Sanhedrin 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

You said,

you have to answer and say:

There is a basis in the reading!

And the reading is “beḥelev” [with a ḥaṭef pataḥ beneath the ḥet, which is the construct form of ḥalav with a kamatz]. And there is no tanna who disagrees with this beraita, because it is from this verse that the prohibition of meat cooked with milk is derived, without any dissent.

Thus, everyone maintains: “There is a basis in the reading”!

And therefore Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov explains that indeed all the tannaim maintain that there is a basis in the reading.

Rather, everyone,

all the tannaim maintain

that there is a basis in the reading.

And Rabbi and the Rabbis,

both maintain that we read yarshi’un in the plural.

And in this they disagree,

they disagree concerning another derivation:

Rabbi maintains: “The judges will condemn”—others;

in addition to the judge mentioned above, two further judges will condemn, and he derives the upper case from the lower case: just as here there are two, so too above in the verse there are two. That makes four. And since a court may not have an even number of judges, one more is added to them, making five.

And the Rabbis maintain: “They will condemn”

in the plural

refers to this one and that one,

this judge written here together with the judge written above, making two. And since a court may not have an even number of judges, a third is added to them, making three.

And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov likewise disagrees with what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, that Rabbi Yehuda ben Ro’etz is the one who maintains that there is a basis in the reading, implying that the Rabbis disagreed with him and maintain that there is a basis in the written tradition.

And as for Rabbi Yehuda ben Ro’etz,

who said “and she shall be impure for two weeks” because there is a basis in the reading—

the Rabbis did not disagree with him;

there is no tanna who disagrees with him. Rather, everyone maintains that there is a basis in the reading.

And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov likewise disagrees with what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, that Beit Hillel maintain “there is a basis in the written tradition.”

Rather,

Beit Hillel

have another derivation, from which they learn that, after the fact, a sin offering whose blood was given as only one placement effects atonement.

As it was taught: “And he shall effect atonement,” “and he shall effect atonement,” “and he shall effect atonement”—because of the inference

of the kal va-chomer!

That is: The Torah wrote “and the priest shall effect atonement for him” three times [Leviticus 4]: once in the passage concerning the sin offering brought by a leader, a second time in the passage concerning the female goat brought by an individual for his sin, and a third time concerning the female sheep brought by an individual for his sin. These verses are superfluous for purposes of exposition, and they came to teach that even if all four placements were not given on the four corners, the offering effects atonement.

And why are all three derivations necessary? Because of the inference: Had the Torah not written them to teach that the four placements do not prevent atonement, but that even one suffices, I would have learned through an analogy—also called a din—that they do prevent atonement.

And this is the analogy that could have been made:

Is it not an inference

that it is possible to learn and reason through the analogy:

“Blood” is stated

with regard to offerings whose blood is placed on the altar

below,

beneath the ḥut ha-sikra, which is the midpoint of the altar [in the case of an olah, shelamim, and asham],

and “blood” is stated

with regard to offerings whose blood is given

above

the ḥut ha-sikra [in the case of an animal sin offering, concerning which it is stated: “its corners”].

Just as the blood mentioned below,

in the case of the other offerings, whose blood is given below the ḥut ha-sikra,

if he gave it as one placement, he effected atonement,

for even Beit Shammai maintain that with regard to the other offerings, apart from a sin offering, we learn from the verse “and the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out” that one placement suffices.

So too, the blood mentioned above,

in the case of an animal sin offering,

if he gave it as one placement, he effected atonement.

Indeed, without the derivation from the superfluous verses, we would have learned through the analogy that the offering effects atonement.

But the beraita presents a counter-analogy, from which it can be learned that even one of the placements prevents atonement.

Or alternatively,

it is possible for you to follow

the path

of reasoning

this:

“Blood” is stated with regard to the outside,

in the case of sin offerings whose blood is given on the outer altar, such as the goat of a leader and the sheep or female goat of an individual,

and “blood” is stated with regard to the inside,

in the case of sin offerings whose blood is given inside the Sanctuary, on the inner altar, on the curtain, and between the staves, such as the sin offering of Yom Kippur, the bull of the anointed priest, and the bull for the unwitting decision of the community.

Just as the blood mentioned inside,

the law is that if he

omitted one of the placements—

he has done nothing,

and this sin offering does not effect atonement, as we learn in tractate Menaḥot [27a],

so too the blood

of the sin offerings

mentioned outside,

perhaps the law should be that if he

omitted one of the placements, he has done nothing.

And since there is an analogy supporting each side,

it appears

from reason

to which

the law of the external sin offerings is comparable:

We reason from

offerings

outside,

the external sin offerings,

from

offerings

outside,

the asham, olah, and shelamim.

But we do not reason from

offerings

outside from inside,

from the sin offerings performed inside.

Or alternatively, follow this path:

for the counter-analogy, we reason

from a sin offering with four corners

the external sin offerings, which are sin offerings that come to effect atonement for a sin and whose mitzva is to give their blood on the four corners,

from a sin offering with four corners,

from the internal sin offerings, which are likewise sin offerings brought to effect atonement, and whose blood is also given on the four corners of the inner altar.

And let this not prove

this,

namely, the blood of an olah, shelamim, and asham,

which is not a sin offering,

which are not sin offerings,

and

whose blood is not given on

four corners,

but on the “altar round about,” in two placements that are equivalent to four.

And therefore, since it was more reasonable to derive from the internal sin offerings that one of their placements prevents atonement, the Torah came to teach us—

The verse states: “And he shall effect atonement,” “and he shall effect atonement,” “and he shall effect atonement”—because of the inference,

so that we should not compare it to the internal sin offerings, but rather say:

“He shall effect atonement,”

to say that he effects atonement

even though he gave only three. “He shall effect atonement,” even though he gave only two. “He shall effect atonement,” even though he gave only one.

And this is the reason that Beit Hillel disagree with Beit Shammai and maintain that one placement prevents atonement, rather than because they maintain that there is a basis in the written tradition.

And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov likewise disagrees with what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, that Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree over whether there is a basis in the reading or in the written tradition.

And as for Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis,

they all maintain that there is a basis in the reading. The first “in sukkot” is stated for its own purpose, namely, for the mitzva of sukka. And four further derivations remain, from the two instances of “in sukkot”:

Rabbi Shimon maintains: The roofing does not require a verse.

There is no need to derive the requirement of the roofing through one of the derivations, because it can be learned from the plain meaning of the first verse: a sukka is not called a sukka without roofing. Therefore, four derivations remain for the four walls, and the halakha given to Moses at Sinai teaches us that one of the walls need be only a handbreadth wide.

And the Rabbis maintain: The roofing does require a verse.

According to them, one derivation teaches us that a sukka requires roofing, leaving them three derivations for the three walls. And the halakha given to Moses at Sinai teaches us that the third wall need be only a handbreadth wide.

And therefore the Sages maintain: “Two according to their halakhic requirements, and the third may be even a handbreadth,” and not because they maintain that there is a basis in the written tradition.

And likewise with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages concerning the combining of a quarter-log of blood from two corpses—

And as for Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis,

they all maintain that there is a basis in the reading. Rather,

in this they disagree:

Rabbi Akiva maintains: “Souls” connotes two.

Therefore he deems one impure through blood that comes from two corpses.

And the Rabbis maintain: “Souls” has its ordinary meaning—

referring to each individual soul in the world [this is the way of the Torah, to speak in the plural]. And they deem one impure only through a quarter-log of blood from a single corpse.

These are the words of Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who maintains that all the tannaim maintain that there is a basis in the reading.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But

is it possible to say that

everyone

maintains

“There is a basis in the reading”?

But it was taught:

we learned in a beraita:

“For a sign, for a sign, for signs”

(see the note ),

here there are four

compartments. Two are derived from “for signs, for a sign,” in the singular, and two from “for signs,” in the plural. These are

the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

But

Rabbi Akiva says: It is not necessary

for this derivation. Rather,

tat

in the place called

Katfi

means

two, and pat

in the place called

Afriki

also means

two;

that makes four.

Certainly, the reading in all the verses is letotafot, in the plural; nevertheless, Rabbi Yishmael expounds it in the singular, in accordance with the written tradition.

It is therefore proven that Rabbi Yishmael maintains that there is a basis in the written tradition.

The Gemara therefore retracts Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov’s statement that there is no one who maintains that there is a basis in the written tradition, and gives another answer to the difficulty from “in the milk of its mother,” which implies that the written tradition is not expounded.

Rather,

we shall answer that

in truth,

the tannaim

disagree;

they disagree on this matter, and there is one who maintains that there is a basis in the written tradition.

And this statement applies when they disagree,

when do they disagree and maintain that there is a basis in the written tradition?

When the written text differs from the written tradition,

when the reading differs in its letters from the written tradition, so that the reading contains more letters than the written tradition.

But in this case, “ḥelev and ḥalav,” since they are identical,

since they contain the same letters and the difference is only in the manner of reading them, then everyone agrees that

there is a basis in the reading.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

But “he will appear—

“he will see” [as we shall explain],

(as we shall explain),

since they are identical,

since they contain the same letters,

and they disagree,

and nevertheless the tannaim disagree in this matter.

As it was taught,

we learned in a beraita: The tanna

Yoḥanan ben Dehavai said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima: One who is blind

in one eye

is exempt from the mitzva of

the mitzva of

appearing,

which is the mitzva of seeing the Presence of the Divine at the pilgrimage festival in the Temple courtyard, together with bringing the burnt offering of appearance,

as it is stated

[Exodus 23]: “Three times a year all your males shall appear before the Lord God,” and he expounds [see note ] also the reading

“he will appear,”

that all your males shall appear before the Holy One, blessed be He. And he also expounds the written tradition

“he will see,”

that all your males shall come to see the Divine Presence themselves, because

just as

the Holy One, blessed be He, comes

to be seen

by all your males—as this is learned from the reading “he will appear”—

so He comes

the Holy One, blessed be He,

to see,

meaning that all your males come to see the Divine Presence, as this is learned from the written tradition.

And therefore he expounds:

What:

just as the Holy One, blessed be He, comes

to see,

and He comes in a state of wholeness, as though He were

with both eyes,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 11]: “The eyes of the Lord your God,”

so too

when the Holy One, blessed be He,

comes to be seen

by those who make the pilgrimage, He will see them

with both eyes

of the person. Therefore, one who is blind in one eye is exempt from appearing. This means that Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima expounds both the reading and the written tradition. But the Sages disagree with him and do not expound this interpretation.

In any event, it is proven from here that although there is no difference in letters between “he will appear” and “he will see,” Rabbi Yehuda nevertheless expounds the written tradition. Consequently, it is difficult: Why, in the case of “ḥelev, ḥalav,” do we not expound the written tradition!?

And the Gemara answers why ḥalav is not expounded.

Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: The verse states, “You shall not cook a kid

in the milk of its mother”;

the Torah prohibited it only by way of cooking.

Therefore it is prohibited only through the manner of cooking, which is with milk from the mother; but with ḥelev, animal fat, it is not the manner of cooking, but rather frying. And the conclusion is: There are tannaim who maintain that there is a basis in the written tradition, even when the reading and the written tradition have the same letters; but with regard to meat cooked with milk, this cannot be said.

And now the Gemara returns to the law concerning judges.

The Sages taught: Monetary laws

which concern admissions and loans are adjudicated

by three

laymen.