Sanhedrin 61a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yohanan said:

the animal

is forbidden

to derive benefit, according to the law of an offering slaughtered for idolatry.

For Rabbi Yohanan learned the law of intention concerning idolatry from the law of the intention of pigul concerning sacrificial offerings. Just as with sacrificial offerings, if one intended at the time of slaughtering the offering to sprinkle its blood on the following day, the offering becomes pigul, since one’s intentions are considered from one sacrificial service to another, so too with idolatry, if one intended during one service to perform the second service for the sake of idolatry, that is sufficient to forbid the animal.

And Reish Lakish said: It is permitted,

because one cannot learn concerning idolatry from sacrificial offerings, and with idolatry one’s intentions are not considered from one service to another.

This works out well according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that one learns from sacrificial offerings to idolatry that one’s intentions are considered from one service to another with regard to forbidding the animal from benefit; it is possible to learn from there also with regard to the liability of the person who performs the service.

And according to him, the verse “One who slaughters to gods shall be destroyed” is properly superfluous, in order to learn from it the rule that only the inner services are liable when performed outside for idolatry, even when not in its customary manner, but not for the other services.

But according to Reish Lakish,

who holds that one does not learn from sacrificial offerings to idolatry that one’s intentions are considered from one service to another, according to his words,

a verse is needed!

“One who slaughters to gods shall be destroyed” is not superfluous; rather, it is needed to say that with idolatry, if one intended from one service to another, he is liable. And according to him, the question remains: Why should we not say that the verse “One who slaughters to gods shall be destroyed” comes to say that one who intends from one service to another with idolatry is liable, whereas bowing was singled out to teach the rule that for every service that is a manner of honor, even a service that is not an inner service, one is liable for it even when it is not in its customary manner?!

This is the question of Rava bar Rav Hanan up to here: Why should we not say that bowing is what was singled out to reveal the rule that for every service that is in the manner of honor, one is liable for it even when it is not in its customary manner?

Rav Pappa raised an objection against him,

against what Rava bar Rav Hanan said within his words, that his question applies only according to Reish Lakish:

And

because

according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who says that with idolatry one’s intentions are considered from one service to another, and the animal becomes forbidden, and learns this from the inner sacrificial offerings,

a verse is not needed

for a capital liability, and therefore “One who slaughters to gods shall be destroyed” is superfluous, in order to learn from it the rule?

But

up to this point Rabbi Yohanan has forbidden only

because of the law that one’s intentions are considered from one service to another,

but

the

animal

that is worshipped, just as an intention of pigul from one service to another invalidates the offering,

but the person—

he is not subject to execution.

You cannot learn from sacrificial offerings that one who intends from one service to another with idolatry is liable for it, since with sacrificial offerings only the disqualification of pigul was stated concerning the animal, and no more.

And the verse came—

“One who slaughters to gods shall be destroyed”—

to make the person liable for execution.

And if so, even according to Rabbi Yohanan it is difficult: this verse is not superfluous in order to teach the rule, and let us say that bowing is what was singled out to teach the rule!?

And likewise, on the other hand,

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, raised an objection against

Rava bar Rav Hanan:

And according to Reish Lakish, does a verse need to

make one who intends from one service to another with idolatry liable to execution?

But

up to this point Reish Lakish has permitted—

only the animal,

which does not become forbidden.

But the person—

he is subject to execution.

For the capital liability of one who intends from one service to another can properly be learned by reasoning: since it is impossible to perform the sprinkling of the blood without slaughtering the animal, the intention at the time of slaughter to sprinkle the blood for idolatry is considered for him as worshipping idolatry, and he is liable for it; and this has no connection to what Reish Lakish holds, that the animal does not become forbidden through this [because he does not learn from the outside service to the inner service],

just as it is with one who bows to a mountain: the mountain is permitted, but the one who worships it is executed by the sword.

For we find with idolatry that one who worships it is liable to execution, while it itself does not become forbidden, as with one who bows to a mountain: the mountain is not forbidden because it is attached to the ground, and we have a derivation from the verse that what is attached to the ground does not become forbidden, but one who worships the mountain is liable to execution.

And if so, if it is as you say, that you asked why we should not say that bowing is what was singled out to teach the rule, it follows that the verse “One who slaughters to gods shall be destroyed” is a superfluous verse!?

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: According to what Rava bar Rav Hanan said to Abaye: Let us say that bowing was singled out to teach the entire rule,

[Deuteronomy 12] if so,

“How they will serve,”

which implies that one is liable only for a manner of service, and not for one that is not in its customary manner,

to exclude what?

And if you say:

the verse comes

to exclude one who exposes himself before those to whom sacrifices are offered,

who performs a service in a degrading manner for an idolatry whose manner is that sacrifices should be offered to it in a manner of honor, and the verse comes to exclude this and say that one is not liable for it.

This cannot be said, because this matter is

derived from bowing,

for since, according to your words, you asked why we should not say that bowing is what was singled out to teach the rule, we learn from it:

Just as bowing is a manner of honor,

so too, everything that is a manner of honor.

And there is no need for a special verse to inform us that there is no transgression in a service performed in a degrading manner for an idolatry that is worshipped in a manner of honor.

Rather, to exclude one who exposes himself before Markulis,

whose manner of service is also in degradation, and it is necessary to learn from the verse that for such a service in a degrading manner one is not liable for Markulis.

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since its service

of Markulis

is degradation,—

for every degradation as well; it teaches us

that for such degradation, in which one exposes himself before it, he is not liable.

Rather, as for that which Rabbi Eliezer said: From where is it derived concerning one who slaughters

an animal for Markulis,

which is a service in a manner of honor, whereas the service of Markulis is in a manner of degradation,

that he is liable? As it is stated

[Leviticus 16]

“And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices to the goat-demons.” If it does not concern its customary manner, as it is written, “How they will serve,”—

apply it to a matter that is not in its customary manner.

And it is difficult: according to the words of Rava bar Rav Hanan, that bowing was singled out to teach the rule, every service

that is not in its customary manner

is derived from bowing!

And the Gemara answers:

There,

what Rabbi Eliezer learned from “And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices to the goat-demons” is

concerning one who slaughters in defiance,

who does not intend to accept it as a deity, and the verse innovates that nevertheless he violates a prohibition.

Rav Hamnuna’s oxen were lost,

and he went to search for them.

Rabba encountered him,

met him,

challenged him,

and raised before him an apparent contradiction of

one Mishna against another,

two Mishnayot in our chapter that contradict one another.

On the one hand

we learned

in our Mishna:

“One who worships idolatry.”

And it implies that only one who

worships

idolatry through an act—

, yes,

he is liable. But if he

says

to himself or to others that he will worship idolatry,

no.

He is not liable for this.

But did we not learn

[below, in the Mishna on 67a]:

“One who says

to one who incites him to worship idolatry:

‘I will worship!’

Or even if he agrees to his incitement, but makes it conditional on going to worship [and can retract in the meantime], and says to him,

‘I will go and worship,’

or even says to him,

‘Let us go and worship!’

making his worship conditional on the joining of others.”

In all these cases, he is liable to execution from the moment they incited him and he consented!?

He said to him:

Our Mishna, which implies that one who says is exempt, is speaking

of one who says, “I do not accept it upon myself

as a deity through my present speech,

but

until I worship it

through an act.”

But the Mishna below, which makes one liable for speech alone, is speaking of one who accepted it upon himself as a deity. And for this he is liable even without an act. It is not necessary for him to say explicitly that he accepts it as a deity; rather, his very agreement to worship it is his acceptance of it as a deity.

Rav Yosef said:

But is it that

you have taken the tannaitic dispute from the world?

After all, there is a dispute

of tannaim

whether one is liable for speech alone, and it is possible to attribute the statements of the two Mishnayot to a dispute of tannaim.

As it was taught:

One who presents himself as an idolatry and incites others to worship him—

One who says, “Come and worship me”—

Rabbi Meir makes him liable

to execution under the law of an “inciter,”

and Rabbi Yehuda exempts him.

And Rav Yosef adds: After all,

where they worshipped him,

where people worshipped this person,

everyone agrees

that he is liable to execution,

as it is written

[Exodus 20]

“You shall not make for yourself a sculptured image,”

and this person has made himself into an image that people worship! And necessarily,

they disagree—

concerning speech alone,

where he said, “Come and worship me,” but no one worshipped him, and it is found that he did not make an image; rather, the matter remains within the category of an inciter.

Rabbi Meir holds: Speech is a matter

for making one liable for inciting to idolatry.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Speech is not a matter.

Afterward,

afterward he returned and

Rav Yosef said: It is not a matter, what I said.

What I said, that the matter depends on a dispute of tannaim, is not correct, since

even according to Rabbi Yehuda, through speech alone he is indeed made liable

to execution, according to the law of an inciter.

As it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees with Rabbi Meir, who makes one who incites people liable to execution by saying, “Come and worship me,” and

says: He is never liable

to execution for speech of incitement if he did not perform an act,

until he says

through speech alone to one who incites him to worship idolatry,

“I will worship,”

or

“I will go and worship,”

or

“Let us go and worship,”

for then he is liable even for his speech, because he consented to and heeded the inciter, and violated “You shall not consent to him and you shall not heed him.”

And it is proven that even according to Rabbi Yehuda one is liable for speech alone. Necessarily, the reason Rabbi Yehuda exempts one who says, “Come and worship me,” is another reason, and not because this is speech alone.

And the Gemara explains the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda:

Over what do they disagree?—

Concerning one who incites for himself,

who said, “Come and worship me,”

and they said to him,

the listeners said to him,

“Yes,”

[yes],

they disagree.

One master,

Rabbi Meir, who makes him liable,

holds:

One who is

an inciter for himself—

they heed him,

people listen to him and are prepared to worship him,

and the “yes” that they say to him—

is truthful.

What they answered him, “Yes,” their intention was truly to worship him, and therefore he is liable for having incited them and for their having heeded him.

And the other master,

Rabbi Yehuda, who exempts him,

holds: A person who is

A person who is

an inciter for himself,

that they should worship him,

they do not heed him;

people do not listen to him, because

they say: