Sanhedrin 31a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Are you raising a contradiction from one person against another?!

Are you challenging the words of Rav Hisda with the words of Rav Yehuda?

Rav Yehuda disagrees with Rav Hisda and holds that in capital cases, when one says, “His garments were black,” and the other says, “They were white,” the testimony is invalid; and he comes to inform us that in a similar case, in monetary cases, concerning a black purse and a white one, their testimony stands.

The Nehardeans say: Even when one says, “A black maneh,” and one says, “A white maneh,” they join together

for one testimony.

The Gemara explains the words of the Nehardeans.

As

As

whom

did the Nehardeans say this?

If you say:

In accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa,

who holds that if both of them testify concerning an “obligation” of a maneh, they join together—

This is not similar to the law of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa. For—

Say that you heard Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa say

when did he state his ruling that they join together? Only

where they do not contradict one another

where the witnesses do not “contradict” one another: the witness who says that it was on the first day of the week does not say that on the second day of the week he did not see what the other witness saw; rather, each one testifies concerning what he saw, and since an obligation of a maneh emerges from both of them, it is possible to join their testimony—

But

where they contradict one another,

where they contradict one another, and the witness concerning the black one says that it was black and not white, and according to his words the other witness is contradicted,

who said

that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa would hold that they join together?! Surely there is a proper distinction between these two laws.

And we answer:

Rather, he

the Nehardean

who stated in accordance with this tanna,

like this tanna.

For it was taught:

The tanna of the Mishna (Nazir 20a) says: If there were two groups of witnesses testifying against him, these testify that he took a nazirite vow for two [terms], and those testify that he took a nazirite vow for five [terms], Beit Shammai say: The testimony is divided, and there is no nazirite status here. And Beit Hillel say: Two are included within five; he shall be a nazirite for two [terms].

And in the beraita Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar disagrees with the tanna of the Mishna.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning two groups of witnesses, one of which says two hundred and the other says one hundred,

and Beit Shammai concede that their testimony is not divided, since

one hundred is included within two hundred—

one hundred,

there are two groups of witnesses concerning one maneh, who do not contradict one another, and their contradiction concerns only the second maneh.

Over what did they disagree?

Concerning one group,

with one of the witnesses saying one hundred and the other two hundred.

For Beit Shammai say: Their testimony is divided, and

one of the witnesses is a liar, and there is no testimony here.

And Beit Hillel say:

They join them for testimony concerning that same one hundred,

because there is

within two hundred—

one hundred.

And the Nehardeans hold in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar; therefore, they hold that it is possible to join even a black maneh and a white maneh.

Until here the Gemara explained a case of two witnesses who contradict one another concerning the sum of the money, or concerning black and white. Now the Gemara discusses a barrel of wine and a barrel of oil.

One

witness says: “

I heard that he admitted to him

a barrel of wine,” and one says: “

I heard that he admitted to him

a barrel of oil.”

Are they contradicted testimony?

The sides of the uncertainty are that it is possible to say that this is a contradiction, since they are two species, or not.

There was an incident

like this,

and there came

the litigants to litigate

before

before

Rabbi Ami.

Rav Ami joined their testimony and obligated him to pay, but not a barrel of oil, which is more expensive than wine; rather,

Rabbi Ami obligated him to pay him a barrel of wine

a barrel of wine

from a barrel of oil

from a barrel of oil.

That is, he compared it to one maneh and two hundred, concerning which it is explained that he gives him one hundred, because one hundred is included within two hundred. So he held that wine is included within oil.

And we raise a difficulty:

Like whom,

did he consider it analogous to which law—

If you say: He held that oil and wine are similar

to

the law of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar according to Beit Hillel, that in the case of one maneh and two hundred they join their testimony concerning one maneh?!

This is not similar to that. For—

Say,

when

Rabbi said

Shimon

ben Elazar,

only

where one hundred is included within two hundred,

and they join the testimony concerning the “one hundred,” because it is the same species.

But

in such a case, who said so?!

They are two species, and what this one testifies is contradicted by the other witness; how did Rabbi Ami join them?

And we answer:

No,

it is not speaking of witnesses who testified concerning an admission of oil and wine, for then the testimony would indeed be invalid; rather,

it is necessary,

the incident was

concerning their value,

the value of oil and wine: one testified that he admitted to him the value of a barrel of oil, and the other testified that he admitted to him the value of a barrel of wine, and concerning this Rav Ami obligated him to pay the value of wine, as in the case of one maneh and two hundred.

The Gemara discusses another law. Two witnesses testified concerning a loan of one hundred, except that they disagreed about the place of the loan [and it is not speaking of entirely different places, for then, without doubt, its law would be that of contradicted testimony, since they were contradicted in the inquiries and would not be able to bring about a case of conspiring witnesses; rather, it concerns different places within the same place].

One

witness says: “

I saw that he lent him one hundred

on the upper gallery” [

a projection extending into the public domain across the width of the house, beneath which the inhabitants of the public domain pass] and the other says:

“On the lower gallery.”

And the question is whether they join their testimony.

Rabbi Ḥanina said: There was an incident

like this

that came before Rabbi. And he joined their testimony.

In accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who holds that testimony that contradicts itself in examinations remains valid testimony.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And from where, when he leaves, and so forth.”

The Sages taught: From where

do we learn this law?

When he leaves

the judge from the court,

he should not say

to the litigant who has left obligated in the judgment:

“I declare you exempt, but my colleagues obligate you; yet what can I do, since my colleagues outnumbered me.”

The verse states: “You shall not go about as a talebearer among your people.” And it

further

says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals a secret.”

And the Gemara relates:

That one student

one student

about whom a voice went out

a rumor went out about him,

that he

was

revealed a matter

revealed things—words of slander—

that had been stated in the house of study,

that had been said in the house of study,

after twenty-two years,

after twenty-two years,

Rav Ami expelled him from the house of study,

Rav Ami took him out of the house of study, because

he said: This is

this man

reveals secrets,

reveals secrets.

Mishna:

Our Mishna deals with one for whom the court issued its judgment and who was found liable, and afterward found witnesses or evidence in his favor that he did not have at the time of the judgment, and whether he may bring them and reverse the judgment. And this law has several forms.

Whenever he brings evidence—

he overturns the judgment,

and the court will judge him anew, and if they exempt him, he is exempt.

A.

The

court [or we may read

“they said”,

the judges]

said to him: “Bring all the evidence that you have

them

from now until thirty days.”

He found [

the version of the Bayit Hadash:

“He brought”]

within thirty days—

he overturns

the judgment. But if he brought it

after thirty days—

he does not overturn it;

these are the words of the Sages. And the reason, is that they are concerned that perhaps he is bringing false witnesses or forged a document, since he did not bring them earlier.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What shall this person do

the litigant,

who did not find [them] within thirty days, but found [them] after thirty days?

And according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, he may bring them.

B.

He said [

“They said”]

to him: “Bring witnesses.” And he said

the litigant: “

I have no witnesses.” He said [

“They said”]

to him:

“Bring evidence,” and he said

the litigant:

“I have no evidence.” And after some time he brought evidence and found witnesses—

This amounts to nothing,

since he said, “I have none,” they are concerned that perhaps he forged the evidentiary document or hired false witnesses. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What shall this person do, who did not know that he had witnesses and found witnesses,

or

did not know that he had evidence and found evidence.

And according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, he may bring them. And what he said, that he had no witnesses, was because that is what he thought, and now it became known to him that he indeed has them.

C.

A litigant saw

the litigant

that he was becoming liable in the judgment, and said: “Bring near [

bring near]

so-and-so and so-and-so

who are nearby, close to the court,

and let them testify to me.” Or he brought out

a document

of evidence from beneath his apundeta

his belt—

In this law Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel agrees with the Sages, who hold:

“This amounts to nothing.”

Since he knew about them, why did he not bring them earlier? It indicates that they are liars, and he thought he would not need them and was afraid to bring them; and when he saw that he had become liable, he brought them. Therefore, it amounts to nothing.

Gemara:

In the first clause of the Mishna we learned the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Sages, when the court limited him to thirty days for bringing his evidence. The Sages hold that he cannot bring it after thirty days, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that he may bring it.

Concerning

this, Rabbah bar Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel,

since he did not say, “I have none,” he may bring it after thirty days, because “what shall this person do, who did not find within thirty days but found after thirty days?”

And

further

Rabbah bar Rav Huna said

concerning this law:

The halakha is not in accordance with the words of the Sages.

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious; since he said

Rabbah bar Rav Huna:

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,” we know automatically,

it is known by itself,

that the halakha is not in accordance with the Sages;

what need is there to inform us of this?

And we answer: If he had informed us only that the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

what might you say

would have been understood to say:

“These words”—

initially,

if the court had found him liable and after thirty days he found and brought witnesses who exempted him, as the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

But after the fact,

if the court did not rule in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but in accordance with the Sages, and did not let him bring his evidence, and obligated him to pay, and he paid—

it is fine,

and they would not return his money to him.

Therefore,

he teaches us

Rabbah, with extra emphasis, “The halakha is not in accordance with the Sages,” to inform us that even

if he acted

in accordance with the Sages,

we return it to him,

they reverse the judgment, and return his money to him.

We learned in our Mishna:

“He said to him, ‘Bring witnesses,’ and so forth; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said, and so forth.”

In the second law [“the later evidence”], the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree if he said to the court, “I have no evidence,” and afterward found it. The Sages hold that he cannot bring it, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that he may bring it.

Concerning this law

Rabbah bar Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with the words of the Sages,

since he said, “I have no evidence,” they are concerned that now he is bringing false witnesses or forged evidence.

And

further

Rav bar Rav Huna said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious; since he said, “The halakha is in accordance with the words of the Sages,” we know automatically that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Shimon;

what need is there to inform us of this?

And we answer:

this teaches us

Rava informs us

that

in the halakha

that

of “the last proof” [the second halakha of our Mishna], in which he brings a proof after he said, “I have none,”

there is no halakha according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but in all of them

in all the other cases

the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

even in a place where he disagrees with the Sages. And therefore Rava said with extra emphasis: “There is no halakha according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.”

This conclusion is

to exclude

in opposition

from what Rabbah bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

Every place where Rabban ben Gamliel taught in our Mishna—

the halakha is like him, except for

these three halakhot:

a.

The guarantor (

Bava Batra 173b); b.

and Zidon (

Gittin 74a); c.

and the last proof,

the second halakha of our Mishna.

But according to Rav Huna, the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel even with regard to the guarantor and Zidon.

This halakha is stated with regard to the litigant himself, and the Gemara discusses his son.

That young boy,

a minor,

who was summoned to judgment before Rav Nahman.

He said to him,

Rav Nahman said to the minor: “

Do you have witnesses

do you have witnesses

? He said to him

the minor said to Rav Nahman:

“No.”

And he asked him again:

“Do you have proof?”

do you have proof

?

Rav Nahman obligated him .

He was crying

the minor was crying

and going

and continued crying.

Those people heard him

people heard his crying.

They said to him

the people said to the minor: “

We

we

know

know

about your father’s affairs

about your father’s affairs, and we shall come to establish your right.”

Rav Nahman said:

Although the halakha was decided according to the Sages, that if one said, “I have none,” he may not bring new proofs,

in this

in the case before us

even the Rabbis agree,

and he may bring them, because

a young boy does not know about his father’s affairs,

and therefore he said, “I have none,” and there is no concern here that he is lying; rather, he indeed did not know, and now he learned from others that he has proofs.

The Gemara relates another incident.

That woman

that woman

from beneath whose hand a document emerged

from whose possession a loan document emerged—that is, she held a document that was not hers, and she claimed that the lender and the borrower had given it to her to safeguard.

She said to him

she said to the lender: “

I know about this document

I know this document

that it had been paid

that the borrower had already repaid it.”

And the lender denied it, and they came to litigate before Rav Nahman.

He believed her

he believed her

Rav Nahman.

As will be explained.

Rava said to Rav Nahman: According to whom

according to whose words are you believing her; is it

according to

the words of

Rabbi, who said: “Documents are acquired through delivery”.

When one sells “documents” to his fellow—that is, a debt document—and the purchaser acquires the document and the debt written in it, and the borrower will repay him: through what act of acquisition does the seller transfer the document?

The Sages hold: “Documents are acquired through a document,” that is, the seller must write another document, a deed of sale, in which it is written that he sells him the debt; and without writing a document for him, he acquired only the paper, but not the debt.

Rabbi holds: He need not write another document; rather, the very “delivery” from his hand to his hand is the “act of acquisition.”

Now, in this incident, the woman did not have a deed of sale to show that they had sold the document to her; rather, since the document was in her possession, it was evident that they had delivered it to her.

And from now, according to Rabbi, the debt document belongs to her; therefore she is believed to say that it was paid , and therefore it is explained why Rav Nahman believed her. But according to the Sages, why did he believe her? What right does she have in the document?

And Rava wondered: Do you hold like Rabbi?!

He said to him

Rav Nahman said to Rava:

It is different here

here there is a special reason to believe her, because

if she wished

if she had wished to deprive the lender

she could have destroyed it,

she could have burned the document, and the lender would be deprived in any event; so why would she lie? Therefore she is to be believed.

The Gemara brings another version of this incident, and of the dispute between Rav Nahman and Rava.

There are those who say: Rav Nahman did not believe her.