Sanhedrin 5b — the Talmud in English

Therefore he called Rav “son of my sister,”

on account of his wisdom,

for Rav was exceptionally wise, and therefore Rabbi Hiyya called him “Rav, son of my sister,” since wisdom is called “sister,”

as it is written

Proverbs 7:

“Say to wisdom: You are my sister.”

We learn from here that Rabbi did not permit Rav to adjudicate cases concerning firstborn animals.

The Gemara now discusses Rabbi Hiyya’s question to Rabbi concerning Rav’s authority, and Rabbi’s reply:

“May he adjudicate cases concerning firstborn animals? —

He should not adjudicate!” What is the reason?

Why did Rabbi not permit Rav to adjudicate cases concerning firstborn animals?

If you say,

if it is said

because he was not wise,

that he was not sufficiently wise, this is not so, for

we have said that he was exceedingly wise,

as he was called “son of my sister” because he was very wise.

Rather,

Rabbi therefore did not permit Rav to adjudicate cases concerning firstborn animals,

because he was not expert in blemishes,

for Rav was not an expert in matters concerning blemishes of the firstborn. And this matter depends neither on learning nor on reasoning, but on practical experience and alertness.

The Gemara objects:

But Rav said: “I grew up for eighteen months אצל a cattle herder”

in order

to know which

blemish is

a permanent blemish

[for which it is permitted to slaughter the firstborn because of this blemish],

and which

is a blemish

that passes,

for which it is forbidden to slaughter the firstborn?

It follows that Rav was expert in blemishes.

The Gemara answers:

Rather,

Rabbi therefore did not permit him to adjudicate cases concerning firstborn animals

in order to accord honor to Rabbah bar Hannah.

In order that the people of Babylonia conduct themselves respectfully toward Rabbah bar Hannah, he granted Rabbah this distinction, that only he should adjudicate cases concerning firstborn animals, and therefore he did not grant it to Rav. And Rabbi was not concerned that they would slight Rav’s honor, because he knew that even without this they would treat him with honor.

And if you wish, say:

Rav was very expert in blemishes,

and precisely because of this,

because he grew up for eighteen months אצל a cattle herder,

for Rav was more expert in blemishes,

as he was exceedingly expert,

and he would permit a blemish

because of his great expertise, even blemishes

that people did not know,

for people did not regard them as permanent blemishes,

and they would say,

they would come, through Rav’s permission, to say that even concerning a passing blemish

of this kind Rav permitted it.

They would come to compare another passing blemish to this blemish that Rav permitted,

and they would come to permit a passing blemish.

And they would permit also a passing blemish.

Because of concern for this stumbling block, Rabbi refrained from permitting Rav to adjudicate cases concerning firstborn animals.

The Gemara now discusses what was brought above, that Rabbi Hiyya requested from Rabbi permission that Rabbah and Rav issue rulings of prohibition and permission in Babylonia.

The Gemara objects: Why did Rabbi Hiyya ask whether he

“shall issue rulings,”

and why did Rabbi need to answer him

“He shall issue rulings!”

But

if he studied,

то есть изучил Тору и знает галаху,

why do I need him to take permission!?

Зачем ему получать разрешение выносить решения? Ведь он всего лишь сообщает, какова галаха.

The Gemara answers: In addition to knowledge of Torah, one who issues rulings must have clear speech, so that the listeners will not err in his words. Therefore he must receive permission to issue rulings, and the one authorizing him to issue rulings must pay attention to this as well; and they instituted that every one who issues rulings should receive permission to issue rulings,

because of an incident that occurred,

in which they erred in the words of one student because of his defective speech.

For it was taught in a beraita: Once Rabbi went to a certain place,

to the city of Acre,

and saw

the

people kneading their dough in ritual impurity,

kneading their doughs in impure vessels.

He said to them

Rabbi:

“Why are you kneading your dough in ritual impurity!?”

For you are careful concerning the observance of ritual purity, and the water in the dough renders the dough susceptible to contracting ritual impurity?

They said to him: “A certain student came here and issued a ruling for us

that

the waters of swamps

the water of a lake

do not render susceptible.”

And he,

the student who issued this ruling to them,

expounded for them “egg waters,”

that they may knead dough with the white and yolk of chicken and goose eggs, which are not a liquid that renders susceptible to contracting ritual impurity, but their status is like fruit juice, which does not render susceptible to contracting ritual impurity.

But they thought,

they did not understand his speech, and thought that

he said “swamp waters,”

meaning that he permitted them to knead with swamp waters. And because his speech was not clear, they erred.

They had another error as well:

And they also erred in this,

that we learned in the Mishna in tractate Parah:

“The waters of the Karmion and the waters of the Piga

[names of rivers]

are unfit

to mix them with the ashes of the red heifer and sprinkle from them upon one impure through contact with a corpse,

because they are swamp waters

[or

swamp waters],

and the Torah said, “living water in a vessel,” without admixture and obstruction by earth.

But they thought,

the people of the place erred and thought,

from

within

that concerning

the water of

the purification offering they are unfit,

that they are not considered “water,” likewise

they also do not render susceptible,

they are not considered water so as to render [an object] susceptible to contracting ritual impurity.

But it is not so!

This is not correct, for

there,

there

concerning the purification offering, we require

we need

living water

without admixture of earth. But

here, for rendering susceptible, any amount renders susceptible.

Any water, even if it is not clear, renders susceptible.

The tanna

we learned in a beraita:

At that time

when they saw the stumbling block that emerged from a student whose speech was not open,

they decreed

the Sages:

“A student may not issue rulings unless he takes permission from his teacher,”

so that his teacher will examine him concerning whether his speech is clear, and no stumbling block will emerge through him.

And likewise, it is forbidden for a student to issue rulings in the place of his teacher.

And concerning this law the Gemara relates:

“Tanhum, son of Rav Ami, happened to come to Hater.”

Tanhum, son of Rav Ami, arrived at a place whose name was Hater.

He expounded for them: “It is permitted to soak wheat,”

to soak the wheat for a short time in water and pound it in a mortar

on Passover,

and there is no concern that it may become leavened, because he pounds it immediately after the soaking.

The townspeople said to him

the residents of the city:

“Is it not so,

is there not

Rabbi Mani of Tyre here

present in our city,

and it was taught,

and we learned in a beraita:

‘A student may not issue rulings in the place of his teacher, unless he is three parasangs distant from him,’

which are

corresponding to the camp of Israel

[when they were in the wilderness, and the place of Israel’s encampment was three parasangs in size], and it is written there: “And it shall be that everyone who seeks the Lord [that is, a matter of the Lord] shall go out to the Tent of Meeting that is outside the camp,” that is, to Moses our teacher, despite the fact that within the camp there were students who had already received instructions from Moses our teacher and knew how to issue rulings.

And they argued against him: Why are you expounding rulings in the place of Rabbi Mani?

He said to them: “It was not known to my mind,”

I did not know, and I am inadvertent.

And the Gemara relates:

“Rabbi Hiyya saw a certain man who was standing in a cemetery,”

he saw a certain man standing in a cemetery.

He said to him

Rabbi Hiyya said to that man: Are you not

«Разве ты не сын такого-то человека, коэна,

ведь ты коэн и тебе запрещено входить на кладбище»?

He said to him:

that man answered Rabbi Hiyya:

“Yes,”

верно, я сын такого-то человека, но я не коэн, поскольку

“the father of that man”

of that man [and he meant himself]

“was haughty-eyed,”

he stumbled in the prohibition against gazing at women,

“he set his eyes upon a divorcee,”

and married her, and I was born from her,

“and he profaned him,”

and I became a ḥalal.

The Gemara adds another law concerning the granting of permission.

It is obvious,

this is obvious,

for half

that if the teacher grants the student half-permission, such as permitting him to issue rulings of prohibition and permission but not permitting him to adjudicate, or permitting him to adjudicate but not permitting him to issue rulings,

he has said that it is effective.

For we have said that it is effective, since Rabbi did not grant Rav the entire authority and did not permit him to adjudicate cases concerning firstborn animals.

But there is a question concerning granting permission

on condition: what is the law?

Can he grant permission for a limited time, such as one or two years? Is this permission effective?

The Gemara resolves it:

Come and hear: For Rabbi said to

Yohanan to Rav Shaman:

“Behold, you are under our authority,

permission is granted to you to adjudicate

until you come to us,”

until you return to us.

It follows that it is possible to grant permission for a limited time.

And now the Gemara explains Samuel’s opinion.

As for the matter itself,

we learned in the preceding discussion

, Samuel said: If two adjudicated, their judgment is a judgment, but

their court

is called a brazen court,

for they transgressed the enactment of the Sages that three are required.

Rav Nahman sat,

Samuel’s student,

and was stating this teaching

and saying this statement.

Rava challenged Rav Nahman,

Rava objected to Rav Nahman: We learned in our Mishna:

“Even if two acquit

the litigant

or two obligate, and

the

one

third

says, ‘I do not know,’ —

the judges shall be increased

and it is difficult:

And if it is so,

if Samuel’s law exists,

let them be

that the two should be

like two who adjudicated,

and why is it necessary to add [judges]?

Rav Nahman answers:

“There it is different,”

the law there is different,

for initially they sat with the intention of three,

that from the outset they sat intending that the judgment would be decided by three, and since one does not know, one of the three is missing. But

here,

in Samuel’s law,

they did not sit with the intention of three;

they sat as only two, and they agree on one opinion; therefore Samuel holds that their judgment is a judgment.

And Rava asks another difficulty—

He challenged him:

we learned in a beraita:

“Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: Judgment is [by] three, and

if

compromise,

which the judges make between the litigants, is performed

by two. And the power of compromise is greater than the power of judgment, for two who adjudicated —

the litigants can retract, and

if

two who made a compromise —

the litigants cannot retract,

for they desired the compromise, and the court acted as they requested.

It follows that Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel holds that two who adjudicated—their judgment is not a judgment—