Sanhedrin 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

And if you would say:

if Rav Naḥman wishes to answer that

the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel,

and they hold that the judgment of two judges is a valid judgment, and that Shmuel follows their opinion.

Rava objects to this:

But didn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: When two judge a case, according to everyone—

their judgment is not a valid judgment?

For there is no one who disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and according to everyone their judgment is not a valid judgment; this is therefore difficult for Shmuel.

Rav Naḥman answers:

What,

are you bringing the statement of one person against that of another!?

How can you raise a difficulty from the statement of Rabbi Abbahu, who is an amora, against the statement of Shmuel, who is also an amora? It is possible to say that Rabbi Abbahu indeed holds that the Rabbis do not disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, whereas Shmuel holds that the Rabbis do disagree, and hold that their judgment is valid—and Shmuel follows their opinion.

As for the substance of the matter,

the Gemara now explains Rabbi Abbahu’s statement:

Rabbi Abbahu said: When two judges adjudicate monetary cases, according to everyone, their judgment is not a valid judgment.

He raised an objection

and

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu

from what we learned in a Mishna in tractate Bekhorot [28b]:

An individual who is not an expert

who adjudicates a case

alone and errs,

and acquits the liable party

or

finds the innocent party liable,

or

declares the pure impure

or

declares

the impure pure,

thereby causing a loss to the litigant,

what he did stands,

his judgment is valid,

but he pays from his own pocket.

The judge must reimburse the person against whom he erred for the monetary loss, since he is not an expert judge and adjudicated alone.

Thus, the Mishna states that his judgment is valid, which is difficult for Rabbi Abbahu, who holds that according to all the tannaim his judgment is not valid.

Rabbi Abbahu answers:

What are we dealing with here?

That Mishna is speaking of a case

where they accepted him upon themselves,

where both litigants agreed to litigate before him. In such a case Rabbi Abbahu also concedes that his judgment is valid.

But Rabbi Abba raises a difficulty:

If so,

if the case is one in which they accepted him upon themselves,

why does he pay from his own pocket?

Why must the judge pay when he errs in the judgment? They agreed to litigate before him.

Rabbi Abbahu answers that the intention is not that they accepted the judge both for rendering a judgment and for making an error, for if that were the case, the judge would indeed be exempt for his error.

Rather, that case is speaking of a situation in which

they said to him,

when they accepted him upon themselves to adjudicate:

“Judge our case according to Torah law!”

They accepted you as a judge only for a judgment according to Torah law, and not for an erroneous judgment. Therefore, since he erred, he must pay.

The Gemara now discusses what sort of error is involved for which the judge must pay.

Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: In what did he err?

What error did this judge make?

If you say

that it means

that he erred regarding a matter

explicitly stated in the

Mishna,

if so, why must he pay?

For

didn’t

Rav Sheshet say that Rav Ami said: If one errs regarding a matter of Mishna, the case is retried?

The party who prevailed in the judgment returns the value of the claim to the other party, since the judgment is not a judgment at all. Why, then, must the judge pay?

Rabbi Abba answers:

Rather,

the case is one in which

the judge erred

in

judicial reasoning.

The Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances of an error in judicial reasoning?

Rav Pappa said: For example, two tannaim

or

two amoraim who disagree with one another

regarding the ruling upon which this claim depends. If later amoraim had decided the case in accordance with one opinion, and the judge ruled in accordance with the second opinion, he would have erred regarding a matter of Mishna. Rather,

the halakha was not stated either in accordance with this one or in accordance with that one,

as no explicit ruling had been issued,

but the general course of practice

—the majority of judges— decide the case

in accordance with one of them,

in accordance with one opinion,

and he went

—this judge decided—

and acted in accordance with the other,

in accordance with the second opinion.

That is judicial reasoning;

this is called erring in judicial reasoning.

Therefore, the litigant who prevailed in the judgment need not return the money. In any event, the judge ruled in accordance with one genuine opinion, which had not been disproved and against which no contrary halakha had been established. Nevertheless, the judge must pay from his own pocket, since the practice of the majority of judges is to rule according to the opposing opinion, and his error was one of judicial reasoning. After explaining the disagreement between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu as to whether the judgment of one judge or three judges is required, the Gemara raises the possibility that their disagreement is the disagreement of tannaim.

Let us say

that Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu disagree

as do the tannaim,

in the same disagreement in which the tannaim disagreed.

For we learned in a beraita:

Compromise,

a compromise is made

by three;

these are

the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: A compromise

may be made even

by one.

They assumed

the one raising the difficulty assumed that

everyone—

both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis—holds that

we compare compromise to judgment,

that compromise is equated with judgment, since compromise is called “justice and righteousness” [see page 6b], and therefore resembles judgment.

Therefore,

is it not

that we should explain

that this is the point of their disagreement,

that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree for this reason:

this master

—Rabbi Meir—

holds that judgment

is conducted

by three,

like Rabbi Abbahu,

and this master holds

—the Rabbis hold—

that judgment is conducted by two,

like Shmuel?

If so, the difficulty remains: “Let us say that it is the disagreement of tannaim.”

The Gemara answers:

No;

they did not disagree about this. Rather,

everyone,

Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, holds that

judgment requires three,

like Rabbi Abbahu.

Here,

with regard to compromise,

this is the point of their disagreement,

they disagree about the following principle:

this master holds

—Rabbi Meir holds—

that we compare compromise to judgment,

and just as judgment requires three, so does compromise.

And this master holds

—the Rabbis hold—

that we do not compare compromise to judgment,

and therefore, although judgment requires three, compromise may be made by one.

The Gemara nevertheless continues to ask:

Let us say,

that there are

three opinions of tannaim regarding compromise.

There are three different opinions of tannaim regarding the number required for a compromise:

this master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds

that it is done

by three. And this master,

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the earlier beraita,

holds that it is done by two. And this master,

the Rabbis,

holds

—they hold—

that it is done by one.

The Gemara answers:

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said, and some say

that

Rabbi Yemar bar Shelemya

said: There are only two opinions.

The one who says two

holds that

even one is also sufficient

to make a compromise. Since we have said that compromise is not compared to judgment, two have no advantage over one.

And the reason he says two

is

so that they may serve as witnesses for it.

The two can testify that the compromise took place if one of the litigants denies the compromise, or denies its details.

Therefore, he holds that it is performed by two.

It may be inferred from the answer we gave that Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a compromise may be made even by one, and that at most two are required so that they will be witnesses. If so, it is difficult: Why did Rabbi Meir say that it is done by three? The litigants who are making a compromise can do whatever they wish; why is a court required for this?

We must say that the reason is so that the compromise will have the enhanced force of a court, so that if one of the litigants wishes to retract from the compromise, he can be compelled to fulfill it.

Therefore,

Rav Ashi said: Learn from this: A compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition.

They need not transfer ownership to one another through an act of acquisition in order to prevent them from retracting from the compromise.

For if it enters your mind

that you should hold that

it requires an act of acquisition,

if so, the following difficulty arises:

according to the one who says

that a compromise

requires three, why do I need

three judges to strengthen the compromise, so that the litigants cannot retract from it?

Two should suffice,

two should be enough,

and they should effect an acquisition from him,

and the parties should transfer ownership to one another, in which case they certainly could not retract, since even ordinarily, one who gives a gift cannot retract after performing an act of acquisition.

Rather, it follows that a compromise does not require an act of acquisition.

And the halakha:

the halakhic ruling is:

A compromise requires

an act of acquisition,

even when it is made before three judges.

We learned in a baraita: Just as adjudication is with three, so too arbitration,

compromise,

with three.