Sanhedrin 31a (לא.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Are you raising a contradiction from one person against another?!

Are you raising an objection from the words of Rav Hisda against the words of Rav Yehuda?

Rav Yehuda disagrees with Rav Hisda and maintains that in capital cases, if one witness says that the defendant’s garments were black and the other says that they were white, the testimony is disqualified. And he comes to teach us that in an analogous case involving monetary law—if one says that the purse was black and the other says that it was white—their testimony is valid.

The Nehardeans say: Even if one says, “A black maneh,” and the other says, “A white maneh,” they join together

as a single testimony.

The Gemara explains the statement of the Nehardeans.

As

As

whom

did the Nehardeans state this opinion?

If you say:

In accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha,

who maintains that if both witnesses testify concerning an obligation of one maneh, they join together—

This is not comparable to the ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha. For—

Say that you have heard Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha

say that they join together only

where they do not contradict one another,

where the witnesses do not “contradict” one another: The witness who says that it occurred on Sunday is not saying that on Monday he did not see what the other witness saw. Rather, each one testifies about what he saw, and since an obligation of one maneh emerges from the testimony of both of them, it is possible to combine their testimony—

But

where they do contradict one another,

where they contradict each other, and the witness who speaks of the black item says that it was black and not white, thereby contradicting the other witness,

who said

that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha would maintain that they join together?! Surely there is a valid distinction between these two halakhot.

And we answer:

Rather, he,

the Nehardean,

stated his opinion in accordance with this tanna,

like this tanna.

As it was taught:

The tanna of the Mishna (Nazir 20a) says: In the case of one about whom two sets of witnesses testify: These testify that he took a nazirite vow for two terms, and those testify that he took a nazirite vow for five terms, Beit Shammai say: The testimony is divided, and there is no naziriteship here. And Beit Hillel say: Two is included within five; he is a nazirite for two terms.

And in the beraita, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar disagrees with the tanna of the Mishna.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning two sets of witnesses, one of which says two hundred and the other of which says one hundred,

and Beit Shammai agree that their testimony is not divided, since

one hundred is included within two hundred—

one hundred

: Regarding one hundred, there are two sets of witnesses who do not contradict one another; their contradiction concerns only the second hundred.

With regard to what did they disagree?

With regard to one set,

where one of the witnesses says one hundred and the other says two hundred.

As Beit Shammai say: Their testimony is divided,

one of the witnesses is lying, and there is no valid testimony here.

And Beit Hillel say:

They combine them for testimony concerning that one hundred,

because

two hundred includes

one hundred.

And the Nehardeans hold in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. Therefore, they maintain that it is possible to combine even a black maneh and a white maneh.

Until this point, the Gemara explained the case of two witnesses who contradict one another concerning the sum of the money, or concerning black and white. Now the Gemara discusses a barrel of wine and a barrel of oil.

One

witness says: “

I heard that he admitted to him

a barrel of wine,” and the other says: “

I heard that he admitted to him

a barrel of oil.”

Is this contradictory testimony?

The sides of the uncertainty are as follows: It is possible to say that this is a contradiction, since they are two different types of substance, or perhaps it is not.

An incident occurred

like this,

and

the litigants came to litigate

before

before

Rabbi Ami.

Rav Ami combined their testimony and obligated him to pay, but not a barrel of oil, which is more expensive than wine. Rather,

Rabbi Ami obligated him to pay him a barrel of wine

a barrel of wine

from a barrel of oil,

from a barrel of oil.

That is, he compared it to the case of one hundred and two hundred, where it is explained that he gives him one hundred, because one hundred is included within two hundred. So here, too, he held that wine is included within oil.

And we ask:

Like whom,

to which ruling did he compare it?

If you say that he held that oil and wine are comparable

to

the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar according to Beit Hillel, that in the case of one hundred and two hundred their testimony is combined concerning one hundred—

This is not comparable to that. For—

Say

: When

did Rabbi

Shimon

ben Elazar

say this? Only

where one hundred is included within two hundred,

and the testimony is combined concerning the “one hundred,” since it is the same type of thing.

But

in a case such as this, who said so?!

These are two different types of substance, and what one witness testifies is contradicted by the other witness; how, then, did Rabbi Ami combine them?

And we answer:

No,

the case is not one in which the witnesses testified about an admission of oil and wine, for in that case the testimony would indeed be void. Rather,

it is necessary

that the incident was

concerning their monetary value—

the value of oil and wine. One witness testified that he admitted owing him the value of a barrel of oil, and the other testified that he admitted owing him the value of a barrel of wine. In this case, Rav Ami obligated him to pay the value of wine, as in the case of one hundred and two hundred.

The Gemara discusses another law. Two witnesses testified concerning a loan of one hundred, but they disagreed about the place of the loan [and it is not a matter of entirely different places, since in that case it would unquestionably have the status of contradictory testimony, as they contradicted one another in the examinations and could not establish a claim of conspiring witnesses, but rather different places within the same location].

One

witness says: “

I saw that he lent him one hundred

on the upper gallery” [

a gallery projecting into the public domain across the width of the house, beneath which the people of the public domain pass], and the other says:

“On the lower gallery.”

The question is whether they combine their testimony.

Rabbi Hanina said: An incident

like this

came before Rabbi, and he combined their testimony.

This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who maintains that testimony that contradicts itself in examinations remains valid.

We learned in our Mishna:

And from where is it derived that when he leaves, etc.

The Sages taught: From where

do we learn this halakha?

When he leaves,

the judge leaves the court,

he may not say

to the litigant who left obligated by the judgment:

“I am acquitting you, while my colleagues are obligating you; but what can I do, since my colleagues outnumber me?”

The verse states: “You shall not go about as a talebearer among your people.” And

another verse

states: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals a secret.”

And the Gemara relates:

There was a certain student—

one student—

about whom a rumor went out,

a rumor spread about him,

that

he

revealed a matter—

he revealed matters, that is, words of slander—

that had been said in the study hall,

which had been stated in the beit-midrash.

After twenty-two years,

Rav Ami

expelled him from the study hall,

because

he said: “This man

reveals

reveals secrets.”

He reveals secrets.

Mishna:

Our Mishna deals with one for whom the court issued its judgment and found him liable, and afterward he found witnesses or evidence in his favor that he did not possess at the time of the judgment. The question is whether he may bring them and have the judgment reopened. There are several cases in this halakha.

Whenever he brings evidence—

he overturns the judgment,

and the court will adjudicate his case anew; if they acquit him, he is acquitted.

A.

The court said

to him [or the text reads:

“They said

—the judges—

to him: Bring any evidence that you have

—

from now until thirty days.”

He found [

the version of the Bach:

“He brought”]

within thirty days—

he overturns

the judgment. But if he brought it

after thirty days—

he does not overturn

it. These are the words of the Sages. And the reason is, that they are concerned that perhaps he is bringing false witnesses or forged a document, since he did not bring them earlier.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What can this person do,

the litigant,

who did not find [them] within thirty days, but found [them] after thirty days?

And according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, he may bring them.

B.

The court said [

“They said”]

to him: “Bring witnesses.” And he said

—

the litigant—“I have no witnesses.” They said [

“They said”]

to him:

“Bring evidence,” and he said

—

the litigant—“I have no evidence.” And after some time he brought evidence and found witnesses—

This is of no consequence,

since he said, “I have none,” we are concerned that perhaps he forged the evidentiary document or hired false witnesses. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What can this person do, who did not know that he had witnesses and found witnesses,

or

did not know that he had evidence and found evidence.

And according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, he may bring them. His statement that he had no witnesses was because that was what he believed; now it has become known to him that he indeed has them.

C.

A litigant saw

that he was about to be found liable in the judgment, and said:

“Bring close [

bring closer]

so-and-so and so-and-so,”

who were near the court,

“and let them testify for me.” Or he took out

a document

of evidence from beneath his afundata,

his belt—

With regard to this halakha, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel agrees with the Sages, who maintain:

“This is of no consequence.”

Since he knew about them, why did he not bring them earlier? This indicates that they were liars, and that he thought he would not need them and was afraid to bring them; once he saw that he had been found liable, he brought them. Therefore, this is of no consequence.

Gemara:

In the first clause of the Mishna, we learned the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Sages, where the court limited him to thirty days in which to bring his evidence. The Sages maintain that he may not bring it after thirty days, while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that he may bring it.

Concerning

this halakha, Rabba bar Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel,

since he did not say, “I have none,” he may bring them after thirty days, because: “What can this person do, who did not find them within thirty days but found them after thirty days?”

And

further

Rabba bar Rav Huna said

concerning this halakha:

The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Sages.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious, since he said

Rabba bar Rav Huna:

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,” we know automatically,

it is known by itself,

that the halakha is not in accordance with the Sages;

what need was there to teach us this?

And we answer: If he had taught us only that the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

it might be said

that one would understand

these words

—

initially: If the court found him liable, and after thirty days he found and brought witnesses who exempted him, the ruling would be in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

But after the fact,

if the court did not rule in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but in accordance with the Sages, and did not allow him to bring his evidence, obligating him to pay, and he paid—

it is perfectly acceptable,

and they would not return his money to him.

Therefore,

this comes to teach us

that Rabba stated with particular emphasis, “The halakha is not in accordance with the Sages,” to teach us that even

if he acted

in accordance with the Sages,

we return it to him,

we reopen the judgment, and return his money to him.

We learned in our Mishna:

“He said to him, ‘Bring witnesses,’ etc.; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said, etc.”

In the second halakha [“subsequent evidence”], the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree when he said to the court, “I have no evidence,” and afterward found some. The Sages maintain that he may not bring it, while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that he may bring it.

Concerning this halakha,

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Sages,

since he said, “I have none,” we are concerned that he is now bringing false witnesses or forged evidence.

And

further

Rav bar Rav Huna said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious; since he said, “The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Sages,” we know automatically that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

—what need was there to teach us this?

And we explain:

this teaches us

Rabba teaches us

that

with regard to the halakha

of that

“last proof” [the second halakha of our Mishna], in which one presents proof after saying, “I have no [further proof],”

the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, whereas in all the others

in all the other cases,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

even where he disputes the Sages. And therefore Rabba stated with particular emphasis: “The halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.”

This conclusion is

to exclude

in contrast to

that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Every place where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught [a halakha] in our Mishna—

the halakha is in accordance with him, except for

these three halakhot:

a.

Arav

(Bava Batra 173b); b.

and Tzidan

(Gittin 74a); c.

and the last proof,

the second halakha of our Mishna.

But according to Rav Huna, the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel even with regard to Arav and Tzidan.

This halakha is stated with regard to the litigant himself, and the Gemara discusses his son.

A certain young child

a minor,

who was summoned to judgment before Rav Naḥman.

He said to him

Rav Naḥman said to the child: “

Do you have witnesses

do you have witnesses

? He said to him

the child said to Rav Naḥman:

“No.”

And he asked him again:

“Do you have proof,”

do you have proof?

He said to him: “No.”

Rav Naḥman found him liable.

He was crying

the child was crying

and continued

and continued to cry.

Certain people heard him

people heard his crying.

They said to him

the people said to the child: “

We

we

know

know

your father’s affairs

your father’s affairs, and we will come to establish your right.”

Rav Naḥman said:

Although the halakha was decided in accordance with the Sages, who maintain that if one said, “I have no [further proof],” he may not bring new proofs,

in this case

in the case before us,

even the Sages concede,

and he may bring them, because

a young child does not know his father’s affairs,

and therefore he said, “I have no [proof].” There is no concern here that he was lying; rather, he truly did not know, and now he learned from others that he had proofs.

The Gemara relates another incident.

A certain woman

that woman,

from beneath whose hand a document emerged

a loan document emerged from her possession; that is, she was holding a document that did not belong to her, and claimed that the lender and the borrower had given it to her for safekeeping.

She said to him

to the lender:

“I know concerning this document

I know this document,

that it had been paid

that the borrower had already repaid it.”

The lender denied this, and they came to litigate before Rav Naḥman.

He believed her,

he accepted her testimony,

Rav Naḥman.

As will be explained.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: In accordance with whom

in accordance with whose words do you believe her—

with

the words of

Rabbi, who said: “Documents are acquired through delivery.”

When one sells “documents,” meaning a debt document, and the buyer acquires the document and the debt recorded in it, so that the borrower will repay him, through what act of acquisition does the seller transfer the document?

The Sages maintain: “Documents are acquired through a document,” meaning that the seller must write another document, a deed of sale, in which it is written that he sells him the debt; and if he does not write such a document for him, the buyer acquires only the paper and not the debt.

Rabbi maintains: He need not write another document; rather, the very act of “delivery” from his hand to the buyer’s hand is the act of acquisition.

In this incident, the woman did not have a deed of sale to show that they had sold her the document. However, since the document was in her possession, it was evident that they had delivered it to her.

Accordingly, according to Rabbi, the debt document belonged to her, and she was therefore believed when she said that it had been paid. This explains why Rav Naḥman believed her. But according to the Sages, why did he believe her? What right did she have in the document?

Rava was astonished: Do you hold like Rabbi?!

He said to him

Rav Naḥman said to Rava:

The case here is different

there is a special reason to believe her, because

if she had wanted

if she had wanted to deprive the lender—

she could have burned it,

she could have burned the document, and the lender would have been deprived in any event. Why, then, would she lie? Therefore she should be believed.

The Gemara brings another version of this incident and of the exchange between Rav Naḥman and Rava.

Some say: Rav Naḥman did not believe her.