Sanhedrin 34a (לד.) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda?

As the verse states [

Numbers 35 ]

“One witness shall not testify against a person to cause his death.”

And from the superfluous word “death” we learn: only

to cause his death may he not testify; but to acquit him—

he may testify.

And as for the Rabbis,

why do they disqualify the witness from presenting an argument in favor of the accused?

Reish Lakish said: Because he appears to be personally interested in his testimony.

For it is possible that he comes to present an argument in the accused’s favor because he fears that the verdict will be rendered against the accused on the basis of his testimony, and the accused will then bring witnesses to discredit him.

And as for the Rabbis, what do they expound from this

superfluous word

“death”?

They apply it to one of the students

who sit before the judges, and not to the witnesses, for the reason explained above.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one of the witnesses said: I have an argument in his favor, from where is it derived that he is not heeded?

The verse states: “One witness shall not testify.”

From where is it derived that if one of the students said: I have an argument against him, he is not heeded?

The verse states: “One shall not testify against a person to cause his death.”

We learned in the Mishna:

In capital cases, one who presents an argument in favor of the accused may not present an argument against him.

Rav said: They taught

that he may not retract and present an argument against him

only during the deliberations,

when he must exert himself to find a defense for the accused, since perhaps he has not yet erred.

But during the final stage of judgment,

when he has already examined every possible argument in the accused’s favor and found none, even a judge who

initially presented an argument in his favor

[unclear: the Hebrew text is syntactically incomplete here]

may retract and present an argument against him.

The Gemara raises an objection

from the Mishna below [40a]: A court that judged a capital case does not issue its verdict on that same day. Rather, they deliberate the matter throughout the entire night, each judge individually.

On the following day, they rise early

the judges

and come

to the court session.

The one who acquitted says: “I am the one who acquitted

yesterday,

and I maintain my position in acquitting him.”

I must stand and acquit him today as well, against my will, because one who acquits may not retract. Whereas

the one who found him liable

yesterday

says: “I am the one who found him liable, and I maintain my position in finding him liable,”

as I still maintain the view that he should be found liable.

One who presented an argument against him

retracts and

presents an argument in his favor. But one who presented an argument in his favor may not retract and present an argument against him.

The Gemara challenges Rav from here:

But on the following day, it is the final stage of judgment!

And it is evident that even during the final stage of judgment, one who acquitted may not retract and find him liable!?

The Gemara rejects the challenge:

But according to your reasoning, on the following day, are there no deliberations?

Can the deliberations not continue on the following day as well? If so,

when it teaches

in the Mishna below that even on the following day he may not retract, it refers to

the time of the deliberations.

The Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

another proof from that Mishna, that even during the final stage of judgment, one who acquitted may not retract and find him liable:

A Sanhedrin of seventy-one that judged a capital case had thirty-five judges who acquitted and thirty-six who found him liable. Since the verdict cannot be decided adversely on the basis of only one judge,

these deliberate against those

in their arguments,

until one of

the thirty-six judges

who found him liable

sees the merit in

the arguments of those who acquitted him,

at which point there will be thirty-six judges who acquit and thirty-five who find him liable, and the verdict is decided in his favor by the majority of one judge.

The Gemara infers:

And if it is so,

that during the final stage of judgment even one who acquitted may retract and find him liable,

let it also teach the reverse,

until one of those who acquitted him sees the force of the arguments of those who found him liable, so that there would be thirty-seven judges finding him liable and thirty-four acquitting him, and the verdict would then be decided against him by a majority of more than one judge.

The Gemara rejects this:

The tanna returns to the possibility of acquittal,

since it is preferable for the tanna to return to and state the possibility of acquittal, but

he does not return to the possibility of liability.

Nevertheless, the same law applies: one who acquitted may retract and find him liable.

The Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

from that

which Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said [

below, 43a ]:

If one of the students who acquitted the accused died,

we view him

with regard to the count of those who find him liable and those who acquit him

as though

he were still

alive and standing in his place.

The Gemara infers:

And why

is it possible to rely on his opinion even after his death?

Let us say: Had he been alive,

he might have retracted!

Rather, this proves that even had he been alive, he could not have retracted, since he had already acquitted the accused. And it follows that even during the final stage of judgment, one who acquitted may not retract and find him liable!

The Gemara rejects this: In fact, one who acquitted may retract during the final stage of judgment. However,

at present, at least, he did not retract.

Since he did not retract before his death, we need not be concerned that had he remained alive he would have retracted; rather, his opinion may be taken into account as it stood before he died.

But the Gemara asks: How can we reconcile Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina’s statement so that it is also consistent with Rav?

But they sent from there,

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia:

According to Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina,

who says that if one of the students who acquitted the accused died, his opinion may be taken into account in the count during the final stage of judgment, he

is excluded from the general rule of our master

[unclear: the source segment appears to contain the bracketed identification “Rav” outside the grammatical flow]. According to Rav, one who acquitted may retract during the final stage of judgment. Therefore, once the judge who acquitted has died, his opinion cannot be taken into account, because perhaps he would have retracted. It follows that Rav and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina disagree on this matter, and their statements cannot be reconciled!

The Gemara answers:

“Is excluded” was stated,

not “excludes” was stated!

The Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

from that which was taught in a beraita below:

Two court scribes stand before them, one on the right and one on the left, and they write the arguments of those who acquit and the arguments of those who find him liable,

their reasons for acquittal and liability.

The Gemara demonstrates:

Granted,

the

arguments of those who find him liable

must be written, even though those who find him liable may retract on the following day, because perhaps

on the following day they will see

that he should be found liable [or one of them will see that], on account of

another reason,

a reason different from what they saw

yesterday, and they will need to delay the judgment,

and will have to delay the judgment for another night in order to examine this other reason during the night.

But the arguments of those who acquit:

if one who acquitted may retract,

for what reason

must the reason for the acquittal be written, rather than merely recording that so-and-so acquitted him?

Is it not

because

if they see another reason for liability,

if those who acquitted wish to retract and find him liable,

we do not heed them?

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

that is not why the reasons of those who acquit are written. Rather, it is

so that two

judges will not say

one reason based on two different verses,

as in that case one of them has certainly erred, since it is impossible for two different verses to be written as the basis for a single matter; therefore, they cannot be counted as two, as will be explained below.

As Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: If two

judges

stated one reason based on two different verses, what is the law?

He said to him: They are counted only as one.

The Gemara discusses this:

From where are these matters derived?

Abaye said: The verse states [

Psalms 62 ]

“One thing God has spoken; two have I heard: that might belongs to God.”

One verse [“

One thing God has spoken”]

can yield

the teaching of

several reasons [“two have I heard”],

[“I have heard two”];

but one reason,

one ruling,

cannot be derived from several verses.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: [

Jeremiah 23 ]

“And like a hammer that shatters the rock”: Just as this hammer breaks into many sparks,

so too, one verse can yield several reasons.

The Gemara discusses this:

What are the circumstances of one reason based on two verses?

Rav Zevid said: As we learned:

The

altar sanctifies

even an invalid offering, so that if it was placed on the altar it may not be removed, despite its disqualification. However, the altar does not sanctify every offering, but only

the

offering

that is fit for it.

This excludes a handful of meal-offering substance that was not sanctified in a service vessel, which is not considered fit for the altar as long as it has not been sanctified in a service vessel.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: Anything fit for the fires,

that is designated to be burned on the fire atop the altar, namely, the sacrificial portions,

if it ascended—

it may not be taken down. As it is stated [

Leviticus 7 ] “It is

the

burnt offering upon its flame.”

Just as a burnt offering, which is fit for the fires, may not be taken down once it has ascended,

so too, anything fit for the fires,

even if it was the sacrificial portion of an invalid offering,

if it ascended, it may not be taken down.

Rabban Gamliel says: Anything fit for the altar,

and not specifically what is fit for the fires,

if it ascended, it may not be taken down. As it is stated: “It is the burnt offering upon its flame, upon the altar.” Just as a burnt offering, which is fit with regard to the altar,

as it is stated, “upon the altar,”

if it ascended, it may not be taken down, so too, anything fit for the altar.

Therefore, even blood that became disqualified or wine designated for libation that became disqualified,

if it ascended, it may not

be taken down,

and the disqualified blood is sprinkled, and the disqualified wine is poured as a libation.

And what do both of them include?—

Invalid offerings

that became disqualified in the courtyard, so that if they ascended onto the altar, they become fit for sacrifice.

One Master derives it from “flame,” and the other derives it from “altar.”

The Gemara assumed that they do not disagree about the law, but only about the source of the law; and this is an example of one reason derived from two verses.

The Gemara asks:

But there, they actually disagree

with regard to the halakha, so this is not one reason at all!

As it is taught in the latter clause: The only difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is the blood and the libations

that became disqualified and were placed upon the altar.

Rabban Gamliel says: They may not be taken down,

because the altar sanctified them and rendered them fit for sprinkling and libation,

whereas Rabbi Yehoshua says: They must be taken down,

since the altar sanctifies invalid offerings only when they are sacrificial portions fit for the fire.