Sanhedrin 5a — the Talmud in English

And if there was

one judge who was

an expert recognized by the public

as the Gemara will explain, he

may judge even alone.

This is because the tanna of the beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—holds like Rav Aḥa, that by Torah law even one judge is fit to judge, as it is stated: “You shall judge your fellow with righteousness.” He also holds that the sections of the Torah are not intermingled; therefore, cases of admissions and loans do not require three judges.

The Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—now explains who is called “an expert recognized by the public.”

Rav Nahman said:

A judge who is

like me,

like myself,

may judge monetary cases alone.

And Rabbi Hiyya likewise said: A judge like me may judge monetary cases alone.

The Sages raised a question:

The members of the study hall were uncertain: What is the meaning of “like me,” as stated by Rav Nahman and Rabbi Hiyya? If it means:

like me, who has learned,

who received traditions and laws from my teachers,

and

also

can reason,

who knows how to add explanations and derive reasoning on my own,

and

also

have received authorization,

having received authorization from the resh galuta, the head of the Jewish exile, Rav Nahman in Babylonia, and Rabbi Hiyya from Rabbi, who was the nasi, the leader of the Jewish community, in Eretz Yisrael—then only judges who possess all three of these qualities may judge alone.

But

one who lacks the third quality, meaning that he

has not received authorization,

if he judges alone,

his judgment is not a judgment;

his ruling has no validity and is void.

Or perhaps,

perhaps

even though he has not received authorization,

nevertheless, since he has learned and can reason,

his judgment is a valid judgment,

and it cannot be annulled.

The Gemara resolves this question from an incident that came before Rav Yosef:

Come and hear a proof:

Come and hear a proof from the case of

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Nahman,

who

judged a case,

judging the case alone, and

erred

in his ruling.

He came before Rav Yosef,

Mar Zutra came before Rav Yosef to ask whether he had to pay the person who had lost the case because of his mistaken ruling.

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said to Mar Zutra:

If

when the two litigants came before you to litigate,

they accepted you upon themselves,

they fully accepted you as their judge, explicitly saying that they wanted you to decide between them according to the law, but that even if you made an error in the law they would not sue you,

you need not pay,

because that is what they stipulated between themselves.

And if they did not

say this to you, but asked you to judge between them according to Torah law,

go and pay;

go and pay the person who suffered a loss because of your error, since you erred and did not issue a ruling according to Torah law.

All this is because he erred. But if he did not err, the judgment is valid. This is so even though Mar Zutra had not received authorization from the resh galuta.

The Gemara proves from here that his judgment is valid:

This proves

from this incident that even

when

he has not received authorization,

his judgment is valid.

The Gemara concludes: Indeed,

this proves it.

Rav said: In the case of one

any judge

who wishes to judge a case,

who wants to judge,

and

to ensure that he will also

be exempt from payment if he errs,

meaning that he will not have to pay if he makes an error—the advice is

to obtain authorization from the house of the head of the exile,

to receive authorization from the resh galuta to judge.

And Shmuel likewise said,

the advice is

to obtain authorization from the house of the head of the exile.

Then, since he has received authorization from him to judge, he does not pay if he errs in his ruling.

Since the Gemara said that Rav Nahman and Rabbi Hiyya received authorization to judge, the Gemara now explains who is authorized to grant permission to judge, the scope of his authority, and how authorization to judge is actually granted.

It is obvious

that a judge who received authority to judge

from here to here,

meaning that the resh galuta in Babylonia—since the Babylonian Talmud was composed in Babylonia—authorized him to judge here, the people of Babylonia,

and likewise it is obvious that a judge who received authorization to judge

from there to there,

from the nasi in Eretz Yisrael to judge the people of Eretz Yisrael,

and likewise it is obvious that

from here to there,

one who received authorization from the resh galuta and judged the people of Eretz Yisrael—

all of these forms of authorization

are effective.

Their authorization is valid, and they may judge alone as expert judges; if they err, they are exempt from payment.

The Gemara explains the advantage of the resh galuta in Babylonia over the nasi in Eretz Yisrael:

Here,

the resh galuta in Babylonia has greater authority, extending over all Israel, and he stands in the place of the king. The resh galuta in Babylonia has authority to authorize a court to declare property ownerless, based on the principle that whatever a court declares ownerless is ownerless. His authority is called

“the scepter,”

whereas

the

“there,”

the nasi in Eretz Yisrael, has limited authority and is called only

“the lawgiver.”

And

as it is taught in a beraita:

It is stated in the Torah, in Jacob’s blessing to Judah: “The scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor the lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh comes.” The meaning of the verse is that the rule of Judah will endure forever, even when there is no king among Israel.

The Sages interpreted:

“The scepter shall not depart from Judah”—

“scepter” refers to authority and dominion—

these are the heads of the exiles in Babylonia, who rule over Israel with the scepter,

as they possess power and authorization from the Persian kings.

“Nor the lawgiver from between his feet”—

these are the descendants of Hillel

the Elder, who was the nasi in Eretz Yisrael,

who teach Torah publicly.

But their authority is limited.

All this is obvious. But this question remains:

From there

to here—what is the law? If one received ordination and authorization from the nasi in Eretz Yisrael, does his authority also allow him to judge the people of Babylonia, or not?

The Gemara resolves the question:

Come and hear

from the case

of Rabba bar Ḥana, who judged a case

and issued a ruling in Babylonia,

and erred

in a matter requiring judicial discretion. One who is ordained to judge is exempt from payment.

He came before Rabbi Hiyya,

who went to Eretz Yisrael,

to Rabbi Hiyya,

and asked him whether he had to pay from his own money.

Rabbi Hiyya said to him,

Rabbi Hiyya said to Rabba:

If they accepted you upon themselves—

you need not pay; and if they did not

accept you—

go and pay,

go and pay from your own money the person who suffered a loss because of your mistaken judgment.

The Gemara proves:

But Rabba bar Ḥana had received authorization,

Rabba had received authorization from Rabbi, as the Gemara will relate below; Rabbi was the nasi of Eretz Yisrael. Why, then, did Rabbi Hiyya obligate him to pay? Rather,

this proves

that one can learn from this ruling that

from there to here, the authorization is not effective.

The Gemara concludes: Indeed,

this proves it.

But the Gemara challenges the proof:

Is it not effective!?

Is it indeed the case that the authorization of the nasi in Eretz Yisrael is not effective with regard to the people of Babylonia?

But,

there was an incident in which

Rabba bar Rav Huna, when he was quarrelling with the resh galuta,

when he had a dispute with the people of the head of the exile,

said

to the people of the resh galuta:

“I did not receive my authorization from you!”

I am not subordinate to you, because I did not receive my authority to judge from you. Rather,

I received authorization from my father,

from my father, Rav Huna,

and my father

received authorization to judge

from Rav, and Rav

received authorization to judge

from Rabbi Hiyya, and Rabbi Hiyya from Rabbi,

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, in Eretz Yisrael.

This proves that authorization to judge received from Eretz Yisrael is effective for judging in Babylonia as well, and that he does not need to receive authorization to judge there from the resh galuta of Babylonia.

The Gemara answers: In fact, the authorization from Eretz Yisrael was not effective for him, and what he said to the resh galuta

was merely something said for the sake of the argument;

he said it only for the purpose of the dispute, to dismiss their claim at that moment, but he did not intend to say that the authorization from Eretz Yisrael was effective for him.

But if so, this is difficult: Since the authorization from Eretz Yisrael was not effective for him, why did Rabba bar Ḥana receive authorization before he went down to Babylonia?

And since it is not effective,

if the authorization from Eretz Yisrael was not effective for him to judge in Babylonia,

why did Rabba bar Ḥana receive the authorization

before he went down to Babylonia,

what need was there for it,

what benefit would it provide him?

The Gemara answers: Indeed, outside Eretz Yisrael it would not benefit him, but it would benefit him

in the towns located on the borders,

which follow the authority of Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara relates:

What was the authorization?

How did Rabba bar Ḥana receive authorization before going down to Babylonia?

When Rabba bar Ḥana was going down,

when he wished to go down

to Babylonia, Rabbi Hiyya said to Rabbi

and asked him:

“Rabbi,

Rabba, who is

the son of my brother

Ḥana,

is going down to Babylonia.

Will he

issue rulings

there? Does he have authorization to issue rulings concerning matters of prohibition and permission, and matters of ritual impurity and purity?” [The Gemara will explain below why authorization is needed to issue rulings concerning prohibition and permission.]

Rabbi answered him:

“He may issue rulings!”

He is granted authorization to issue rulings.

Rabbi Hiyya further asked Rabbi:

“May he judge?”

Does he also have authorization to judge monetary cases there as an expert judge acting alone, and, if he errs, be exempt from payment?

Rabbi answered him:

“He may judge!”

He is also granted authorization to judge.

Rabbi Hiyya further asked him:

“May he rule on firstborn animals,”

meaning, may he rule concerning blemishes in a firstborn animal? Rabbi answered him:

“He may rule on them!”

He is also granted authorization to permit firstborn animals.

The Gemara further relates:

When Rav was going down,

when he wished to go down

to Babylonia, Rabbi Hiyya said to Rabbi:

Rav, who was

the son of my sister,

whose name was Aimu, the mother of Rav and the sister of Rabbi Hiyya,

is going down to Babylonia,

and Rabbi Hiyya asked Rabbi whether he

may issue rulings?

Rabbi answered:

“He may issue rulings!”

He asked him:

“May he judge?”

Rabbi answered:

“He may judge.”

He asked him:

“May he rule on firstborn animals?”

Rabbi answered:

“He may not rule on them!”

He is not granted authorization to permit firstborn animals. [The Gemara will explain.]

The Gemara discusses this:

What is the difference

that caused

this one,

Rabba bar Ḥana,

to be called

by Rabbi Hiyya

“the son of my brother,” and what is the difference

that caused

this one,

Rav,

to be called

by Rabbi Hiyya

“the son of my sister”?

And if you would say

that perhaps he called them this because

that was how the matter was,

meaning that in reality Rabba was his nephew through his brother, and Rav was his nephew through his sister:

It is impossible to say this! Rav was both Rabbi Hiyya’s nephew through his brother and his nephew through his sister [see the note].

But did the Master not say,

one of the amoraim related:

“Aivu,

Rav’s father,

and Ḥana,

Rabba’s father,

and Shila, and Marta, and Rabbi Hiyya—

all of them

the five of them—

were sons of Abba bar Aḥa Karsala, from

the place called

Kafrei.”

If so, Rav was also Rabbi Hiyya’s nephew through his brother. Why, then, did he call him “the son of my sister”?

The Gemara answers:

Rav was the son of his brother who was also the son of his sister.

Rav was both his nephew through his brother and his nephew through his sister, and therefore he called him “the son of my sister.”

But

Rabba bar Ḥana was the son of his brother, not the son of his sister,

as he was his nephew through his brother and not through his sister; therefore, he called him “the son of my brother.”

And if you wish, you may say

and this is another way to answer: