Sanhedrin 34a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda?

For the verse says [

Numbers 35 ]

“One witness shall not testify against a person to die.”

And from the superfluity of the word “to die,” we learn: only

to die is that he does not testify. But for acquittal—

he does testify.

And the Rabbis,

why do they disqualify the witness from teaching acquittal?

Reish Lakish said: Because he appears as one who has a personal interest in his testimony.

For it is possible that he comes to teach acquittal on his behalf because he is concerned lest the judgment be determined for conviction on the basis of his testimony, and the defendant will bring witnesses to invalidate his testimony.

And the Rabbis, this

superfluity of

“to die”—what do they expound from it?—

They establish it as referring to one of the students

who sit before the judges, and not to the witnesses, for the reason that was explained.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one of the witnesses said, “I have something with which to teach acquittal on his behalf,” from where is it that they do not listen to him?—

The verse says: “One witness shall not testify.”

From where is it concerning one of the students who said, “I have something with which to teach conviction on his behalf,” from where is it that they do not listen to him?—

The verse says: “One shall not testify against a person to die.”

We learned in the Mishna:

In capital cases, one who teaches acquittal does not teach conviction.

Rav said: They taught

that he cannot return and teach conviction

only during the give-and-take,

so that he will exert himself to find acquittal for him, for perhaps he has not erred.

But during the finalization of the judgment,

when he has already searched all the sides of acquittal and has not found one, even a judge who

teaches acquittal

at first

returns and teaches conviction.

The meitivi

from the Mishna below [40a]: A court that judged a capital case does not issue the judgment on that day; rather, they engage in give-and-take concerning the matter throughout the entire night, each man by himself.

On the following day, they rise early

the judges

and come

to the sitting of the court.

The one who acquitted says, “I am the one who acquitted

yesterday,

and I acquit in my place.”

I must stand and acquit today as well, against my will, because the one who acquitted does not retract. But

the one who convicted

yesterday

says, “I am the one who convicted, and I convict in my place,”

for I still hold the opinion that he should be convicted.

One who teaches conviction

returns and

teaches acquittal. But one who teaches acquittal cannot return and teach conviction.

And the Gemara raises an objection from here against Rav:

But on the following day, it is the finalization of the judgment!

And it is proven that even at the finalization of the judgment, the one who acquitted cannot return and convict!?

And the Gemara rejects the objection:

And according to your reasoning, on the following day, is there no give-and-take?

Is it impossible to continue the give-and-take also on the following day? And if so,

when it teaches

in the Mishna below that on the following day as well he cannot retract, it is

during the give-and-take.

And the Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

another proof from the words of that Mishna, that even at the finalization of the judgment the one who acquitted cannot return and convict:

A Sanhedrin of seventy-one that judged a capital case, and there were thirty-five who acquitted and thirty-six who convicted—and it is impossible to determine the judgment for the worse on the basis of only one judge—

these confront those

in their arguments,

until one of

the thirty-six judges

who convicted

sees

the arguments of those who acquitted,

and then there will be thirty-six who acquitted corresponding to thirty-five who convicted, and they determine the judgment for acquittal on the basis of the majority of one judge.

And the Gemara infers:

And if it is so,

that at the finalization of the judgment even the one who acquitted can return and convict

, let it teach also conversely,

until one of those who acquitted sees the arguments of those who convicted, and there will be thirty-seven for conviction and thirty-four for acquittal, and then the judgment will be determined for conviction by more than one judge.

And the Gemara rejects this:

The tanna goes back to [the possibility of] acquittal,

it is preferable for the tanna to go back and state in his words the possibility of acquittal, but

he does not go back to [the possibility of] conviction.

Although, in truth, this is the law: the one who acquitted can return to conviction.

And the Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

from that

which Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina said [

below, 43a ]

If one of the students who acquitted died—

we see him

with regard to the count of those who convicted and those who acquitted

as though

he were still

alive and standing in his place,

And the Gemara infers:

And why

is it possible to rely on his opinion even after he died?

Let us say: If he were alive—

he would have retracted!

Rather, from here there is proof that even if he were alive, he would not have been able to retract, since he had already acquitted. And it is proven that even at the finalization of the judgment, the one who acquitted cannot return and convict!

And the Gemara rejects: In truth, the one who acquitted can retract at the finalization of the judgment. Rather,

now, at any rate, he did not retract.

For now he did not retract, and therefore we do not have to be concerned lest, if he had been alive, he would have retracted; rather, it is possible to take his opinion into account before he died.

But the Gemara wonders: How do we reconcile the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina so that they are also in accordance with Rav?

But they sent from there,

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia:

According to the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina,

who says that if one of the students who acquitted died, it is possible to take his opinion into account in the count at the finalization of the judgment, he is

removed from the category of our master [

Rav ]. For according to Rav, the one who acquitted can retract at the finalization of the judgment. And if so, since the one who acquitted died, it is impossible to take him into account, for perhaps he would have retracted. And it is proven that Rav and Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina disagree concerning this matter, and it is impossible to reconcile their words!

And the Gemara answers:

“He is not removed” was stated,

and not “he is removed” was stated!

And the Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

from that which was taught below:

Two court scribes stand before them, one on the right and one on the left, and they write the arguments of those who acquit and the arguments of those who convict,

their reasons for acquittal and conviction.

And the Gemara proves:

Granted,

the

arguments of those who convict

must be written, even though those who convict can retract on the following day, because perhaps

on the following day they will see

those who convict [or one of them] will see that he should be convicted because of

another reason,

a reason different from what they saw

yesterday, and they will need to cause a delay of the judgment,

and they will need to delay the judgment for another night in order to examine the other reason during the night.

But the arguments of those who acquit,

if the one who acquitted can retract,

for what reason

must the reason for the acquittal be written, and is it not sufficient to write that so-and-so acquitted?

Is it not

that

because if they see another reason for conviction,

if those who acquitted wish to retract and convict,

we do not heed them?

And the Gemara rejects:

No,

it is not for this reason that the reasons of those who acquitted are written, but

so that two

judges will not say

one reason from two different verses,

for then certainly one of them is mistaken, because it is impossible for two verses to be written for one matter, and therefore they cannot be counted as two, as will be explained below.

As Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Yohanan: If two

judges

said one reason from two different verses, what is [the law]?

He said to him: They are counted as only one.

And the Gemara discusses:

From where are these words?—

Abaye said: For the verse says: [

Psalms 62 ]

“One thing God has spoken; two have I heard, for strength belongs to God”—

one verse [“One thing God has spoken”]

“God has spoken one thing”

emerges to

teach about

several reasons [“two have I heard”]

[“I have heard two”];

, but one reason,

one judgment,

does not emerge from several verses.

The school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: [

Jeremiah 23 ]

“And like a hammer that shatters a rock,” just as this hammer divides into several sparks—

so too, one verse emerges to several reasons.

And the Gemara discusses:

What are the circumstances of one reason from two verses?—

Rav Zevid said: As we learned:

The

altar sanctifies

even an invalid offering, for if it ascended onto the altar, it does not descend again, despite its invalidity. But the altar does not sanctify every offering, but only

the

offering

fit for it.

This excludes a handful that was not sanctified in a service vessel, which is not considered fit for the altar as long as it has not been sanctified in a service vessel.

Rabban Gamliel says: Everything fit for the fires,

which is designated to be burned upon the fire that is on the altar, namely the sacrificial portions,

if it ascended—

it does not descend. As it is stated [

Leviticus 7 ] “It is

the

burnt-offering upon its fire.”

Just as a burnt-offering, which is fit for the fires, if it ascended does not descend—

so too, everything that is fit for the fires,

even if it was the sacrificial portions of an invalid offering,

if it ascended, it does not descend.

Rabban Gamliel says: Everything fit for the altar,

and not specifically that which is fit for the fires,

if it ascended, it does not descend. As it is stated: “It is the burnt-offering upon its fire upon the altar.” Just as a burnt-offering, which is fit with regard to the altar,

for it says “upon the altar,”

if it ascended, it does not descend; so too, everything that is fit for the altar.

And therefore, even blood that became disqualified or wine of libations that became disqualified,

if it ascended, it does not

descend,

and the disqualified blood is sprinkled, and the disqualified wine is poured.

And what do both of them include?—

Invalid offerings

that became disqualified in the Temple courtyard, which, if they ascended onto the altar, became fit for sacrifice.

One master derives it from “upon its fire,” and one master derives it from “altar.”

And the Gemara assumed that they do not disagree concerning the law, but only concerning the source of the law; and this is an example of one reason emerging from two verses.

And the Gemara wonders:

But there they emphatically disagree

concerning the law, and this is not one reason at all!

For it teaches in the latter clause: There is no difference between the words of Rabban Gamliel and the words of Rabbi Yehoshua except for the blood and the libations

that became disqualified and were brought up onto the altar,

for Rabban Gamliel says: They do not descend,

because the altar sanctified them and rendered them fit for sprinkling and pouring,

and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They descend,

since the altar sanctifies invalid offerings only when they are sacrificial portions fit for the fire.