Sanhedrin 30b — the Talmud in English

And in order to explain their dispute in “the verse,” it is necessary to preface and

to say:

say:

that everyone—

both the first tanna and Rabbi Natan—hold

like the Sages who dispute with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha,

and hold that “seeing the testimony” must be together, as they expounded from the singular wording, which is “witness.”

And here,

in “giving the testimony,”

they dispute concerning equating giving testimony with seeing,

they dispute whether we shall learn giving testimony from seeing by means of a hekesh, since seeing and giving testimony are written in the same verse—

One master,

the first tanna,

holds: We equate giving testimony with seeing,

and just as seeing the testimony must be together, so too the giving of the testimony;

and

whereas

the other master,

Rabbi Natan,

holds: We do not equate them,

and even if the Torah required that seeing the testimony be together, it is not necessary that the giving of the testimony be together.

The Gemara relates an incident to clarify in accordance with whose words the halakha is, whether in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha or in accordance with the Sages who dispute with him.

Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim was diligently occupied,

toiling, waiting, and seeking,

for Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina, to ordain him,

so that their master, Rabbi Yohanan, would “ordain” Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina,

but the matter did not succeed,

and he did not succeed in this.

One day,

one day,

he was sitting [the reading of the Yad Ramah is

the reading of the Yad Ramah manuscript is

they were sitting]

Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina were sitting

before Rabbi Yohanan,

before Rabbi Yohanan.

He said to them,

Rabbi Yohanan to his students:

Is there among you

someone among you

who knows,

who knows how to answer—whether

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha, or not,

but rather in accordance with the Sages?

Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim said to him,

to Rabbi Yohanan:

This one knows,

this one—Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina—knows.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan to Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim:

Let him say it!

Let him speak!

He said to him,

Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim to Rabbi Yohanan:

Let the master ordain him first,

let my master ordain him first!

He ordained him.

He ordained him.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina:

My son! Tell me! How did you hear it?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina to Rabbi Yohanan:

This is how I heard it: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha concedes to Rabbi Natan,

for just as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha does not require seeing the testimony together, so he does not require giving the testimony together.

Rabbi Yohanan said,

Rabbi Yohanan:

Did I need this?!

Was this what I needed? These are surely obvious matters—

now,

let us reason now:

and if the “principal

of the testimony, which is

seeing—

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha said that we do not require it together,

it need not be together,

giving testimony,

which is not the “principal” of the testimony,

is it necessary

to inform us that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha holds that it need not be together?! [And I did not need to ask what Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha holds concerning “giving testimony”; rather, whether the halakha regarding seeing the testimony is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha or with the Sages.]

And nevertheless, although he had not resolved his uncertainty for him,

Rabbi Yohanan said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina:

Since you have ascended,

to the lofty status of “one ordained,”

do not descend!

When Rabbi Zeira heard this incident,

Rabbi Zeira said: Learn from this: Once a great man is ordained, he is ordained.

The Gemara continues to discuss whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abin said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha both in

testimony concerning

land,

where one witness testifies that in his presence he acknowledged that this land is his, and a second witness likewise testifies,

both in

testimony concerning

movable property,

where one witness testifies that in his presence he lent him one hundred dinars, and a second witness likewise testifies. And although there is room to distinguish between land and movable property, as will be explained, we do not distinguish, and the halakha is like him both with regard to land and with regard to movable property.

Ulla said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha with regard to land,

since the land is before us and the two witnesses testify concerning it; both testify concerning one “testimony,” and the “testimony” joins them,

but not with regard to movable property, [that is, money or movable property that can be exchanged]

because concerning the “one hundred dinars” about which this witness testifies, the second does not testify, and they are two separate testimonies.

It follows from Ulla’s words that the Sages dispute Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha both with regard to land and with regard to movable property; rather, Ulla decided—in his view—that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha with regard to land, but the halakha is not like him [but rather like the Sages] with regard to movable property.

And concerning this the Gemara raises a difficulty from the words of amoraim who hold that the Sages never disputed Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha with regard to land, and that they concede that the witnesses join together.

Abaye said to him,

to Rabbi Hiyya bar Abin: When you say in the name of Ulla

“the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha,

by inference, they dispute,

the Sages dispute him!

But Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: The Sages concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha with regard to testimony concerning land,

and they never disputed him.

And

further,

Rav Idi bar Abin taught in

the tractate

of Damages of the school of Karna,

which the amora named Karna taught:

The Sages concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha

in these laws:

a.

With regard to testimony concerning a firstborn animal.

A firstborn of a kosher animal becomes holy with firstborn sanctity by itself, from the time of its birth, even though it was not verbally sanctified. And even nowadays, when it is not offered as a sacrifice, sanctity applies to it, and it is given to the priests.

Even the priests are forbidden to slaughter it until a blemish occurs in it—a blemish among those that invalidate a sacrifice and remove it from sacrificial sanctity. Therefore, the priests were suspected of inflicting a blemish in it, and the Sages prohibited slaughtering a firstborn until the priest brings two witnesses who testify that they saw that a blemish occurred in it by itself, without the priest causing it.

And if he brought one witness who testifies that he saw that a particular blemish occurred in it by itself, and another witness who testifies that he saw that another blemish occurred in it, the Sages concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha that the two witnesses join together to permit the firstborn for slaughter.

b.

And with regard to testimony concerning land,

as explained above, the Sages concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha.

c.

And with regard to testimony concerning presumptive ownership,

one who brings two witnesses who testify that they saw him exercising possession over his fellow’s land for three years need not prove with a document his claim that he purchased the land or received it as a gift.

And if he brought one witness who testifies concerning three years, and another witness who testifies concerning three other years, the Sages concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha that the two witnesses join together for a three-year presumption of ownership.

d.

And likewise with regard to a son and a daughter,

a son and a daughter are considered “adults” for all the laws of the Torah upon the growth of two hairs on their bodies. And testimony of witnesses is required to testify to this.

And if one witness testified that he saw [them] in a particular place on the body, and a second witness testifies concerning another place, the Sages concede to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha that the two witnesses join together to establish the son and the daughter as “adults.”

And in all these cases, the reason that the Sages concede is this: Since the two witnesses, although their testimony is separate, nevertheless testify concerning one matter—concerning the firstborn in which a blemish occurred “in it” by itself, concerning the land that he acknowledged was “this” one’s, concerning the land over which he exercised possession for three years, and concerning “the son and the daughter” who manifested signs of adulthood—

and they dispute only in the case where this one says, “In my presence he lent him one hundred dinars,” and likewise the second witness, for each witness testifies concerning a different one hundred dinars.

These are the words of Rabbi Abba and Rav Idi, who hold that with regard to land the Sages did not dispute Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha, and this is difficult against Ulla, who holds that they indeed disputed.

And we answer:

Do you raise one man’s statement against another man’s statement?!

Are the words of one amora refuted by the words of other amoraim?

One master,

Ulla,

holds: They dispute,

the Sages dispute;

and the other master,

Rav Abba and Rav Idi,

holds: They do not dispute,

and one may not raise a contradiction between the two amoraim.

Ulla said with regard to testimony concerning a son and a daughter that the testimony of two witnesses is joined. And the Gemara discusses this—

What is the case of “with regard to a son and with regard to a daughter”?

What did the witnesses each see separately?

If you say

if one witness says:

One

says: “I saw one hair

on her back

on the back of the hand, between the joints of her fingers,”

and

one witness says: “I saw one hair

on her abdomen”—

This is difficult: Is this called half a testimony? Is it not

“half a matter” and half a testimony?

Each witness saw “half” of a matter, for the signs of adulthood are in “two” hairs, whereas one hair is not a sign but half a sign; and even if we join the witnesses so that they are one group, nevertheless this “group” does not testify concerning a complete sign.

And we answer:

Rather,

one witness

says: “

I saw

two on her back,”

and

one

witness says: “

I saw

two on her abdomen,”

and each and every witness testifies concerning a “complete matter,” that she is an adult; and when we join the two witnesses, it emerges for us that “both” testified concerning a complete matter.

The Gemara continues to discuss whether the halakha is in accordance with the Sages or in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha.

Rav Yosef transmits a different tradition in the name of Rav and likewise in the name of Ulla, and according to him, on the contrary, Ulla said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha both with regard to land and with regard to movable property, whereas Rav said that the halakha is like him with regard to land but not with regard to movable property.

And according to him, there is another distinction between land and movable property, namely: Granted, with regard to land, we do not need both of them to see or hear together, since in addition to their testifying concerning one matter, also at the time of “their giving testimony” in court both of them know that they are testifying concerning one matter. Therefore their “giving testimony” joins them into one group, and it is possible to expound concerning this the verse, “And he is a witness,” as was expounded above.

But with regard to movable property, even at the time of “their giving testimony” in court they do not testify concerning “one hundred dinars,” and neither their seeing nor their giving testimony is together. [Rather, they join together in the final calculation of the “knowledge of the court,” but this is not a joining of “testimony.”]

Rabbi Yosef said: I said

I said

in the name of Ulla: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha both with regard to land and with regard to movable property.

And the Sages who came

who came

from Mehoza [a place-name]

a place-name

said: Rav Zeira said in the name of Rav: With regard to land—

yes,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha,

but not with regard to movable property,

the halakha is not like him.

The Gemara continues to explain Rav’s view.

Rav stated his words

in accordance with his reasoning,

in accordance with another statement that he made.

For Rav said:

a.

An acknowledgment after an acknowledgment,

one witness says: “In my presence he acknowledged owing him one hundred dinars on the first day of the week,” and the second witness says: “In my presence he acknowledged owing him the one hundred dinars on the second day of the week.”

And likewise—

b.

An acknowledgment after a loan,

one witness says: “In my presence he lent him one hundred dinars on the first day of the week,” and the second witness says: “In my presence he acknowledged owing him one hundred dinars on the second day of the week”—

They join,

the two witnesses join to become one group in order to obligate him monetarily, since it is possible to say that both are testifying concerning the same one hundred dinars [and this will be explained below].

But—

c.

A loan after a loan,

one witness says: “In my presence he lent him one hundred dinars on the first day of the week,” and the second witness says: “In my presence he lent him one hundred dinars on the second day of the week.” And likewise—

d.

A loan after an acknowledgment,

one witness says: “In my presence he acknowledged owing him one hundred dinars on the first day of the week,” and the second witness says: “In my presence he lent him one hundred dinars on the second day of the week”—

They do not join,

since they do not testify concerning the same one hundred dinars, for the one hundred dinars that he lent him on the second day is not the same one hundred dinars that he lent him or acknowledged owing him on the second day.

And Rav follows his own approach and holds: Even if from the two of them there emerges a “calculated knowledge” for the court that he indeed owes him one hundred dinars, this is not sufficient to obligate him; rather, the two witnesses must actually testify concerning “the same one hundred dinars.”

The Gemara explains the difference between the first two cases, in which according to Rav they join, and the last two, in which they do not join.

He found

found

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua. He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rav Huna:

What is different

what is different about

a loan after a loan, that they do not,

which according to Rav they do not join, namely, because

the one hundred dinars that this one sees,

the one hundred dinars that the witness says he saw,

this one does not see,

the second witness did not see it, and likewise the second witness did not see the one hundred dinars of the first witness.

And what is different about an acknowledgment after an acknowledgment, in which according to Rav they do join? Is it not that

this acknowledgment after an acknowledgment, too,

it is not clear that it is the same one hundred dinars, and it is possible that

concerning the one hundred dinars

concerning the one hundred dinars

that he acknowledges before this one,

before this witness—

does he not acknowledge before this one?

And what distinction did Rav find between a loan after a loan, in which they do not join, and an acknowledgment after an acknowledgment, in which they do join?

Rav Huna answered him: Indeed, if he acknowledged before one not in the presence of the other, they do not join; and what Rav said—that they join—refers to a case

where he said to him,

the borrower

to this latter one,

to the second witness:

With regard to this one hundred dinars that I am acknowledging before you,

with regard to this one hundred dinars concerning which I now acknowledge to you,

I also acknowledged it,

I already acknowledged it

before so-and-so,

before the second witness.” And only in this manner did Rav say that they join, because now he acknowledged the same one hundred dinars.

Still

this answer is insufficient, for although

the latter knew,

the second one before whom he confessed later knew that he was confessing concerning a maneh concerning which he had also confessed before another witness, nevertheless,

the first,

the earlier one,

did not know

that he had also confessed before the second one, [and even if he says that he “will” confess before an additional witness, from where does he know that he in fact did so], and it follows that the first witness has no knowledge of a confession concerning “that same maneh”.

And the question returns: why do they join together, according to Rav, who holds that each of the witnesses must actually testify concerning “that same maneh”?

Rav Huna answered him, and added that it is further speaking of a case

that

after he had confessed before the second witness,

he went back

and returned and

said to him

the borrower

to the first one,

to the witness before whom he had confessed at first: “

This maneh concerning which I confessed to you

this is the maneh concerning which I confessed to you,

I also confessed concerning it

I had already confessed concerning it

before so-and-so.”

And only in this manner did Rav say that they join together.

But in the latter clause it is not possible to say so. For in a loan after a loan, it was certainly not the same maneh. And likewise, if he lent him [the money] on the second occasion, it is another maneh that he is now giving him, and it is not the same maneh concerning which he confessed to him yesterday.

This formulation and this explanation were accepted by Rabbi Nahman bar Yitzhak, and

he said to him

to Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua, and blessed him:

May your mind be at rest

because of

your having put at rest

[your having set down]

my mind.

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said to him

to Rabbi Nahman bar Yitzhak:

What is the restfulness

how has your mind become at rest—

For Rava, and some say

or

Rav Sheshet felled an ax upon it

cut it down with an axe, that is, he gave a decisive answer , and it is this—

If Rav holds that each witness must know of his fellow’s testimony, then also in a confession after a loan—for Rav said that they join together—we are forced to say that the matter is specifically speaking of a case in which, at the time of his confession before the second one, he said to him: “This maneh concerning which I am confessing to you has a witness who saw the loan,” and afterward he went back and said to the first witness who saw the loan: “Concerning this maneh I went back and confessed before so-and-so.”

And it follows from this that in the two cases in which Rav said that they join together, it is speaking only according to this formulation, and it is difficult:

is this not a confession after a loan,

that is, why did Rav need to repeat twice to inform us that they join together in this manner? [

Explanation: Granted, if we were to distinguish between “confession” and “loan” on the basis of some reasoning, there would be room to elaborate and explain when they join together and when they do not join together. But according to this formulation there is no distinction whatsoever between confession and loan; rather, [the distinction is] whether he informed each witness that his testimony was stated or seen before another witness or not. Why, then, does he elaborate with two examples that are essentially one?!]

And how has your mind become at rest?

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said to him

to Rabbi Nahman bar Yitzhak:

This is what I heard about you

this is what I heard about the people of your city, that you are peculiar people,

you cut down palm trees

you cut down palm trees,

and you set them up

and then replant them; that is, you build and demolish. And so you did to me: you explained Rav’s teaching to me, and then went back and refuted it.

This is Rav’s view, which distinguishes between a confession after a confession and so forth, and his teaching has not been clarified—

whereas

the Nahardeans

[the disciples of Shmuel]

say: whether a confession after a confession, whether a confession after a loan, whether a loan after a loan, whether a loan after a confession—

they join together.

In accordance with whom? In accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha,

who holds: testimony of this kind, in which each one saw independently, joins together in all monetary cases .

The Gemara discusses two witnesses in monetary cases who contradicted one another in “examinations.” And this is—

We learned in the chapter “They Were Examining,” that they interrogate the witnesses through “inquiries” and “examinations.”

Inquiries: these are the questions that they ask them—each not in the presence of the other—concerning the precise “place” and “time” at which the event about which they testify occurred.

These inquiries, besides their purpose of verifying the truth of the testimony, have another purpose, namely, that it be possible to declare them conspiring witnesses. For if they do not testify concerning a precise “place” and “time,” it will not be possible to declare them conspiring witnesses and say to them, “You were with us at that time in another place,” since the witnesses did not state a place and time. And if it is not possible to declare them conspiring witnesses—that is, if the witnesses do not wish to confront the matter—their testimony is not trusted.

Therefore, with regard to these inquiries, they are not so lenient in monetary cases, despite the fact that the Sages were lenient in monetary cases, on account of placing a bar before borrowers, [see there].

Examinations: these are the questions that they ask them—each not in the presence of the other—concerning the details of the event. If they do not correspond, then the testimony is “contradictory” and is not testimony. These examinations are carried out in capital cases in order to fulfill the mitzva of “and the assembly shall save,” and to acquit the defendant from death.

But in monetary cases, the Sages were lenient, as stated, not to multiply examinations .

Our sugya discusses a case in which they indeed contradicted one another in examinations.

And it is clear that if they contradicted one another in peripheral and secondary details that have no connection to the substance of the testimony, this is not considered a contradiction, just as it is clear that if they contradicted one another in essential matters that are part of the substance of the testimony, the testimony is contradicted.

And the Gemara discusses what is the definition of essential and secondary matters. And there are different cases and different lines of reasoning in this matter.

Rav Yehuda said: Testimony that contradicts itself in examinations—

is valid in monetary cases.

Rava said: His statement makes sense

the words of

Rav Yehuda—

in

a case in which

one says: “

I saw that he handed him money

in a black purse,”

and one says: “In a white purse,”

since the purse is not part of the “substance” of the testimony—

But,

if

one says: “

I saw that he handed him

a black maneh” ,

and one says: “A white maneh,”—

they do not join together,

and theirs is contradictory testimony, since they contradict one another concerning the principal substance of the testimony.

And we raise an objection:

But a black purse—in capital cases, is it not [valid]?!

That is, when they contradict one another even in capital cases concerning an external matter that is not part of the substance of the testimony, and its externality from the substance of the testimony is like the externality of a black purse, is the testimony not accepted in court?

And what is the leniency in monetary cases? Surely even in capital cases it is not contradictory testimony?!

And

is it not

Rav Hisda who said: A

witness

says: “With a sword

a sword

he killed him,” and one says: ‘With an axe

an axe

he killed him’”—

this is not correct

it is not focused testimony, that is, corresponding testimony, [from the wording of the verse (Deuteronomy 13): “And behold, the matter is truly established”], and it is contradictory testimony.

But if

one says: “His garments

the garments of the murderer or of the murdered person

were black,” and one says: “His garments were white,”—

this is correct,

their testimony is focused, that is, corresponding, and it is accepted in court.

Now, “his garments,” like a purse, are external matters and are not part of the substance of the testimony. What, then, is the novelty of Rava’s statement that in monetary cases their testimony remains valid? Surely even in capital cases their testimony remains valid?