Sanhedrin 34b — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

an example of one rationale derived from two verses is

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Since it is stated ![](pamud.bmp "

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[Exodus 29]

“Anything that touches the altar shall become consecrated,”

even an unfit offering becomes consecrated and is not removed from the altar,

I might understand

that the altar consecrates

both what is fit and what is unfit,

such as leaven and honey, or a deer, or unconsecrated animals, which are entirely unfit for sacrifice—

The verse therefore states

[Exodus 29]

“sheep.” Just as sheep are fit—

so too, anything that is fit.

Rabbi Akiva says:

[Exodus 29]

“a burnt offering.” Just as a burnt offering is fit—

so too, anything that is fit.

And what do both of them exclude—

unfit offerings

that were never fit for sacrifice.

One master derives it

from this,

from “sheep,” while the other

derives it

from “a burnt offering.”

But the Gemara rejects this explanation, saying that they disagree about the law, and this is not one rationale:

But didn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava say: The issue between them is an invalid bird burnt offering? One who derives it

from

“sheep” understands: sheep—

yes, but a bird burnt offering—

no. And one who derives it from “a burnt offering”—

even a bird burnt offering as well!

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

an example of one rationale derived from two verses is

as it was taught in a beraita:

Regarding one who slaughters sacrificial animals outside the Temple courtyard,

[Leviticus 17]

“It shall be counted as blood for that man; he has shed blood”—

to include one who sprinkles

the blood of sacrificial animals outside, so that he is liable to karet, like one who slaughters sacrificial animals outside,

according to Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says:

[Leviticus 17]

regarding one who offers sacrificial animals outside, it is stated

“or sacrifice,”—

to include one who sprinkles.

And what do both of them include—

sprinkling

of the blood of sacrificial animals outside, teaching that one is liable to karet for it.

One master derives it

from

“It shall be counted as blood,” while the other derives it from “or sacrifice.”

The Gemara asks that this too is not one rationale:

But didn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: If one slaughtered and sprinkled

outside inadvertently, during one period of unawareness,

the issue between them is as follows: According to Rabbi Yishmael,

who derives liability for sprinkling outside from the verse that includes it with slaughtering sacrificial animals outside,

he is liable only

for one sin offering,

?

But

according to Rabbi Akiva,

who derives liability for sprinkling outside from the verse concerning offering sacrificial animals outside,

he is liable to bring two

sin offerings, like one who slaughters and offers sacrificial animals outside, who is liable to bring two sin offerings because the two acts involve two separate prohibitions punishable by karet.

The Gemara answers:

This matter was stated concerning it. Abaye said: Even according to Rabbi Akiva as well,

who derives liability for sprinkling from the verse concerning offering outside,

he is not liable

for slaughtering and sprinkling outside

except

for one sin offering,

;

even though there are two prohibitions punishable by karet, because they are subject to only one warning. The warning was stated only concerning offering sacrificial animals outside, while slaughtering and sprinkling are also derived from that same warning.

As the verse says,

[Deuteronomy 12]

“There you shall offer your burnt offerings, and there you shall perform”—

the Merciful One grouped all the acts together,

for the Torah equated slaughtering and sprinkling outside with the warning against offering outside. Since the warning for all of them is one warning, one is liable to bring only one sin offering for them.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Civil monetary cases are judged by day, and their conclusion may be reached by night.”

(Mnemonic: MishpaT Ma’aneH MaTeH.)

The Gemara discusses this:

From where are these matters derived?

Rabbi Hiyya bar Pappa said: As the verse states,

[Exodus 18]

“And they shall judge the people at all times.”

The Gemara raises an objection:

If so, the beginning of the trial should also

take place at night!?

As in the resolution of Rava, for Rava raised a contradiction:

there appears to be a contradiction in the verses:

It is written, “And they shall judge the people at all times,”

both by day and by night.

And

on the other hand,

it is written

[Deuteronomy 21]

“And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit,”

which implies that the judgment concerning inheritances, which is a civil monetary case, must take place specifically by day.

How is this resolved?

Day—

for the beginning of the trial; night—

for the conclusion of the trial,

because the verse “And they shall judge the people at all times” refers primarily to the conclusion of the judgment, which is the essential part of the trial, and it says that this may take place at all times, even at night.

The Gemara says:

The Mishna,

which holds that the conclusion of a trial may take place at night, is

not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

As it was taught in a beraita, Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning of the verse

[Deuteronomy 21]

“By their word shall every dispute

between people in civil monetary cases

and every affliction be decided”? And what connection is there between disputes and afflictions?

Rather, the verse compares

the

disputes to afflictions,

to teach us:

Just as afflictions

may be examined by a kohein, a member of the priestly class who served in the Temple, only

by day, as it is written,

[Leviticus 13]

“And on the day that it appears,”—

so too, disputes

may be judged only

by day.

The term “disputes” also includes the conclusion of the trial, and this comparison teaches that according to Rabbi Meir even the conclusion of a trial may take place only by day.

And just as afflictions are not examined by

kohanim who are

blind—

as it is written,

[Leviticus 13]

“According to all the appearance of the kohein’s eyes”—

so too, disputes are not judged by

judges who are

blind.

And the verse also compares

the

afflictions to disputes,

to teach us:

Just as disputes may not be judged by

judges who are

close relatives

of the litigant—

so too, afflictions may not be examined by

kohanim who are

close relatives

of the person afflicted.

You might say:

If, just as disputes are judged by three

judges—

so too, afflictions are examined by three

kohanim

. And this can be inferred by an a-fortiori argument: A person’s property

is judged

by three; his body, all the more so?

The verse therefore states

[Leviticus 13]

“And he shall be brought to Aaron the kohein or to one of them.” And so on. You learn from this that even one kohein may examine afflictions.

There was a certain blind man,

a blind judge,

who lived in the neighborhood

of

Rabbi Yohanan, and he would judge cases, and Rabbi Yohanan said nothing to him.

The Gemara is surprised:

How could he do this?

How could Rabbi Yohanan remain silent about this?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha is in accordance with an unattributed Mishna.

And we learned in a Mishna: “Anyone who is fit to judge is fit to testify, but there are some who are fit to testify and are not fit to judge.” And Rabbi Yohanan said

about this Mishna that it

comes to include one who is blind in one eye,

who is also unfit to judge, because of the comparison of disputes to afflictions, in accordance with Rabbi Meir. Since this Mishna was taught without a dissenting opinion, the halakha should follow it. If so, why did Rabbi Yohanan remain silent about the blind judge who lived in his neighborhood!?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yohanan found another unattributed Mishna:

He found our Mishna, which was also taught without a dissenting opinion, stating

“Civil monetary cases are judged by day and concluded by night,”

and it is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir, since it does not accept the comparison of disputes to afflictions.

The Gemara asks:

What makes

it stronger

than the other unattributed Mishna?

It answers:

If you wish, say: The unattributed Mishna that represents the view of the majority

—our Mishna, which rules in accordance with the Sages, who are the majority—

is stronger

as a basis for a ruling.

And if you wish, say: It is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught it

here, in tractate Sanhedrin,

alongside the established law concerning judgment.

This is the primary place to state this law. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught the Mishna “Anyone who is fit to judge is fit to testify” in tractate Niddah, among other similar rules, such as: “Anyone who is liable for the first shearing is liable for the gifts to the kohein, but there are some who are liable for the gifts and are not liable for the first shearing.” Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan ruled in accordance with the unattributed ruling of our Mishna.

The Gemara now discusses Rabbi Meir’s opinion:

And Rabbi Meir—what does he expound from this verse, “And they shall judge the people at all times,”

which implies that one may judge even at night,

what does he derive from it?

Rava said: It comes to include an overcast day,

teaching that although such a day is unsuitable for examining afflictions, it is suitable for judging, despite the comparison of disputes to afflictions.

As we learned in a Mishna: “One does not examine afflictions in the early morning,

early in the morning,

or at twilight,

when the daylight is not strong,

and not indoors, and not on an overcast day, because

because of the weak light,

the appearance

of an affliction that is

dim appears intense,

and they may consequently declare the afflicted person impure improperly.

And

likewise,

one does

not examine afflictions

at midday—

because

the sunlight is strongest and distorts one’s vision, so that the appearance of an affliction that is

intense appears dim,

and they may consequently declare the impure afflicted person pure improperly.

The Gemara further discusses Rabbi Meir’s opinion:

And Rabbi Meir—what does he do with this verse, “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit”?

Why was it necessary for the verse to state this, when according to him we already learn it from the comparison of disputes to afflictions?

That

verse

is needed for the teaching that Rabbah bar Ḥanina taught before Rav Naḥman:

“And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit”—the verse teaches

that only

by day may you determine inheritances, but you may not determine inheritances at night.

Abaye said to him: If that is so, the sons of one who dies during the day shall inherit from him,

only those who die during the day are inherited by their sons, whereas

one who dies at night—his sons shall not inherit from him!?

According to this interpretation of the verse, one would have to say that only a person who dies during the day bequeaths his property to his sons, while one who dies at night does not bequeath it!?

Perhaps you meant: “the judgment concerning inheritances,”

perhaps you meant to say that the case concerning inheritances may be judged only during the day, like other civil monetary cases?

And from where do we know that the division of inheritances is governed by the laws of civil monetary cases?

As it was taught in a beraita:

At the end of the passage concerning inheritances, it is stated,

“And it shall be for the Children of Israel a statute of judgment.” The entire passage

was completed

as a judgment.

From here we learn that the inheritance must be carried out by three, like a judgment.

We also learn from here that all civil monetary cases must have their beginning judged by day, like inheritances, concerning which it is stated: “And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit.”

And this is in accordance with Rav Yehuda.

For Rav Yehuda said: If three people entered to visit

the sick person, if they wish, they write

the testimony as they heard from the sick person concerning how he wishes to bequeath his property.

If they wish, they issue a judgment.

Since there are three of them, they can judge and say: This is the law, so-and-so shall receive this portion and so-and-so shall receive that portion, whose values are equal, and the like.

And they write a judgment for them, so that they can no longer bring claims against one another. But if there were

only

two, they write

testimony,

but they do not issue a judgment,

because a court consists of no fewer than three.

And Rav Hisda said: They taught this only

when they entered to visit him

during the day.

But

if they entered to visit him

at night, even if there are three of them,

they may only

write

testimony

, but they may not issue a judgment,

even afterward, when day has dawned.

What is the reason? Because

at

the time they entered,

they became witnesses.

They could not judge at night.

And

when they came to judge the next day, they could not judge on the basis of what they had seen at night, because

a witness may not become a judge.

He said to him: Yes, that is what I am saying!

We learned in the Mishna:

Capital cases are judged during the day, etc.

And the Gemara asks:

From where are these matters?

Rav Shimi bar Hiyya said: Scripture says

[Numbers 25]

concerning the sinners at Baal Peor,

“And impale them for Hashem opposite the sun,”

while the sun is shining.

Rav Hisda said: From where [do we know] that “impalement” is hanging? —

As it is written,

that the Gibeonites said

[II Samuel 21]

“And we shall impale them for Hashem

the sons of Saul

at Gibeah of Saul, chosen of Hashem.”