Sanhedrin 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

Why should we not believe her? “

For if she wished

she could have burned it.”

As above.

And Rav Naḥman answers him:

Since

this document

was established in the court,

it had already been brought before the court, and they had written “hanpak” on it. This is the court’s confirmation that the document is valid and not forged; therefore,

we do not say, “If she wished, she could have burned it,”

as her claim cannot annul an act of the court.

Rava continues to challenge him: she should be believed by the law of a shlish, a trusted third party. That is, since both parties—the lender and the borrower—acknowledge that they delivered the document into her hands in her capacity as a “third party,” accepted and trusted by both of them, the lender cannot come and challenge her credibility. Rava learns this from a beraita.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

We learned in a beraita:

A simpon,

a receipt, meaning a document that the lender writes for the borrower, stating that he has indeed repaid the debt, so that the document “breaks” the debt—

and the simpon is in the borrower’s possession, while the lender claims that it is invalid and that the document is forged—

if it is a simpon

that has upon it

the signature of

witnesses,

it is validated through its signatures,

they validate it as they validate all documents, by identifying the handwriting of the witnesses, and the document is valid.

The beraita continues:

And if

there are no witnesses upon it, and it emerged from the hand of a shlish,

and both parties, the lender and the borrower, acknowledge that he was appointed to be a “third party” between them, the document is valid, and this demonstrates the credibility of the shlish.

Or, if

the simpon

emerged after the completion of the document,

that is, the “receipt” was written within the loan document, after the signatures of the loan’s witnesses, the simpon

is valid,

since the loan document is in the lender’s possession, and if he had written a simpon in it, this proves that the lender authorized him to write a receipt.

In any event, this beraita explicitly states that the shlish is believed,

so evidently a shlish is credible?

A conclusive refutation of Rav Naḥman

(conclusive refutation).

The Gemara now returns to the law of our Mishna.

When

he arrived,

Rav Dimi

from Eretz Yisrael,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: He may always bring proof and overturn

the judgment,

until his claims are blocked,

and he has no further proof to bring,

and

afterward

he says: “Bring so-and-so and so-and-so, and let them testify for me.” [

This is the third case in our Mishna, in which the witnesses are near the court, and in this case even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel agrees that he may not bring them.]

And we challenge this:

This itself is difficult,

as this statement contradicts itself.

You said:

that he may bring proof until

his claims are blocked,

that is, until he says, “I have no further proofs.” Until then, he may bring as many proofs as he wishes, but after he says, “I have none,” he may no longer bring them—

and who holds this view? This law is

that of the Rabbis.

And then

further

you said:

When is he indeed no longer believed? If he says,

“Bring so-and-so and so-and-so, and let them testify for me,”

but as long as he has not said this, he may retract and bring proofs even after saying, “I have none.”

And who holds this view?

It follows the view of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

This is difficult: how can the statement contradict itself?

And if you would say

and attempt to explain that this tradition in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan

is entirely according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and

the statements do not contradict one another, but

he is explaining his statement—

Rabbi Yoḥanan intended his final words to explain himself:

what

did he mean when he said

“until his claims are blocked”?

Until he says

an entirely unacceptable claim, saying,

“Bring so-and-so and so-and-so,”

but if he did not say this, he may advance new claims even after he had already said, “I have none”—

another difficulty arises: How could Rabbi Yoḥanan say this, ruling in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

But Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with him, except for the cases of a guarantor, Sidon, and the final proof.

Thus Rabbi Yoḥanan does not rule in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel regarding the second law in our Mishna?

The Gemara answers and presents another version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.

Rather, when Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: He may always bring proof and overturn,

even if the court limited him to thirty days [and this is the “first proof,” regarding which the halakha was indeed decided in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel].

Until,

that is, when may he no longer return and bring proofs?

His claims are blocked, and

how are his claims blocked? If

they say to him, “Bring witnesses,” and he says, “I have none,”

witnesses,

“Bring proof,” and he says, “I have none,”

proof. [And this is the “final proof,” regarding which the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.]

Rabbi Yoḥanan did not innovate anything in these two rulings; the innovation appears in the continuation of his statement:

But

if ultimately

witnesses came from overseas,

from a distant land,

or his father’s leather satchel

a leather bag containing documents

was deposited in the possession of

another

person,

and he claims that he did not know of them and now wishes to bring them—

he may bring them and overturn the judgment.

The Gemara discusses another law: whether one litigant can compel the other to litigate at the beit ha-va'ad, a place where many Torah scholars gather and where there is an excellent court, meaning one with greater expertise.

When

he arrived,

Rav Dimi

from Eretz Yisrael,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

A difficult litigant,

who presses his fellow in court

and burdens his fellow,

one

of the litigants

says: “Let us litigate here,”

in the court of the city,

and the other says: “Let us go to the place of assembly,”

so that the aggressive litigant will be embarrassed before them.

We compel him, and he goes to the place of assembly.

Rabbi Elazar said before him,

before Rabbi Yoḥanan,

“My master!”

If one is owed a maneh by his fellow,

should he

spend a maneh

on travel expenses

for a maneh ?!

Rather, Rabbi Elazar holds:

we compel him, and he litigates in his own city.

It was also stated: Rav Safra said

(Rabbi Yoḥanan said): When two litigants become entrenched

and become difficult with one another

in court, one says: “Let us litigate here,” and the other says: “Let us go to the place of assembly,”—

we compel him, and he litigates in his own city.

Rav Safra further said:

And if he requires

the city court

to ask about something,

and they do not know the halakhic ruling—

they write

to the place of assembly [according to the version of the Rif: to the Great Court in Jerusalem]

and they send

from the place of assembly a halakhic opinion.

Rav Safra further said:

And if

the litigant

says, “Write and give me

an explanation

of the basis on which you judged me,”—

they write it and give it to him.

Rav Safra further said:

And the yevama follows the yavam to obtain her release

through ḥalitza, as will be explained.

The Gemara discusses this final ruling:

How far

must the yevama travel after the yavam?

Rabbi Ami said: Even from Tiberias to Sepphoris,

even though the scholarly academy of Tiberias is greater than that of Sepphoris, she follows him to Sepphoris.

Rav Kahana said: What is the verse

from which we derive this?

It is stated in the passage concerning ḥalitza (Deuteronomy 25):

“And the elders of his city shall call him,”

and we expound: “his city”

and not the elders of her city.

The Gemara returns to the case of two litigants who become entrenched in court, one saying, “Let us litigate here,” and the other saying, “Let us go to the place of assembly.”

Ameimar said: The halakha is that we compel him and he goes

to the place of assembly.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But Rabbi Elazar said: “We compel him, and he litigates in his own city,”

and he gave a reason for his ruling, and his reasoning is plausible: should he spend a maneh for a maneh?

And Ameimar answers:

These words,

the words of Rabbi Elazar, apply only

where he says to him

this

a borrower to a lender,

so that the lender should not spend a maneh for a maneh. But if

a lender

says this to the borrower, he may compel him, because:

“A borrower is a servant to the lender.” [

This is a verse in the Book of Proverbs.] And since he has become obligated to him like a servant to his master, he follows him.

The Gemara relates an incident concerning a lawsuit that was sent to Mar Ukva.

They sent word

from Tiberias in Eretz Yisrael

to Mar Ukva,

who was the presiding judge in Babylonia. This was the wording of their message:

“To the one whose radiance is like that of the son of Bitya!”

The message was addressed to Mar Ukva, whose face shone like that of Moses our teacher, whom Bitya, Pharaoh’s daughter, had raised—

A man named

Ukvan the Babylonian,

whose name indicated that he originated in Babylonia,

brought a case before us

and complained before us—the court of Tiberias. This was his complaint:

“Jeremiah, my brother, has taken away my way.”

He deprived me of the way of ordinary human beings, meaning that he castrated me. [Some explain: he did not treat me properly, having defrauded me in monetary matters.]

And they said [

say

to him

to Jeremiah, that he should reconcile with him;

they compelled him

they forced and compelled Jeremiah

“and let him appear before us”

here

in Tiberias

to litigate with his brother.”

And we challenge this: this incident is not understood.

This itself is difficult,

as it contains an internal contradiction—

You said: “They said [

say

to him,” evidently

meaning: ask Mar Ukva

“that you judge them,”

that Mar Ukva should judge them. Yet afterward they say to him:

“They compelled him and let him appear before us in Tiberias,” evidently

meaning that they asked Mar Ukva

“to send him here,”

to compel him to come to Tiberias.

And we answer:

Rather, this is what they said: “They said [

say

to him—

‘You judge them,’

let Mar Ukva judge them,

if he obeys,

if he heeds your ruling and accepts the judgment—

he has obeyed,

and everything will be settled peacefully.

But if he does not obey,

if Jeremiah is a recalcitrant litigant—

compel him and let him appear before us in Tiberias,

and we will judge him.

The Gemara offers another explanation of this incident.

Rav Ashi said: It was a case involving fines

between Ukvan the Babylonian and his brother Jeremiah,

and in Babylonia we do not judge cases involving fines [

because cases involving fines are judged only by a court of ordained judges, and there was no ordination in Babylonia], so in fact Mar Ukva could not judge them at all.

And the reason they sent him this message—

“Tell him” that he would apparently judge them—was

in order to show

honor to Mar Ukva

for his great wisdom and righteousness. That is, because of his stature he was fit to judge them, but the fact that he was in Babylonia prevented him from doing so; they wrote this as an expression of apology and honor.

We shall return to you, chapter “This One Chooses.”