Sanhedrin 51a (נא.) — the Talmud in English

It is written in the verse:

“the daughter of a priest”:

I have no

basis to learn from this

except a daughter of a priest

who is a daughter of a priest

who married a priest

and committed adultery while married to him. But if she

married a Levite, an Israelite, or a Samaritan

1, or a disqualified priest—

that is, the son of a priest who married a divorcee or a zona, for the son is called a ḥalal, disqualified from the priesthood, as it is stated: “He shall not profane his offspring” [Leviticus 21:15]. His status in all other matters is that of a fully qualified Israelite, but his wife is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood—

a mamzer

that is, one born of a prohibition punishable by capital punishment administered by the court, or by karet [except a menstruant woman],

or a natin

that is, one of the descendants of the Gibeonites from the time of Joshua, who were sentenced [by David] to remain separate from the congregation, their status being like that of mamzerim—

from where

do we know that even that daughter of a priest who married one of these men is included among the daughters of priests whose punishment is burning?

The verse states: “And the daughter of a priest”—

the word “man” is superfluous and is expounded to mean that only the father must be a priest, but the husband need not be a priest; rather,

even though she is not the daughter of a priest who married a priest,

the essential point is that she is the daughter of a priest, since the Torah was particular only that she be the daughter of a priest, and not that she be the wife of a priest.

It is written in the verse: “She profanes her father,” and the word “she” is expounded as an exclusion, for only

“she”

is removed from the category of an Israelite woman and sentenced

to burning, but her paramour is not

sentenced

to burning.

Only

“she”

is removed from the category of an Israelite woman and sentenced

to burning, but her conspiring witnesses are not

sentenced

to burning,

but are sentenced as though she were an Israelite woman.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

They expound the verse

“her father”

as an exclusion, meaning that only if she committed adultery with her father is she sentenced

to burning, and

whereas if she committed adultery with

her father-in-law, she is sentenced to stoning.

The Gemara will explain this exposition below.

The Master said:

We learned in the earlier beraita concerning the verse [Leviticus 21:9]: “And the daughter of a priest, when she profanes herself through prostitution, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire”

: One might have thought that even if she profaned Shabbat

she would be liable to burning. For this reason, “through prostitution” is written in the verse, to teach that the verse speaks only of profanation through prostitution.

And we raise a difficulty: How could it have entered our minds that if a daughter of a priest

profaned Shabbat

she would be liable to burning? After all, a woman who profanes Shabbat

is subject to stoning!

If so, how could we think that the Torah would be lenient with regard to a daughter of a priest, so that she would be sentenced to a lighter form of execution than other Israelite women?

Rava said: Whose opinion is this?

This beraita

is Rabbi Shimon’s, who says: Burning is more severe.

Therefore

it might enter your mind to say

we might think:

Since the Merciful One was stringent with regard to priests,

since the Torah was stringent with regard to priests,

and increased

the number of

additional mitzvot

imposed upon them—

she should be sentenced to burning

for profaning Shabbat, even though other Israelite women are sentenced only to stoning . For this reason,

it teaches us

the verse that she is sentenced to burning only for profanation through prostitution, and not for profaning Shabbat.

And we raise a difficulty: How could we initially have thought that a daughter of a priest who profaned Shabbat is sentenced to burning?

How is he different from her?

Why should the Torah be more stringent with females than with male priests ?

And we answer:

It might enter your mind to say

we might think:

He is the one for whom it was permitted

the male priest, for whom the performance of

Shabbat work was permitted with regard to the Temple service;

therefore, there is reason not to treat him stringently in a circumstance in which Shabbat work was not permitted to him.

In contrast,

she,

the female,

since it was not permitted

since performance of

Shabbat work was not permitted with regard to her

under any circumstances —

I might say

we might think that the Torah was stringent with her, so that she

would be sentenced to burning.

For this reason

it teaches us

the verse that she is not sentenced to burning for profaning Shabbat, but only for profanation through prostitution.

We learned in the earlier beraita:

One might have thought that even

a

single

daughter of a priest who committed adultery would be liable to burning. For this reason, we derive a gzera shava: “her father” and “her father,” from the law of the betrothed young woman.

And we raise a difficulty: How could we think that a single woman who committed adultery would be liable to burning?

“Through prostitution” is written,

in the verse, whereas with a single woman this is not called prostitution, for the term prostitution applies only when she commits adultery and leaves her husband for others, as it is written in Hosea [9:1]: “For you have gone astray from your God.” The word “prostitute” connotes one who rebels, leaves, and turns from one to another.

And we answer: This beraita follows

the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says

in tractate Yevamot [61b]:

A single man who has relations with a single woman not for the sake of marriage renders her a zona,

and she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, since a priest is forbidden to marry a divorcee, a ḥalala, or a zona. This indicates that according to Rabbi Elazar, relations with a single woman are also considered prostitution . Therefore, the gzera shava “her father” and “her father” is necessary, to derive the law from the betrothed young woman, because the verse concerning a daughter of a priest who committed adultery is not speaking of a single woman.

We learned in the earlier beraita:

Or perhaps “her father” does not say

perhaps “her father” was not stated for this gzera shava,

but to exclude everyone else?

If she committed adultery with any other man, she would be sentenced like other Israelite women: a married woman by strangulation and a betrothed woman by stoning.

And we raise a difficulty:

Rather, what is it?

If the verse is not speaking of her committing adultery with any other man, then with whom is it speaking of her committing adultery? Should we establish the verse as referring to her

committing adultery with her father?

But if we establish it in this manner, there is a difficulty:

Why specifically

why did the verse speak only of

a daughter of a priest,

when

even an Israelite woman

who committed adultery with her father

also

is sentenced to burning?

For Rava said that Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi said: It is derived

through a gzera shava

“behold” and “behold,”

to make one who has relations with his daughter liable as one who has relations with his granddaughter. For it is written concerning one who has relations with his son’s daughter or his daughter’s daughter [Leviticus 18:10]: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter or your daughter’s daughter, you shall not uncover their nakedness, for their nakedness is your own.” And it is written concerning one who has relations with his wife’s daughter [ibid., 17]: “The nakedness of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover; you shall not take her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they are your kin, it is lewdness.” They derive from the gzera shava: Just as, in the case of one’s wife, he is liable for her daughter as for her granddaughter, so here, he is liable for his daughter as for his granddaughter .

And likewise,

it is derived

through a gzera shava

“lewdness” and “lewdness”

to make one who has relations with his daughter liable to burning, for here it is written, “It is lewdness,” and it is written concerning the law of burning [Leviticus 20:14]: “They shall be burned with fire ... so that there shall be no lewdness among you.”

If so, how could we think that the verse requiring a daughter of a priest who committed adultery to be burned is speaking of her committing adultery with her father? We have already learned this from Rava’s gzera shava, that anyone who has relations with his daughter is liable to burning.

And we answer: In fact, the verse requiring a daughter of a priest who committed adultery to be burned is speaking of her committing adultery with her father.

Even if the verse is speaking of her committing adultery with her father,

it is necessary,

it is needed.

For

it might enter your mind to say

we might think:

The verse comes to exclude

since “her father,” which is written in the verse, is superfluous and teaches that a daughter of a priest who committed adultery with her father is sentenced to burning, it comes to exclude

Rava’s

gzera shava, so that an Israelite who has relations with his daughter would not be liable to burning ,

since the Merciful One explicitly stated

that the verse requires burning only

for a daughter of a priest and not for a daughter of an Israelite.

For this reason,

it teaches us

the verse: “She profanes him”—meaning that the verse speaks only of a case in which “she” profanes her father, and not one in which he profanes her; that is, it is speaking of her committing adultery with any other man and not with her father. Therefore, the verse speaks only of a daughter of a priest, because when she commits adultery with any man, only a daughter of a priest is sentenced to burning. But when she commits adultery with her father, we learn from Rava’s gzera shava that an Israelite woman, too, is sentenced to burning.

We learned in the earlier beraita concerning the verse:

“the daughter of a priest” \-

I have no

basis to learn from this,

except

a daughter of a priest

who married a priest;

but if she

married a Levite, an Israelite, a Samaritan, a disqualified priest, a natin, or a mamzer, from where

do we know that she too is included among the daughters of priests whose punishment is burning?

The verse states: “the daughter of a priestly man”—

the word “man” is superfluous and is expounded to mean that only the father must be a priest, but the husband need not be a priest; rather,

even though she is not the daughter of a priest who married a priest,

the essential point is that she is the daughter of a priest, since the Torah was particular only that she be the daughter of a priest, and not that she be the wife of a priest.

And we raise a difficulty: How could there be any basis for saying that the verse speaks only of a daughter of a priest married to a priest, such that the verse must write the superfluous word “man” so that we can expound that a daughter of a priest is liable to burning even if she married men who are not priests or men who are disqualified?

Is it because she married these men that she is no longer the daughter of a priest?

Does the fact that she married men who are not priests, or men who are disqualified, mean that she is no longer considered the daughter of a priest?

Furthermore,

and in addition:

Is “the daughter of a priest married to a priest” written?

Does the verse speak specifically of a daughter of a priest who married a priest?

And we answer:

It might enter your mind to say

we might think that since the verse states

“when she begins to commit prostitution, the Merciful One said,”

then

this matter

the law that she is liable to burning applies only

where she is profaned now,

in a case in which she becomes profaned now through prostitution,

but this one,

the woman who married a man disqualified to her,

since she was already profaned and remains so from the outset,

since she was already profaned from the time she married him—for if she married a disqualified priest, a natin, or a mamzer, she was disqualified from eating teruma, and even if her husband dies childless, she does not return to her father’s house as in her youth to eat teruma, and she is also disqualified from the priesthood, as she may no longer marry a priest—

as the Master said,

for Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, in Yevamot [68a], expounding the verse [Leviticus 22:12]:

“And when the daughter of a priest shall be married to a non-priest,

she may not eat of the sacred teruma”

—

once she has had relations with one disqualified to her, he disqualifies her

forever from teruma and from the priesthood. It is thus clear that she becomes profaned from the priesthood already at the time of her marriage.

And even if she married

a Levite or an Israelite as well

—although she is not permanently profaned, nevertheless, the verse states [ibid., 13] that if her husband dies childless:

“and she returns to her father’s house as in her youth”; from this

we learn

that when she is with him,

when she is under her husband’s authority,

she may not eat

teruma, and she is therefore profaned with regard to teruma. Consequently,

I might say

we might think that in such a case

she should not be sentenced to burning.

For this reason,

it teaches us

the verse’s superfluous word “man,” to expound that only the father must be a priest, but the husband need not be a priest. Even though she is not the wife of a priest, she is liable to burning, since the Torah was particular only that she be the daughter of a priest, and not that she be the wife of a priest.

And this beraita, which maintains that a kohen's daughter, even if she married one who is disqualified to her, remains in her sanctity and is sentenced to burning,

is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

As it is taught

in the Mishna in Trumot [7:2]:

A kohen's daughter who married an Israelite

is under the authority of her Israelite husband.

And

if

she ate teruma—

she pays the principal,

since the Torah did not grant her teruma; therefore, the teruma in her possession is considered stolen.

But she does not pay the additional fifth,

since she is not a non-kohen, and she is fit to return and eat teruma if her husband dies without children.

And

if she committed adultery,

her death is by burning.

But if

she married one of those disqualified to her,

she is disqualified forever and her status is profaned, so that she is entirely like a non-kohen.

And if she ate teruma—

she pays the principal and the additional fifth,

as is the law with regard to a non-kohen who ate teruma.

And

if she committed adultery,

her death is by strangulation,

since she is not included in the category of a kohen's daughter who committed adultery, whose death is by burning. Rabbi Meir expounds the verse: “When she begins to commit adultery,” teaching that she is liable for burning only when she becomes profaned through the adultery. This one, who was already profaned and remains so from the moment she married, is excluded,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

Even if she married one who is disqualified to her, she remains in her sanctity and is still considered a kohen's daughter. Therefore,

both this one and that one—

both the one who married an Israelite and the one who married one disqualified to her, if they ate teruma,

pay the principal but not the additional fifth, and

if they committed adultery,

their deaths are by burning.

We learned above in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

They expound the verse

“her father”

to exclude a case, teaching that only if she committed adultery with

her father

is her sentence burning; but if she committed adultery with

her father-in-law,

her sentence is

stoning.

And we raised a difficulty with this:

What

is the meaning of Rabbi Eliezer's statement that only if she committed adultery with

her father

is her sentence burning, but if she committed adultery with

her father-in-law,

her sentence is stoning?

If you say

that the meaning is:

“her father”—

that she committed adultery

with her father—

then her sentence is burning;

“and her father-in-law”—

that she committed adultery

with her father-in-law—

then her sentence is not burning but stoning,

this is difficult:

Why specifically

did Rabbi Eliezer speak only about

a kohen's daughter?

After all,

even

with regard to

an Israelite's daughter as well,

the same law applies: if he engages in intercourse with

his daughter,

their sentence is

burning,

and if he engages in intercourse with

his daughter-in-law,

their sentence is

stoning [as explained in the Mishna below, 53a].

[as explained in the Mishna below, on 53a].

Rather,

Rabbi Eliezer is speaking of her committing adultery with another man who is not her father, and this is how his statement is to be understood:

“her father”—

meaning that she committed adultery

while under her father's authority,

while she was betrothed; in this case her sentence is burning. But

“and her father-in-law”—if she committed adultery

while

under her father-in-law's authority,

after she had married, in this case her sentence is not burning but stoning.

In accordance with whom

does Rabbi Eliezer hold in this matter?

If

Rabbi Eliezer holds

in accordance with the Rabbis

of our Mishna, who maintain that stoning is more severe than burning, he should have stated the opposite, since a betrothed woman is subject to a more severe penalty than a married woman.

For they say:

But the Rabbis said that only

a married woman was excluded

from the category of an Israelite's daughter, whose penalty is strangulation,

to burning, and not

was

a betrothed woman

excluded from stoning to burning.

If

it is said that Rabbi Eliezer holds

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who in our Mishna maintains that burning is more severe than stoning,

for he said:

Rabbi Shimon said that

both a betrothed woman and a married woman

are subject

to burning,

whereas Rabbi Eliezer said that only a betrothed woman is subject to burning, but a married woman is subject to stoning.

And if

it is said that Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that burning is more severe, holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael, for he said

below in the sugya that only

a betrothed woman was excluded

from the category of an Israelite's daughter, whose penalty is stoning,

to burning, and not a married woman,

as he derives through a binyan av that the verse speaks only of a betrothed woman and not of a married woman, it follows according to Rabbi Yishmael that if she committed adultery with

“her father-in-law”

while under her father-in-law's authority after she had married,

her penalty is strangulation,

as is the law with regard to a married Israelite's daughter who committed adultery. Whereas Rabbi Eliezer said that her sentence is stoning.

Ravin sent in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina: This is the formulation of the Mishna,

the statement of Rabbi Eliezer should be taught as it stands and should not be reversed, and his intention should be interpreted as follows:

In every case

he holds

in accordance with the Rabbis,

who maintain that a betrothed woman is sentenced to stoning and a married woman to burning.

And this is what he said:

And this is what he said: a.

Every

act of adultery

that is

committed by an Israelite's daughter

for which she receives a penalty less severe than death by her father,

meaning: for every act of adultery for which an Israelite's daughter is sentenced to a death less severe than that for committing adultery with her father, whose penalty is burning, a kohen's daughter is sentenced to burning, as though she had committed adultery with her father.

And what is it

that is the act of adultery for which an Israelite's daughter receives a less severe death than if she had committed adultery with her father?

A married Israelite's daughter

who committed adultery with another man who is not her father.

For if a married Israelite's daughter

committed adultery with another man who is not her father, her sentence is

strangulation.

Here,

with regard to a married kohen's daughter who committed adultery with another man, we do not treat her leniently by sentencing her to the less severe death of strangulation. Rather, she is sentenced as though she had committed adultery with her father, and she is sentenced

to the death of her father, by burning.

b.

Every

act of adultery

that is

committed by an Israelite's daughter

for which she receives a penalty more severe than death by her father,

meaning: for every act of adultery for which an Israelite's daughter is sentenced to a death more severe than that for committing adultery with her father, whose penalty is burning, a kohen's daughter is likewise sentenced to the more severe death.

And what is it

that is the act of adultery for which an Israelite's daughter receives a more severe death than if she had committed adultery with her father?

A betrothed Israelite's daughter

who committed adultery,

for if a betrothed Israelite's daughter

committed adultery

in general,

her sentence is

stoning,

which is more severe than burning.

Here,

likewise, with regard to a betrothed kohen's daughter who committed adultery, she is not removed from the category of an Israelite's daughter and sentenced to burning, which is less severe than stoning. Rather, she is sentenced as though she had committed adultery with her father-in-law, and she is sentenced

to the death of her father-in-law, by stoning.

And this is how Rabbi Eliezer's statement is interpreted: “With her father—in burning.”

Meaning, the act of adultery that is one degree less severe than committing adultery with her father—that is, a married Israelite's daughter who committed adultery, whose sentence is strangulation—here, with regard to a kohen's daughter, the verse removes her from the category of an Israelite's daughter in order to impose a more severe penalty upon her, so that she is sentenced to burning. “

And with her father-in-law—in stoning.”

Meaning, the act of adultery that is more severe than committing adultery with her father, such as a betrothed Israelite's daughter who committed adultery, whose sentence is stoning. “With her father-in-law”—the kohen's daughter is judged according to the law of a daughter-in-law who committed adultery with her father-in-law, whose sentence is stoning.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to this:

How can this be the interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer's statement?

Did he teach cases more severe and less severe?

Do we find that Rabbi Eliezer spoke about an act of adultery that is more severe [than committing adultery with her father] and about an act of adultery that is less severe [than committing adultery with her father]?

Rather, Rabbi Yirmeya said: