Sanhedrin 50b (נ:) — the Talmud in English

That is to say:

certainly

the force of the inciter

is more severe. According to Rabbi Shimon [below, 89b], the inciters of a city led astray are judged by strangulation, whereas the inhabitants led astray are judged by the sword. We learn from here that strangulation is more severe than the sword.

Accordingly, one can derive by means of a kal va-homer that burning is more severe than the sword.

And the kal va-homer is as follows: Just as strangulation, which is more severe than the sword—

burning is more severe than it,

as was explained above. If so,

the sword, which is less severe

than strangulation—

all the more so

burning is more severe than it.

Stoning is more severe than strangulation—

for

the death of stoning

was prescribed for one who blasphemes and for one who worships idolatry. And what is the severity

of these offenses?

As we said,

as stated above: in these offenses, a person rebels against God, blessed be He.

Since we find that for these severe offenses one is judged by stoning, this indicates that stoning is a severe form of death.

And we raise an objection:

On the contrary,

it may be said that

strangulation is more severe

than stoning,

for

strangulation

was prescribed for one who strikes his father or mother. And what is the severity

of the offense of striking one’s father or mother?

For their honor was equated with the honor of the Omnipresent!

As it is stated concerning one’s father and mother [Exodus 20:11]: “Honor your father and your mother,” while concerning the Almighty it is written [Proverbs 3:9]: “Honor the Lord with your wealth.” And if one who strikes his father or mother is judged by strangulation, this indicates that strangulation is a severe form of death. If so, from where do we know that stoning is more severe than strangulation?

And we answer:

From the fact that the Merciful One

—that the verse excluded

a betrothed Israelite woman from the category of a married Israelite woman, from strangulation to stoning

—for a betrothed woman who commits adultery is more culpable than a married woman who commits adultery, since she is harmful to Heaven, to other people, and to herself: she blemishes her own honor and that of her family, and her act involves greater disgrace than that of a married woman, whose reputation has already been blemished. The Torah excluded her from strangulation, which is stated concerning a married woman [Leviticus 20:10]: “And the man who commits adultery with a man’s wife, who commits adultery with his fellow’s wife, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death,” meaning strangulation. The betrothed woman, too, was included in the category of “his fellow’s wife,” and thus would have been liable for strangulation; yet the verse explicitly excluded her and made her liable for stoning, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:23–24]: “If there be a young woman, a virgin, betrothed to a man … then you shall stone them with stones”

This proves that stoning is more severe

than strangulation.

And likewise,

stoning is more severe than the sword, for

the death of stoning

was prescribed for one who blasphemes

and for one who worships idolatry, which are severe offenses, since in these offenses one rebels against God, blessed be He. Since we find that for these severe offenses one is judged by stoning, this indicates that stoning is a severe form of death.

And we raise an objection:

On the contrary,

it may be said that

the sword is more severe

than stoning,

for it was prescribed for the inhabitants of a city led astray. And what is the severity

of a city led astray?

For their property

—the property of the inhabitants of the city led astray—

is destroyed!

Their entire property is burned. And if the inhabitants of a city led astray are judged by the sword, this indicates that the sword is a severe form of death. If so, from where do we know that stoning is more severe than the sword?

You have said

—say, to resolve the matter:

Which has greater force—

that is, which offense is more severe:

the force of the inciter or the force of the one incited? That is to say:

certainly

the force of the inciter

is more severe.

According to Rabbi Shimon [below, 89b], the inciters of a city led astray are judged by strangulation, whereas those led astray are judged by the sword. We learn from here that strangulation is more severe than the sword. Accordingly, one can derive by means of a kal va-homer that stoning is more severe than the sword.

And the kal va-homer is as follows: Just as strangulation, which is more severe than the sword—

stoning is more severe than it,

as was explained above. If so,

the sword, which is less severe

than strangulation—

all the more so

stoning is more severe than it.

According to Rabbi Shimon,

strangulation is more severe than the sword—

for

strangulation

was prescribed for one who strikes his father or mother. And what is the severity

of the offense of striking one’s father or mother?

As we said,

their honor was equated with the honor of the Omnipresent, and if one who strikes his father or mother is judged by strangulation, this indicates that strangulation is a severe form of death.

And we raise an objection:

On the contrary,

it may be said that

the sword is more severe

than strangulation,

for

the sword

was prescribed for the inhabitants of a city led astray. And what is the severity

of a city led astray?

For their property

—the property of the inhabitants of the city led astray—

is destroyed,

as their entire property is burned. And since we find that they are judged by the sword, this indicates that the sword is a severe form of death. If so, from where do we know that strangulation is more severe than the sword?

You have said

—say, to answer:

Which has greater force—

that is, which offense is more severe:

the force of the inciter or the force of the one incited? That is to say:

certainly

the force of the inciter

is more severe.

And it was taught

in a beraita below [89b]:

“The inciters of a city led astray are subject to stoning; Rabbi Shimon says: They are subject to strangulation.”

The inhabitants led astray, however, are judged by the sword. From here Rabbi Shimon learns that strangulation is more severe than the sword.

It was familiar in the mouth

—this statement was regularly spoken—

of Rabbi Yohanan

who had received this teaching from his teacher:

A betrothed young woman, the daughter of a priest, who committed adultery—

according to the Sages,

is subject to stoning

and not burning, because in their view burning is less severe than stoning, and the daughter of a priest should not be given the less severe death rather than an Israelite woman.

Rabbi Shimon says:

She is judged

by burning,

because in his view burning is more severe than stoning . Accordingly, she should not be distinguished from an ordinary daughter of a priest, whose punishment is burning, since the verse did not distinguish between a married daughter of a priest who committed adultery and a betrothed daughter of a priest who committed adultery.

A betrothed Israelite woman, if

she committed adultery with her father,

is liable to two deaths: a. stoning, because she is a betrothed woman who committed adultery; b. burning, because she committed adultery with her father.

And by which death is she judged?

According to the Sages, she is judged

by stoning,

since she must be judged by the more severe death, and in their view stoning is more severe than burning.

Rabbi Shimon says:

She is judged

by burning,

since in his view burning is more severe than stoning.

And we inquire:

What does this teach us

about this dispute, according to Rabbi Yohanan?

And we explain: Rabbi Yohanan seeks to prove from the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon that one who becomes liable for two deaths is judged by the more severe of them. For

according to the Sages,

only a married

daughter of a priest was excluded

from the category of an Israelite woman, from strangulation

to burning, and not a betrothed woman,

because a betrothed Israelite woman is subject to stoning, and the law of stoning should not be annulled on account of the law of burning. Whereas

according to Rabbi Shimon, both a betrothed woman and a married woman were excluded for burning,

because in his view a betrothed daughter of a priest, too, was excluded from the category of an Israelite woman, from stoning to burning.

And what is the reason

for their dispute?

Because according to the Sages, stoning is more severe,

and therefore a betrothed daughter of a priest is judged by stoning, the more severe death, rather than by burning, the less severe death. Whereas

according to Rabbi Shimon, burning is more severe,

and therefore she is judged by burning, the more severe death, rather than by stoning, the less severe death.

The practical difference

that emerges from this is the halakha:

One who becomes liable for two court-imposed deaths is judged by the more severe one.

For here, too, there is liability for two deaths: a. stoning, as the law of a betrothed woman; b. burning, as the law of a daughter of a priest. It is only because the halakha is that one is judged by the more severe death that, according to the Sages, the betrothed woman is judged by stoning, which is the more severe death, while according to Rabbi Shimon she is judged by burning, since in his view the verse teaches that burning is the more severe death .

Earlier, on the first side of the page, the Gemara stated that Rabbi Shimon, in accordance with his position, learns from the verse that both a betrothed daughter of a priest and a married daughter of a priest are judged by burning.

And we inquire:

What is Rabbi Shimon’s source

—where do we find that Rabbi Shimon learned this from the verse?

And we explain:

As it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Shimon says: Two general formulations were stated concerning a daughter of a priest;

the daughter of a priest was included twice in a liability for death: once in the verse concerning a married woman and once in the verse concerning a betrothed woman.

Concerning a married woman [a married woman] it is written: “The adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death” [Leviticus 20:10], meaning death by strangulation, and the daughter of a priest was included in this statement.

And when the verse excluded a betrothed woman from the category of a married woman, since a betrothed woman is liable for stoning, the daughter of a priest was likewise included in that statement.

And we refute this: Did the verse speak only

of a daughter of a priest and not of an Israelite woman?

Rather,

say

—state it as follows:

The verse also spoke of a daughter of a priest.

That is, two general formulations were stated in the Torah: a. concerning a betrothed woman who committed adultery, who is liable for stoning; b. concerning a married woman who committed adultery, who is liable for strangulation. The daughter of a priest, too, was initially included in the meaning of the verse.

And the verse excluded

the daughter of a priest, who is judged only by burning, and the verse did not distinguish between a married woman and a betrothed woman. If so, one may say that a

married

daughter of a priest who committed adultery was excluded

from the category of

an

married

Israelite woman who committed adultery, so that her punishment is not strangulation but burning; and a

betrothed

daughter of a priest who committed adultery was also excluded

from the category of

a

betrothed Israelite woman who committed adultery, so that her punishment is not stoning but burning.

From here we learn that burning is more severe than stoning.

For

just as when the verse excluded a married

daughter of a priest

from the category of a married

Israelite woman, from strangulation to burning, it did so

to make her punishment more severe;

the verse excluded her, since it is clear that burning is more severe than strangulation.

If so, we can learn from here that

also when the verse excluded a betrothed

daughter of a priest

from the category of a betrothed

Israelite woman, from stoning to burning, it did so

to make her punishment more severe;

the verse excluded her for this purpose.

And from here Rabbi Shimon learns that burning is more severe than stoning.

The conspiring witnesses concerning a married daughter of a priest—

witnesses who testified that a married daughter of a priest had committed adultery and were proven conspiring witnesses are

included among the conspiring witnesses concerning a married Israelite woman,

whose punishment is strangulation.

And the conspiring witnesses concerning a betrothed daughter of a priest—

witnesses who testified that a betrothed daughter of a priest had committed adultery and were proven conspiring witnesses are

included among the conspiring witnesses concerning a betrothed Israelite woman,

whose punishment is stoning.

The verse imposed liability for burning only upon the daughter of a priest herself, as it is written [Leviticus 21:9]: “She … shall be burned with fire,” excluding her partner and the conspiring witnesses. They are judged as though she had been an Israelite woman.

The Sages taught

in a beraita: The verse states [Leviticus 21:9]:

“And the daughter of a priest, when she profanes

herself by committing harlotry, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire.”

One might have thought that even if she profaned Shabbat

she would become liable for burning.

The verse therefore states: “By committing harlotry”—

the verse is speaking of profanation through harlotry.

One might have thought even

a daughter of a priest who is

unmarried

and committed adultery would be liable for burning. We therefore derive a gzera shava:

“Father” is stated here, and below

concerning a betrothed young woman,

“father” is stated. Just as below

concerning a betrothed young woman, the verse speaks of

adultery involving a bond to a husband,

as she is already betrothed,

so here,

concerning a daughter of a priest who committed adultery, the verse speaks of

adultery involving a bond to a husband.

And we raise an objection:

Or perhaps when it says “her father,”

perhaps “her father” was not stated for this gzera shava,

but to exclude her own father?

If she committed adultery with her father, she is judged by burning, but if she committed adultery with anyone else, she is judged like other Israelite women: if she is married, by strangulation, and if she is betrothed, by stoning.

When it says

in the verse:

“She profanes”—

this implies that she profanes her father, rather than he profaning her.

That is to say,

you are compelled to conclude that the verse is speaking of her having committed adultery with

any other person,

not with her father.

How, then, do I understand

what is written

“her father”?

It cannot be expounded to mean that she is judged by burning only if she committed adultery with her father, since it is written, “She profanes.”

Rather, it was certainly written in order to derive the gzera shava:

“Father” is stated here, and below

concerning a betrothed young woman

“father” is stated. Just as below—

the verse speaks of

adultery involving a bond to a husband, so here—

the verse speaks of

adultery involving a bond to a husband.

And we raise an objection: If there is a gzera shava equating a daughter of a priest who committed adultery with a betrothed young woman, let us likewise derive and say:

Just as below

the verse speaks of a

young woman

who has developed the signs of puberty [two hairs] but has not developed the signs of maturity [the signs of maturity are explained in Tractate Niddah 47a]

and is betrothed

and not married,

so here

the verse speaks of a

young woman

who has developed the signs of puberty but has not developed the signs of maturity

and is betrothed

and not married.

But

a young woman who is married,

or

a mature woman who is betrothed,

or

a mature woman who is married—and even an elderly woman, from where

do we know that they, too, are included in the category of a daughter of a priest who committed adultery, whose punishment is burning?

The verse therefore states: “And the daughter of a priest”

with the conjunction “and,” to include

every case,

so that every daughter of a priest who commits adultery is included in the category of a daughter of a priest who committed adultery, even if she is married or mature, and her punishment is burning.