Sanhedrin 30b (ל:) — the Talmud in English

And in order to explain their dispute concerning “he read,” we must first state:

and

say:

Everyone—

both the first tanna and Rabbi Natan—hold

in accordance with the Rabbis who dispute Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa

and maintain that the “seeing of the testimony” must take place together, as they expounded from the singular wording, “and he is a witness.”

Here, however,

with regard to “giving testimony,”

they dispute whether testimony is juxtaposed to seeing;

that is, they dispute whether we derive the law of giving testimony from the law of seeing through a hekesh, since seeing and giving testimony are written in the same verse—

One—

the first tanna—

holds: We juxtapose giving testimony to seeing;

just as the seeing of the testimony must take place together, so too the giving of testimony must take place together.

And

if

the other—

Rabbi Natan—

holds: We do not juxtapose them,

then even if the Torah requires that the seeing of the testimony take place together, it is not necessary that the giving of testimony take place together.

The Gemara recounts an incident to clarify whose view is the halakha: whether it follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa or the Rabbis who dispute him.

Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim was assiduously striving

to wait for, seek out, and pursue

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, in order to ordain him,

meaning that their master, Rabbi Yoḥanan, should “ordain” Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,

but the matter did not come to fruition,

and he did not succeed in doing so.

One day,

one day,

he was sitting [

the version of the Yad Ramah reads

they were sitting]

Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina

before Rabbi Yoḥanan,

in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s presence.

He said to them,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to his students:

Is there

among you

one who knows

how to answer—whether

the halakha follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, or not,

but rather follows the Rabbis?

Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim said to him,

to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

This one knows—

this one, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, knows.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim:

Let him say it !

Let him speak!

He said to him,

Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim said to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Let my master ordain him first,

let my master ordain him beforehand!

He ordained him,

he ordained him.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

My son! Tell me! How did you hear it?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

This is what I heard: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa concedes to Rabbi Natan,

for just as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa does not require the seeing of the testimony to take place together, so too he does not require the giving of testimony to take place together.

He said,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Did I need this information?!

Was this what I needed to know?! Surely this is obvious—

now,

let us reason:

And if the “primary

element of testimony is

seeing,

which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said need not take place together,

it need not be together,

then as for

giving testimony, which is not the “primary” element of testimony,

is it necessary

to inform us that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa holds that it need not take place together?! [I did not need to ask what Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa holds regarding “giving testimony”; rather, the question was whether the halakha concerning the seeing of testimony follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa or the Rabbis.]

Nevertheless, although he had not resolved his doubt for him,

he said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

Since you have ascended,

to the lofty level of being “ordained”—

do not descend!

When Rabbi Zeira heard this incident,

Rabbi Zeira said: Learn from this: Once a great man has been ordained, he remains ordained .

The Gemara continues to discuss whether the halakha follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav said: The halakha follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa both with regard to

testimony concerning

land,

where one witness testifies that the owner admitted in his presence that this land belonged to him, and a second witness testifies likewise,

and with regard to

testimony concerning

movable property,

where one witness testifies that the person lent him one hundred dinars in his presence, and a second witness testifies likewise. Although there is room to distinguish between land and movable property, as will be explained, no distinction is made; the halakha follows him both with regard to land and with regard to movable property.

Ulla said: The halakha follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land,

since the land is before us and both witnesses testify concerning it; both are testifying about one testimony, and the testimony combines them,

but not with regard to movable property, [

that is, money or movable property that can be exchanged,] since regarding the “one hundred dinars” about which this witness testifies, the other does not testify; their testimonies are two separate testimonies.

Ulla’s words imply that the Rabbis dispute Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa both with regard to land and with regard to movable property. Rather, Ulla ruled—in accordance with his own view—that the halakha follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land, but does not follow him [and follows the Rabbis] with regard to movable property.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this from the statements of amoraim who maintain that the Rabbis never disputed Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land, and agree that the witnesses combine.

Abaye said to

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin, concerning his report in the name of Ulla:

“The halakha”

follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa—

by inference, they dispute

him; the Rabbis dispute him!

But Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to testimony concerning land,

and they never disputed him.

And

further,

Rav Idi bar Avin taught in

the tractate

Nezikin of the school of Karna,

where the amora named Karna taught:

The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa

with regard to these laws:

a.

With regard to testimony concerning a firstborn animal.

A firstborn of a kosher animal becomes holy with firstborn sanctity automatically from the time of its birth, even though it was not verbally consecrated. Even nowadays, when it is not offered as a sacrifice, sanctity applies to it, and it is given to the priests.

Even the priests are forbidden to slaughter it until it develops a blemish—one of the blemishes that disqualify a sacrifice and remove it from sacrificial status. Therefore, the priests were suspected of intentionally inflicting a blemish on it, and the Sages prohibited slaughtering a firstborn animal until the priest brought two witnesses who testified that they saw that it had developed a blemish on its own, without the priest’s causing it.

If he brought one witness who testified that he saw it develop one particular blemish on its own, and another witness who testified that he saw it develop a different blemish, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that the two witnesses combine to permit the firstborn animal to be slaughtered.

b.

And with regard to testimony concerning land,

as explained above, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

c.

And with regard to testimony establishing possession,

one who brings two witnesses who testify that they saw him occupying another’s land for three years need not prove with a document his claim that he purchased the land or received it as a gift.

If he brings one witness who testifies concerning three years, and another witness who testifies concerning three other years, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that the two witnesses combine to establish the three-year presumption of ownership.

d.

And likewise with regard to a son and a daughter,

a son and a daughter are considered “adults” for all Torah laws when two pubic hairs appear on their bodies. Witnesses are required to testify to this.

If one witness testified that he saw hair in one particular place on the body, and a second witness testified concerning another place, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that the two witnesses combine to establish that the son and daughter are “adults.”

In all these cases, the reason the Rabbis concede is that although the testimony of the two witnesses is separate, nevertheless they testify concerning one thing: the firstborn animal on which a blemish developed “in it” on its own; the land concerning which the owner admitted that “this” belonged to him; the land that he occupied “for” three years; or “the son and daughter” who displayed signs of adulthood.

They dispute him only in the case where one says that the borrower borrowed one hundred dinars in his presence, and the second witness says likewise, since each witness testifies concerning a different hundred dinars.

These are the statements of Rabbi Abba and Rav Idi, who maintain that with regard to land the Rabbis did not dispute Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa. This poses a difficulty to Ulla, who maintains that they did dispute him?

The Gemara answers:

Are you challenging one man on the basis of another man?!

Can the words of one amora be refuted by the words of other amoraim?

One!

Ulla

holds: They dispute,

the Rabbis dispute him,

while the other

Rav Abba and Rav Idi

holds: They do not dispute,

and no contradiction can be raised between two amoraim.

Ulla stated that, with regard to a son and daughter, the testimony of two witnesses combines. The Gemara discusses this—

What does “with regard to a son and a daughter” mean?

What did the witnesses each see separately?

If you say

that one

witness

says: “I saw one hair

on her back

on the back of her hand, between the joints of her fingers,” and

another

witness says: “I saw one hair

on her abdomen”—

this is difficult. Is this called half a testimony? Surely

this is “half a matter” and half a testimony.

Each witness saw “half” of a matter, since the signs of adulthood consist of “two” hairs, whereas one hair is not a sign but half a sign. And even if we combine the witnesses to make them a single group, nevertheless this “group” does not testify concerning a complete sign.

The Gemara answers:

Rather,

one

witness says: “

I saw

two on her back,”

and another

witness

says: “

I saw

two on her abdomen.”

Each and every witness testifies concerning a “complete matter,” namely, that she is an adult; and when the two witnesses are combined, it emerges that “both” testified concerning a complete matter.

The Gemara continues to discuss whether the halakha follows the Rabbis or Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

Rav Yosef transmitted a different statement in the name of Rav and likewise in the name of Ulla. According to his account, on the contrary, Ulla said that the halakha follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa both with regard to land and with regard to movable property, whereas Rav said that the halakha follows him with regard to land but not with regard to movable property.

According to this account, there is another distinction between land and movable property: Granted, with regard to land, it is not necessary for both witnesses to see or hear together, since in addition to testifying concerning one thing, at the time they “give their testimony” in court they both know that they are testifying concerning one thing. Therefore, their “giving testimony” combines them into one group, and the verse “and he is a witness” can be expounded with regard to this, as was expounded above.

But with regard to movable property, even at the time they “give their testimony” in court, they are not testifying concerning “one hundred dinars”; neither their seeing nor their giving testimony is together. [Rather, they combine in the final calculation of the “court’s knowledge,” but this is not a combination of “testimony.”]

Rabbi Yosef said: I said

I stated

in the name of Ulla: The halakha follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa both with regard to land and with regard to movable property.

And the Rabbis who came

who came

from Meḥoza [

the name of a place]

said: Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav: With regard to land—

yes,

yes, the halakha follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa,

but not with regard to movable property

the halakha does not follow him.

The Gemara continues to explain Rav’s view.

Rav stated his ruling

in accordance with his own position,

in keeping with another statement that he made.

For Rav said:

a.

Admission after admission:

One witness says: “He admitted in my presence that he owed him one hundred dinars on Sunday,” and the second witness says: “He admitted in my presence that he owed him the one hundred dinars on Monday.”

And likewise—

b.

Admission after a loan:

One witness says: “He lent him one hundred dinars in my presence on Sunday,” and the second witness says: “He admitted in my presence that he owed him one hundred dinars on Monday”—

they combine,

the two witnesses combine to form one group and obligate him monetarily, since it is possible to say that both are testifying concerning the same one hundred dinars [as will be explained below].

But—

c.

A loan after a loan:

One witness says: “He lent him one hundred dinars in my presence on Sunday,” and the second witness says: “He lent him one hundred dinars in my presence on Monday.” And likewise—

d.

A loan after an admission:

One witness says: “He admitted in my presence that he owed him one hundred dinars on Sunday,” and the second witness says: “He lent him one hundred dinars in my presence on Monday”—

they do not combine,

since they are not testifying concerning the same one hundred dinars, because the hundred dinars that he lent him on Monday are not the same hundred dinars that he lent him or admitted owing him on Sunday.

Rav follows his own position and maintains that even if, from the two testimonies together, the court derives “arithmetic knowledge” that he indeed owes him one hundred dinars, this is insufficient to obligate him; the two witnesses must actually testify concerning “the same one hundred dinars.”

The Gemara explains the difference between the first two cases, in which Rav says that the witnesses combine, and the latter two, in which they do not combine.

He encountered

found

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua. He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna:

What is different

what distinguishes

a loan after a loan, which does not

which according to Rav does not combine, namely, because

the hundred dinars that this one saw,

the hundred dinars concerning which one witness says that he saw it,

this one did not see,

the second witness did not see; and likewise, the second witness did not see the hundred dinars of the first witness.

And what is different about admission after admission, which according to Rav does combine? Surely

this admission after admission, too,

is not clearly referring to the same hundred dinars, and it is possible that

concerning the hundred dinars

about which

he admits before this one

this witness—

did he not admit before that one?

What distinction, then, did Rav find between a loan after a loan, in which the witnesses do not combine, and admission after admission, in which they do combine?

Rav Huna answered him: Indeed, if he admitted before each witness without the other present, they do not combine. And when Rav said that they combine, it is referring to a case

where he said to him

the borrower said

to the latter one

to the second witness:

“Regarding these hundred dinars about which I am admitting to you,

this sum concerning which I am now admitting to you,

I also admitted

I already admitted concerning them

before so-and-so

before the other witness.” Only in such a case did Rav say that they combine, because now he admitted concerning the same hundred dinars.

Still,

this answer is insufficient, for although

the latter knew,

the second witness, before whom he made his admission later, knows that he is admitting to the same maneh about which he had also made an admission before another witness, nevertheless,

the first,

the witness before whom he had originally admitted,

did not know

that he had also admitted it before the second witness [and even if he were to say that he would “eventually” admit it before another witness, how would he know that he had in fact done so?]. It follows that the first witness has no knowledge of an admission concerning “that same maneh.”

The question therefore returns: Why do they combine, according to Rav, who holds that each of the witnesses must actually testify concerning “that same maneh”?

Rav Huna answered him, adding that the case is one in which

after

he had admitted it before the second witness,

he then went back

and returned and

said to him,

the debtor,

to the first witness,

the witness before whom he had originally admitted:

“This maneh about which I admitted to you

this maneh about which I admitted to you,

I also admitted

I had already admitted it

before so-and-so.”

And it was only in this manner that Rav said that they combine.

But in the latter clause it is not possible to say this. In the case of one loan followed by another loan, it was certainly not the same maneh. And likewise, if he lent him money on the second occasion, it is a different maneh, which he is now giving him, and it is not the same maneh concerning which he admitted to him yesterday.

This establishment of the case and this explanation were accepted by Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, and

he said to him,

to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and blessed him:

“May your mind be at rest

because

you have set

[settled]

my mind.”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him,

to Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

“What tranquility

how has your mind come to rest—

for Rava, and some say

or

Rav Sheshet, felled a tree with an ax,

he cut it down with an ax; that is, he gave a forceful answer , and it is as follows:

If Rav holds that each witness must know of the testimony of the other, then also in the case of an admission followed by a loan—concerning which Rav said that they combine—we are compelled to say that the case is specifically one in which, at the time of his admission before the second witness, he said to him: “This maneh about which I am admitting to you has a witness who saw the loan,” and afterward he returned and said to the first witness, who had seen the loan: “Concerning this maneh I returned and admitted before so-and-so.”

It follows that in both cases in which Rav said that the witnesses combine, the case is limited to this establishment of the circumstances. And this is difficult:

Is this not an admission followed by a loan?

That is, why did Rav need to repeat twice that they combine in this manner?

Explanation: Granted, if we were to distinguish between “admission” and “loan” on the basis of some rationale, there would be room to elaborate and explain when the witnesses combine and when they do not combine. But according to this establishment of the circumstances, there is no distinction whatsoever between an admission and a loan; rather, the distinction is whether he informed each witness that his testimony had been stated or observed before another witness. Why, then, does he elaborate with two examples that are essentially one and the same?!

And how has your mind come to rest?

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him,

to Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

“This is what I heard about you,

which is what I heard about the people of your city: that you are unusual people,

for you cut down palm trees

you cut down palm trees

and then replant them,

and then return and plant them, that is, you build and demolish. And this is what you have done to me: You explained Rav’s tradition to me, and then returned and refuted it.

This is Rav’s view, which distinguishes between an admission followed by an admission and so forth, but his tradition has not been clarified—

whereas

the Nehardeans

[the disciples of Shmuel]

say: Whether it is an admission followed by an admission, an admission followed by a loan, a loan followed by a loan, or a loan followed by an admission,

they combine.

In accordance with whose opinion? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa,

who holds that testimony of this kind, in which each witness saw the event independently, combines in all cases of monetary law .

The Gemara discusses two witnesses in monetary law who contradicted one another in “examinations.” And this is—

We learned in the chapter Hayu Bodekin that the witnesses are examined through “interrogations” and “examinations.”

Interrogations are the questions that they ask them—each separately—concerning the precise “place” and “time” at which the event about which they are testifying occurred.

These interrogations, in addition to their purpose of verifying the truth of the testimony, have another purpose: to make it possible to disqualify the witnesses through hazama. For if they do not testify concerning a precise “place” and “time,” it will not be possible to disqualify them by saying: “You were with us at that time in another place,” since the witnesses did not state a place and time. And if it is not possible to disqualify them in this manner, meaning that the witnesses are unwilling to face such a challenge, their testimony is not trustworthy.

Therefore, these interrogations are not treated as leniently in monetary law, despite the fact that the Sages were lenient in monetary law, due to the concern of locking the door before borrowers [see there].

Examinations are the questions that they ask them—each separately—concerning details of the event. If their answers do not correspond, the testimony is “contradictory” and is not testimony. These examinations are conducted in capital cases, in order to fulfill the mitzva of “the congregation shall save,” and acquit the accused from execution.

But in monetary law, as stated, the Sages were lenient and did not require extensive examinations .

Our passage discusses a case in which the witnesses did in fact contradict one another in the examinations.

It is clear that if they contradicted one another concerning peripheral and secondary details that have no connection to the substance of the testimony, this is not considered a contradiction, just as it is clear that if they contradicted one another concerning essential matters forming the substance of the testimony, the testimony is contradicted.

The Gemara discusses how essential and secondary matters are to be defined. There are various cases and various rationales concerning this.

Rav Yehuda said: Testimony in which the witnesses contradict one another in the examinations

is valid in monetary law.

Rava said: His statement

his words are understandable

of Rav Yehuda—

in

a case in which one witness

says:

“I saw him give him money

in a black purse,”

and one says: “In a white purse,”

since the purse is not part of the substance of the testimony—

But

if

one says:

“I saw him give him

a black maneh,”

and one says: “A white maneh,”—

they do not combine,

and their testimony is contradictory, since they contradict one another concerning the very substance of the testimony.

We object:

“And a black purse—in capital cases, is it not [considered significant]?”

That is, when they contradict one another even in capital cases concerning an external matter that is not part of the substance of the testimony—where its externality from the substance of the testimony is like that of a black purse—is the testimony not accepted in court?

What leniency is there in monetary law? Even in capital cases, the testimony is not considered contradictory!

But

is it not that

Rav Ḥisda said:

If one witness

says: “He killed him with a sword,

a blade,

and one says: ‘He killed him with an ariran,’”

an ax,

—

this is not correct;

it is not precise testimony, meaning, it does not correspond [as in the verse (Deuteronomy 13): “And behold, the matter is true and correct”], and it is contradictory testimony.

But if

one says: “His garments,

the clothing of the murderer or of the murdered person,

were black,” and one says: “His garments were white,”

this is correct;

their testimony is precise, meaning, it corresponds, and it is accepted in court.

Thus, “his garments,” like a purse, are external matters and are not part of the substance of the testimony. What, then, is the novelty of Rava’s statement that in monetary law their testimony remains valid? Even in capital cases their testimony remains valid!