Sanhedrin 61a (סא.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yohanan said:

the animal

is forbidden

to derive benefit from, like an offering sacrificed to idolatry.

Rabbi Yohanan learned the law of intention in the case of idolatry from the law of the intention of piggul in the case of sacrificial offerings. Just as with sacrificial offerings, if one intended at the time of slaughtering the offering to sprinkle its blood on the following day, the offering becomes piggul, since one’s intention regarding one sacrificial rite is considered as though it were regarding another sacrificial rite, so too with idolatry, if one intended during one rite to perform the second rite for the sake of idolatry, this alone is sufficient to forbid the animal.

And Reish Lakish said: It is permitted,

because one cannot derive the law of idolatry from that of sacrificial offerings, and with regard to idolatry, one’s intention regarding one rite is not considered as though it were regarding another rite.

This works out well according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that one learns from sacrificial offerings to idolatry that one’s intention regarding one rite is considered as though it were regarding another rite with regard to forbidding the animal from benefit; it is possible to derive from there as well the liability of the one who performs the service.

And according to him, the verse “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be doomed” is properly superfluous, to teach from it the general principle that only rites performed inside the Temple render one liable when performed outside for the sake of idolatry, even when performed not in the usual manner, but not for the other rites.

But according to Reish Lakish,

who holds that one does not learn from sacrificial offerings to idolatry that one’s intention regarding one rite is considered as though it were regarding another rite, according to his view

is a verse necessary?

The verse “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be doomed” is not superfluous; rather, it is necessary to teach that in the case of idolatry, if one intended during one rite to perform another rite for its sake, he is liable. And according to him, the question remains: Why should it not be said that the verse “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be doomed” comes to teach that one who intended during one rite to perform another rite for the sake of idolatry is liable, while bowing was singled out to teach the general principle that one is liable for any service that is a manner of honoring the deity, even a service not performed inside the Temple, even when performed not in the usual manner!?

This is the question of Rava bar Rav Hanan: Why should it not be said that bowing was singled out to reveal the general principle that one is liable for any service performed as a manner of honoring the deity, even when it is not performed in the usual manner?

Rav Pappa raised an objection to this,

to what Rava bar Rav Hanan said in the course of his statement, that his question applies only according to Reish Lakish:

And

if so,

according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who says that in the case of idolatry one’s intention regarding one rite is considered as though it were regarding another rite, and the animal thereby becomes forbidden, and who derives this from sacrificial offerings performed inside the Temple,

is a verse not necessary

for liability to execution? Therefore, “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be doomed” is superfluous, to teach from it the general principle?

But

Rabbi Yohanan has forbidden only

on account of the law that one’s intention regarding one rite is considered as though it were regarding another rite

the

sacrificial

animal

that is being worshipped, just as the intention of piggul regarding one rite and another invalidates the offering,

but the person—

he is not liable to execution.

One cannot derive from sacrificial offerings that one who intended during one rite to perform another rite for the sake of idolatry is liable for it, since with regard to sacrificial offerings, the law stated is merely the disqualification of piggul concerning the animal, and nothing more.

And the verse

“One who sacrifices to the gods shall be doomed”

comes to render the person liable for execution.

If so, even according to Rabbi Yohanan it is difficult: this verse is not superfluous to teach the general principle, and it should be said that bowing was the element singled out to teach the general principle!?

And conversely,

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, raised an objection to

Rava bar Rav Hanan:

And according to Reish Lakish, does a verse need to be stated

to render one liable to execution for intending during one rite to perform another rite for the sake of idolatry?

But

Reish Lakish has permitted only—

the animal,

which does not become forbidden.

But the person—

he is liable to execution.

For the liability to execution of one who intended during one rite to perform another rite for the sake of idolatry can properly be derived by reasoning: Since it is impossible to perform the sprinkling of the blood without slaughtering the animal, the intention at the time of slaughter to sprinkle the blood for the sake of idolatry is considered as though he were worshipping idolatry, and he is liable for it. This has no connection to Reish Lakish’s view that the animal does not thereby become forbidden [as he does not derive a law concerning outside the Temple from one concerning inside the Temple],

just as in the case of one who bows to a mountain: the mountain is permitted, but the one who worships it is executed by the sword.

For we find with regard to idolatry that one who worships it is liable to execution, while the object itself does not become forbidden, as in the case of one who bows to a mountain. The mountain is not forbidden, because it is attached to the ground, and we have a derivation from the verse that something attached to the ground does not become forbidden; nevertheless, one who worships the mountain is liable to execution.

And if so, if it is as you say—that you asked why it should not be said that bowing was singled out to teach the general principle—then it follows that the verse “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be doomed” is superfluous!?

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: According to what Rava bar Rav Hanan said to Abaye: Say that bowing was singled out to teach the entire general principle,

then

“How do they serve it,”

which implies that one is liable only for a manner of service, and not for a service performed not in the usual manner,

to exclude what?

And if you would say:

The verse comes

to exclude one who defecates before those that are worshipped,

who worships in a degrading manner an idolatry whose usual service is to sacrifice before it in a respectful manner, and the verse comes to exclude this, teaching that one is not liable for it.

That cannot be said, because this matter is derived

from bowing,

for according to your statement, in which you asked why it should not be said that bowing was singled out to teach the general principle, we would derive from it:

Just as bowing is a manner of honoring,

so too, any manner of honoring.

There is no need for a special verse to teach that there is no transgression in a service performed in a degrading manner for an idolatry that is worshipped in a respectful manner.

Rather, it is to exclude one who defecates before Mercury,

whose manner of worship is also through degradation, and it is necessary to derive from the verse that one is not liable for such a degrading service of Mercury.

Because

it might enter your mind to say: Since its service

of Mercury

is through degradation,

the verse teaches us

that one is not liable for such degradation, namely, defecating before it.

Rather, what of that which Rabbi Eliezer said: From where is it derived that one who sacrifices

an animal to Mercury,

which is a service performed in a respectful manner, whereas the service of Mercury is performed through degradation,

is liable? As it is stated

[Leviticus 16]

“And they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the goat-demons.” If it does not apply to the usual manner of service, as it is written, “How do they serve it,”

apply it to service not performed in the usual manner.

And this is difficult: According to Rava bar Rav Hanan, who says that bowing was singled out to teach the general principle, every service

not performed in the usual manner—

is it not derived from bowing!?

The Gemara answers:

There,

what Rabbi Eliezer derived from “And they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the goat-demons” is

in the case of one who sacrifices in defiance,

who does not intend to accept it as a deity; the verse teaches anew that he nevertheless violates a prohibition.

Rav Hamnuna’s oxen were lost,

and he went to search for them.

Rabba encountered him,

met him,

and posed a difficulty to him,

raising an apparent contradiction between

one Mishna and another,

two Mishnayot in our chapter that contradict one another.

On the one hand,

we learned

in our Mishna:

One who worships idolatry.

And it implies that only one who

worships

idolatry through an action—

, yes,

he is liable. But if he

says

to himself or to others that he will worship idolatry,

no.

He is not liable for this.

But did we not learn

[below, on page 67a, in the Mishna]:

One who says

to one who incites him to worship idolatry:

“I will worship!”

Or he even agrees to his incitement but makes it conditional upon going to worship [and can retract in the meantime], and says to him,

“I will go and worship,”

or he even says to him,

“Let us go and worship!”

making his worship conditional upon others joining them.

In all these cases, he is liable to execution from the moment that he was incited and consented!?

He said to him:

Our Mishna, which implies that one who merely says this is exempt, is speaking

of one who says, “I do not accept it upon myself

as a deity through my present speech,

but

only once I worship it

through a service.”

Whereas the Mishna below, which renders one liable for a mere statement, is speaking of one who accepted it upon himself as a deity. For this he is liable even without an action. It is not necessary for him to say explicitly that he accepts it as a deity; rather, his very agreement to worship it constitutes his acceptance of it as a deity.

Rav Yosef said:

But did you

take the tanna’im out of the world?

After all, there is a dispute among

the tanna’im

as to whether one is liable for a mere statement, and it is possible to attribute the statements of the two Mishnayot to a dispute among tanna’im.

As it was taught:

One who presents himself as a deity and incites others to worship him—

One who says, “Come and worship me,”

Rabbi Meir renders him liable

to execution under the law of an “inciter,”

and Rabbi Yehuda exempts him.

Rav Yosef adds:

Where they worshipped him,

where people worshipped this person,

everyone agrees

that he is liable to execution,

as it is written

[Exodus 20]

“You shall not make for yourself a graven image,”

for this person made himself into an image that people worship! And necessarily,

they disagree—

about a mere statement,

where he said, “Come and worship me,” but no one worshipped him; consequently, he did not make an image, and the matter remains within the category of incitement.

Rabbi Meir holds: A statement is significant

to render him liable for inciting others to idolatry.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: A statement is not significant.

Afterward,

he subsequently

said Rav Yosef: What I said—that it is not significant—is not correct.

It is not correct that I said that the matter depends upon a dispute among tanna’im, since

even according to Rabbi Yehuda, a mere statement also renders him liable

to execution, under the law of an inciter.

As it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees with Rabbi Meir, who renders one liable to execution for inciting people by saying, “Come and worship me,” and

says: He is never liable

to execution for words of incitement if he did not perform an action,

until he says

merely through speech to one who incites him to worship idolatry:

“I will worship,”

or

“I will go and worship,”

or

“Let us go and worship,”

at which point he is liable even for his speech, because he consented to and heeded the inciter, and violated “You shall not consent to him and you shall not heed him.”

And it is thereby demonstrated that even according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is liable for speech alone. Necessarily, the reason Rabbi Yehuda exempts one who says, “Come and worship me,” is another reason, and not because this is merely speech.

The Gemara explains the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda:

With regard to what do they disagree?—

With regard to one who incites others to worship him,

who said, “Come and worship me,”

and they said to him,

the listeners said to him,

“Yes”

[that is so],

they disagree.

One master,

Rabbi Meir, who renders him liable,

holds:

One who is

an inciter to himself—

they heed him;

people listen to him and are prepared to worship him,

and the “yes” that they say to him—

is genuine.

When they answered him “yes,” they truly intended to worship him; therefore, he is liable because he incited them and they heeded him.

And the other master,

Rabbi Yehuda, who exempts him,

holds:

A person who is

an inciter to himself,

that they should worship him,

they do not heed him;

people do not listen to him, because

they say: