Sanhedrin 34b (לד:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

an example of one rationale derived from two verses is

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Since it is stated

[Exodus 29]

“Everything that touches the altar shall become consecrated,”

even an unfit offering shall become consecrated and may not be removed from the altar,

I might infer

that the altar consecrates

both what is fit and what is unfit,

such as leaven and honey, or a deer, or non-sacred animals, none of which are at all fit for sacrifice—

The verse therefore states

[Exodus 29]

“lambs.” Just as lambs are fit—

so too, anything that is fit.

Rabbi Akiva says:

[Exodus 29]

“a burnt offering”; just as a burnt offering is fit—

so too, anything that is fit.

And what do both of them exclude—

unfit offerings

that were never fit for sacrifice.

One Sage derives it

from this,

from “lambs,” and the other

derives it

from “a burnt offering.”

But the Gemara rejects this, saying that they disagree in law, and this is not one rationale:

But didn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava say: A disqualified bird burnt offering is the difference between them? The one who derives it

from

“lambs”—

lambs

are included, but a bird burnt offering is not.

And the one who derives it from “a burnt offering”—

even a bird burnt offering is included as well!

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

as it was taught in a beraita:

With regard to one who slaughters consecrated animals outside the Temple courtyard,

[Leviticus 17]

“It shall be accounted to that man as blood; he has shed blood”—

to include one who sprinkles

the blood of consecrated animals outside, so that he is liable to karet, like one who slaughters consecrated animals outside;

these are the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says:

[Leviticus 17]

with regard to one who offers consecrated animals outside, it is stated

“or sacrifices”—

to include one who sprinkles.

And what do both of them include—

sprinkling

of the blood of consecrated animals outside, teaching that one is liable to karet for it.

One Sage derives it

from this,

from “It shall be accounted,” and the other derives it from “or sacrifices.”

The Gemara wonders that this is not one rationale:

But didn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: If one slaughtered and sprinkled

outside inadvertently, with a single lapse of awareness,

there is a difference between them: According to Rabbi Yishmael,

who derives one who sprinkles outside from the verse’s inclusion concerning one who slaughters consecrated animals outside,

he is liable only

to one

sin-offering.

Whereas

according to Rabbi Akiva,

who derives one who sprinkles outside from the verse’s inclusion concerning one who offers consecrated animals outside,

he is liable to two

sin-offerings, as in the case of one who slaughters and offers consecrated animals outside, who is liable to two sin-offerings, since two prohibitions punishable by karet are involved.

The Gemara answers:

This matter was stated concerning it; Abaye said: Even according to Rabbi Akiva as well,

who derives one who sprinkles from the verse concerning one who offers consecrated animals outside,

he is not liable

for slaughtering and sprinkling outside

except

for one

sin-offering,

even though two prohibitions punishable by karet are involved, because there is only one warning concerning them. The warning was stated only with regard to one who offers consecrated animals outside, whereas the slaughterer and the sprinkler are also derived from this warning,

as the verse states

[Deuteronomy 12]

“There you shall offer your burnt offerings, and there you shall perform”—

the Merciful One combined all the acts,

for here the Torah equated one who slaughters and one who sprinkles outside with the prohibition and warning concerning one who offers outside. Since a warning was stated only concerning one who offers outside, and since all of them are subject to one warning, one is liable for them only to one sin-offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Civil cases are judged both by day and by night.”

(Mnemonic: MishPaT Ma’aneH MaTeH.)

The Gemara asks:

From where are these matters derived?

Rabbi Hiyya bar Pappa said: As the verse states

[Exodus 18]

“And they shall judge the people at all times.”

The Gemara raises an objection:

If so, the beginning of the trial should also

be conducted at night!?

It is

as Rava posed a contradiction:

It is written, “And they shall judge the people at all times,”

both by day and by night.

But

on the other hand,

it is written

[Deuteronomy 21]

“And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit,”

which indicates that the judgment concerning inheritances, which is a civil case, must be specifically conducted by day.

How is this resolved?

Day—

for the beginning of the trial; night—

for the conclusion of the trial,

because the verse “And they shall judge the people at all times” refers primarily to the conclusion of the trial, which is the essential judgment, and the verse states that it may take place at all times, even at night.

The Gemara says:

The Mishna,

which maintains that the conclusion of a trial may take place at night, is

not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

As it was taught in a beraita, Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning of the verse

[Deuteronomy 21]

“By their word shall every dispute

between people in civil cases

and every affliction be established. And what connection is there between disputes and afflictions?

Rather, the verse compares

the

disputes to afflictions,

to teach us:

Just as afflictions

are shown to a koen only

by day, as it is written

[Leviticus 13]

“And on the day that it appears in him”—

so too, disputes

may be judged only

by day.

And “disputes” also includes the conclusion of the trial, and the comparison reveals that, according to Rabbi Meir, the conclusion of a trial too may be conducted only by day.

And just as afflictions are not examined by

koanim who are

blind—

as it is written

[Leviticus 13]

“according to all the sight of the eyes of the koen”—

so too, disputes are not judged by

judges who are

blind.

And the verse also compares

the

afflictions to disputes,

to teach us:

Just as disputes are not judged by

judges who are

relatives

of the defendant—

so too, afflictions are not examined by

koanim who are

relatives

of the afflicted person.

You might say:

If, just as disputes are judged by three

judges—

so too, afflictions are examined by three

koanim

. And this is a logical inference: A person’s property

is judged

by three; his body, all the more so?

The verse states

[Leviticus 13]

“And he shall be brought to Aaron the koen, or to one of them.” And so on. You learn from here that even one koen examines afflictions.

That blind man

a blind judge,

who lived in the neighborhood

of Rabbi Yohanan,

would judge cases, and Rabbi Yohanan said nothing to him.

The Gemara wonders:

How could he do this?

How could Rabbi Yohanan act in this way, remaining silent about it?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna.

And we learned in a Mishna: Anyone who is qualified to judge is qualified to testify, but there are some who are qualified to testify and are not qualified to judge. And Rabbi Yohanan said

with regard to this Mishna, that it comes

to include one who is blind in one eye,

who is also disqualified from judging, based on the comparison of disputes to afflictions, and in accordance with Rabbi Meir. Since this Mishna was taught without dissent, the halakha follows it; if so, why did Rabbi Yohanan remain silent about the blind judge who lived in his neighborhood!?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yohanan found another unattributed Mishna:

he found our Mishna, which was also taught without dissent, stating

“Civil cases are judged by day and concluded at night,”

and it is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir, as it does not accept the comparison of disputes to afflictions.

The Gemara asks:

What makes

the authority

of this unattributed Mishna greater than that of the other unattributed Mishna?

It answers:

If you wish, say: The unattributed Mishna represents the view of the majority,

our Mishna, which rules in accordance with the Sages, who are the majority,

and is preferable

as the basis for a ruling.

And if you wish, say: It is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught it

here, in tractate Sanhedrin,

alongside the halakhot of judgment.

This is the primary place for stating this halakha. Whereas Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught the Mishna “Anyone who is qualified to judge is qualified to testify” in tractate Niddah, among other similar rules [such as “Anyone who is liable for the first shearing is liable for the gifts, but there are some who are liable for the gifts and are not liable for the first shearing”]. Therefore Rabbi Yohanan ruled in accordance with the unattributed Mishna in our tractate.

The Gemara now discusses Rabbi Meir’s statement:

And as for Rabbi Meir, this verse, “And they shall judge the people at all times,”

which indicates that cases may also be judged at night,

what does he expound from it?

Rava said: It comes to include an overcast day,

teaching that although such a day is unsuitable for examining afflictions, it is suitable for judging cases, despite the comparison of disputes to afflictions.

As we learned in a Mishna: Afflictions are not examined in the early morning,

early in the morning,

or between the evenings,

when the daylight is not strong,

or inside a house, or on an overcast day, because

due to the weakness of the light,

the appearance

of an affliction that is

dim appears intense,

and they might consequently declare the afflicted person impure unlawfully.

And

likewise,

they do not

examine afflictions

at midday—

because

the sunlight is exceedingly strong and distorts one’s vision, so that the appearance of an affliction that is

intense appears dim,

and they might consequently purify the impure afflicted person unlawfully.

The Gemara further discusses Rabbi Meir’s statement:

And as for Rabbi Meir, what does he do with this verse, “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit”?

Why was it necessary for the verse to state this, when according to him we have already derived it from the comparison of disputes to afflictions?

That

verse

is needed for that which Rabba bar Ḥanina taught before Rav Naḥman:

“And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit”—the verse teaches

that only

by day may you establish inheritances, but you may not establish inheritances at night.

Abaye said to him: If that is so, the sons of one who dies during the day shall inherit him,

only one who dies during the day is inherited by his sons, whereas

one who dies at night, his sons shall not inherit him!?

For according to this exposition of the verse, one must say that only a person who dies during the day bequeaths his property to his sons, whereas one who dies at night does not bequeath it!?

Perhaps you meant “the judgment concerning inheritances,”

perhaps you meant to say that the judgment concerning inheritances may be conducted only by day, like other civil cases?

And from where do we know that the division of inheritances is governed like civil cases?

As it was taught in a beraita:

at the end of the passage concerning inheritances it is stated,

“And it shall be for the Children of Israel a statute of judgment.” The entire passage

was completed

to be a judgment.

We learn from here that the establishment of an inheritance must be carried out by three, like a judgment.

We also learn from here concerning all civil cases that their beginning must be judged by day, like the case of inheritances, concerning which it is stated, “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit.”

And this is in accordance with Rav Yehuda.

For Rav Yehuda said: If three entered to visit

the sick person, if they wish, they may write

the testimony as they heard it from the sick person concerning how he wished to distribute his property.

If they wish, they may render judgment.

Since they are three, they may adjudicate and say: This is the law, that so-and-so should receive this portion and so-and-so that portion, whose values correspond equally, and the like.

And they write a judgment for them, so that they will no longer be able to contest one another. But if there were

two,

they write

testimony,

but they do not render judgment.

For a court consists of no fewer than three.

And Rav Ḥisda said: They taught this only

when they entered to visit him

by day.

But

if they entered to visit him

at night, even if they are three,

they may only

write

testimony

, but they do not render judgment,

even afterward, when day has dawned.

What is the reason? Because

at

the time they entered,

they had the status of witnesses.

For they could not judge at night.

And

when they came to adjudicate on the following day, they could not judge on the basis of what they had seen at night, because

a witness cannot become a judge.

He said to him: Yes, that is what I meant!

We learned in the Mishna:

Capital cases are judged by day, etc.

And the Gemara discusses this:

From where are these matters derived?

Rav Shimi bar Hiyya said: The verse says

[Numbers 25]

concerning those who sinned with Baal Peor,

“And hang them up for Hashem opposite the sun,”

while the sun is shining.

Rav Hisda said: From where do we know that “hanging” means hanging on a gallows? —

As it is written

that the Gibeonites said

[II Samuel 21]

“And we will hang them up for Hashem

the sons of Saul

on the hill of Saul, the chosen of Hashem.”