Sanhedrin 50b — the Talmud in English

That is to say:

certainly

the power of the inciter

is more severe. And according to Rabbi Shimon [below, 89b], the inciters of an idolatrous city are judged by strangulation, whereas those incited are judged by the sword; from here they learn that strangulation is more severe than the sword.

Accordingly, one should make a kal va-chomer that burning is more severe than the sword.

And the kal va-chomer: Just as strangulation, which is more severe than the sword—

burning is more severe than it,

as was explained above. If so,

the lighter sword

than strangulation—

is it not all the more so

that burning is more severe than it?

Stoning is more severe than strangulation—

for

the death of stoning

was given for one who blasphemes and for one who worships idolatry. And what is the severity

of these transgressions—

as we said,

as we said above: for in these transgressions he rebels against the Lord, may He be blessed.

And if we find that for these severe transgressions he is judged by stoning, this is a sign that stoning is a severe death.

And we object:

on the contrary,

one can say that

strangulation is more severe

than stoning,

for

strangulation

was given for one who strikes his father and his mother. And what is the severity

and what is the gravity of the sin of one who strikes his father and his mother?

For, for their honor was equated—for their honor was equated with the honor of the Omnipresent!

For it is stated concerning his father and his mother [Exodus 20:11]: “Honor your father and your mother,” and concerning the Holy One, blessed be He, it is written [Proverbs 3:9]: “Honor the Lord with your wealth.” And if one who strikes his father and his mother is judged by strangulation, this is a sign that strangulation is a severe death. If so, from where is it that stoning is more severe than strangulation?

And we answer:

from the fact that the Merciful One took out

from the fact that Scripture took out

the betrothed Israelite woman from the category of the married Israelite woman, from strangulation to stoning

—and behold, a betrothed woman who committed adultery is more severe than a married woman who committed adultery, for she is evil toward Heaven, toward people, and toward herself, since she damages her honor and the honor of her family, and there is greater disgrace in her case than in the case of a married woman, who has already been disgraced; and from the fact that the Torah took her out of the category of strangulation, which is stated concerning a married woman [Leviticus 20:10]: “And a man who commits adultery with a married woman, who commits adultery with his fellow’s wife, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death,” that is, by strangulation—and the betrothed woman, too, was included in “his fellow’s wife” for liability to strangulation—and Scripture explicitly took her out for liability to stoning, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:23–24]: “For if there be a young woman, a virgin, betrothed to a man, etc., then you shall stone them with stones

it follows that stoning is more severe

than strangulation.

And likewise,

stoning is more severe than the sword, for

the death of stoning

was given for one who blasphemes

and for one who worships idolatry, which are severe transgressions, for in these transgressions he rebels against the Lord, may He be blessed; and if we find that for these severe transgressions he is judged by stoning, this is a sign that stoning is a severe death.

And we object:

on the contrary,

one can say that

the sword is more severe

than stoning,

for it was given to the people of an idolatrous city. And what is the severity

and what is the severity of an idolatrous city?

For their property

of the inhabitants of the idolatrous city

was destroyed!

For all their property is burned. And if the inhabitants of an idolatrous city are judged by the sword, this is a sign that the sword is a severe death. If so, from where is it that stoning is more severe than the sword?

You have said,

say in order to resolve it:

And which power is greater—

that is, which transgression is more severe, whether

the power of the inciter or the power of the incited? That is to say:

certainly

the power of the inciter

is more severe.

And according to Rabbi Shimon [below, 89b], the inciters of an idolatrous city are judged by strangulation, whereas those incited are judged by the sword; from here they learn that strangulation is more severe than the sword. Accordingly, one should make a kal va-chomer that stoning is more severe than the sword.

And the kal va-chomer: Just as strangulation, which is more severe than the sword—

stoning is more severe than it,

as was explained above. If so,

the lighter sword

than strangulation—

is it not all the more so

that stoning is more severe than it?

According to Rabbi Shimon,

strangulation is more severe than the sword—

for

strangulation

was given for one who strikes his father and his mother. And what is the severity

and what is the gravity of the sin of one who strikes his father and his mother?

As we said,

as we said above: their honor was equated with the honor of the Omnipresent, and if one who strikes his father and his mother is judged by strangulation, this is a sign that strangulation is a severe death.

And we object:

on the contrary,

one can say that

the sword is more severe

than strangulation,

for

the sword

was given to the people of an idolatrous city. And what is the severity

of an idolatrous city—

for their property

of the people of an idolatrous city

was destroyed,

for all their property is burned. And since we find that they are judged by the sword, this is a sign that the sword is a severe death. If so, from where is it that strangulation is more severe than the sword?

You have said,

say in order to answer:

And which power is greater—

that is, which transgression is more severe, whether

the power of an inciter or the power of the incited? That is to say:

certainly

the power of the inciter

is more severe.

And it was taught

in a beraita below [89b]:

The inciters of an idolatrous city are stoned; Rabbi Shimon says: by strangulation.

Whereas those incited are judged by the sword; from here, according to Rabbi Shimon, it can be learned that strangulation is more severe than the sword.

It was habitual in the mouth

this matter was arranged

of Rabbi Yohanan

who received this teaching from his teacher:

The betrothed daughter of a koen who committed adultery—

according to the Sages, her law is

stoning

and not burning, because according to them burning is lighter than stoning, and one does not lessen the punishment of a koen’s daughter by giving her the lighter death rather than the death of an Israelite woman.

Rabbi Shimon says:

she is judged

by burning,

because according to him burning is more severe than stoning ; if so, she should not be distinguished from an ordinary koen’s daughter, whose law is burning, for Scripture did not distinguish between a married koen’s daughter who committed adultery and a betrothed koen’s daughter who committed adultery.

A betrothed Israelite woman, if she

committed adultery with her father,

is liable for two deaths: a. stoning—because she is a betrothed woman who committed adultery; b. burning—because she committed adultery with her father.

And by which death is she judged?

According to the Sages, she is judged

by stoning,

since she must be judged by the more severe death, and according to them stoning is more severe than burning.

Rabbi Shimon says:

she is judged

by burning,

since according to him burning is more severe than stoning.

And we inquire about this:

what does he come to teach us

Rabbi Yohanan through this dispute?

And we explain: Rabbi Yohanan came to prove from the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon that one who becomes liable for two deaths is judged by the more severe of them, for

according to the Rabbis

only a married koen’s daughter

was taken out

from the category of an Israelite woman, from strangulation

to burning, and not a betrothed woman,

because the law of a betrothed Israelite woman is stoning, and the law of stoning is not nullified on account of the law of burning; whereas

according to Rabbi Shimon, both a betrothed woman and a married woman were taken out to burning,

for according to him a betrothed koen’s daughter, too, was taken out of the category of an Israelite woman from stoning to burning.

And what is the reason

and what is the reason for their dispute—

because according to the Rabbis stoning is more severe,

therefore a betrothed koen’s daughter is judged by the more severe stoning and not by the lighter burning. Whereas

according to Rabbi Shimon burning is more severe,

therefore she is judged by the more severe burning and not by the lighter stoning.

The practical difference

that emerges from this is the halakha:

one who became liable for two court-imposed deaths is judged by the more severe one.

For here, too, there is liability for two deaths: a. stoning—as the law of a betrothed woman; b. burning—as the law of a koen’s daughter. And only because the halakha is that one is judged by the more severe death, according to the Rabbis a betrothed woman is judged by stoning, which is the more severe death, and according to Rabbi Shimon she is judged by burning, for according to him it is learned from Scripture that burning is the more severe death .

Above, on page 50a, the Gemara said that Rabbi Shimon follows his own position, teaching from the verse that both a betrothed koen’s daughter and a married koen’s daughter are judged by burning.

And we inquire about this:

what is [the source of] Rabbi Shimon

where do we find that Rabbi Shimon learned this from the verse?

And we explain:

for it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Shimon says: Two general inclusions were stated concerning a koen’s daughter,

a koen’s daughter was included twice in liability for death: once in the verse concerning a married woman and once in the verse concerning a betrothed woman.

Concerning a married woman [a married woman] it is written: “The adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death” [Leviticus 20:10], that is, the death of strangulation, and a koen’s daughter was included in it.

And when the verse took the betrothed woman out of the category of the married woman, since a betrothed woman is liable for stoning, a koen’s daughter was also included in it.

And we refute: Did the verse speak only

of a koen’s daughter and not of an Israelite’s daughter?

Rather,

say

say as follows:

it also spoke of a koen’s daughter

the verse, that is, two general inclusions were stated in the Torah: a. concerning a betrothed woman who committed adultery, who is liable for stoning; b. concerning a married woman who committed adultery, who is liable for strangulation. A koen’s daughter, too, was initially included in the meaning of the verse.

And Scripture took out

a koen’s daughter, who is judged only by burning, and Scripture did not distinguish between a married woman and a betrothed woman. If so, one can say that also

a married

koen’s daughter who committed adultery was taken

from the category of

an Israelite

married woman

who committed adultery, whose law is not strangulation but burning; and also

a betrothed

koen’s daughter who committed adultery was taken

from the category of

an Israelite

betrothed woman

who committed adultery, whose law is not stoning but burning.

And from here it can be learned that burning is more severe than stoning.

For

just as when Scripture took out a married woman

a koen’s daughter

from the category of a married woman

an Israelite woman, from strangulation to burning—

to make more severe

her punishment, Scripture took her out, for it is clear that burning is more severe than strangulation;

if so, it can be learned from here that

also when Scripture took out a betrothed woman

a koen’s daughter

from the category of a betrothed woman

an Israelite woman, from stoning to burning—

to make more severe

her punishment, Scripture took her out.

And from here Rabbi Shimon learns that burning is more severe than stoning.

The false witnesses concerning a married koen’s daughter—

witnesses who testified that a married koen’s daughter committed adultery and were refuted, they are

included in the category of false witnesses concerning a married Israelite woman,

whose law is strangulation.

And false witnesses concerning a betrothed koen’s daughter—

witnesses who testified that a betrothed koen’s daughter committed adultery and were refuted, they are

included in the category of false witnesses concerning a betrothed Israelite woman,

whose law is stoning.

For Scripture took out for liability to burning only the koen’s daughter herself, as it is written [Leviticus 21:9]: “She… shall be burned with fire,” to exclude her paramour and the false witnesses concerning her, for they are judged as though she were an Israelite woman.

The Sages taught

in a beraita: It is written in the verse [Leviticus 21:9]:

“And the daughter of a koen, when she begins

to commit harlotry, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire.”

One might have thought that even if she profaned Shabbat

she would become liable for burning—

the verse states: “to commit harlotry”—

Scripture is speaking of profanations through harlotry.

One might have thought even

a koen’s daughter

who is unmarried

and committed adultery would become liable for burning—for this reason we derive a gzera shava:

“Her father” is stated here, and below

concerning the betrothed young woman

“her father” is stated. Just as below

concerning the betrothed young woman—the matter concerns

harlotry while bound by the husband’s claim,

for she is already betrothed,

so here

concerning a koen’s daughter who committed adultery—the matter concerns

harlotry while bound by the husband’s claim.

And we object:

Or perhaps “her father” says

perhaps “her father” was not stated for this gzera shava,

but to exclude every person?

So that if she committed adultery with her father she would be judged by burning, but if she committed adultery with any other person she would be judged like the other daughters of Israel: if she is married, by strangulation, and if she is betrothed, by stoning.

When it says

in the verse:

“She profanes”—

it implies that she profanes her father, and he does not profane her,

that is to say

it must necessarily be said that concerning her committing adultery with

any other person it speaks

the verse.

What, then, do I establish

with regard to what is written

“her father”?

It is impossible to derive from it that only if she committed adultery with her father is she judged by burning, for it is written: “She profanes.”

Rather, it was certainly written in order to derive from it the gzera shava:

“Her father” is stated here, and below

concerning the betrothed young woman

“her father” is stated. Just as below—

the matter concerns

harlotry while bound by the husband’s claim, so here—

the matter concerns

harlotry while bound by the husband’s claim.

And we object: If there is a gzera shava to equate a koen’s daughter who committed adultery with a betrothed young woman, then let us equate them and say also:

Just as below

the matter concerns a

young woman

who has developed the signs of maidenhood [two hairs] but has not developed the signs of maturity [what the signs of maturity are was explained in tractate Niddah, 47a]

and she is betrothed

and not married—

so here

the matter concerns a

young woman

who has developed the signs of maidenhood but has not developed the signs of maturity

and she is betrothed

and not married.

But

a young woman who is married,

or

an adult woman who is betrothed,

or

an adult woman who is married, and even one who has grown old—from where

do we know that they, too, are included among koen’s daughters who committed adultery, whose law is burning?

The verse states: “And the daughter of a koen”—

with the conjunctive vav, to include

in every case,

every koen’s daughter who committed adultery, even if she is married or an adult woman, is included among koen’s daughters who committed adultery, whose law is burning.