting error of the anointed priest.”

d. The priest brings the bull as a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression only if the transgression resulted from an erroneous ruling in halakha, in which the High Priest erred and instructed himself to act accordingly. But if the High Priest erred through an unwitting act, like an ordinary Jew who sinned unintentionally, he is entirely exempt from bringing an offering.

This law is derived from the verse: “If the anointed priest shall sin, to the guilt of the people.” Here the verse compares the sin of the priest to the sin of the community, teaching that the High Priest brings his bull for the unwitting error only if the law was hidden from him and he sinned as a result of his ignorance of the law—just as the community brings a bull for the unwitting error only if it sinned because of the court’s erroneous ruling.

e. When does this apply? When the transgression concerns the other mitzvot, regarding which the Torah states that the High Priest does not bring a female sheep or female goat for his transgression, as does every individual; rather, he brings a bull for the unwitting error.

But if the transgression concerns the law of idolatry, the High Priest brings an offering like an individual Jew who sinned unintentionally through idolatry, who brings only a female goat as a sin-offering.

f. A community that sins unintentionally through idolatry on the basis of an erroneous ruling by the Great Court—for example, the court erred and ruled that a particular act was not a customary form of worship of idolatry—brings a female goat as a sin-offering and a bull as a burnt-offering.

As it was taught:

What is the law of a

anointed priest

who sinned unintentionally

through idolatry—

Rabbi says:

Since the offering of the High Priest for an unwitting transgression involving idolatry is the same as the offering of an individual who sinned through idolatry—a female goat—and differs from the offering of the community, which brings a goat as a sin-offering and a bull as a burnt-offering, it is evident that the law of the High Priest was compared to that of the community with regard to idolatry only in the other mitzvot. Therefore, for idolatry the priest is liable to bring an offering for his transgression

through an unwitting act,

and it is unnecessary that his error result specifically from an erroneous ruling.

And the Sages say:

The High Priest is equivalent to an individual with regard only to the type of offering in the case of idolatry, but not with regard to the manner in which he unwittingly committed the transgression. Therefore, even in the case of idolatry the High Priest brings a sin-offering only if his error was

an unwitting error concerning the law,

that he erred in his ruling and acted on its basis—for example, he erred regarding a particular form of worship and believed that this act was not considered worship of the idolatry he worshipped.

And they agree

Rabbi and the Sages, with regard to the type of sin-offering brought by a High Priest who sinned through idolatry,

that

his law

with regard to a female goat is

like that of an individual.

That is, even the Sages, who maintain that the law of the High Priest differs from that of an individual with regard to liability to bring an offering, since the High Priest is liable only when he erred in a ruling, agree that he brings the type of offering brought by an individual: only a female goat.

And they agree

Rabbi and the Sages, with regard to a High Priest who is uncertain whether he sinned unintentionally through a transgression for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering,

that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering

like an individual who is uncertain.

Abaye now analyzes and proves:

This “unwitting act”

without an unwitting error in a ruling

concerning idolatry,

for which Rabbi holds that the High Priest is liable to bring a sin-offering like an ordinary individual,

what are the circumstances?

If he believed

the High Priest mistakenly, concerning an idolatrous temple, that

it was a synagogue, and bowed down to it

inside it, to the Almighty—

What of it!?

After all, his heart

was directed to bow

to Heaven,

and he did not worship idolatry at all! If so, why should we hold this person liable to bring a sin-offering for his error or mistake? Even if he had acted intentionally, knowing that it was an idolatrous temple and bowing down inside it to Heaven, he would still be exempt, since he did not worship idolatry but bowed down to the Almighty. If so, how can we hold him liable to bring a sin-offering when he acted unintentionally and did not know that this building was an idolatrous temple!?

Rather,

it must be referring to a case

where he saw a statue,

a statue made in the likeness of the king. Some statues are worshipped as idolatry, while others are made merely in the king’s honor; one who bows to them honors the king but does not worship him as idolatry. The High Priest saw a statue that people worshipped as idolatry, but he did not know that this statue was one of those that were worshipped,

and he bowed down to it.

Abaye argues:

If he accepted it

the image of the king’s statue

as a deity,

and bowed to it because he accepted it as a deity, then

he acted intentionally

and is liable to execution, not to a sin-offering!