Sanhedrin 32a (לב.) — the Talmud in English

Regarding the acceptance of testimony in capital cases, the Torah states in the Book of Deuteronomy [13:15], “And you shall inquire, investigate, and question thoroughly.” The verse teaches that the witnesses must be interrogated and investigated.

The words of the verse in the Book of Leviticus [24:22], “You shall have one law,” teach that monetary law is to be equated with capital law, and that even when accepting testimony concerning money, the witnesses must be investigated and interrogated.

Mishna:

Monetary cases and capital cases are equivalent

in requiring

the

need for

interrogation and investigation

of the witnesses in order to accept their testimony.

As it is stated [

Leviticus 24:22 ]

“You shall have one law.”

This law is of Torah origin. However, the Sages said [above, 3a, and in the Gemara below] that monetary cases do not require interrogation and investigation, so as not to bar the door before borrowers, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Likewise, the teaching derived from the verse “You shall have one law,” equating monetary cases with capital cases, applies only to the acceptance of testimony, but not to the conduct of the trial itself.

The reasons for the distinction between the conduct of monetary and capital trials will be explained below.

What

are the distinctions

between monetary cases and capital cases?

The Mishna lists ten distinctions:

1.

Monetary cases are adjudicated by three

judges.

Capital cases—

by twenty-three,

who are called the Minor Sanhedrin.

2.

In monetary cases—

the discussion is opened

by the judges with the words of the plaintiff or the defendant,

whether in support of liability or of acquittal.

Whereas in

capital cases—

the discussion is opened

among the judges

in support of acquittal,

and it is not opened in support of liability.

3.

In monetary cases—

the decision may be inclined

the judgment

according to

a majority of one judge

whether in support of acquittal or of liability.

And in capital cases—

the decision may be inclined according to

a majority of one judge

only

for

acquittal, and according to a majority of two for liability.

4.

In monetary cases—

if, after the judgment has been concluded, the judges realize that they were mistaken,

they reverse it,

they retract their ruling and overturn it,

whether in support of acquittal or of liability.

But

in capital cases—

they reverse it in support of acquittal, but do not reverse it in support of liability.

5.

In monetary cases—

everyone may teach a reason for acquittal or liability.

Even the students sitting before the judges, who are not among the judges of the court, may express their opinions, whether in support of acquittal or of liability.

But

in capital cases—

everyone,

including the students sitting before the judges,

may teach a reason for acquittal. But not everyone may teach a reason for liability;

only the judges of the court may do so.

6.

In monetary cases—a judge

who

initially teaches

a reason of

liability

may retract his position during the proceedings and

teach a reason for acquittal. And

likewise, a judge

who teaches a reason for acquittal

may retract his position and

teach a reason for liability.

But in

capital cases—only the judge

who

teaches a reason for liability

may subsequently retract his position and

teach a reason for acquittal. But

the judge

who teaches a reason for acquittal—

may not retract his position

during the proceedings

and teach a reason for liability,

so that he will continue striving and exerting himself to find grounds for acquittal, because the Torah states, “And the congregation shall save” [Numbers 35:25], teaching that one must seek the acquittal of the accused so that he will not be killed. But at the final stage, before the ruling is issued, he may retract his position regarding acquittal and say that in his opinion the accused should be found liable.

7.

In monetary cases, the discussion is conducted

during the day,

and

if they wish,

they may conclude

it even

at night.

In capital cases—

the trial is conducted during the day,

and it is concluded during the day.

8.

In monetary cases—

they conclude the case on that same day, whether in support of acquittal or of liability.

In capital cases—

they conclude it on that same day in support of acquittal,

for if they acquit him on the first day, they issue the ruling of acquittal immediately.

And on the following day in support of liability.

If they were unable to acquit him on the first day and instead agreed that he was liable, they do not issue the ruling sentencing him to death that day. Rather, they postpone the judgment until the following morning, lest they find grounds for acquittal during the night.

Therefore, capital cases may not be judged

on

the eve of Shabbat or on the eve of a Festival.

For perhaps they will agree that day that he is liable, and will have to postpone his judgment through the night of Shabbat in order to seek grounds for acquittal. If they do not find such grounds, it will not be possible to execute him the following morning, because a court-imposed execution does not override Shabbat or a Festival. And it is impossible to delay his execution until Sunday because of the delay of judgment.

9.

Monetary cases,

as well as cases of

ritual impurity and purity [

which are questions requiring a halakhic ruling concerning impurity and purity, and are not cases involving entitlement or liability ]—

begin with the senior judge

among the judges, and they hear his words.

Capital cases—

begin from the side,

with the youngest of the judges, so that the words of the younger judges will not be stifled by the senior ones, as it is stated, “You shall not answer concerning a dispute” [Exodus 23:2], and it is read as, “You shall not answer the master,” meaning that the junior judge may not contradict the words of his master, the senior judge.

10.

Everyone,

even those disqualified by lineage, such as a mamzer,

is fit to judge monetary cases.

But not everyone is fit to judge capital cases; only priests, Levites, and Israelites

of unblemished lineage,

who marry

their daughters

into the priesthood.

Gemara:

We learned at the beginning of the Mishna: Monetary cases and capital cases are equivalent with regard to interrogation and investigation, as it is stated [Leviticus 24], “You shall have one law.”

The Gemara wonders:

With regard to monetary cases, do we require interrogation and investigation?

And we raise a contradiction

from what we learned in a beraita in the Tosefta [Makkot, chapter 1]:

A document whose date [

the date on which the document was written ]

is written as ‘On the first of Nisan, in the Sabbatical year,

in a certain place.’

And witnesses came and said

to the witnesses who signed the document:

How can you testify concerning this document

that it was written on this day in the place mentioned in the document,

when on that day

this

you were with us, in a different place—

yet the

document is valid, and its witnesses are valid,

and they are not rendered edim zomemim, because

we are concerned

and must say that this is not false testimony, but

perhaps they delayed it and wrote it,

and therefore their disqualification as conspiring witnesses is not established.

The Gemara proves:

And if it enters your mind that we require

also in monetary cases

interrogation and investigation,

so that if the witnesses are contradicted their testimony would be nullified,

how can we be “concerned” that perhaps they delayed it and wrote it?

How can we, based on uncertainty—perhaps a later date was written in it—validate their testimony, which was contradicted by other witnesses?!

But the Gemara rejects this:

And according to your reasoning,

before you raised your difficulty from this beraita,

you should raise a difficulty for yourself from the Mishna,

from an explicit Mishna familiar to everyone, rather than raising a difficulty from a beraita that is not known to all.

For we learned:

Promissory notes dated earlier,

in which a date earlier than the actual date of the loan was written, are

invalid,

because perhaps they will be used to collect improperly from purchasers who bought land from the borrower before the loan, when that land was not yet encumbered for repayment of the debt.

And

promissory notes

dated later,

for example, when other witnesses came and testified that they saw that this loan took place on an earlier date than the date written in the document, and the date in the document signed by the witnesses is later, are

valid.

There is no problem with this; on the contrary, it benefits the purchasers, since the lien on the land was waived for the period from the date of the loan until the date written in the document.

And if it enters your mind

that monetary cases

require interrogation and investigation,

raise the difficulty: Why are

later-dated promissory notes valid,

since, as there are two witnesses testifying that the loan did not take place on the date appearing in the document, because they saw that it took place on an earlier date, we should be concerned that perhaps the witnesses who signed the document did not see the loan at all, since their testimony concerning their having seen it on the date appearing in the document has been contradicted by other witnesses?

The Gemara rejects the rejection:

This,

your claim that the difficulty should be raised from the Mishna rather than from the beraita,

is not difficult.

Since

we are stating a stronger point,

there is a novelty in the words of the beraita that lends this halakhic ruling greater force than the words of the Mishna, and therefore it is preferable to raise the difficulty from the beraita. For it is apparent from the beraita

that even

a later-dated document in which the date of

the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical year is written, when people are not accustomed to lend money,

since it is uncommon for people to lend money to one another on the eve of the end of the Sabbatical year, because they fear that the Sabbatical year will cancel the debt at its end, and it follows

that there is no basis for saying

the explanation [concerning the testimony of the other witnesses that the witnesses to the document were with them in a place other than the place appearing in the document]

perhaps they delayed it

the witnesses who signed the document

and wrote it

at a later time, on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical year, since

they would not impair their document,

as witnesses would not do this in order not to undermine the document. Delaying the writing of the document until this date impairs it, because people would gossip that it was forged, since people do not usually lend money at that time—

even so, since the Sabbatical year

only

cancels at its end,

we validate

the document, and we are not concerned that perhaps the witnesses who signed it did not see the loan.

In any event,

whether from the Mishna or from the beraita,

there is a difficulty

from the contradiction to our Mishna. For if our Mishna is correct, that monetary cases also require interrogation and investigation, how can we validate later-dated promissory notes even though the date on which they are signed is contradicted by other witnesses who testify that it is incorrect?!

(Mnemonic: ḤarPaSh.)

Four answers were stated to the contradiction between our Mishna and the Mishna and beraita concerning later-dated promissory notes, by four amoraim. The mnemonic formed from the [first or second] letters of their four names is “ḤarPaSh,” as will be explained.

The first answer is that of Rabbi Ḥanina [indicated by the letter ḥet in ḤarPaSh]:

Rabbi Ḥanina said: By Torah law, monetary cases and capital cases are equivalent with regard to interrogation and investigation, as it is stated, “You shall have one law.”

From this we learned that the acceptance of testimony in monetary cases is to be equated with that in capital cases. This is the law stated in the Mishna.

And for what reason did they say

in the Mishna and in the beraita concerning later-dated documents that

monetary cases do not require interrogation and investigation?

Because of a rabbinic ordinance,

so as not to bar the door before borrowers.

This is so that lenders will not fear that the witnesses to the loan might fail the interrogation and investigation and consequently refrain from lending money to those who need a loan.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

“But if that is so,”

since you said that the Sages instituted that the witnesses in monetary cases are not to be examined and interrogated, the judges in the court are deprived of the ability to ascertain the truth by means of examining and interrogating the witnesses,