Sanhedrin 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

That

deed of acknowledgment,

which was written

in the formula used by judges,

“Dukhren pitgami,” a record of matters [whereas witnesses write “record of testimony”],

a record of matters [whereas witnesses write: “Record of testimony”],

and all the language of the court,

the entire formula was in the language of judges, but only two judges had signed it.

When three judges sat to ratify a deed, and one of them died before signing the deed, the Gemara says in tractate Ketubot that they write: “We were sitting as a court of three [we were a quorum of three], and one is absent.” If they do not write this, one who sees the deed will say that they ratified it as two.

But in the deed of acknowledgment under discussion, this was not written.

And it did not say in it: “We were sitting as a court of three, and one is absent.”

Is the deed valid or not?

Ravina thought

he reasoned

to say: This is the same as the ruling of Reish Lakish,

whose ruling is analogous to that of Reish Lakish; and presumably it was executed properly and in accordance with halakha, and certainly there had been three judges.

Rav Natan bar Ami said

to Ravina:

This is what we say in the name of Rava: In any such case,

anything that has this form,

we are concerned

that there indeed had been a court, but

a mistaken court

that was mistaken in this halakha and held that two are fit to adjudicate. The halakha was established in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu [above, 3b], who holds that when two adjudicate monetary cases, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a judgment.

And the deed is invalid.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: If it had written in it

in the deed of acknowledgment:

“The court,”

for example: So-and-so came before us, “the court,” or: We, “the court,” sat—

that is sufficient;

nothing more is required. That is, the deed is valid, because everyone knows that two are not called “a court,” and presumably one of them simply forgot to sign.

The Gemara raises an objection: What difference does it make that they called themselves a court—

Perhaps it was an insolent court?

For Shmuel said: When two adjudicate

monetary cases,

their judgment is a judgment, but they are called “an insolent court,”

because they transgress the enactment of the Sages—which, according to Shmuel, established that monetary cases should not be adjudicated by fewer than three.

And there is concern that they ruled in accordance with Shmuel, and therefore acted in this manner. But for us, the halakha is not in accordance with Shmuel, and their judgment is not a judgment; so why should we validate the deed?

The Gemara answers: Indeed, in this case we would not validate the deed. Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak was speaking

—when it was written in it

in the language of the deed: “We sat

in the court of Rav Ashi,”

and the court of Rav Ashi—or a distinguished court like his—certainly knew that a court cannot be called “a court” when only two judges sit.

They mentioned Rav Ashi as an example, since his court was preeminent in his generation and in the days of Ravina, and the two of them organized the Babylonian Talmud; this tradition was stated in his days and incorporated into the Gemara.

The Gemara raises an objection: What difference does it make that “the court of Rav Ashi” was written in the deed—

Perhaps the Sages of Rav Ashi’s court held in accordance with Shmuel, and

therefore two signed it; but for us, the halakha is not in accordance with Shmuel, and their judgment is not a judgment.

The Gemara concludes:

It was written in it: “We sat in the court of Rav Ashi,

and

Rav Ashi instructed us

to write a deed.” Rav Ashi [or a distinguished judge like him] certainly would not have made such an error and adjudicated as two.

The Gemara cites a beraita concerning one who acknowledges something in the presence of a single witness: when the witness is believed and when he is not believed.

The Sages taught: One person said to them

the heirs:

I saw

your

father hiding money in a chest, box, or cabinet

[types of cabinets],

and

the father

said: “

The money

belongs to so-and-so,”

or: “

It is second-tithe money.”

If he hid it

in the house, the witness said

nothing,

and he is not believed;

but if he hid it

in the field, his words stand

and he is believed.

The reason is: What basis would he have for lying? Had the witness wished to do so, he could have taken the money and given it to that person. But in the house, where he cannot take it, he is not believed.

The general rule

Whatever is in the witness’s power

to

take—

his words stand; if it is not in his power to take—

he has said nothing.

It follows that

the sons

saw their father hide money in a chest, box, or cabinet, and he said

the father: “

It belongs to so-and-so”; “It is second-tithe money”—

if

the implication of his words is

that he was conveying a bequest,

truly telling his sons this in the language of a testament—

his words stand.

But

if

the implication of his words is

that he was acting deceptively,

because he feared that they would take the money while he was still alive, or that they would regard him as wealthy and cause him to spend his money with excessive generosity—

he has said nothing.

It happened that

the son

was distressed over money that his

father

had left him, but had not told him where the money was,

and the master of the dream

the angel who shows dreams at night

came and said to him: “

Such-and-such an amount

is there, in such-and-such a place,

but

it is second-tithe money.”

At first glance, he should be believed that the money is second-tithe money, since he also told him the amount and the location.

This was an incident,

this case occurred,

and

the Sages said: He need not take the money up to Jerusalem, and it is his, because

“dreams have neither effect nor consequence.”

We learned in our Mishna:

Two say

that he is acquitted, and one says that he is liable—he is acquitted. Two say that he is liable, and one says that he is acquitted—he is liable.

The Gemara discusses a case in which the judges disagreed, and followed the majority in declaring the litigant acquitted [and the same applies when they followed the majority in declaring him liable, but the Gemara speaks of acquittal]—how do they write the judgment?

How do they write it?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

They write in an impersonal formulation: “So-and-so is

acquitted.”

Reish Lakish said:

They write explicitly: “

So-and-so and so-and-so

the judges

declare him acquitted, and so-and-so

the judge

declares him liable.”

Rabbi Elazar said:

They write:

“On the basis of their statements,

so-and-so was acquitted,”

which implies that the judges indeed disagreed, and that the judgment was decided according to the majority who acquitted him.

The Gemara now explains the dispute between the amoraim.

What difference is there between them?

What practical difference results from the formulation in which they write it?

The halakha is that a judge who erred [in certain circumstances], and whose error became clear, must pay from his own resources, that is, from his own money. Therefore—

The difference between them is

if it becomes clear that the two judges erred in acquitting one of the litigants, and must pay the other litigant for his loss:

to pay his share together with them,

whether the third judge

—who did not err—must pay his share together with them.

According to the one who says

—Rabbi Yoḥanan—that they write

“acquitted”—he

pays,

the third judge, since he joined them, and without him they could not have issued a judgment. Therefore, they are all equal, and the third judge also pays like them. This is why they write in an impersonal formulation, “acquitted,” which implies that the judgment was issued by all three.

But

if

according to the one who says

—Reish Lakish—that they write

“So-and-so and so-and-so declare him acquitted, and so-and-so and so-and-so declare him liable,”

—the third judge does not join them in the judgment, and therefore the third judge

does not pay

his share with them.

The Gemara asks:

But according to the one who says: “Acquitted,”

does he

pay?!

What is his guilt?

Let him say to them

for he can argue against them:

“Had you obeyed me,

had you accepted my opinion,

you too would not have paid,”

and why should I be dragged along with you because of your error, which resulted from your failure to heed my view?!

Rather,

there is no doubt that the judge who did not err need not pay his share from his own resources. What, then, is the dispute between the amoraim?

The difference between them is

whether they need

to pay

the two of them, from their own money,

his share

the third judge’s share, the amount that he does not pay.

According to the one who says:

they write

“acquitted,” they pay,

because the judgment issued from among all three of them; therefore, they pay what the third judge does not pay.

But

if

according to the one who says

that they write

“So-and-so and so-and-so declare him acquitted, and so-and-so and so-and-so declare him liable”—

they do not pay.

This is specifically why they write that the judges disagreed: to make known that the judgment was completed by two, and they do not assume full responsibility for the consequences of the judgment.

The Gemara asks:

But

does

according to the one who says: “Acquitted,”

the two pay

the third judge’s share?

Let them say to him:

they can argue:

“Had you not been with us,

had you not joined us, and we had been only two,

our judgment would not have been issued at all;

there would have been no judgment, since we would not have sat in judgment at all. By sitting with us, you share responsibility.”

The Gemara concludes:

Rather,

just as he does not pay his share, so they do not make up his share. The amoraim do not disagree concerning the legal ruling, but rather disagree in their underlying reasoning.

The difference between them is because

if it becomes known to the litigants which judge ruled in their favor and which against them, they encounter the prohibition of

“You shall not go about as a talebearer”

among your people.

Therefore,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

They do not specify which judges declared him liable and which acquitted him; rather, they write in an impersonal formulation:

“Acquitted,” because of: “You shall not go about as a talebearer.”

Reish Lakish said:

They write:

“So-and-so and so-and-so declare him acquitted, and so-and-so and so-and-so declare him liable,

because

if

they write: “Acquitted,”

it appears false,

the matter appears to be a lie.

But

if

Rabbi Elazar, he holds

the concern

of the master

Rabbi Yoḥanan, and holds that this involves “You shall not go about as a talebearer.”

And he holds

the concern

of the master

Reish Lakish, and holds that this involves “it appears false.”

Therefore, they write this way: “On the basis of their statements, so-and-so was acquitted,”

and they do not reveal which judge declared him liable and which acquitted him; nor do they write something that appears false, since the wording itself demonstrates that they did not all agree with the judgment.

We learned in our Mishna:

When they have completed the matter, they bring in

the litigants, and the greatest of the judges says: So-and-so, you are acquitted; so-and-so, you are liable.

The Gemara explains whom they bring in: the litigants or the witnesses.

Whom

did they bring in?

If you say

if it is referring

to the litigants,

this is difficult. They were

standing there;

they were still standing in the courtroom, and they had not been removed from there. The Mishna did not say that they removed them after the court had heard their claims.

Rather, they brought in

the

witnesses,

since they had interrogated them separately, and when one testified the other witnesses were outside. Therefore, as the judgment was being concluded, they brought them in again so that they would testify in one another’s presence.

In accordance with whose opinion

did they act in this manner? In accordance with the view of the Sages, who hold that the witnesses must testify together, and

not in accordance with Rabbi Natan,

who holds that witnesses may testify separately.

As it is taught:

The Gemara cites a beraita, whose latter clause records the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Natan concerning this halakha. [In the first clause they disputed another halakha, which was cited incidentally.]

Their testimony never combines

to make them a single group

until both see the matter simultaneously. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Even one after the other

[as will be explained later in the sugya].

And their testimony is not established in court

to become testimony on the basis of which the court issues a judgment

until both testify simultaneously;

this is the view of the Sages.

Rabbi Natan says:

They need not testify together; rather, even

they hear the words of one today, and when his fellow comes tomorrow, they hear his words.

The wording of our Mishna implies the view of the Sages, and therefore they bring the witnesses back in so that they will testify together. This is difficult: Is the Mishna not in accordance with Rabbi Natan?

The Gemara answers:

No.

It is not necessary to say that the Mishna is discussing witnesses and is not in accordance with Rabbi Natan. Rather,

in fact, they bring in

the

litigants,

and they had removed them during the judges’ deliberations,

and

our Mishna

is the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.

As it is taught: Rabbi Neḥemya says: This was the practice of the refined men of Jerusalem. They bring in the litigants and hear

their

words. And they bring in the witnesses and hear

their

words. And

after receiving the testimony

they send them outside,

so that during the deliberations they will not hear the arguments of liability and acquittal and learn to lie,

and they deliberate the matter. When they have completed the matter, they bring them in

and so on.

And this is also the explanation in our Mishna [even though it did not say that they must bring them out. And it is similar to the resolution, “the Mishna is incomplete”].

And we challenge this:

But it was taught

in another beraita:

“Once they have completed the matter, they bring in the witnesses.”

And not as in the proposed resolution, that they brought in the litigants?

And we answer: That beraita,

that

indeed,

is not in accordance with Rabbi Natan,

and it maintains that the witnesses must return and testify together, after they questioned them separately, each one in the absence of the other.

With regard to the matter itself,

now that a beraita concerning the joining of testimony has been cited, the Gemara discusses the substance of this halakha, its rationale and source, and the basis of the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

We learned in a beraita:

“Their testimony never joins together until both of them see [the event] simultaneously,”

these are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Even

if they saw [it]

one after the other.

With regard to what do they disagree

—what is the basis of the dispute as to whether testimony joins when they saw [the event] one after the other?

If you wish, say

that they disagree concerning the exposition of a

verse. And if you wish, say

that they disagree on the basis of

reasoning.

And the Gemara explains:

If you wish, say—

reasoning:

The Sages maintain that when one witness testifies that the borrower borrowed one hundred dinars in his presence, and the other likewise testifies that the borrower borrowed one hundred dinars in his presence, there is no complete testimony here concerning one hundred dinars, since

the one hundred dinars

concerning which

this one testifies

—that this witness testifies—

that one does not testify

about it;

and the one hundred dinars concerning which that one testifies, this one does not testify about it.

And the other,

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, responds: What of it? In any event,

concerning one hundred dinars alone

concerning a single hundred dinars,

both of them testify,

both of them testifying that the lender’s claim against the borrower for one hundred dinars is justified.

And if you wish, say: [they disagree concerning] a verse:

It is stated in the Torah, in the passage concerning the oath of testimony [What is the oath of testimony? Witnesses who knew testimony concerning a monetary matter, and the person entitled to that testimony summoned them to testify on his behalf, but they denied their testimony and did not testify, and swore that they did not know this testimony concerning him—this is called the oath of testimony. They are liable to bring an offering for this oath (Rambam, chapter 1 of the Laws of Oaths)] (Leviticus 5:1):

“And he is a witness, or he saw, or he knew.”

Before the Gemara completes the exposition of the verse concerning the joining of witnesses, it introduces another exposition:

And

from where do we know that when the Torah writes “witness,” it refers to two witnesses?

It was taught

in a beraita: It is stated in the Torah (Deuteronomy 19:15): “One witness shall not rise up … by the testimony of two witnesses or by the testimony of three witnesses shall the matter be established.”

And the beraita asks: Why did the Torah write “one” witness,

from the implication of what is stated,

if it had said

“A witness shall not rise up”,

would

I not know that he is

“one”?

After all, two are indeed valid as witnesses?!

What does the designation “one” come to teach?

And the beraita answers: This verse,

this

is

a foundational principle

teaching us that

every place

in the Torah

where it says “witness,” here there are “two.”

The proof is:

unless the verse specifies “one” for you,

as it specified it in this verse; and when the Torah does not specify it, the reference is to a single group consisting of two witnesses.

The Gemara now concludes its explanation of the rationale of the Sages, who maintain that the two witnesses must see [the event] simultaneously—

and

the reason

the Torah expressed

by emphasizing

the wording “one,”

that is, “a witness”—

is to say

and teach us that the two witnesses are as one, namely,

until both of them see as one,

that they both saw together.

And the other,

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, will respond: From the fact that the Torah expanded the wording and wrote:

“And he is a witness, or he saw, or he knew,”

this comes to teach us that

in any event,

even if they did not see [the event] simultaneously, their testimony joins together.

The Gemara continues to explain the latter clause of the beraita.

We learned in a beraita:

“And their testimony is not established in the court until both of them testify together. Rabbi Natan says: We hear the words of this one today, and when his colleague comes tomorrow, we hear his words.”

With regard to what do they disagree

—what is the basis of the dispute as to whether the two witnesses must testify together?

If you wish, say—

reasoning; if you wish, say—

a verse.

And the Gemara explains:

If you wish, say: [they disagree based on] reasoning: The master

the first tanna

maintains: One witness—

when he comes

to testify,

he comes for an oath,

for he comes to impose an oath, whereas

he does not come for money [a single witness’s testimony is insufficient to obligate the defendant to pay money, but his testimony has the “power” to obligate the defendant to swear in order to deny the witness’s claim, as required by a scriptural decree]. Therefore, when this one testifies by himself, he does not establish a monetary obligation, and likewise the other one; and since neither testified concerning a monetary obligation, they cannot be joined to establish a monetary obligation, because they did not testify as monetary witnesses.

(And the other

Rabbi Natan responds: Indeed, if one witness has no second witness with him, and he is alone, he comes only for an oath and not for money. But here there is another witness joining him; his only deficiency is that he is not present “before us” to testify with him. What of it?

Is it so that when they come together,

when they appear together, do they

testify with one mouth,

testifying with one voice?

Rather, we join them

their testimonies as one.

Here too,

even if they appeared one after the other,

let us join them,

it is possible to join them as a single group.)

And if you wish, say: [they disagree based on] a verse:

In the same verse cited by the Gemara, “And he is a witness, or he saw, or he knew,” it is stated:

“If he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity.”

That is, the beginning of the verse speaks of “seeing” the testimony, while its end speaks of “testifying” to the testimony.