Sanhedrin 32a — the Talmud in English

Regarding the acceptance of testimony in capital cases, the Torah said in the Book of Deuteronomy [13:15], “And you shall investigate, and examine, and inquire היטב”—thoroughly; the verse teaches that examination and interrogation of the witnesses are required.

The words of the verse in the Book of Leviticus [24:22], “One judgment shall there be for you,” teach that monetary law is to be equated with capital law, and also when accepting testimony concerning money, the witnesses must be interrogated and examined.

Mishna:

One [set of] monetary laws and one [set of] capital laws

are equal,

in

the need for

examination and interrogation

of the witnesses in order to accept their testimony.

As it is stated [

Leviticus 24:22]

“One judgment shall there be for you.”

This law is a matter of Torah law. But the Sages said [above, 3a, and in the Gemara below] that monetary laws do not require examination and interrogation, so that the door should not be locked before borrowers, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Likewise, the teaching from the words of the verse, “One judgment shall there be for you,” to equate monetary laws with capital laws, applies only regarding the acceptance of testimony, but not regarding the conduct of the trial itself.

The reasons for the distinction in the conduct of the trial between monetary laws and capital laws will be explained below.

What

are the distinctions that exist

between monetary laws and capital laws?

And the Mishna enumerates ten distinctions:

1.

Monetary laws [are adjudicated] with three

judges.

And capital laws —

with twenty-three,

who are called the Minor Sanhedrin.

2.

Monetary laws —

they begin

the deliberation [the give-and-take] of the judges with the words of the claimant or the defendant,

whether for merit or for liability .

Whereas in

capital laws —

they begin

the deliberation among the judges

for merit,

and they do not begin for liability.

3.

Monetary laws —

the judgment is inclined

the ruling is decided

according to

a majority of one judge

whether for merit or for liability.

And capital laws —

the judgment is inclined according to

a majority of one judge

only

only

for merit, and according to two for liability.

4.

Monetary laws —

if the judges knew after the completion of the judgment that there had been an error on their part,

they reverse it,

they retract their determination of the judgment and overturn it,

whether for merit or for liability.

But

capital laws —

they reverse it for merit, and they do not reverse it for liability.

5.

Monetary laws —

everyone teaches merit and liability.

Even the students sitting before the judges, who are not among the judges of the court, may express their opinion, whether for merit or for liability.

But

capital laws —

everyone,

even the students sitting before the judges,

teaches merit. And not everyone teaches liability,

but only the judges of the court.

6.

Monetary laws —

a judge

who teaches

first

liability

may retract during the deliberation, and

teach merit. And

likewise a judge

who teaches merit

may retract, and

teach liability.

But in

capital laws —

only the judge

who teaches liability

may retract afterward, and

teach merit. But

the judge

who teaches merit —

may not retract

at the time of the deliberation

and teach liability,

so that he will endeavor and exert himself further in finding merit, because the Torah said, “And the congregation shall save,” that one must seek the saving of the accused so that he not be killed. But at the final stage, before the determination of the judgment, he may retract from the side of merit and say that in his opinion he must be found liable.

7.

Monetary laws are adjudicated

the give-and-take

during the day, and

if they wish,

they complete

them even

at night.

Capital laws —

they are adjudicated during the day,

and they are completed during the day.

8.

Monetary laws —

they complete it on that same day, whether for merit or for liability.

Capital laws —

they complete it on that same day for merit,

for if they found him meritorious on the first day, they issue the ruling of merit for him immediately.

And on the following day for liability.

If they could not find him meritorious on the first day, but instead agreed concerning him that he was liable, they do not issue the ruling for his execution on that same day; rather, they let his judgment remain overnight until the following morning, lest they find merit for him during the night.

Therefore, they do not adjudicate

capital laws

neither on the eve of Shabbat nor on the eve of a Festival.

For perhaps they will agree on that same day that he is liable, and they will have to let his judgment remain overnight on Shabbat night in order to find merit for him. And if they do not find merit for him, it will not be possible to execute him the following morning, because an execution by a court does not override Shabbat or a Festival. And it is impossible to delay his execution until Sunday because of the delaying of the judgment.

9.

Monetary laws,

and likewise the laws of

impurities and purities [

which are questions of instruction in impurity and purity, and are not judgments concerning merit or liability] —

they begin with the greatest

among the judges, and they hear his words.

Capital laws —

they begin from the side,

with the youngest of the judges, so that the words of the younger ones will not be sealed before the greater ones, because it is stated, “You shall not answer concerning a dispute,” and we read it, “You shall not answer before the great one,” for the younger one may not disagree with the words of the master, the great one.

10.

Everyone,

even those disqualified by lineage, such as a mamzer,

is fit to adjudicate monetary laws.

And not everyone is fit to adjudicate capital laws, but only kohanim, Levites, and Israelites

of established lineage,

who marry

their daughters

to the priesthood.

Gemara:

We learned at the beginning of the Mishna: one [set of] monetary laws and one [set of] capital laws [are judged] with examination and interrogation, as it is stated [Leviticus 24], “One judgment shall there be for you.”

And the Gemara wonders:

For monetary laws, do we require examination and interrogation?

And we raise a contradiction

to this from what we learned in a beraita in the Tosefta [Makkot, chapter 1]:

A document whose date [

the time of the writing of the document]

is written, “On the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical year,

in a certain place.”

And witnesses came and said

to the witnesses of the document:

How are you testifying concerning this document

that it was written on this day in the certain place mentioned in the document,

when on this certain day

this

you were with us, in a certain place

other than that? — the

document is valid, and its witnesses are valid,

and they are not rendered conspiring witnesses, because

we are concerned,

we must be concerned and say that this is not false testimony, but

perhaps they delayed it and wrote it,

and therefore their being made conspiring witnesses is not a valid conspiracy.

And the Gemara proves:

And if it enters your mind that we require

also in monetary laws

examination and interrogation,

so that if the witnesses are contradicted their testimony will be nullified,

how can we be “concerned” that perhaps they delayed it and wrote it?

How can we, on the basis of uncertainty, perhaps it was written with a later date, validate their testimony, which was contradicted by other witnesses?!

But the Gemara rejects:

And according to your reasoning,

before you raised a difficulty from this beraita,

raise a difficulty for yourself from the Mishna,

from an explicit Mishna that is familiar to everyone, and you need not raise a difficulty from a beraita that is not known to everyone.

For we learned:

Promissory notes that are predated,

in which a date earlier than the time of the loan was written —

are invalid,

because perhaps they will come to collect with them unlawfully from purchasers who bought the land from the borrower even before the loan, when this land was not yet encumbered for repayment of the debt.

And

promissory notes

that are postdated,

for example, other witnesses came and testified that they saw that this loan took place on a date earlier than the date written in the document, and the date in the document signed by the witnesses is a later date,

are valid.

For there is no problem in the matter; on the contrary, it is an advantage for the purchasers, since the encumbrance on the land was forgiven from the time of the loan until the date written in the document.

And if it enters your mind

that monetary laws

require examination and interrogation,

raise the difficulty: promissory notes

that are postdated, why are they valid,

for since there are two witnesses testifying that the loan did not take place on the date appearing in the document, because they saw that the loan took place on an earlier date, we must be concerned that perhaps the witnesses who signed the document did not see the loan at all, since their testimony concerning their seeing it on the date appearing in the document was contradicted.

And the Gemara rejects the rejection:

This,

your claim that if so one should raise the difficulty from the Mishna and not from the beraita,

is not difficult.

Since

we are stating a greater novelty than that,

there is a novelty in the words of the beraita that gives this halakha greater force than the words of the Mishna, and therefore it is preferable to raise the difficulty from the words of the beraita. For it is explained in the beraita

that even

a postdated document in which a date of

the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical year is written, when people are not accustomed to lend,

for it is not common for people to lend money to their fellows on the eve of the end of the Sabbatical year, because they fear that perhaps the Sabbatical year will cancel the debt at its end, and it follows

that there is no possibility of saying

the answer [to what the other witnesses testified, that the witnesses to the document were with them in a place other than the place appearing in the document]

perhaps they delayed it

the witnesses who signed the document

and wrote it

at a later time, on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical year, since

they would not impair their document,

the witnesses would not do this so as not to impair the document. For delaying the writing of the document to this date impairs the document, because people gossip about it that it is forged, since people do not usually lend money at that time —

even so, since the Sabbatical year

only at

its end cancels,

we validate

the document, and we are not concerned that perhaps the witnesses who signed it did not see the loan.

In any event,

whether from the Mishna or from the beraita,

there is a difficulty

from the contradiction to our Mishna. For if it is as our Mishna says, that even in monetary laws the witnesses must undergo examination and interrogation, how do we validate postdated promissory notes even though the date on which they are signed is a date concerning which other witnesses testify that it is incorrect?!

(Mnemonic: HarpaSH.)

Four answers were stated for the contradiction between our Mishna and the Mishna and beraita concerning postdated promissory notes, by four amoraim; the mnemonic of the [first or second] letter of their four names is “HarpaSH,” as will be explained.

The first answer is that of Rabbi Hanina [indicated by the letter het from HarpaSH]:

Rabbi Hanina said: By Torah law, one [set of] monetary laws and one [set of] capital laws [are judged] with examination and interrogation, as it is stated, “One judgment shall there be for you.”

And from it we learned that the acceptance of testimony in monetary laws is to be equated with [that in] capital laws. And this is the law of the Mishna.

And for what reason did they say

in the Mishna and the beraita concerning postdated documents that

monetary laws do not require examination and interrogation?

Because of the enactment of the Sages,

so that the door should not be locked before borrowers.

So that lenders would not fear that perhaps the witnesses to the loan would not withstand examination and interrogation, and they would refrain from lending money to those in need of a loan.

The Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—is puzzled:

But if that is so,

as you said, the Sages instituted that the witnesses in monetary cases need not be examined and interrogated, and the judges in the court are deprived of the ability to establish the truth by examining and interrogating the witnesses,