Sanhedrin 29a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara relates:

the sons of Mar Ukva’s brothers-in-law

the brothers of Mar Ukva’s wife.

They had been relatives, but became unrelated.

Their sister died—the wife of Mar Ukva died—and their relationship was severed.

They would come before him for judgment

They came to litigate before him.

He said to them: “I am disqualified for you for judgment.”

They thought that this was why he said that he was disqualified: because of their relationship. And therefore—

They said to him: “What is your view—is it like Rabbi Yehuda?! We shall bring a letter from the West,

We shall bring a letter from the Land of Israel, where they ruled

that the halakha is not like Rabbi Yehuda.”

He said to them: “Is it in a kab of wax that I have become stuck to you,

have I become stuck to you in a kab of wax?! I am not attached to you, and I do not wish to judge you.

For I am not saying, ‘I am disqualified for you for judgment,’

because I hold like Rabbi Yehuda,

but rather because you do not obey the judgment,

you do not accept the ruling, and therefore I do not wish to judge you.

We learned in our Mishna:

“A beloved friend”—this is his groomsman.

And the Gemara asks:

And how many

days is he considered his groomsman, who is disqualified on account of “a beloved friend” [is he disqualified all the days of his life?!]

Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rav said: All seven days of the wedding feast.

And the Rabbis in the name of Rava said: Even from the first day onward,

the groomsman relationship is nullified, and he returns to being fit.

We learned in our Mishna: “A beloved friend and an enemy. A beloved friend—this is his groomsman”

. “An enemy”—anyone who has not spoken with him for three days out of hostility. They said to him: ‘Israel are not suspected of this.’

.

The Gemara explains the reason of Rabbi Yehuda and his derivation from the Torah, that a beloved friend and an enemy are disqualified for testimony, and the reason of the Sages who disagree with him.

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the Torah, in the section of the cities of refuge (Numbers 35): “And he was not an enemy ... and the assembly shall restore him to his city of refuge to which he had fled.”

This verse is superfluous for purposes of exposition, for if the Torah came to state the law that an inadvertent killer is not liable for death, but for exile, this was already stated elsewhere (Deuteronomy 4): “And he was not his enemy,” as well as other verses.

Therefore Rabbi Yehuda expounded that the intention of the verse is not regarding the killer, but regarding the witnesses, and we expound:

“And he was not his enemy”—

he shall testify concerning him,”

he shall testify concerning him; whereas an enemy is disqualified for testimony.

And it is likewise stated there:

“And he does not seek his harm”—

and we expound:

he shall judge him,

for in the following verse it is stated: “And the assembly shall judge”; and from here Rabbi Yehuda derives that judges who hate [one of the litigants] are also disqualified.

From this exposition,

we find

we find disqualification

in the case of an enemy,

whereas

from where do we derive a beloved friend

that he is disqualified?

Read it in this manner

It is possible to expound it thus:

“And he was not his enemy and not his beloved friend”—he shall testify concerning him. And he does not seek his harm

and not his benefit—

he shall judge him.

And we challenge this:

Is “beloved friend” written?!

How can we expound it thus? Is “beloved friend” written in the Torah

?

Rather, it is logical:

An enemy—what is the reason

he is disqualified?

Because his mind is distant from him;

his mind is distant from him. Therefore, a beloved friend

also

is disqualified, because his mind is

close to him,

his mind is close to him.

And the Gemara explains:

And the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda,

these

superfluous verses,

“He is not his enemy” and “he does not seek his harm”—what do they expound from them,

for what exposition are they expounded?

One verse—

for a judge,

to state that a judge who is an enemy [and the same applies to a beloved friend] is disqualified, for the Sages agree with Rabbi Yehuda that a judge who is an enemy [or a beloved friend] is disqualified; and the reason for distinguishing between a judge and a witness is explained in the Mishna.

The other

they expound the second verse

as

in

as it was taught: Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda said:

It is stated in the Torah:

“And he was not his enemy and did not seek his harm,”

“and the assembly shall judge him”;

from here

we learn

that two Torah scholars who hate one another—

do not sit in judgment together.

Mishna:

After we learned who are fit for testimony, the Mishna comes to explain the order of the examination of the witnesses.

Our Mishna speaks of monetary law; and although in monetary law one does not greatly multiply examinations and inquiries, nevertheless the testimony itself is examined.

How are the witnesses examined?

They would bring them into a chamber

the judges.

And they would admonish them

to state true testimony and not false testimony.

And

at the time of the examination

they would take out all the people

the remaining witnesses

outside, and leave

and retain

the greatest among them

of the witnesses, in order to examine them one without the other’s presence.

Since the Mishna describes the order of the trial, it explains—in passing—another law in the laws of testimony. It is this: “One to whom many people, great in wisdom and fear [of Heaven], testified, saying that they saw so-and-so commit a particular transgression, or that he lent money to so-and-so—even though he believes the matter in his heart as though he saw it—he may not testify until he sees the matter with his own eyes.” (The wording of the Rambam, chapter 17 of the Laws of Testimony

)

The Mishna explains another law—in passing—and it is the law of “admission”: that is, the borrower admits before witnesses that he owes money to the lender. And there are forms of this admission in which the testimony is not accepted, as will be explained.

Therefore the judges examine the witnesses, to ascertain that the testimony is true and that it does not contain these two deficiencies.

And

the judges

say to him,

the witness, “Say! How do you know that this one owes that one?”

If he said,

If he said

he,

the borrower,

said to me: “For I”

the borrower

owe him

to the lender

”, or he said:

“A certain man said to me that he owes him.”

In both of these cases,

he has said nothing,

and his testimony is no testimony.

And the reason is: If the borrower said this, even though he said it in the presence of witnesses, since he did not instruct them to be witnesses, his statement does not constitute an obligation, and these are empty words. He can claim that he said this because he did not want them to regard him as wealthy, for this is the way people speak.

And if the witness said, “So-and-so said to me,” there is nothing in his testimony, since he did not see the lending with his own eyes, as stated above.

Until—

that is, when is their testimony actually accepted? When

the witness says

“

In our presence he admitted to him”

the borrower to the lender

that he owes him two hundred zuz,”

and he appointed us as witnesses concerning the matter, saying to us, “You are my witnesses.”

Now the Mishna returns to the examination of the witnesses.

And afterward they would bring in the

witness

second, and examine him.

If their words were found to correspond,

to match, and their testimony was accepted, then

they would deliberate and discuss

the judges

the matter.

Now the Mishna explains the procedures for the judges’ decision and the issuance of their judgment.

If

two

of the three judges

say

their judgment:

“Exempt,” and one says: “Liable,”

then he is

exempt.

And likewise, if

two say: “Liable,” and one says: “Exempt,”

then he is

liable.

As it is stated (Exodus 23): “After the majority to incline.”

But if

one says: “Liable,” and one says: “Exempt,”

and the third says: “I do not know.”

And likewise,

even if two acquit, or two obligate, and one says: “I do not know,”

the judgment has not been decided,

and they shall add

to

the judges.

When one says “exempt,” one says “liable,” and the third does not know, it is obvious that they add judges, since the judgment has not been decided. And when two say “exempt” or “liable,” and the third does not know, even though if the third had disagreed with them as well, he would likewise have been nullified by being the minority, and the judgment would have been decided without him, nevertheless, since he said “I do not know,” he is considered as though he had not sat with them in judgment. It follows that the judgment was decided on the basis of two, whereas the Torah required three judges for monetary law.

When they had concluded

the court

the matter, they would bring them in [the Gemara will explain that during the deliberation they took out the litigants, the claimant and the defendant, and in preparation for the judgment they brought them in].

The greatest of the judges would say: “So-and-so, you are exempt; so-and-so, you are liable.”

And from where do we know

this?

We learn the following law:

When he leaves

the judge from the court,

he may not say

to the litigant who was found liable in the judgment:

“I acquit you!

I was in the minority in acquitting you,

but my colleagues

the judges

obligated

you

; but what can I do, since my colleagues outnumbered me.”

Concerning this it is stated:

“You shall not go about as a talebearer among your people.” And it says

and it is further stated

“One who goes about as a talebearer reveals a secret” .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “And they intimidate them.”

The Gemara explains:

How do we say this to them—

how do we say it to them; what words of intimidation?

Rav Yehuda said: This

verse

we say to them: “Clouds and wind, but no rain, [

the heavens become overcast with thick clouds, and there is wind to bring rain, but there is no rain—and why have the rains stopped? Because of]

a man boasting of a gift

of falsehood”—

those who testify false testimony. And through this they intimidate them: because of their false testimony, the rains will be stopped.

Rava said

to him:

These are not words of intimidation, for what do they care if the rains do not fall?

They can say

in their hearts: A common proverb says, “

Seven years

seven years

there was famine

there was famine,

and at the door of the craftsman

and at the door of one who knows a craft and is a craftsman

it did not pass

the famine did not pass.” And the analogy is: We have saved our own lives.

Rather, Rava said: We say to them

to the witnesses, to intimidate them, this verse: “

A scatterer [

a type of weapon]

and sword and sharpened arrow [

come as punishment upon]

a man answering against his fellow as a false witness.”

That is, the witnesses should fear a plague.

Rav Ashi said

to him:

These are not words of intimidation, for what do they care about a plague?

They can say

in their hearts: A common proverb says, “

Seven years

seven years

there was a plague

there was a plague,

and a person does not die without his year

and no person dies before his time to die.”

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Natan bar Mar Zutra said to me: We say to them

to the witnesses, to intimidate them: “

False witnesses

false witnesses,

their wages are cheap

they are cheap and insignificant even in the eyes of those who hire them.

As it is written

when Naboth did not wish to give his vineyard to King Ahab, and his wife Jezebel sent to the judges of Naboth’s locality and commanded them to carry out a false judgment against him, that he had blessed God and the king, so that he would be killed and Ahab would inherit his vineyard; and it is said there: “

And seat two men, worthless men, opposite him, and let them testify against him, saying, ‘You blessed God and the king,’”

so even Jezebel—and her men who were privy to the matter—called the false witnesses “worthless men.”

We learned in our Mishna:

If he said, “He said to me”

he has said nothing,

until they say, “In our presence he acknowledged to him that he owes him two hundred zuz.”

From the fact that the Mishna did not say that the witnesses say, “We heard that he acknowledged to him,” but rather “in our presence,” it follows that he said to the witnesses, “You are my witnesses,” that I acknowledge to the creditor.

This precision in the language of the Mishna

supports him

it is proof

for

the law stated by

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

In order that his acknowledgment be accepted as an obligation,

he must say

to the witnesses,

“You are my witnesses,”

and if he did not say this, his statement does not constitute an obligation; and the reason will be explained .

It was also stated: Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: [

the version of the Rif:

And he must say, “You are my witnesses”]

The version of the Rif reads:

“I have a maneh in your possession,” he said to him, “Yes”;

the next day he said to him, “Give it to me,” and he said, “I was joking with you,” he is exempt,

it will be explained shortly).

It was also taught in a beraita in this manner:

The creditor says to the borrower,

“I have a maneh in your possession”

my maneh is in your possession, for you owe me a maneh.

He said to him

the borrower to the creditor,

“Yes,”

yes.

The next day he said to him

the borrower to the creditor,

“Give it to me,”

return to me the maneh that you acknowledged to me yesterday.

He said to him

the borrower answered him,

“I was joking with you” [

from the expression “fool”; I was joking with you, because you made a false claim against me;] the borrower

is exempt

from giving it, because this is not an acknowledgment, even if witnesses testify that they heard his acknowledgment yesterday, since he did not say, “You are my witnesses.”

And the beraita continues:

Furthermore, even

if he

concealed

hid

witnesses for him behind a wall,

and the witnesses hear,

and he said to him, “I have a maneh in your possession,” and he said to him, “Yes.”

And the creditor asked him, “Do you

wish to acknowledge in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so

the witnesses?”

He said to him

the borrower: “[I would acknowledge to you in their presence, but]

I fear lest you compel me

force me

to court.” The next day he said to him, “Give it to me.” He said to him: “I was joking with you,”

he is exempt. For he did not acknowledge to him in the presence of witnesses.

And the beraita continues:

And

the court

does not claim

a claim of merit

for an inciter

who incited his fellow to worship idolatry.

Explanation: In all other cases liable to the death penalty by a court, the judges endeavor to find merit for him, in order to exempt him from death; but for an “inciter,” they do not claim for him if he does not claim for himself.

And we raise an objection:

An inciter?! Who mentioned him,

who mentioned his name?! What connection does the law of an inciter have here?

And we answer:

The text is incomplete,

the beraita as it was learned is missing something and is not understandable,

and this is what it teaches

and this is the correct version:

All this is speaking where he indeed claimed, “I was joking,” but

if

the borrower himself

did not claim “I was joking,” and now claims, “I will not give it until you bring witnesses who saw with their own eyes that you lent it to me,”

“I was only joking,” and now claims, “I will not pay until you bring witnesses who saw with their own eyes that you lent me the money,”

the court

does not

claim for him

to make the claim “I was joking”; rather, they say to him: Since you acknowledged, pay!

And the beraita continues:

And

if

in capital cases,

if there is a claim of merit for him,

even though

he himself

does not claim

because he does not know how to make a claim—the court [or the students sitting before the judges]

claims for him .

And concerning this the beraita concludes:

And one does not claim for an inciter.

And the Gemara clarifies:

What is different about an inciter,

why is his law different from all the laws of the Torah?

Rav Hama bar Hanina said: From the public discourse

the public lecture

of Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba I heard

I heard:

An inciter is different, for the Merciful One said

in the section of the inciter (Deuteronomy 13):

“You shall neither pity him nor conceal him.”

And concerning “one does not claim for an inciter,” the Gemara brings another exposition.

Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: From where

do we learn

that one does not claim for an inciter?

From the primordial serpent

who incited the woman to eat from the Tree of Knowledge, and said to her, “For God knows that on the day you eat from it... you will be like God, knowing good and evil,” and this was denial of the unity of God .

For Rabbi Simlai said: The serpent had many claims to make

in his defense [as will be explained]

but he did not make them. And why did the Holy One, blessed be He, not claim for him

the True Judge? Rather, He immediately said to him, “Because you have done this, cursed are you.”

Because he did not make the claim himself

the serpent himself; therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, did not claim for him, because “one does not claim for an inciter.”

And the Gemara explains:

What

claim

did he have

the serpent

to say

in his defense, and did not make it?

He should have claimed: “

The words of the Master and the words of the student—which words are obeyed?! The words of the Master are obeyed”

! Likewise, Eve’s apology, “The serpent deceived me,” cannot exempt her from obeying the word of the Holy One, blessed be He, who commanded, “But from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil you shall not eat from it.” And Eve knew this, for she said to the serpent, “And from the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, God said, ‘You shall not eat from it.’”

And from one matter to another, the Gemara explains the verses stated there concerning that sin.

Eve said to the serpent, “And from the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, God said, ‘You shall not eat from it, and you shall not touch it.’” But the Holy One, blessed be He, did not command the prohibition of touching.

Hezekiah said: From where

do we learn that

“whoever adds

to the commandments of the Torah ultimately

subtracts

from its commandments”?

As it is stated: God said, “You shall not eat from it,” and she added, “and you shall not touch it.”

And since she added a prohibition against touching, she came to subtract from the commandment of the Holy One, blessed be He. How? The serpent pushed the woman against the tree until she touched it. The serpent said to her: See! Just as there is no death for touching, so too you will not surely die for eating .

The Gemara expounds further expositions that “whoever adds subtracts.”

Rav Mesharsheya said: From here,

it is said in the Torah (Exodus 25), concerning the making of the Ark:

“Two cubits and a half was its length.”

The word “cubits,” without the letter alef, would be read as “two hundred,” meaning two hundred cubits, and the alef that was added reduced it to two cubits.

Rav Ashi said:

One should expound from what is stated concerning the making of the curtains:

“Eleven curtains,”

and without the letter ayin it would be read as “twelve curtains,” while with the addition of the ayin they were reduced to eleven.

The Gemara returns to the law of “acknowledgment.”

Rav Ashi said: They taught

in the beraita that when he claims, “I was joking,” he is exempt

only when he said

on the following day,

“I was joking with you,” but

if he

said: