Sanhedrin 29b (כט:) — the Talmud in English

“Those words never happened.”

I never admitted it to you, although the witnesses testify that he indeed admitted it to him,

he is established as a denier

and is not deemed credible, and he must pay.

He said

Rav Pappa, son of Rav Aḥa bar Adda,

to Rav Ashi:

This is what we say

that one says

in the name of Rava:

Even if he says, “I did not admit it,” he is exempt from payment, because he can claim that he forgot that admission.

For all matters that are for naught

things said without purpose,

people do not remember;

people do not remember them. And what he said, “I did not admit it,” is because he forgot his admission.

The Gemara relates an incident.

There was a certain man

there was a certain man

who concealed witnesses for his fellow

who hid witnesses from another man

in his curtain,

inside the sheet spread around the bed.

He said to him

to his fellow: “

‘I have a maneh in your possession,’ he said to him, ‘Yes.’ He said, ‘

Do you want all those who hear, both

the awake

and

the sleeping,

those who are asleep,

to be witnesses against you,

to testify to your admission?” The one who concealed the witnesses realized that he was unwilling to admit the debt in the presence of witnesses. He therefore thought that perhaps the defendant would assume that everyone was asleep and would admit it, and that the witnesses, who were awake, would come and testify against him, saying that they had heard his agreement that both the awake and the sleeping should be witnesses.

He said to him

the defendant: “

No,”

I do not agree that they should testify, despite the fact that I admitted it to you.

The matter came before Rav Kahana.

Rav Kahana said:

What can be done to him?

He said to him, “No,”

and he did not agree to admit it in the presence of witnesses. His admission is therefore not an admission.

The Gemara relates a similar incident.

There was a certain man

there was a certain man

who concealed

hid

witnesses in a cemetery

among the graves

from his fellow

from his fellow.

He said to him, “I have a maneh in your possession,” and he said to him, “Yes.”

He said to him: “Do you want

the living and the dead

the living and the dead

to be witnesses against you,

to testify to your admission?” He did this, thinking that the man would certainly admit it, since the dead would not come to testify against him; it did not occur to him that the living were listening and would come to testify against him, saying that he had agreed that both the living and the dead should be witnesses.

He said to him, “No,”

I do not agree.

Rabbi Shimon

ben Lakish

said: “He said to him, ‘No,’

and his admission is not an admission, since he did not agree to admit it in the presence of witnesses.

From the statements of Rav Kahana and Rabbi Shimon, who said, “He said to him, ‘No,’” it may be inferred that only when the defendant refuses the plaintiff’s question is it not an admission. But had he remained silent in response to the plaintiff’s question, “Shall the awake and the sleeping [or the living and the dead] be witnesses against you?” his silence would have the significance of an admission, and the witnesses could come and testify to his admission.

Ravina said, and some say

that it was

Rav Pappa who said: Learn from this

from the two incidents cited above:

That which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: He must say, “You are my witnesses,”

refers to either of two situations.

It makes no difference

whether

the debtor says,

“You are my witnesses,”

and it makes no difference

whether

the creditor says

and the witnesses hear, “Do you want so-and-so and so-and-so to be witnesses?”

and the debtor remains silent;

his silence is deemed an admission.

And from where do we infer this?

The reason

The entire reason that Rav Kahana and Rabbi Shimon exempted him is

that the debtor said, “No,”

and refused to admit it in the presence of witnesses; it follows

that if he remained silent, it is indeed so

that this constitutes an admission.

The Gemara relates another incident.

There was a certain man

there was a certain man

whom people called

whom people called

“a kav of debts,”

as though he were carrying a full kav [the name of a measure] of promissory notes. That is, he owed money to many people.

He said

that man said: “I do not owe many people, because

who is claiming against me?

Who is demanding payment from me?

Only so-and-so and so-and-so,

and I indeed owe them.”

They came

those men came

and brought him to court before Rav Naḥman,

claiming that he had admitted in the presence of witnesses that he owed them.

Rav Naḥman said:

His admission has no significance, and they have no claim against him, because his admission was made because

a person is apt

to say to people, “I owe money to so-and-so,” in order

not to make himself appear satisfied,

not to appear wealthy, so as to distance himself from the evil eye.

The Gemara relates another incident.

There was a certain man

there was a certain man,

whom people called

whom people called

“a mouse

a mouse

lying on dinars,”

“lying on gold coins.” That is, just as a mouse lying on gold coins does not benefit from them, so too this man was wealthy but did not benefit from his money.

When he was dying,

at the time of his death,

he said, “So-and-so and so-and-so,

so-and-so

and so-and-so are claiming money from me,”

they are claiming a sum of money from me, and I owe it to them.

After he died,

after his death,

they came,

those men came,

and brought a claim against the heirs,

claiming that their father had admitted during his lifetime that he owed them.

They came

to litigate

before Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei.

He said to them

to the heirs:

When we say

that the Sages said:

“A person is apt not to make himself appear satisfied; these words

apply

during his lifetime,

when a person says this about himself during his lifetime,

but

if he says it at the time of his death, with the implication that the money should be given

after death—

no,

we do not say that he is apt not to make himself appear satisfied. For what does he care what people will think of him after his death? Infer from this that he intended his statement as an admission.

The heirs

paid half

half the sum that their father had admitted.

They brought a claim

they sued them

in court for the other half,

for the half that they had not yet paid.

They came before Rabbi Ḥiyya.

He said to them,

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: I disagree with Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, and I maintain:

Just as a person is apt not to make himself appear satisfied,

so is a person apt not to make his sons appear satisfied.

He does not want people to regard his sons as wealthy, and he wishes to distance himself from the evil eye. And he exempted them from paying the remainder of the debt.

They said to him

the men who were suing the heirs said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Should we

go and return

the half of the sum that we received?

He said to them

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them:

An elder has already issued a ruling

Rabbi Yishmael; you received the money in accordance with his ruling, and I will not disagree with what he did. [Although I do not hold like him.]

The Gemara now discusses a case in which a person made a complete admission in the presence of witnesses, and the admission obligates him to pay, while the creditor wishes to have his admission written in a document and have the witnesses sign it, so that the admission will acquire the status of a “loan documented by a document” : When do they write it, and when do they not write it?

He admitted

the debtor

before two

witnesses,

and they acquired from him

he performed an act of acquisition to formalize his obligation—

they write

an admission document, even though the debtor did not tell them, “Write a document,” because he performed an act of acquisition, and an unspecified act of acquisition is presumed to be intended for writing.

But if not,

if he did not perform an act of acquisition,

they do not write,

because the debtor wants it to remain an oral loan and not a loan documented by a document. And although he admitted it in the presence of witnesses and indeed became obligated, he does not want his obligation to be written in a document.

He admitted

before three, but they did not acquire from him—

Rav

[some texts: Rav Ami] said: They write,

because he designated the three as a court, and an admission made before them is considered equivalent to a document. And a court can declare the property of its owners ownerless; therefore, it can transform the admission from an oral loan into a loan documented by a document, and act in place of the debtor as his agent to have it written in a document.

And Rav Asi said: They do not write,

because presumably he accepted them not as a court but as witnesses [and witnesses do not write unless he instructed them to do so or they acquired from him].

And the Gemara relates:

There was an incident

of this kind, in which a person admitted before three but they did not acquire from him. Rav did not write a document, in accordance with his own view; rather,

Rav was concerned about this ruling of Rav Asi,

he was concerned about the opinion of Rav Asi, who maintained that “they do not write.”

The amoraim disputed this matter.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: This admission

this admission made before three [without their acquiring from him]—

sometimes we write

we write it in certain circumstances,

and sometimes we do not write it.

And on what does this depend?

If

they were assembled and sitting,

three men who were sitting together, and he admitted before them—

we do not write.

But if

he assembled them,

the debtor gathered them and summoned them together—

we write.

For if he gathered the three of them, instead of admitting before two, his intention was that they should serve as a court, and therefore we write. But if he came and found them sitting and admitted before them, this is no proof that he wanted them to act as a court; perhaps he would also have admitted before two.

Rava said: Even if

he

assembled them

the three—

we do not write,

since there is still no proof that he intended them to be a court rather than merely to increase the number of witnesses,

until he says to them, “Be judges for me,”

and then it is clear that he wanted them to act as a court. Without saying this, he does not intend to make them a court.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Even if he said, “Be judges for me,”—

we do not write until they establish a place

and designate a place, as judges do,

and send

a court messenger

and summon

and invite

him

the debtor in the name of the court, to come

to the court,

where the plaintiff brings his claim and the debtor admits before them. Since he stood trial and the court obligates him—even had he not admitted—the court’s ruling has the force of a publicly known loan documented by a document; therefore, we write it.

But if he voluntarily admitted before the court, this has no force as a court ruling, but only as an admission before witnesses.

The Gemara now considers whether there is a distinction between one who admitted before witnesses with regard to movable property and one who admitted with regard to land.

The reason for making a distinction between them is as follows: Granted, when he admitted with regard to movable property that is in the debtor’s possession, and “a loan is given for expenditure,” meaning that the money he borrowed belongs to him for all his needs and he has only a debt to repay, he does not want it made into a loan documented by a document, as he does not want a stronger lien imposed upon him. But when he admitted with regard to land that belongs to the creditor, through his admission he does not “obligate” himself; rather, he reveals that it belongs to the creditor. What difference is there whether it is documented or oral? In either case it belongs to the creditor, and he does not become more encumbered through the document.

If he admitted with regard to movable property and they acquired from him—

they write, and if not

if they did not acquire from him,

they do not write.

As explained.

The discussion is: If he admitted

with regard to real estate, but they did not acquire from him, what is the law?

Do we write, or do we not write?

Ameimar said: They do not write,

as in the case of movable property.

Mar Zutra said: They write it.

And the Gemara’s conclusion:

And the halakha is: They write it.

The Gemara now discusses what they said: If he acknowledged movable property in the presence of witnesses but did not effect a kinyan with him, they do not write a document. Is there a distinction between movable property that is gathered and present [“in existence”] and movable property that is not present?

The reason to distinguish between them is as follows: Granted, when the property is not present, and through his acknowledgment the debtor undertakes to “repay it” when the opportunity arises, he does not want them to write this in a document, and wants to be bound only by an oral loan. But if the money or movable property is present, his acknowledgment does not constitute an undertaking; rather, it is an acknowledgment that the property indeed belongs to the lender, and he does not become more bound through the document.

On the other hand, one could say that even if the movable property is present, since “a loan is given to be spent,” and he can spend it and repay other money in its place, he is not amenable to having a document written concerning it .

Ravina happened to come

to

Dameharya,

a place-name.

Rav Dimi bar Rav Huna of Dameharya said to Ravina: Movable property

that he acknowledged in the presence of witnesses,

and it is present—

what

whether do they write, or do they not write?

He said to him,

Ravina:

It is considered like land,

its status is like that of land, and they write a document even without the debtor’s instruction, in accordance with the opinion of Mar Zutra.

Rav Ashi said: Since they require collection,

as they have not yet been collected, meaning that they have not yet reached the lender, but there is only an acknowledgment—

no,

they do not write, as explained.

The wording of an acknowledgment document is: “So-and-so son of so-and-so came before us and said to us: Write, sign, and give it to him, and give it to the lender, etc.”

The Gemara relates an incident concerning this matter.

There was a certain acknowledgment document

an acknowledgment document

in which it was not written

these words were missing: “

He said to us: Write, sign, and give it to him,”

but it was written in the standard wording that so-and-so acknowledged in the presence of witnesses.

The debtor now claimed that he had not instructed them to write a document, and had not effected a kinyan with him; rather, they had written it on their own. Yet the halakha had been established that if he had not effected a kinyan with him, they do not write.

Abaye and Rava both say:

The document is valid, for he certainly instructed them to write a document. And this case—

is

similar to the ruling

of Reish Lakish.

One who sold property he had inherited from his father, and afterward his relatives came to challenge the sale, claiming that he had been a minor, under twenty years of age—and the halakha is that only one who is twenty may sell inherited property—

as Reish Lakish said:

His challenge is not a valid challenge, because there is a

presumption

that can be relied upon, namely, presumably,

witnesses do not sign a document unless it was executed

the document

by

a seller who is

of age.

So too in our case: Certainly, if they signed, they did so at the instruction of the person who made the acknowledgment.

Rav Pappi objected, and some say it was Rav Huna, son

of Rav Yehoshua:

After all, there are even many judges who are not familiar with this halakha, that if he did not effect a kinyan with him, they do not write.

Is there anything

such as this?

That we

the judges

do not know, and

these

court scribes do know?!

What basis is there for relying on the scribes’ knowing this law, and for assuming that if they wrote it, the person who made the acknowledgment certainly instructed them to do so?

They questioned

them,

Abaye’s scribes, and they knew,

and indeed they knew this law; and likewise they questioned

Rava’s scribes, and they knew.

The conclusion is: A document signed by two witnesses is valid, even if they did not write that he instructed them to write it or that he had effected a kinyan with him.

This applies when it is written in the wording of witnesses: “We are witnesses testifying

The Gemara now discusses a document that was written in the wording of judges, but was signed by only two of them. Is the document valid?

The sides of the question are as follows: Is it possible in this case as well to rely on Reish Lakish’s “presumption” and say that presumably it was executed properly, and that three judges were present, but one of them forgot to sign? Or not, as will be explained.