Sanhedrin 31b — the Talmud in English

Rava said to Rav Nahman: And

why should we not believe her?

“For if she wished ![](pamud.bmp "

exact column location")

she could have burned it.”

As above.

And Rav Nahman answers him:

Since

this document

was established in court,

it had already been in court, and they wrote “hanpak” upon it, which is the court’s confirmation that the document is valid and is not forged—therefore,

“If she wished, she could have burned it” we do not say,

for this is not capable of nullifying an act of the court.

Rava continues to object: They should believe her by the law of a “third party.” That is, since both of them—the lender and the borrower—admit that they entrusted the document to her in the capacity of a “third party,” acceptable to them and trusted by them, the lender cannot come and challenge her credibility. And Rava learned this from a beraita.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman:

We learned in a beraita—

A simpon,

a “receipt,” which is a document that the lender writes to the borrower stating that he indeed repaid the debt, and the document “breaks” the debt—

and the simpon is in the borrower’s possession, while the lender claims that it is invalid and that the document is forged—

if it is a simpon

upon which there are

the signatures of

witnesses—

it shall be validated by its signatures,

they shall confirm it as with the confirmation of all documents: they identify the handwriting of the witnesses, and the document is valid.

The beraita continues:

And if

there are no witnesses upon it, and it came from the hand of a third party,

and both of them, the lender and the borrower, admit that he was appointed to be a “third party” between them, the document is valid, and this is the credibility of the “third party.”

Or, if

the simpon

came out after the completion of the document.

That is, the “receipt” is written inside the loan document, after the signatures of the witnesses to the loan—the simpon

is valid,

since the loan document is in the lender’s possession, and if a simpon was written in it, it is evident that the lender authorized him to write a receipt.

In any event, this beraita explicitly states that the “third party” has credibility,

evidently, a third party is trusted?

A refutation of Rav Nahman

(a refutation.)

Now the Gemara returns to the law of our Mishna.

When you

when

Rav Dimi

arrived from the Land of Israel,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: He may always bring proof and overturn

the judgment,

until his claims are closed off,

and he has no proof at all to bring,

and

afterward

he says: “Bring forward so-and-so and so-and-so, and let them testify for me” [

and this is the third law in our Mishna, in which the witnesses are found near the court, and in this case even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel agrees that he may not bring them].

And we object:

This itself is difficult,

this statement is difficult and contradicts itself internally.

You said:

that he may bring proof until

his claims are closed off,

and he says, “I have no further proofs,” and until then he may bring as many proofs as he wishes, but after he said, “I have none,” he may no longer bring them—

And who holds this? This law is

according to the Rabbis.

And then

and further

you said:

When is he indeed not believed, if he said:

“Bring forward so-and-so and so-and-so, and let them testify for me,”

but as long as he did not say this, he may return and bring proofs even though he said, “I have none.”

And who holds this?

We arrive at Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And it is difficult: how does he contradict himself internally?

And if you would say

and if you wish to force an interpretation and explain that this report in the name of Rabbi Yohanan is

entirely according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and

the statements do not contradict one another, but

he is explaining,

Rabbi Yohanan intended at the end of his words to explain himself:

what

is meant by his saying

“until his claims are closed off”—

until he says

a claim that is not accepted at all, for he says:

“Bring forward so-and-so and so-and-so,”

but if he did not say this, he may present new claims even though he had already said, “I have none.”

Another difficulty: how is it possible that Rabbi Yohanan would say this, ruling according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

But Rabbah bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught [a law] in our Mishna, the halakha is according to him, except for guarantor, Sidon, and the last proof.

It follows that Rabbi Yohanan does not rule according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the second law of our Mishna?

And the Gemara answers, and brings another version of Rabbi Yohanan’s statement.

Rather, when Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: He may always bring proof and overturn,

even if the court limited him to thirty days [and this is the “first proof,” for the halakha was indeed decided according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel].

Until,

that is, when does he not return and bring proofs?

His claims are closed off, and

how are his claims closed off? If

they say to him: “Bring witnesses,” and he says, “I have none,”

witnesses,

“Bring proof,” and he says, “I have no

proof.” [And this is the “last proof,” that the halakha is not according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.]

And in these two laws Rabbi Yohanan innovated nothing; the innovation is in the continuation of his words:

But

if in the end

witnesses came from overseas,

from a distant land,

or there was a leather bag

a leather sack containing documents

of his father deposited in the possession of

another

person,

and he claims that he did not know about them, and now he wishes to bring them—

he may bring them and overturn.

The Gemara discusses another law: whether one litigant can compel his fellow to litigate at the assembly of scholars, which is a place where many Torah scholars gather, where there is a fine court, that is, more expert judges.

When

when

Rav Dimi

arrived from the Land of Israel,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan:

A difficult litigant,

who overpowers his fellow in court

and troubles his fellow,

one

of the litigants

says: “Let us litigate here”

in the court of the city,

and one says: “Let us go to the assembly of scholars”

so that the one who overpowers him will be embarrassed before them.

They compel him, and he goes to the assembly of scholars.

Rabbi Elazar said before him,

before Rabbi Yohanan,

“Rabbi!”

One who has a creditor’s claim against his fellow for one hundred zuz,

does he

spend one hundred zuz

on travel expenses

for one hundred zuz?!

Rather,

Rabbi Elazar holds:

They compel him, and he litigates in his city.

It was also stated: Rav Safra said

(Rabbi Yohanan said): When two became obstinate

they became difficult toward one another

in court, one saying: “Let us litigate here,” and one saying: “Let us go to the assembly of scholars,”—

they compel him, and he litigates in his city.

And Rav Safra further said:

And if he needed

the court of the city

to ask about a matter,

and they do not know the ruling of the halakha—

they write

to the assembly of scholars [the version of the Rif: to the great court in Jerusalem]

and they send

from the assembly of scholars a halakhic opinion.

And Rav Safra further said:

And if he said,

the litigant,

“Write and give me

an explanation

of what reason you judged me”—

they write and give it to him.

And Rav Safra further said:

And the yevama follows the yavam to release her,

through halitza. As will be explained.

The Gemara discusses this last law:

How far

must the yevama go after the yavam?

Rabbi Ami said: Even from Tiberias to Sepphoris,

even though the academy of Tiberias is greater than that of Sepphoris, she follows him to Sepphoris.

Rav Kahana said: What is the verse

from which do we expound this?

It is stated in the section of halitza (Deuteronomy 24):

“And the elders of his city shall call him,”

and we expound “his city”

and not the elders of her city.

The Gemara returns to the case of two who became obstinate in court, one saying, “Let us litigate here,” and one saying, “Let us go to the assembly of scholars.”

Ameimar said: The halakha! They compel him and he goes

to the assembly of scholars.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But Rabbi Elazar said: They compel him, and he litigates in his city,

and he gave a reason for his words, and his reason is reasonable: does he spend one hundred zuz on one hundred zuz?

And Ameimar answers:

These words,

the words of Rabbi Elazar are stated only

where he says to him

so

a borrower to a lender,

and the lender should not spend one hundred zuz on one hundred zuz; but if

a lender

says so to a borrower, he can compel him, because:

“A borrower is a servant to the lender.” [

And this is a verse in the Book of Proverbs.] And since he became obligated to him like a servant to his master, he follows him.

The Gemara relates an incident concerning a case that they sent to Mar Ukva.

They sent to him

from Tiberias in the Land of Israel

to Mar Ukva,

who was the head of the court in Babylonia. And this is what was stated in the message:

“To the one whose radiance is like the son of Batya!”

The message was addressed to Mar Ukva, whose facial radiance shone like that of Moses our teacher, whom Batya, Pharaoh’s daughter, raised—

A certain man whose name was

Ukvan the Babylonian,

that is, whose origin was from Babylonia,

complained before us,

he complained before us—the court of Tiberias—and this was his complaint:

“Jeremiah, my brother, caused me to lose the way.”

He deprived me of the way of human beings, meaning: he castrated me. [And some explain: he did not treat me properly, for he robbed me in monetary dealings].

And they said [

say]

to him,

to Jeremiah, to make peace with him,

they compelled him

they forced and obligated Jeremiah

“and let him see our face”

here

in Tiberias

to litigate with his brother.”

And we object: This incident is not understandable,

this itself is difficult,

there is an internal contradiction—

You said: “They said” [

say]

to him; evidently,

its meaning is: ask him

“that you should judge them”

that Mar Ukva should judge them, whereas afterward they say to him:

“They compelled him, and let him see our face in Tiberias”; evidently,

its meaning is that they asked Mar Ukva

“send him here”,

that he should force him to come to Tiberias.

And we answer:

Rather, this is what they said: “They said” [

say]

to him—

“You judge them,

let Mar Ukva judge them,

if he obeys,”

if he listens to you and accepts the judgment—

he obeys,

and everything will come peacefully to its proper place,

but if he does not obey,

if Jeremiah is a recalcitrant litigant—

“compel him, and let him see our face in Tiberias,

and we shall judge him.

The Gemara offers another explanation of this incident.

Rav Ashi said: It was a case of fines,

between Ukvan the Babylonian and his brother Jeremiah,

and in Babylonia we do not judge cases of fines [

for cases of fines are judged only by courts of ordained judges, and in Babylonia there is no ordination], and in truth Mar Ukva could not judge them at all.

And this that they sent to him thus: “Tell him,”

that is, as though he should judge them, was

in order to accord

honor to Mar Ukva

for his great wisdom and righteousness. That is, because of his greatness he was worthy to judge them, but the fact that he was in Babylonia prevented him, and they wrote this as an expression of apology and honor.

The way is upon you, chapter “This One Chooses.”