Sanhedrin 29b — the Talmud in English

“Such things never happened.”

I never admitted it to you, although the witnesses testify that he indeed admitted it to him,

he has been established as a denier

he is not believed, and he pays .

He said

Rav Pappa, son of Rav Aḥa bar Adda,

to Rav Ashi:

This is how we say it

this is what is said

in the name of Rava:

even if he says, “I did not admit it,” he is exempt from paying, because he can claim that he forgot that admission,

for all empty matters

things said for no purpose

people do not remember

people do not remember them. And what he said, “I did not admit it,” is because he forgot his admission .

The Gemara relates an incident.

A certain man

there was a certain man

who concealed witnesses for his fellow

who hid witnesses from another man

in his curtain

inside the sheet spread around the bed.

He said to him

to his fellow, “

You have a maneh of mine in your possession,” he said to him, “Yes.” He said:

“Do you want all those listening, both

those awake

and

those sleeping

sleepers,

to be witnesses against you

and testify concerning your admission?” The one hiding them recognized that he was unwilling to admit it in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, he thought: perhaps the defendant will think that they are all asleep and will admit it, and the witnesses who were awake will come and testify against him, saying that they heard his agreement, both by the awake and by the sleeping.

He said to him

the defendant, “

No,”

I do not agree that they should testify, despite the fact that I admitted it to you.

The matter came before Rav Kahana.

Rav Kahana said:

What shall we do to him?

He said to him, “No,”

and he did not agree to admit it in the presence of witnesses. His admission is therefore not an admission.

The Gemara relates a similar incident.

A certain man

there was a certain man,

who concealed

hid

witnesses in a cemetery

among the graves

for his fellow

from his fellow.

He said to him, “You have a maneh of mine in your possession,” and he said to him, “Yes.”

He said to him, “Do you want

my living and my dead

the living and the dead

to be witnesses against you

and testify concerning your admission?” He did this, thinking that he would certainly admit it, because the dead would not come to testify against him, and it would not occur to him that the living were listening and would come to testify against him, saying that he had agreed that the living and the dead should be witnesses.

He said to him, “No”

I do not agree.

Rabbi Shimon

ben Lakish

said: “He said to him, ‘No

’”—and his admission is not an admission, since he did not agree to admit it in the presence of witnesses.

From the words of Rav Kahana and Rabbi Shimon, who said, “He said to him, ‘No,’” it is to be inferred that only when the defendant refuses the plaintiff’s question is it not an admission. But if he had remained silent in response to the plaintiff’s question, “Shall those awake and those sleeping [or the living and the dead] be witnesses against you?”—his silence has the significance of an admission, and the witnesses may come and testify concerning his admission.

Ravina said, and some say

or it was Rav Pappa who said so:

From this infer

from the two incidents above—

That which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: “He must say, ‘You are my witnesses

’”—this refers to one of two situations.

It makes no difference

whether

the borrower said “

You are my witnesses,”

and it makes no difference

or whether

the lender said

and the witnesses hear, “Do you want so-and-so and so-and-so to be witnesses?”

and the borrower remained silent

his silence is considered an admission .

And from where do they infer this?

The reason

the entire reason that Rav Kahana and Rabbi Shimon exempted him is because

the borrower said, “No,”

and refused to admit it in the presence of witnesses; it follows

but if he remained silent, it is indeed so

that this constitutes an admission.

The Gemara relates another incident.

A certain man

there was a certain man

whom people used to call

whom people nicknamed “

a kav of documents,”

a full kav [the name of a unit of measure] of promissory notes was upon him. That is, he owed money to many people.

He said

that certain man said, “I do not owe many people, for

who is claiming from me

who demands from me?

Only so-and-so and so-and-so,

and to them I indeed owe.”

They came

these people came and

they brought him to judgment before Rav Naḥman

with a claim that he had admitted before witnesses that he owed them.

Rav Naḥman said:

There is nothing in his admission, and there is no claim against him, because what he admitted was because

a person is accustomed

to say to people, “I owe money to so-and-so,” in order

not to satisfy himself

not to appear satisfied with wealth, in order to distance himself from the evil eye .

The Gemara relates another incident.

A certain man

there was a certain man,

whom people used to call

whom people nicknamed “

a mouse

a mouse

that lies upon dinars

lying upon dinars.” That is, just as a mouse lying upon gold dinars does not benefit from them, so too that man, who was wealthy and did not benefit from his money.

When he was lying ill

at the time of his death,

he said, “So-and-so and so-and-so

so-and-so

and so-and-so are claiming money from me

they demand a sum of money from me, and I owe them.

After he was lying ill

after his death,

they came

these people came and

they brought a claim against the heirs,

claiming that their father had admitted during his lifetime that he owed them.

They came

they came to litigate

before Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei.

He said to them

to the heirs:

When we say

in what circumstances did the Sages say:

“A person is accustomed not to satisfy himself,” these words apply

these words apply

during life

when a person says this about himself during his lifetime,

but

if he says this at the time of his death, whose meaning is that they should give the money

after death—

not

do we say that he is accustomed not to satisfy himself. For what does he care what they will think of him after his death? It follows that his intention was an admission.

The heirs

paid half

half the sum that their father had admitted.

They sued them

they sued them

in court for the other half

for the half that they had not yet paid.

They came before Rabbi Ḥiyya.

He said to them

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: I disagree with Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Yosei, and I hold:

Just as a person is accustomed not to satisfy himself—

so a person is accustomed not to satisfy his sons.

He does not want people to regard his sons as wealthy, and he wants to distance himself from the evil eye. And he exempted them from paying the remainder of the debt.

They said to him

the people who were suing the heirs said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Should we

go and return

the half of the sum that we received?

He said to them

Rabbi Ḥiyya:

An elder has already issued a ruling

Rabbi Yishmael, and according to his ruling you received the money, so I will not dispute what he did [although I do not hold as he does].

The Gemara now discusses one who made a complete admission before witnesses, and the admission obligates him to pay, while the lender wants to write his admission in a document and have the witnesses sign it, so that the admission will receive the status of a “loan documented by a promissory note” ; when do they write, and when do they not write?

He admitted

the borrower

before two

witnesses,

and they acquired from him

he performed an act of acquisition for his obligation—

they write

a document of admission, even though the borrower did not say to them, “Write a document,” because he performed an act of acquisition, and an unspecified act of acquisition is intended for writing.

But if not

he did not perform an act of acquisition—

they do not write,

because the borrower wants it to remain an oral loan and not a loan documented by a promissory note. And although he admitted it before witnesses and indeed became obligated, he does not want his obligation written in a document.

He admitted

before three, but they did not acquire from him—

Rav

[Rav] Ami said: They write,

because he designated the three as a court, and an admission before them is considered like a document. And they can declare the owner’s property ownerless; therefore, they can change it from an oral loan into a loan documented by a promissory note and act in place of the borrower as an agent to write it in a document.

And Rav Asi said: They do not write,

because presumably he accepted them not as a court, but as witnesses [and witnesses do not write unless he commanded them to do so or they acquired from him].

And the Gemara relates:

There was an incident

of this kind, in which he admitted before three but they did not acquire from him, and Rav did not write a document, in accordance with his view, but

Rav was concerned about this opinion of Rav Asi

he was concerned about the view of Rav Asi, who holds that “they do not write.”

And the amoraim disputed this matter.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: This admission

this admission made before three [and they did not acquire from him]—

sometimes we write

in certain circumstances they write

and sometimes we do not write.

And upon what does this depend?

If

they gathered and were sitting

three who were sitting, and he admitted before them—

we do not write.

But if

he gathered them

the borrower gathered them and summoned them together—

we write.

For if he gathered the three of them, instead of admitting before two, his intention is that they should be a court; therefore they write. But if he came and found them sitting and admitted before them, there is no proof from this that he wanted them in the capacity of a court, and it is possible that he would have admitted even before two.

Rava said: Even

if

he gathered them

the three—

we do not write,

since there is still no proof that he intended them as a court, rather than to increase the number of witnesses,

until he says to them, “Be judges for me

”—be judges for me. Then it is demonstrated that he wanted them in the capacity of a court, and without saying this, he does not want to make them a court.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Even if he said, “Be judges for me,”—

we do not write, until they establish a place

that they establish a place, as judges do,

and they send

a court messenger

and summon

and summon

him

the borrower, in the name of the court, to come

to the court,

and the plaintiff makes his claim against him, and the borrower admits before them. Since he stood in judgment, and the court obligates him [even had he not admitted], the ruling of the court has the status of a loan documented by a promissory note, openly known to all; therefore they write.

But if he admitted before the court on his own initiative, this does not have the status of a court ruling, but only of an admission before witnesses .

The Gemara now discusses whether there is a distinction between one who admitted before witnesses concerning movable property and one who admitted concerning land.

The reason for making a distinction between them is this: Granted, if he admitted concerning movable property that is in the borrower’s possession, and “a loan is given for expenditure”—that is, the money he borrowed is his for all his needs, and he has only a “debt” to repay; therefore, he does not want to make it a loan documented by a promissory note, since he does not want a stronger lien. But if he admitted concerning land that belongs to the lender, through his admission he does not “become encumbered”; rather, it is a revelation that it belongs to the lender. What difference is there to me between a document and an oral statement? In either case it belongs to the lender, and through the document he does not become further encumbered.

If he admitted concerning movable property, and they acquired from him—

they write, but if not

they did not acquire from him—

they do not write.

As explained.

And the discussion is: He admitted

concerning real property, but they did not acquire from him—what

is the law? Do they write or do they not write?

Ameimar said: They do not write

as with movable property .

Mar Zutra said: They write.

And the Gemara’s conclusion:

And the halakha is: They write.

Now the Gemara discusses what they said: that if he acknowledged movable property in the presence of witnesses, but they did not acquire it from him, they do not write. Is there a distinction between movable property that is gathered and lying there [“present”] and movable property that is not present?

And the reason to distinguish between them is: Granted, when it is not present, and through his acknowledgment the borrower undertakes to “pay it” when he finds [the opportunity], he does not want them to write it in a document, and wants to obligate himself only through an oral loan. But if the money or the movable property is present, his acknowledgment does not constitute an undertaking, but rather an acknowledgment that they indeed belong to the lender, and he is not undertaking anything further through the document.

On the other hand, it may be said that even if the movable property is present, since “a loan is given for expenditure,” and he can spend them and repay others in their place, he is not pleased that a document be written concerning them.

Ravina happened to come

by chance

to Demeharya,

a place-name.

Rav Dimi bar Rav Huna of Demeharya said to Ravina: Movable property

concerning which he acknowledged in the presence of witnesses,

and they are present as they are—

what

whether do they write or do they not write.

He said to him,

Ravina:

It is considered like land,

for its law is like that of land, and they write a document even without the borrower’s instruction, in accordance with Mar Zutra’s view.

Rav Ashi said: Since they are lacking collection,

as they have not yet been collected, meaning, they have not reached the lender’s possession, but there is only an acknowledgment—

no,

they do not write. As explained.

The wording of a document of acknowledgment is: “So-and-so son of so-and-so came before us and said to us: Write, sign, and give it to him, and give it to the lender, etc.”

And the Gemara relates an incident concerning this matter.

That acknowledgment

document,

in which it was not written

these words were missing: “

He said to us: Write, sign, and give it to him,”

but it was written in the wording that so-and-so acknowledged in the presence of witnesses.

And now the borrower claims that he did not instruct them to write a document, and they did not acquire it from him, but they wrote it on their own. Yet the halakha was ruled that if they did not acquire it from him, they do not write.

Abaye and Rava both said:

The document is valid, for he certainly told them to write a document. And this case—

it is

similar to the law

of Reish Lakish.

One who sold the property of his father’s inheritance, and afterward his relatives came to challenge the sale, claiming that he had been a minor, under twenty years old, and the halakha is that only one who is twenty years old is permitted to sell inherited property—

as Reish Lakish said:

His challenge is not a challenge, because

there is a presumption

that one may rely on the presumption, that presumably

witnesses do not sign a document unless it was made

the document

by

a seller who is

of age.

And so too in our case: certainly, if they signed, they did so at the instruction of the one who made the acknowledgment.

Rav Pappi objected to this, and some say it was Rav Huna son

of Rav Yehoshua:

After all, there are even many judges who are not familiar with this halakha, that if he did not acquire it from him, they do not write—

is there such a thing

is such a matter possible,

that we

the judges

do not know, and

these

court scribes know?!

And what is the basis for relying on the scribes who know this law, so that if they wrote it, the one who made the acknowledgment certainly instructed them?

They asked

them

the scribes of Abaye, and they knew,

and indeed they knew this law; and likewise they asked

the scribes of Rava, and they knew.

And in conclusion: a document signed by two witnesses, even though they did not write that he instructed them to write, or that they acquired it from him, is a valid document.

When are these words said? When it is written in the wording of witnesses: “We, the witnesses, testify.”

And the Gemara now discusses a document that was written in the wording of judges, and only two are signed on it. Is the document valid?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: Is it possible in this case as well to rely on Reish Lakish’s “presumption,” and say that presumably it was made validly, and there were three at the session, but one of them forgot to sign? Or not, as will be explained.