Sanhedrin 51a — the Talmud in English

It is written in the verse:

“the daughter of a priest” ![](pamud.bmp "

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I have only

to learn from this

but

the daughter of a priest

who married a priest

and committed adultery while married to him; but if

she married a Levite, an Israelite, or a Samaritan

1, or a ḥalal—

that is, a son of a priest who married a divorcee or a harlot, for the son is called a ḥalal with respect to the priesthood, as it is stated: “He shall not profane his offspring” [Leviticus 21:15], and his status in all other matters is that of a fit Israelite, but his wife is disqualified from the priesthood—

a mamzer—

that is, one who was born from a prohibition involving a court-imposed death penalty, or karet [except a menstruant woman]—

or a netin—

that is, one of the descendants of the Gibeonites from the days of Joshua, who were sentenced [by David] to be separated from the congregation, so that their status would be like that of mamzerim—

from where

do we know that even that daughter of a priest who married them is included among the daughters of priests whose punishment is burning?

The verse states: “the daughter of a man who is a priest”—

the word “man” is superfluous, to expound that only the father must be a priest, but the husband need not be a priest; rather,

even though she is not the daughter of a priest,

the essential point is that she is the daughter of a priest, because the Torah was particular only that she be the daughter of a man who is a priest, and not that she be the wife of a priest.

It is written in the verse: “She profanes her father,” and they expound from the word “she” as an exclusion, for only

“she”

departed from the category of an Israelite woman to be judged

by burning, but her paramour is not

judged

by burning.

Only

“she”

departed from the category of an Israelite woman to be judged

by burning, but her conspiring witnesses are not judged

by

burning,

but rather they are judged as though she were an Israelite woman.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

They expound the verse

“her father”

as an exclusion, for only if she committed adultery with her father is she

subject to burning, whereas

if she committed adultery with

her father-in-law, she is subject to stoning.

And below the Gemara will explain the interpretation of this exposition.

The Master said:

We learned in the beraita above concerning the verse [Leviticus 21:9]: “And the daughter of a man who is a priest, when she profanes herself by harlotry, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire”—

one might have thought that even if she profaned Shabbat

she would become liable to burning; for this reason “by harlotry” is written in the verse, to say that the verse speaks only of profanations involving harlotry.

And we raise an objection: How could it have entered one’s mind that if the daughter of a priest

profaned Shabbat

she would become liable to burning—for a woman who profanes Shabbat

is subject to stoning!

If so, how could we think to say that the Torah would be lenient with the daughter of a priest more than with the other daughters of Israel, so that she would be judged with a lighter death penalty?

Rava said: Whose opinion is this

this beraita?

It is Rabbi Shimon’s, who says: Burning is more severe.

And therefore

it might enter your mind

we would think to say:

Since the Merciful One was stringent with them, with the priests,

since the Torah was stringent with the priests,

and increased for them

that there were increased for them

additional mitzvot—

because of this there would be reason to say that

she should be judged by burning

for profaning Shabbat, even though the other daughters of Israel are judged only by stoning ; for this reason

it teaches us

the verse teaches us that she is judged by burning only for a profanation involving harlotry, and not for profaning Shabbat.

And we raise an objection: How did we initially think that the daughter of a priest who profaned Shabbat is judged by burning?

What is different about her from him?

Why should the Torah be more stringent with the females than with the male priests ?

And we resolve:

It might enter your mind

we would think to say:

He is the one for whom it was permitted

the male priest, for whom the labor of

Shabbat was permitted with regard to the Temple service,

therefore there is reason not to be stringent with him in a place where the labor of Shabbat was not permitted to him.

In contrast,

she,

the female,

since it was not permitted

since the labor of

Shabbat was not permitted with regard to her

in any manner —

let us say

we would say that the Torah was stringent with her, so that she

would be judged by burning.

For this reason

it teaches us

the verse teaches that she is not judged by burning for profaning Shabbat, but only for a profanation involving harlotry.

We learned in the beraita above:

one might have thought even

the daughter of a priest,

an unmarried woman,

who committed adultery would become liable to burning; therefore we expound a gezerah shavah: “her father,” “her father,” from the betrothed maiden.

And we raise an objection: How could we think to say that an unmarried woman who committed adultery would become liable to burning,

for “by harlotry” is written

in the verse, and with an unmarried woman it is not harlotry, for the term harlotry applies only when she commits adultery and departs from beneath her husband to others, as it is written in Hosea [9:1]: “For you have committed harlotry away from your God,” where “harlot” has the meaning of rebelling, departing, and turning from one to another.

And we resolve: This beraita follows

the view of Rabbi Elazar, who said

in tractate Yevamot [folio 61b]:

An unmarried man who has intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage has made her a harlot,

and she is disqualified from the priesthood, for it is forbidden for a priest to marry a divorcee, a ḥalalah, or a harlot. It follows that according to Rabbi Elazar, even with an unmarried woman it is considered harlotry . Therefore the gezerah shavah, “her father,” “her father,” is needed to expound from the betrothed maiden, because the verse concerning the daughter of a priest who committed adultery does not speak of an unmarried woman.

We learned in the beraita above:

Or perhaps “her father” does not say

perhaps “her father” was not stated for this gezerah shavah,

but to exclude every other person?

For if she committed adultery with any other person, she would be judged like the other daughters of Israel: if married, by strangulation, and if betrothed, by stoning.

And we raise an objection:

But what is it?

If the verse is not speaking of her committing adultery with any other person, then with whom is the verse speaking of her committing adultery? Are we to establish the verse as speaking of her

committing adultery with her father?

But if we establish it in this way, it will be difficult:

Why specifically

why did the verse speak only of

the daughter of a priest,

for

even the daughter of an Israelite

who committed adultery with her father

also

is judged by burning?

As Rava said, Rav Yitzhak bar Avudimi said to me: We derive

by a gezerah shavah

“behold,” “behold,”

to make one who has intercourse with his daughter liable like one who has intercourse with his daughter’s daughter. For it is written concerning one who has intercourse with his son’s daughter or his daughter’s daughter [Leviticus 18:10]: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter or your daughter’s daughter you shall not uncover; for their nakedness is your own nakedness,” and it is written concerning one who has intercourse with his wife’s daughter [ibid., 17]: “The nakedness of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover; her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter you shall not take to uncover her nakedness; they are her kin, it is depravity.” And they expound from the gezerah shavah: Just as in the case of his wife, he is liable for her daughter as for her daughter’s daughter, so here he is liable for his daughter as for his daughter’s daughter .

And likewise

we derive

by a gezerah shavah

“depravity,” “depravity,”

to make one who has intercourse with his daughter liable to burning, for “it is depravity” is written here, and it is written concerning the law of burning [Leviticus 20:14]: “They shall burn him and them with fire ... so that there be no depravity among you.”

If so, how could we think to say that the verse making the daughter of a priest who committed adultery liable to burning is speaking of her committing adultery with her father? We have already learned this from Rava’s gezerah shavah, that anyone who has intercourse with his daughter is liable to burning.

And we resolve: In truth, the verse making the daughter of a priest who committed adultery liable to burning is speaking of her committing adultery with her father.

For even if the verse speaks of her committing adultery with her father,

it is necessary,

it is needed.

For

it might enter your mind

we would think to say:

the verse comes to exclude

for “her father,” which is written in the verse, is superfluous, to teach that the daughter of a priest who committed adultery with her father is judged by burning—and it comes to exclude

from Rava,

from Rava’s gezerah shavah, so that an Israelite who has intercourse with his daughter should not be made liable to burning ,

since the Merciful One made it explicit

that the verse made liable to burning only

the daughter of a priest, and not the daughter of an Israelite.

For this reason

it teaches us

the verse teaches us: “She profanes,” meaning that the verse spoke only of a case in which “she” profanes her father, and he does not profane her—that is, it speaks of her committing adultery with any other person, and not of her committing adultery with her father. Therefore the verse spoke only of the daughter of a priest, because when she commits adultery with any person, only the daughter of a priest is judged by burning; but when she commits adultery with her father, we learn from Rava’s gezerah shavah that even the daughter of an Israelite is judged by burning.

We learned in the beraita above: concerning the verse

“the daughter of a priest” \-

I have only

to learn from this,

but

the daughter of a priest

who married a priest;

but if

she married a Levite, an Israelite, a Samaritan, a ḥalal, a netin, or a mamzer, from where

do we know that she too is included among the daughters of priests whose punishment is burning?

The verse states: “the daughter of a man who is a priest”—

the word “man” is superfluous, to expound that only the father must be a priest, but the husband need not be a priest; rather,

even though she is not the daughter of a priest,

the essential point is that she is the daughter of a priest, because the Torah was particular only that she be the daughter of a man who is a priest, and not that she be the wife of a priest.

And we raise an objection: How is there room to say that the verse speaks only of the daughter of a priest who is married to a priest, so that the verse must write “man,” which is superfluous, in order that we expound that the daughter of a priest is liable to burning even if she married those who are not priests?

Because she married these people, is she not the daughter of a priest?

Because she married those who are not priests, or those who are disqualified, does she already cease to be considered the daughter of a priest?

And furthermore,

and additionally:

Was “the daughter of a priest to a priest” written?

Does the verse speak of the daughter of a priest who married a priest?

And we resolve:

It might enter your mind

we would think to say: Since it is written in the verse,

“when she begins to commit harlotry,” said the Merciful One,

if so,

this matter

this law, that she is liable to burning, applies only

where she becomes profaned now,

in a situation in which she is profaned now through the adultery;

but this one,

the one who married a man disqualified for her,

since she was already profaned and remains so from the outset,

since she was already profaned and remained so from the time she married—for if she married a ḥalal, a netin, or a mamzer, she became profaned from eating teruma, and even if the husband dies without children, she does not return to her father’s house as in her youth to eat teruma, and she is also disqualified from the priesthood, for she is forbidden to marry a priest.

For the Master said,

that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav in Yevamot [68a], expounding the verse [Leviticus 22:12]:

“And when the daughter of a priest shall be to a strange man

she shall not eat of the sacred offerings”—

once she has had intercourse with one disqualified for her—

he disqualifies her

forever from teruma and from the priesthood. It is explained that already through her marriage she became profaned with respect to the priesthood.

And even if she married

a Levite or an Israelite also—

even though she is not permanently profaned, nevertheless it is written in the verse [ibid., 13] that if the husband dies without children:

“and she returns to her father’s house as in her youth,” from this

we learn

that when he has her with him,

when she is in the husband’s possession,

she does not eat

teruma, and she is therefore profaned with respect to teruma; therefore

let us say

we would say that in such a case

she should not be judged by burning.

For this reason

it teaches us

the verse’s superfluous “man” teaches us that only the father must be a priest, but the husband need not be a priest; and even though she is not the daughter of a priest, she is liable to burning, for the Torah was particular only that she be the daughter of a man who is a priest, and not that she be the wife of a priest.

and this beraita, which holds that a kohen’s daughter, even if she married one forbidden to her, remains in her sanctity and is sentenced to burning,

not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

For it was taught

in the Mishna in Trumot [7:2]:

A kohen’s daughter who married an Israelite

is under the authority of her Israelite husband.

And

if

she ate teruma—

she repays the principal

since the Torah did not grant her [the right] to teruma; if so, the teruma in her possession is stolen property.

But she does not repay the fifth,

since she is not a non-kohen, and she is fit to return and eat teruma if her husband dies without sons.

And

if she committed adultery,

her death is by burning.

But if she

married one of those forbidden to her,

she is disqualified forever and profaned, and she is like a complete non-kohen.

And if she ate teruma—

she repays the principal and the fifth,

according to the law of a non-kohen who ate teruma.

And

if she committed adultery,

her death is by strangulation,

since she is not included within the category of a kohen’s daughter who committed adultery, whose death is by burning. For Rabbi Meir expounds the verse, “When she begins to commit adultery”: she is liable to burning only when she becomes profaned through the adultery. This one, who was already profaned and standing [in that state] from the time she married, is excluded,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

even if she married one forbidden to her, she is still in her sanctity and is still considered a kohen’s daughter. Therefore,

both this one and that one—

both the one who married an Israelite and the one who married one forbidden to her, if they ate teruma,

repay the principal but not the fifth, and

if they committed adultery,

their deaths are by burning.

We learned in the beraita above:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

They expound the verse

“her father”

as an exclusion: only if she committed adultery with her father is her sentence

by burning,

but if she committed adultery with

her father-in-law,

her sentence is

by stoning.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What

is meant by Rabbi Eliezer’s words, that only if she committed adultery with

her father

is her sentence by burning, but if she committed adultery with

her father-in-law,

her sentence is by stoning?

If you say

that the meaning is:

“her father”—

that she committed adultery

with her father—

then her sentence is by burning;

“and her father-in-law”—

that she committed adultery

with her father-in-law—

then her sentence is not by burning but by stoning.

If so, this is difficult:

why specifically

did Rabbi Eliezer speak only about

a kohen’s daughter?

For

even

with regard to

an Israelite’s daughter as well,

the law is thus: if he came upon

his daughter,

their sentence is

by burning,

and if he came upon

his daughter-in-law,

their sentence is

by stoning [as explained in the Mishna below, 53a].

Rather,

Rabbi Eliezer always spoke of her committing adultery with another person who is not her father, and this is how his words are to be explained:

“her father”—that is, that she committed adultery

in her father’s domain

while she was betrothed; in this case her sentence is by burning. But

“and her father-in-law”—if she committed adultery

in her father-in-law’s domain

after she married, in this case her sentence is not by burning but by stoning.

In accordance with whom

does Rabbi Eliezer hold in this matter?

If

Rabbi Eliezer holds

in accordance with the Rabbis

of our Mishna, who hold that stoning is more severe than burning, he should have said the opposite, for a betrothed woman is more severe than a married woman.

Did they not say

that the Rabbis said that only

a married woman went out

from the category of an Israelite’s daughter [whose punishment is] strangulation

to burning, and not

did

a betrothed woman

go out from stoning to burning?

If

it is said that Rabbi Eliezer holds

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who in our Mishna holds that burning is more severe than stoning,

did he not say

that

both a betrothed woman and a married woman

both have their sentence

by burning,

whereas Rabbi Eliezer said that only a betrothed woman’s sentence is by burning, but a married woman’s sentence is by stoning?

And if

it is said that Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that burning is more severe, holds

in accordance with Rabbi Ishmael, who said,

as stated later in the sugya, that only

a betrothed woman went out

from the category of an Israelite’s daughter [whose punishment is] stoning

to burning, but not a married woman,

for he derives by a binyan av that the verse speaks only of a betrothed woman and not of a married woman. It follows, according to Rabbi Ishmael, that if she committed adultery with

“her father-in-law”

in her father-in-law’s domain after she married,

it is strangulation

that is her sentence, according to the law of a married Israelite’s daughter who committed adultery. Whereas Rabbi Eliezer said that her sentence is by stoning.

Ravin sent in the name of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina: This is the arrangement of the Mishna,

this is how the words of Rabbi Eliezer are to be taught, as they are taught, and they are not to be reversed; and his intention is to be explained as follows:

in all cases

he holds

in accordance with the Rabbis,

who hold that a betrothed woman is sentenced to stoning and a married woman to burning.

And this is what he said:

a.

Every

act of adultery

that is

with an Israelite’s daughter

less severe than her father’s death,

that is: every act of adultery for which an Israelite’s daughter is sentenced to a death less severe than if she committed adultery with her father, whose sentence is by burning, a kohen’s daughter is sentenced for it by burning, as though she had committed adultery with her father.

And what is it?

What is that act of adultery for which an Israelite’s daughter’s death is less severe than if she committed adultery with her father?—

a married Israelite’s daughter

who committed adultery with another person who is not her father.

For whereas a married Israelite’s daughter

who committed adultery with another person who is not her father has her sentence

by strangulation,

here,

in the case of a married kohen’s daughter who committed adultery with another, she is not treated leniently, to sentence her to the less severe death of strangulation; rather, she is sentenced as though she had committed adultery with her father, and she is sentenced

to her father’s death, by burning.

b.

Every

act of adultery

that is

with an Israelite’s daughter

more severe than her father’s death,

that is: every act of adultery for which an Israelite’s daughter is sentenced to a death more severe than if she committed adultery with her father, whose sentence is by burning, a kohen’s daughter too is sentenced for it to the more severe death.

And what is it?

What is that act of adultery for which an Israelite’s daughter is sentenced to a death more severe than if she committed adultery with her father?—

a betrothed Israelite’s daughter

who committed adultery;

for whereas a betrothed Israelite’s daughter

who committed adultery

in general

has her sentence

by stoning,

which is more severe than burning,

here too,

in the case of a betrothed kohen’s daughter who committed adultery, she did not leave the category of an Israelite’s daughter to be sentenced to burning, which is less severe than stoning; rather, she is sentenced as though she had committed adultery with her father-in-law, and she is sentenced

to her father-in-law’s death, by stoning.

And thus Rabbi Eliezer’s words are explained: “With her father—in burning.”

That is, the act of adultery that is close to committing adultery with her father, which is one degree less severe than it—namely, a married Israelite’s daughter who committed adultery, whose sentence is by strangulation—here, in the case of a kohen’s daughter, the verse removed her from the category of an Israelite’s daughter, to impose greater severity upon her, so that she would be sentenced by burning. “

And with her father-in-law—in stoning.”

That is, the act of adultery more severe than committing adultery with her father, such as a betrothed Israelite’s daughter who committed adultery, whose sentence is by stoning. “With her father-in-law”: the kohen’s daughter is judged according to the law of the daughter-in-law who committed adultery with her father-in-law, whose sentence is by stoning.

Rabbi Jeremiah raised an objection against it:

How is it possible to explain Rabbi Eliezer’s words in this way,

does he teach [the cases] above and below?

And do we find that Rabbi Eliezer spoke of adultery above [more severe] than committing adultery with her father, and of adultery below [less severe] than committing adultery with her father?

Rather, Rabbi Jeremiah said:

Does he teach cases that are more severe and less severe?

Do we find that Rabbi Eliezer spoke about an act of adultery more severe than adultery with her father and about an act of adultery less severe than adultery with her father?

Rather, Rabbi Yirmeya said: