Sanhedrin 30a — the Talmud in English

That

document

of acknowledgment, in which there was written

in the formulation of judges:

“Record of statements,”

a record of matters [whereas witnesses write: “Record of testimony”],

and all the formulations of a court,

its entire formulation was in the language of judges, and only two were signed upon it.

Three who sat to validate the document, and before the signing of the document one of them died, the Gemara said in tractate Ketubot that they write: “We were seated as three” [we were a court of three] “and one is absent.” And if they do not write so, the one who sees it will say that they validated it as two.

And in the document of acknowledgment with which we are dealing, this was not written.

And it did not have written in it: “We were seated as three and one is absent.”

Is the document valid or not?

Ravina

thought

to say: This is the ruling of Reish Lakish,

its law resembles the law of Reish Lakish, and presumably it was done according to law and halakha, and certainly there were three.

Rav Natan bar Ami said to

Ravina:

This is what we say in the name of Rava: In every such case

anything that is in this form,

we are concerned,

that there indeed was a court, but

an erring court

in this halakha, and they hold that two are valid to judge. And the halakha was decided in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu. [Above, 3b,] who holds: with regard to two who judged monetary cases, according to everyone their judgment is not a judgment.

And the document is invalid.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: If it was written in it

in the document of acknowledgment:

“The court,”

for example: So-and-so came before us, “the court,” or: We, “the court,” sat—

there is no further need,

there is no need for more; that is, the document is valid, because everyone knows that two are not called “the court,” and presumably one forgot to sign.

And we raise an objection: What difference does it make that they called themselves the court—

Perhaps it is a brazen court?

For Shmuel said: Two who judged

monetary cases,

their judgment is a judgment, except that they are called “a brazen court,”

as they transgress the enactment of the Sages, who enacted—in Shmuel’s view—that monetary cases should not be judged by fewer than three.

And there is concern that they rule in accordance with Shmuel, and therefore did so; but for us the halakha is not in accordance with Shmuel, and their judgment is not a judgment, so why should we validate the document?

And we answer: Indeed, in this manner we would not validate the document; rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak was speaking

of one in which it was written

in the language of the document: “We sat

in the court of our master Rav Ashi,”

and Rav Ashi’s court, or a prominent court like it, certainly knows that “court” may not be called a gathering of two judges.

They took “Rav Ashi” as an example, because his court was foremost in his generation and in the days of Ravina, and both of them arranged the Babylonian Talmud; and in his days this tradition was stated and established in the Gemara.

And we raise an objection: What difference does it make that “in the court of our master Rav Ashi” was written in the document—

Perhaps the Sages of Rav Ashi’s house hold in accordance with Shmuel,

and therefore two signed; but for us the halakha is not in accordance with Shmuel, and their judgment is not a judgment.

And we conclude:

For it is written in it: “We sat in the court of our master Rav Ashi,

and

our master Rav Ashi said to us

to write a document,” and Rav Ashi [or a distinguished judge like him] certainly does not err in this, to judge with two.

The Gemara brings a beraita concerning one who acknowledges before a single witness: when the witness is believed and when he is not believed.

The Sages taught: One said to them

to the heirs:

I saw

your

father, who hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet

[types of storage chests],

and

the father

said: “

The money

belongs to so-and-so,”

or: “

It is second tithe.”

If he hid it

in the house, the witness said

nothing

at all,

and he is not believed; but if he hid it

in the field, his words stand

and he is believed.

And the reason is: What could he have to lie? If the witness wished, he could have taken it and given it to that so-and-so; whereas in the house, where he cannot take it, he is not believed.

The general rule

Whatever is in the witness’s power

to

take,—

his words stand; if it is not in his power to take it—

he said nothing.

Behold,

the sons

saw their father hide money in a chest, box, or cabinet, and he said

the father: “

It belongs to so-and-so,” “It is second tithe”—

if

the meaning of his words is

as one transmitting a bequest,

truly giving words to his sons and saying this in the language of a testament—

his words stand.

But

if

the meaning of his words is

as one acting deceptively,

fearing that they will take the money while he is alive, or that they will regard him as wealthy and cause him to spend his money with excessive liberality—

he said nothing.

It happened that

the son

was distressed over money that his

father

had left him and had not told him where the money was,

and the master of the dream

the angel who shows dreams at night

came and said to him: “

An amount of

such and such it is; it is in such and such a place,

but

it is second tithe”.

And apparently he should be believed that the money is second tithe, since he also told him the amount and the place.

This was an incident;

this case occurred,

and

the Sages said: He need not take the money up to Jerusalem, and it is his, because

“dream words do not raise and do not lower”.

We learned in our Mishna:

Two say

that he is acquitted and one says that he is liable—he is acquitted. Two say that he is liable and one says that he is acquitted—he is liable.

The Gemara discusses a case in which the judges disagreed] and followed the majority to acquit, [and the same applies to liability, but the Gemara speaks of acquittal—] how do they write the judgment?

How do they write it?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

They write in an anonymous formulation: “So-and-so

is acquitted.”

Reish Lakish said:

They write explicitly: “

So-and-so and so-and-so,”

the judges,

acquit, and so-and-so,

the judge,

finds liable.

Rabbi Elazar says:

They write:

“From their words

so-and-so was acquitted,”

and the meaning of this formulation is that the judges indeed disagreed, and the judgment was decided according to the majority of those who acquitted.

And now the Gemara explains the dispute of the amoraim.

What is the difference between them?

What practical difference is there in which formulation they write?

The halakha is that a judge who erred [in certain circumstances] and whose error became clear must pay from his own house, that is, from his own money. Therefore—

There is a difference between them

if it becomes clear that the two judges erroneously acquitted one of the litigants, and they must pay the other litigant for his loss,

to pay his share with them,

whether the third judge must— \-

who did not err—pay his share with them—

according to the one who says

and that is Rabbi Yoḥanan: They write

“acquitted”—

he pays,

the third judge, since the third joined with them, and without him they could not issue a judgment; therefore they are all equal, and the third also pays like them. And therefore they write in an anonymous formulation, “acquitted,” which implies that the judgment was issued by all three.

But

if

according to the one who says,

Reish Lakish: They write

“So-and-so and so-and-so acquit, and so-and-so and so-and-so find liable,” \-

the third does not join with them for the judgment; therefore the third

does not pay

his share with them.

And we raise a difficulty:

And according to the one who says: “Acquitted,”

does he

pay?!

What is his guilt?

Let him say to them

for he can claim against them:

“If you had obeyed me,

if you had accepted my opinion,

you too would not have paid;

and how am I dragged along with you for your error, which you made by not listening to my voice”?!

Rather,

without a doubt, the judge who did not err does not have to pay from his own house for his share. And in what do the amoraim disagree?

There is a difference between them

whether they must

pay themselves

the two of them, to complete from their money

his share

the third judge’s share, that which he does not pay—

According to the one who says:

They write

“acquitted,” they pay,

because the judgment issued from among all three, and therefore they pay what the third does not pay.

But

if

according to the one who says:

They write

“So-and-so and so-and-so acquit, and so-and-so and so-and-so find liable”—

they do not pay.

And specifically they write this because the judges disagreed, to make known that the judgment was completed by two, and they do not accept upon themselves all responsibility for the consequences of the judgment.

And we raise a difficulty:

And

does

according to the one who says: “Acquitted”—

they pay

the third judge’s share, the two of them?

And let them say to him:

they can claim:

“If you had not been with us,

if you had not joined us, and we had been only two,

our judgment would not have amounted to anything;

there would have been no judgment, because we would not have sat in judgment at all; and by your sitting with us, you have a share in the responsibility.”

And we conclude:

Rather,

just as he does not pay his share, so they do not complete his share. And the amoraim do not disagree “as a matter of law,” but disagree “in reasoning.”

There is a difference between them, because

if it becomes known to the litigants who judged in their favor and who against them, they encounter the prohibition of:

“You shall not go about as a talebearer”

among your people.

Therefore,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

They do not explain who found liable and who acquitted; rather, they write in an anonymous formulation:

“Acquitted,” because of: “You shall not go about as a talebearer.”

Reish Lakish said:

They write

“So-and-so and so-and-so acquit, and so-and-so and so-and-so find liable,

because

if

they write: “Acquitted,”

it appears as falsehood,

the matter appears to be false.

But

if

Rabbi Elazar, he has

the concern

of the master

of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and holds that there is here the issue of: “You shall not go about as a talebearer.”

And he has

the concern

of the master

of Reish Lakish, and holds that there is here the issue of “it appears as falsehood”;

therefore, write as follows: “From their words so-and-so was acquitted,”

and they do not reveal who found liable and who acquitted, and likewise they do not write words that appear false, for it is evident from the formulation that not all of them agreed with the judgment.

We learned in our Mishna:

When they have finished the matter, they bring in

them, and the greatest of the judges says: So-and-so, you are acquitted; so-and-so, you are liable.

The Gemara explains whom they bring in: whether the litigants or the witnesses.

Whom

did they bring in?

If you say

if it is said

the litigants,

this is difficult, for

they are standing there;

they are still standing there in the courtroom, and surely they did not take them out from there; and the Mishna did not say that they took them out after the court heard their claims.

Rather, they brought in

the

witnesses,

since they questioned them one without the other, and when one testified, the other witnesses were outside; therefore, toward the completion of the judgment, they returned and brought them in so that they would testify in one another’s presence.

In accordance with whom

did they do this? In accordance with the view of the Sages, who hold that the witnesses must testify together, and

not in accordance with Rabbi Natan,

who holds that witnesses may testify one without the other.

As it was taught:

The Gemara brings a beraita, and in its latter clause the Sages and Rabbi Natan disagree over this halakha. [In the first clause of the beraita they disagree over another halakha, which was brought incidentally.]

Their testimony never joins

to make them one group

until both see at once. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korkha says: Even one after the other

[as will be explained later in the sugya].

And their testimony is not established in court

to be testimony upon which the court issues a judgment

until both testify at once;

so hold the Sages.

Rabbi Natan says:

They do not need to testify together; rather, they even

hear the words of this one today, and when his fellow comes tomorrow, they hear his words.

And the meaning of our Mishna accords with the words of the Sages; therefore, they return them so that they may testify together. And this is difficult: Is the Mishna not in accordance with Rabbi Natan?

And we answer:

No,

we are not compelled to say that the Mishna speaks of witnesses and not in accordance with Rabbi Natan; rather,

it always

brings in

the litigants,

and they took them out during the deliberation of the judges,

and

our Mishna

is Rabbi Neḥemiah’s.

As it was taught: Rabbi Neḥemiah says: This was the practice of the men of discretion in Jerusalem. They bring in the litigants and hear

their

words. And they bring in the witnesses and hear

their

words. And

after receiving the testimony,

they take them outside,

so that during the deliberation they would not hear the arguments of liability and acquittal and learn to lie,

and they deliberate over the matter. When they have finished the matter, they bring them in

and so on.

And this is likewise the explanation in our Mishna. [Although it did not say that they must remove them. And it is akin to the resolution “the text is incomplete”].

And we object:

But it was taught

in another beraita:

When they have completed the matter, they bring in the “witnesses”.

And not as in the resolution, that they brought in the litigants?

And we answer: That beraita

that one,

indeed,

is not according to Rabbi Natan

and maintains that the witnesses must return and testify together, after they examined them separately, each one not in the presence of the other.

In essence,

since a beraita was brought concerning the joining of testimony, the Gemara discusses this halakha itself, its reason, its source, and the rationale of the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Joshua ben Korha.

We learned in a beraita:

Their testimony never joins until both see [the matter] together,

these are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Joshua ben Korha says: Even

if they saw [it]

one after the other.

With what do they disagree

—upon what does the dispute depend, whether testimony joins when they saw [the matter] one after the other?

If you wish, say

that they disagree concerning the exposition of a

verse. And if you wish, say

that they disagree concerning

reasoning.

And the Gemara explains:

If you wish, say

reasoning:

The Sages maintain: When one witness testifies that the debtor lent him a maneh in his presence, and likewise the second testifies that the debtor lent him a maneh in his presence, it follows that there is no complete testimony here concerning one maneh, since

the maneh

concerning the maneh

about which this one testifies

—that this witness testifies—

this one does not testify

—the second does not testify concerning it—

and the maneh about which this one testifies, this one does not testify.

But the other one,

Rabbi Joshua ben Korha, answers this: And what of it? In any event,

concerning a mere maneh

concerning one maneh

both of them testify

—both testify, and both indeed confirm that the lender’s claim against the borrower for a maneh is a just claim—.

And if you wish, say: a verse:

It is stated in the Torah, in the passage concerning the oath of testimony [What is the oath of testimony? Witnesses who knew testimony concerning money, and the owner of the testimony demanded that they testify for him, but they denied their testimony and did not testify, and swore that they did not know this testimony for him—this is called the oath of testimony. And they are liable for this oath to bring an offering (Rambam, chapter 1 of the Laws of Oaths)] (Leviticus 5

): “And he is a witness, or he saw, or he knew.”

Before the Gemara completes the exposition of the verse concerning the joining of witnesses, the Gemara introduces another exposition:

And

from where [do we know] that what the Torah wrote, “a witness,” refers to two witnesses?

It was taught

We learned in a beraita: It is stated in the Torah (Deuteronomy 19): “One witness shall not stand ... by the mouth of two witnesses or by the mouth of three witnesses shall a matter stand.”

And the beraita asks: Why did the Torah write: “one” witness, even

from the implication of what is stated

if it had said:

“A witness shall not stand,”

would

I not know that he is

“one”?!

For two are indeed fit for testimony?!

What does “one” come to teach?

And the beraita answers: This

verse

is

a binyan av

It comes to teach us that

every place

in the Torah

where it is stated “witness,” here there are “two.”

And the proof is:

until Scripture specifies for you “one”

as it specified in this verse; and when the Torah does not specify it, the reference is to one group, which is two witnesses.

Now the Gemara concludes explaining the reasoning of the Sages, who maintain that the two witnesses must see together—

and

the reason that

the Merciful One brought it out

that the Torah emphasized

in the wording “one,”

that is: “a witness”

to say

to instruct us that the two witnesses are together, namely,

until both of them see as one

that both saw together.

But the other one

Rabbi Joshua ben Korha will answer this: From the fact that the Torah included and wrote:

“And he is a witness, or he saw, or he knew,”

this comes to teach us that

in any event,

even if they did not see together, they join for testimony .

The Gemara continues to explain the conclusion of the beraita.

We learned in a beraita:

And their testimony is not established in the court until both testify together. Rabbi Natan says: We hear the words of this one today, and when his fellow comes tomorrow, we hear his words.

With what do they disagree

—upon what does the dispute depend, whether the two witnesses must testify together?

If you wish, say

—reasoning; if you wish, say

a verse.

And the Gemara explains:

If you wish, say: reasoning: the master

the first tanna

maintains: one witness

when he comes

when he comes to testify,

comes for an oath,

he comes to impose an oath, whereas

he does not come for money

[One witness’s testimony is not sufficient to obligate the defendant to pay money, but his testimony has the “power” to obligate the defendant to swear in order to deny the witness, as is required by the scriptural decree.] Therefore, when this one testifies by himself, he does not establish a monetary obligation, and likewise the second; and the two did not testify concerning a monetary obligation, so they cannot be joined to establish a monetary obligation, because they did not testify monetary testimony.

But the other one

Rabbi Natan answers this: Indeed, if one witness has no second witness with him, and he is alone, he comes not for money but for an oath. Unlike here, where there is another witness joining him, except that his sole deficiency is that he is not present “before us” to testify with him—and what of it?

Is it that, when they come together

when they appear together, do they

testify with one mouth

testify with one voice?

Rather, we join them

their testimony as one.

Here too,

even if they appeared one after the other,

let us join them

it is possible to join them as one group.

And if you wish, say: a verse:

In that same verse brought by the Gemara, “And he is a witness, or he saw, or he knew,” it is stated:

“If he does not declare it, he shall bear his iniquity.”

That is, the beginning of the verse speaks of “seeing” the testimony, and its end speaks of “declaring” the testimony.