Sanhedrin 51b — the Talmud in English

For all time

Rabbi Eliezer holds

like Rabbi Ishmael,

who said that the verse which excluded a priest’s daughter from the category of an Israelite daughter, so that she is judged by burning, speaks only of a betrothed woman and not of a married woman,

and this is what he said,

and thus Rabbi Eliezer’s words are to be explained:

“Her father”—

if she committed adultery

“under her father’s authority,”

that is, while she was betrothed, her judgment is

by burning.

“And her father-in-law”—

and when she is married, if

with her father-in-law

she committed adultery, her judgment is

by stoning,

as is the law of an Israelite daughter who committed adultery with her father-in-law,

and every man

with whom she committed adultery, her judgment is

by strangulation,

as is the law of an Israelite daughter, because he derives it by a binyan av: the verse which excluded a priest’s daughter from the category of an Israelite daughter speaks of a betrothed woman, whereas the verse did not exclude a married priest’s daughter from the category of an Israelite daughter.

Rava said

to challenge this explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s words:

What is different?

Why do we interpret “her father” differently in Rabbi Eliezer’s words from the way we interpret “her father-in-law,”

or

shall we interpret

both this and that,

both “her father” and “her father-in-law,” as meaning that she committed adultery with them

literally, or

shall we interpret

both this and that,

both “her father” and “her father-in-law,” as meaning that she committed adultery while she was under

the authority

of her father and while she was under the authority of her father-in-law?

Rather, Rava said: For all time

Rabbi Eliezer holds

like Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that burning is more severe than stoning. Therefore, we must explain that a betrothed priest’s daughter was excluded from the category of an Israelite daughter, from stoning to burning; and with regard to a married woman,

Rabbi Eliezer holds:

since an Israelite daughter is judged by a very lenient death, by strangulation, it is sufficient if we make the

married

priest’s daughter subject to a death one degree more severe, by stoning,

as a betrothed woman.

For

just as a betrothed woman

priest’s daughter—

we raise her one degree,

we raise her one degree above an Israelite daughter, from stoning to burning,

so too a married woman—

we raise her one degree,

we raise her one degree above an Israelite daughter,

from strangulation to stoning.

For according to Rabbi Shimon, the order of the severity of the deaths [from the most severe to the least severe] is: burning, stoning, strangulation, execution.

And according to this, “her father” and “her father-in-law” stated by Rabbi Eliezer are both interpreted in the same manner.

And thus Rabbi Eliezer’s words are interpreted: “Her father, by burning”—if she committed adultery “under her father’s authority,” while she was betrothed, she is judged by burning. “

And her father-in-law, by stoning”—if she committed adultery “under her father-in-law’s authority,” when she was married, she is judged by stoning.

Rabbi Hanina raised an objection against it:

How can it be said that Rabbi Eliezer holds like Rabbi Shimon,

for in both cases Rabbi Shimon said that she is judged by burning!

For Rabbi Shimon explicitly said that a priest’s daughter who committed adultery, whether she was betrothed or whether she was married, is judged by burning.

And it is impossible to say that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with Rabbi Shimon regarding a married woman, that she is judged only by stoning. For from where would Rabbi Eliezer learn to hold this way? If he does not hold that one should expound Rabbi Ishmael’s binyan av, that the verse concerning a priest’s daughter speaks only of a betrothed woman and not of a married woman, he must hold that a married woman is also judged by burning, since the verse spoke generally of a priest’s daughter, whether betrothed or married.

And if Rabbi Eliezer expounds Rabbi Ishmael’s binyan av, that the verse concerning a priest’s daughter speaks only of a betrothed woman, then necessarily a married priest’s daughter was not excluded from the category of a married Israelite daughter. If so, how could she move from liability for strangulation to liability for stoning? Is it because the verse made the more severe betrothed priest’s daughter subject to a more severe punishment than an Israelite daughter that we should also be more severe with the lenient married woman?

Rather, Ravina said: For all time

Rabbi Eliezer holds

like the Rabbis, and reverse it,

and Rabbi Eliezer’s words should be reversed:

“Her father,”

that is, while she is under her father’s authority, when she is betrothed, her judgment is

by stoning.

“And her father-in-law,”

when she is married and under her father-in-law’s authority, her judgment is

by burning.

And as for what he said,

and as for Rabbi Eliezer’s wording:

“Her father,”

rather than using the wording “betrothed woman” and the wording “married woman”—

he merely followed the wording,

he was drawn in his wording after the words of the first tanna, who cited the verse “She profanes her father.”

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said that Rav said: The halakha

is in accordance with the words of Rabbi Eliezer,

as Ravin sent,

according to the explanation that

Ravin sent in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,

to explain it: Rabbi Eliezer holds like the Rabbis, for a betrothed priest’s daughter who committed adultery is judged by stoning, while a married woman is judged by burning.

And the explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s words according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, is as follows: the adultery resembling adultery with her father, which is one degree less severe than it, namely, a married Israelite daughter who committed adultery, whose judgment is by strangulation—in the case of a priest’s daughter, the verse excluded her from the category of an Israelite daughter, to make her punishment more severe, so that she would be judged by burning, like a daughter who committed adultery “with her father.”

But the adultery more severe than adultery with her father, such as a betrothed Israelite daughter who committed adultery, whose judgment is by stoning—the verse did not exclude a priest’s daughter from the category of an Israelite daughter to make her punishment more lenient, so that she would be judged by burning; rather, she is judged according to the law of the bride who committed adultery “with her father-in-law,” whose judgment is by stoning.

Rav Yosef said:

What did Rav Naḥman come to say? Did he come to say

a halakha for the messianic era?

For this halakha is not needed until the days of the Messiah, when the four court-imposed deaths will again be administered.

Abaye said to him: If that is so,

the halakha concerning

the slaughtering of sacrificial offerings should not be taught—

for this is

a halakha for the messianic era!

For there is no slaughtering of sacrificial offerings until they rebuild the Temple when the Messiah comes .

Rather,

it must be said that this halakha is different because of

study and receiving reward,

for the study itself.

Here too,

here Rav Naḥman stated a halakha that does not concern us until the days of the Messiah because of

study and receiving reward.

If so, what did Rav Yosef challenge Rav Naḥman about?

Rav Yosef answered:

This is what I said

that I was challenging Rav Naḥman:

Why do I need “the halakha”?

Why did Rav Naḥman use the wording “the halakha”? Did

the subject of the discussion state a halakha,

for there is no difference in the halakha between Ravin’s resolution and Ravina’s resolution. Both explain that Rabbi Eliezer holds like the Rabbis, that a married priest’s daughter who committed adultery is judged by burning, while a betrothed woman is judged by stoning.

And they disagreed only concerning the correction of the wording of the beraita in Rabbi Eliezer’s words: Ravin corrected the wording of the beraita according to the opinion of the Rabbis without reversing the law from the way it was presented before us. Ravina reversed the law in order to reconcile it according to the opinion of the Rabbis, since there is difficulty in correcting the wording of the beraita as Ravin corrected it.

If so, why did Rav Naḥman need to decide that the words of the beraita should be interpreted according to Ravin and not according to Ravina? For we learn nothing at all from this decision, and when the Messiah comes and resurrects the dead, we will ask Rabbi Eliezer in what wording he stated his words.

Above, the Gemara brought that Rabbi Ishmael expounds a binyan av, that the verse concerning a priest’s daughter who committed adultery speaks only of a betrothed woman and not of a married woman.

Where

does

Rabbi Ishmael

expound his exposition?

For it was taught

in a beraita: Concerning the verse:

“And a daughter

[of a man]

of a priest, when she begins to commit adultery”—

only

the verse speaks of a young woman who is betrothed,

and not of a married woman.

You say

that only

a young woman who is betrothed

is spoken of by the verse,

or

perhaps the verse

does not

speak

only of a married woman as well?

The verse says:

[Leviticus 20:10]

“A man who commits adultery with the wife of another man, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death,”

and whenever death is written without specifying which type of death, the reference is to death by strangulation.

If so,

all were included in the category of the adulterer and the adulteress,

both married women and betrothed women, both priestly women and Israelite women.

The verse excluded

from this category a

betrothed Israelite daughter,

whose judgment is

by stoning,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:21]: “And they shall bring out the young woman to the entrance of her father’s house, and they shall stone her.”

And another verse excluded from this category

a priest’s daughter,

whose judgment is

by burning .

And we expound to learn the obscure verse—concerning a priest’s daughter—from the explicit verse—concerning an Israelite daughter:

Just as when the verse excluded an Israelite daughter

from strangulation

to stoning,

it excluded

a betrothed woman and not a married woman, so too when the verse excluded a priest’s daughter

from strangulation

to burning,

it excluded

a betrothed woman and not a married woman.

We learned in the beraita above that they expound the verse “She profanes her father” to exclude: only “she” was excluded from the category of an Israelite daughter, to be judged by burning, but her adulterer and the conspiring witnesses are not judged by burning.

Rather,

her conspiring witnesses and her adulterer

are judged

within the category

[Deuteronomy 19:19]

“And you shall do to him as he plotted

to do to his brother,” and not to his sister—that is, as he plotted to do to the adulterer; and the adulterer of a priest’s daughter was excluded by “she” from the law of burning, and remained included in the category of the adulterer of an Israelite daughter, whose judgment is by stoning.

And we challenge: Granted, with regard to her conspiring witnesses, it is understandable that they are judged by the law of “as he plotted,” but

her adulterer—what

“as he plotted” is there?

What “as he plotted” is there in his case? He did not merely plot; rather, he committed the transgression.

And we answer:

Rather,

the meaning of the matter is as follows: wherever conspiring witnesses came to make the woman liable for one type of death and the man for another type of death—for example, here, where they came to make the priest’s daughter liable for burning and her adulterer liable for stoning—

her conspiring witnesses

are judged

within the category of the death of her adulterer,

by stoning,

because it is stated: “And you shall do to him as he plotted to do to his brother,”

and not to his sister,

[10], the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: Both a betrothed woman and a married woman were excluded—

the verse excluded her from the category of an Israelite daughter, so that she would be judged

by burning,

because the verse concerning a priest’s daughter did not distinguish between a betrothed woman and a married woman.

It could be thought

that I might interpret the verse to mean that

even

a

single

priest’s daughter who committed adultery is included in the category of a priest’s daughter who committed adultery, whose judgment is by burning. Therefore, we expound a gzera shava:

“‘Her father’ is stated here, and ‘her father’ is stated elsewhere

concerning a betrothed young woman;

just as there

concerning a betrothed young woman, the matter is

adultery with the bond of a husband,

for she is already betrothed,

so too here,

concerning a priest’s daughter who committed adultery, the verse speaks only of

adultery

with the bond of a husband.

Rabbi Ishmael said to Rabbi Akiva: Since you expound a gzera shava, then expound from the gzera shava also:

to Rabbi Akiva: Since you derive the matter through a gezeira shava, you should also derive from the gezeira shava:

“If just as there,

concerning a betrothed young woman, the verse speaks of

a young woman who is betrothed—

so too here,

concerning a priest’s daughter, it speaks only of

a young woman who is betrothed!”

And why do you hold that the verse concerning a priest’s daughter speaks both of a betrothed woman and of a married woman?

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Ishmael, my brother,

it is written in the verse: “And a daughter of a man of a priest, when she begins to commit adultery,” and from the superfluous vav of

“daughter—and a daughter”

I expound

that it was written to include a married woman for burning.

He said to him,

Rabbi Ishmael:

And is it because you expound

the superfluous vav of

“daughter—and a daughter” that we will exclude this one,

the married woman, from the category of an Israelite daughter

for burning,

and make her punishment more severe than the death explicitly stated for an Israelite daughter, which is death by strangulation ?

If it is understood

to expound the superfluous vav of “and a daughter”

to include the married woman

within the category of the verse concerning a priest’s daughter, and not to exclude her through the gzera shava “her father,” “her father,” from the verse concerning a betrothed young woman, then

it included

also

the single woman; she should be included within the category of the verse concerning a priest’s daughter, and should not be excluded by the verse concerning a betrothed young woman.

within the scope of the verse concerning a kohen’s daughter, and do not exclude her through the verse concerning a betrothed young woman.

And if it is understood

to expound the gzera shava from the betrothed young woman

to exclude the single woman

from the category of the verse concerning a priest’s daughter, just as the verse concerning a betrothed young woman, then

it excluded

also

the married woman

from the category of the verse concerning a priest’s daughter, just as the verse concerning a betrothed young woman.

And Rabbi Akiva,

what will he answer to Rabbi Ishmael’s difficulty?

He holds that

the gzera shava is effective to exclude a single woman

from the category of the verse concerning a priest’s daughter,

and it is effective

and the superfluous vav of

“daughter—and a daughter” is effective to include the married woman.

And Rabbi Ishmael,

who challenged Rabbi Akiva, did not know Rabbi Akiva’s position, but

he thought: Since he said to him

that Rabbi Akiva told him that he expounds the superfluous vav of

“daughter—and a daughter,” it follows that he retracted

meaning that Rabbi Akiva had retracted

from the gzera shava.

For this reason Rabbi Ishmael said to him: If you, Rabbi Akiva, do not expound the gzera shava, from where do you have the basis to exclude the single woman?

And we challenge:

And Rabbi Ishmael,

who holds that the obscure verse concerning a priest’s daughter, which excluded her from strangulation to burning, is learned by an analogy from the explicit verse, which excluded only a betrothed young woman from strangulation to stoning, but not a married woman—

this

superfluous vav of

“daughter—and a daughter,” what does he expound from it?

What does he expound from it?

And we explain: Rabbi Ishmael

needs it;

he needs this exposition

for that which the father of Shmuel bar Avin taught:

Since we find that the verse distinguished

concerning priests

among males—

between those without blemish and those with blemishes

with regard to service in the Temple,

could we distinguish

also

among their daughters,

so that those with blemishes would be excluded from their sanctity, and if they committed adultery their law would be like that of Israelite daughters? For this reason

the verse says:

the superfluous vav concerning a

daughter

of a priest—

“and a daughter”—

to expound that the daughters of those with blemishes are also included in the verse.

And Rabbi Akiva:

From where does he learn that the daughters of priests with blemishes did not leave their state of sanctity?

From the verse [Leviticus 21:6:

"They offer them and they shall be holy"

from the superfluous vav of "and they shall be"

it is derived,

teaching that the daughters of priests with blemishes, too, were included in sanctity.

And Rabbi Ishmael:

Why does he derive from the superfluous vav of "and a daughter" that even the daughter of a priest with a blemish is included in the verse? For this can be learned from the superfluous vav of "and they shall be holy": the daughters of priests with blemishes were included in sanctity.

And we reconcile: According to Rabbi Ishmael,

if

we were to derive that priests with blemishes, too, remain in their sanctity

from that

"and they shall be holy"—

I might have said:

that

this applies only to them:

only the priests themselves were included in sanctity, so that it should not be said: since they are disqualified for service, they are permitted to become impure through the dead.

But their daughters

of blemished priests—

were not

included in sanctity, and if they committed adultery, their law would be like that of an Israelite woman who committed adultery; for this

teaches us

the superfluous vav concerning "and a daughter of a priest": that the daughters of priests with blemishes, too, were included in sanctity.

And Rabbi Ishmael,

who excluded a married woman from the verse concerning a priest's daughter through the exposition "what do we find" from the betrothed maiden, and does not need the exposition of the gzera shava, "her father," "her father," from the betrothed maiden to exclude a married woman,