Sanhedrin 33b — the Talmud in English

We return [the case] to merit ![](pamud.bmp "

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but we do not return [it] to liability,

in the following manner:

We return [the case] to merit

in capital cases, in cases that are

pure merit,

such as when they convicted him in a capital case for desecrating Shabbat, in which case returning [the case] is a merit for him without there being liability thereby for the opposing side, for there is no opposing side here.

But we do not return [it] to liability,

that is,

to merit that is liability.

For it is impossible to explain [the statement] literally, that in capital cases they do not return [a case] from merit to liability, because this matter does not exist even in monetary cases. Yet the Mishna distinguishes between monetary cases and capital cases.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty: In capital cases,

whose liability!?

For whom would there be liability if we return [the case] to merit in capital cases!? And it answers:

This is not difficult—

the liability of the blood avenger.

For if we return the murderer’s case to merit, this would be liability for the blood avenger, since it is grievous in his eyes that the murderer of his relative should be saved.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: Is it so that

because of the liability of the blood avenger, we kill this one?

Shall we kill this one and not return his case to merit!?

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

What

is the wording that the tan­

between

merit

and

liability? But according to your words, we return only to merit [which is liability for the other]!?

And we conclude: Indeed,

[it is] difficult.

Ravina said:

It is possible to say in accordance with Rav Hisda’s distinction: here, [the case is] where he took and gave with his hand; there, [the case is] where he did not take and give with his hand. And regarding what we raised concerning one who acquitted the liable party—how is it possible that he took and gave with his hand?—one may say that it refers to

a case where he had

the lender’s

collateral

in his possession for the debt, and he exempted him from the debt,

and took it

the judge took the collateral

from him,

and gave it to the borrower. And likewise, regarding

he declared the pure impure,

one should establish it as

that a creeping creature touched it,

so that he rendered it impure with his hands, and likewise, regarding

he declared the impure pure,

one should establish it as

that

the judge

mixed them

the impure produce

among his produce

the pure produce of the person who asked the question, and thereby rendered all of it impure.

We learned in the Mishna:

Capital cases, etc.

The Sages taught: From where [is it derived] concerning one who leaves the court liable, and one [of the judges] said: I have [a reason] to teach merit concerning him—from where [is it derived] that they return him?—

The verse states [Exodus 23]

[the verse]

“Do not kill the innocent.”

The meaning of the verse is that if the person found liable in judgment is innocent of the sin, do not kill him; rather, return him and hear this person’s teaching of merit.

And from where [is it derived] concerning one who leaves the court acquitted, and one [of the judges] said: I have [a reason] to teach liability concerning him—from where [is it derived] that they do not return him?—

The verse states [Exodus 23]

[the verse]

“Do not kill the righteous.”

The meaning of the verse is that he is righteous in his judgment, for he emerged acquitted, but he is not innocent of the sin.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: And the reverse applies to an inciter. For it is written [Deuteronomy 13]

[the verse]

“You shall not spare him and you shall not cover up for him.”

Rav Kahana taught [the proof from]

[Deuteronomy 13]

“For you shall surely kill him.”

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: Those liable to exile—what is the source?

Is their law concerning returning [a case] like the law of capital cases?

And the Gemara explains:

It is derived

by a gzera shava,

“murder, murder.”

With regard to those liable to execution it is stated, “The murderer shall surely be put to death,” and with regard to those liable to exile it is stated, “For the murderer to flee there.”

Those liable to lashes—from where [is it derived]?—

It is derived

by a gzera shava,

“wicked—

wicked.”

It was also taught so: Those liable to exile—what [is the law]?—

It is derived

by a gzera shava,

“murder, murder.” Those liable to lashes—

it is derived

by a gzera shava,

“wicked, wicked.”

We learned in the Mishna:

But we do not return [the case] to liability.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: And this is when he erred

the one who acquitted [the defendant]

in a matter in which the Sadducees do not concede,

for his error is not explicit in the Torah, but only in the words of the Mishna and the Gemara

. But when he erred in a matter that

even

the Sadducees concede,

they return [the case],

go, read it in the schoolhouse!

For it is a matter that even schoolchildren know is an error, and such a judgment is considered nothing.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba asked Rabbi Yohanan: If he erred

the one who acquitted [the defendant]

regarding an adulterer and an adulteress, what [is the law]?

He said to him: While your fire is burning, go cut your gourds and roast them.

It is a proverb: As long as the fire in the hearth is burning, make use of it; cut your gourds and roast them upon it. And its application is that when you hear a matter, apply your heart to understand and to add learning. And once you heard from me that if he erred in a matter that the Sadducees concede, the judgment is returned even from merit to liability, you should have inferred on your own that if he erred regarding an adulterer and an adulteress, which is a matter that the Sadducees concede, the judgment is returned, for there is no aspect of merit here.

It was likewise stated: Rabbi Ami said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: If he erred regarding an adulterer, [the case] is returned.

But the Gemara discusses:

Rather, what are the circumstances of “they do not return”

in capital cases,

which also include an adulterer and an adulteress?

Rabbi Abahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: For example, when he erred

regarding liability for intercourse

in an unnatural manner,

which is derived from the words of the verse, “the lyings of a woman,” for the verse speaks of two lyings: one in the customary manner and one in an unnatural manner; and this is a matter in which the Sadducees do not concede, and this judge acquitted him regarding intercourse in an unnatural manner.

We learned in the Mishna:

In monetary cases, all may teach merit and liability; in capital cases, all may teach merit.

And the Gemara deduces:

“All”—

even

the

witnesses

who testified concerning the act that makes him liable to death may come and teach merit concerning him, to save him from death.

Shall we say that our Mishna is Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, and not the Rabbis?

For it was taught: [Numbers 35]

[the verse]

“And one witness shall not testify against a person”—

whether for merit or for liability; Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: He testifies for merit, but he does not testify for liability.

Rav Pappa said: “All” stated in the Mishna means

to

one of the students

who sit in rows before the judges, and not the witnesses,

and it is the view of all

[the Sages].