Sanhedrin 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara relates:

the sons of Mar Ukva’s brother-in-law

the brothers of Mar Ukva’s wife.

They had been related and then became unrelated.

Their sister, Mar Ukva’s wife, died, and their relationship was severed.

They would come before him for judgment

to litigate before him.

He said to them: I am disqualified from adjudicating your case.

They thought that he said he was disqualified because of their relationship. Therefore—

They said to him: What is your opinion? Do you follow Rabbi Yehuda?! We will bring a letter from the West,

from Eretz Yisrael, where they ruled

that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

He said to them: Have I become stuck to you with a kab of wax,

as though I were attached to you by a kab of wax?! I am not attached to you, and I do not wish to adjudicate your case.

It is not because I say, “I am disqualified from adjudicating your case,”

because I hold in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

but because you do not accept judgment;

you do not accept a judicial ruling, and therefore I do not wish to adjudicate your case.

We learned in our Mishna:

“A friend”—this is his wedding attendant.

And the Gemara discusses this:

And how many

days is he considered his wedding attendant, who is disqualified on account of being a “friend”?

Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rav said: Throughout all seven days of the wedding feast.

And the Rabbis, in the name of Rava, say: Even from the first day onward,

the status of wedding attendant ends, and he again becomes fit to judge.

We learned in our Mishna: “A friend and an enemy. A friend—this is his wedding attendant”

. “An enemy”—anyone who has not

spoken with him for three days because of enmity. They said to him: The Jewish people are not suspected of this.

The Gemara explains the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda and his derivation from the Torah that a friend and an enemy are disqualified from testimony, as well as the rationale of the Rabbis who disagree with him.

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the Torah, in the passage concerning the cities of refuge (Numbers 35): “And he was not an enemy … and the assembly shall restore him to his city of refuge to which he fled.”

This verse is superfluous for purposes of exposition, because if the Torah intends to state that an unintentional killer is not liable for execution but for exile, this has already been stated elsewhere (Deuteronomy 4): “And he was not an enemy to him,” along with additional verses.

Therefore Rabbi Yehuda expounded that the verse does not refer to the killer, but to the witnesses, and we expound:

“And he was not an enemy to him”—

he shall testify concerning him;

he shall testify about him, whereas an enemy is disqualified from testimony.

And it is likewise stated there:

“And he did not seek his harm”—

and we expound:

he shall judge him,

because the following verse states: “And the assembly shall judge.” From here Rabbi Yehuda derives that judges who are enemies are likewise disqualified.

From this exposition,

we find

that there is disqualification

for an enemy,

but

from where do we derive regarding a friend

that he is disqualified?

Read it in this manner;

it is possible to expound it as follows:

“And he was not an enemy, nor a friend”—he shall testify concerning him. And he did not seek his harm

nor his benefit—

he shall judge him.

He shall judge him.

And we raise an objection:

Is “friend” written there?!

How can we expound it in this manner? Is the word “friend” written in the Torah?

Rather, it is a logical inference:

An enemy—what is the reason

he is disqualified?

Because his opinion is distanced

from him, and therefore a friend

also

is disqualified, because his opinion

is drawn close

to him.

The Gemara explains:

And the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda,

these

extra verses, “he was not an enemy to him” and “he did not seek his harm”—

what do they expound from them?

For what exposition are they needed?

One verse—

for a judge,

to teach that a judge who is an enemy [and the same is true of a friend] is disqualified. The Sages agree with Rabbi Yehuda that a judge who is an enemy [or a friend] is disqualified; the reason for distinguishing between a judge and a witness is explained in the Mishna.

The other

verse they expound

as

in

the following beraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said:

It is stated in the Torah:

“And he was not an enemy to him, nor did he seek his harm,

and the assembly shall judge him.”

From here

we learn

that two Torah scholars who hate one another—

do not sit in judgment together.

Mishna:

After the Mishna has taught who is fit to testify, it proceeds to explain the procedure for examining the witnesses.

Our Mishna speaks of monetary cases. Although in monetary cases one does not conduct extensive formal interrogations, the substance of the testimony is nevertheless examined.

How are the witnesses examined?

They would bring them into a room,

the judges.

And they would admonish them

to give truthful testimony and not false testimony.

And

during the examination

they would take all the people

the other witnesses

outside, and leave

behind

the greatest among them

of the witnesses, in order to examine them separately, each one in the other’s absence.

Since the Mishna describes the procedure of the trial, it incidentally explains another law concerning testimony: “One to whom many people, great in wisdom and fear of Heaven, testified that they saw a certain person commit a particular transgression, or that he lent money to a certain person—even though he believes the matter in his heart as though he himself saw it—may not testify until he sees the matter with his own eyes.” (The wording of the Rambam, chapter 17 of the Laws of Testimony.)

The Mishna also incidentally explains another law, the law of “acknowledgment”—that is, when a borrower acknowledges before witnesses that he owes money to the lender. There are circumstances in which such an acknowledgment is not accepted as testimony, as will be explained.

Therefore the judges examine the witnesses, to ascertain that the testimony is true and that it does not contain either of these two deficiencies.

And

the judges

say to him

the witness:

“Say! How do you know that this one owes that one?”

If he said,

the witness:

“He

the borrower

said to me: I

the borrower

owe him

the lender.”

Or if he said:

“A certain man said to me that he owes him.”

In both of these cases,

he has said nothing,

and his testimony is not testimony.

The reason is that if the borrower said this, even if he said it in the presence of witnesses, since he did not instruct them to be witnesses, his statement does not constitute an obligation; these are empty words, and he may claim that he said it because he did not want them to regard him as wealthy, as people commonly speak in this manner.

And if the witness said, “A certain man said to me,” his testimony is entirely worthless, since he did not see the loan with his own eyes, as explained above.

A witness—

that is, when is their testimony in fact accepted? When

the witness says

to the borrower:

“In our presence he acknowledged to him

the borrower acknowledged to the lender

that he owes him two hundred dinars,”

and he appointed us as witnesses to the matter, saying to us, “You are my witnesses.”

The Mishna now returns to the examination of the witnesses.

And afterward they would bring in the

witness

the second, and examine him.

If their statements were found to correspond,

to match, and their testimony was accepted, then

they would deliberate

the judges

about the matter.

The Mishna now explains the procedure by which the judges reach their decision and issue the judgment.

If

two

of the three judges

say

their ruling:

“Exempt,” while one says, “Liable,”

then he is

exempt.

And likewise, if

two say, “Liable,” while one says, “Exempt,”

then he is

liable, as it is stated (Exodus 23): “After the majority to incline.”

But if

one

says, “Liable,” and one says, “Exempt,”

and the third says, “I do not know”—

And likewise,

even if two acquit, or two find liable, and one says, “I do not know,”

the judgment has not been decided,

and they shall add

to

the judges.

When one says “Exempt,” one says “Liable,” and the third does not know, it is obvious that additional judges are added, since the judgment has not been decided. But when two say “Exempt” or “Liable” and the third does not know, even though if the third had disagreed with them as well, his view would have been nullified as the minority and the judgment would have been decided without him, nevertheless, since he said, “I do not know,” he is considered as though he had not sat with them in judgment. Consequently, the judgment was decided on the basis of two judges, whereas the Torah required three judges for monetary cases.

When they had concluded

the court

the matter, they would bring them in

[The Gemara will explain that during the deliberation they removed the litigants, the claimant and the defendant, and before issuing the judgment they brought them in].

The greatest of the judges would say: “So-and-so, you are exempt; so-and-so, you are liable.”

And from where

do we learn the following law?

When he leaves

the judge leaves the court,

he may not say

to the litigant who was found liable:

“I acquitted you!

I was of the minority opinion to acquit you,

but my colleagues

the judges

found you liable,

and

what could I do, since my colleagues were the majority.”

Regarding this it is stated:

“You shall not go about as a talebearer among your people.” And it says

and it is likewise stated:

“One who goes about as a talebearer reveals a secret” .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “And they issue them warnings.”

The Gemara explains:

How do we say this to them,

what words of warning do we say?

Rav Yehuda said: This

verse

we say to them: “Clouds and wind, but no rain,”

the heavens become covered with thick clouds, and there is wind to bring rain, but there is no rain; and why have the rains been withheld? Because of

a man who boasts of a gift

of falsehood,”

those who testify falsely; and in this way they warn them that, because of their false testimony, the rains will be withheld.

Rava said

to him:

These are not words of warning, for what do they care if the rains do not fall?

They can say

to themselves: A popular proverb says,

“For seven years

there

was famine,

there was famine,

but at the door of the craftsman

and at the door of one who knows a trade and is a craftsman,

the famine did not pass

the famine did not pass”; and the analogy is: We have saved ourselves.

Rather, Rava said: We say to them

to the witnesses, to warn them, this verse:

“A mace

a type of weapon

and a sharpened sword and arrow

come as punishment upon

a man who testifies falsely against his fellow.”

That is, the witnesses should fear the plague.

Rav Ashi said

to him:

These are not words of warning, for what do they care about the plague?

They can say

to themselves: A popular proverb says,

“For seven years

there

was pestilence,

there was pestilence,

but a person does not die before his time

and no person dies before the time appointed for his death.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Nathan bar Mar Zutra said to me: We say to them

to the witnesses, to warn them:

“False witnesses,

false witnesses,

their hire is contemptible,

they are despised and considered worthless even in the eyes of those who hire them.

As it is written,

when Naboth refused to give his vineyard to King Ahab, and his wife Jezebel sent to the judges of Naboth’s locality and commanded them to conduct a false trial against him, claiming that he had blasphemed God and the king, so that he would be killed and Ahab would inherit his vineyard, it is stated there:

“And set two worthless men before him, and let them testify against him, saying: ‘You have blessed God and the king,’”

so we see that Jezebel—and her men who were privy to the matter—also called the false witnesses “worthless men.”

We learned in our Mishna:

If he said, “He said to me”

it is nothing,

until they say: “In our presence he acknowledged to him that he owed him two hundred zuz.”

From the fact that the Mishna did not say that the witnesses say, “We heard that he acknowledged it,” but rather, “In our presence,” it may be inferred that he said to the witnesses: “You are my witnesses” that I acknowledge the debt to the creditor.

This inference from the wording of the Mishna

supports

the proof

of

the ruling stated by

Rav Yehuda said that Rav.

For Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

In order for his acknowledgment to be accepted as an undertaking,

he must say

to the witnesses:

“You are my witnesses,”

and if he did not say this, his statement does not constitute an undertaking; the reason will be explained .

It was also stated: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan: [

the version of the Rif:

And he must say: “You are my witnesses”]

The version of the Rif reads:

(If he said to him, “I have a maneh in your possession,” and he said to him, “Yes,”

the next day he said to him, “Give it to me,” and he said to him, “I was only fooling you,” he is exempt,

this will be explained shortly).

It was taught likewise in a beraita:

The creditor who says to the debtor,

“I have a maneh in your possession,”

my maneh is in your possession, for you owe me a maneh,

he said to him

the debtor to the creditor,

“Yes,”

yes.

The next day he said to him

the debtor to the creditor,

“Give it to me,”

return to me the maneh that you acknowledged owing me yesterday.

He said to him

the debtor answered him,

“I was only fooling you”

from the expression “fool”; I was joking with you, because you brought a false claim against me,

he is exempt

from paying, because this is not an acknowledgment—even if witnesses testify that they heard his acknowledgment the previous day—since he did not say: “You are my witnesses.”

And the beraita continues:

Moreover, even if

he

concealed

hid

witnesses for him behind a fence,

and the witnesses hear,

and he said to him, “I have a maneh in your possession,” and he said to him, “Yes.”

And the creditor asked him, “Do you wish

to acknowledge it in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,

the witnesses?”

He said to him

the debtor: “I would acknowledge it to you in their presence, but

I am afraid that you will compel me

force me

to go to court.” The next day he said to him, “Give it to me.” He said to him: “I was only fooling you,”

he is exempt, because he did not acknowledge the debt to him in the presence of witnesses.

And the beraita continues:

And

the court

does not argue

a claim of merit

on behalf of an inciter

who incited his fellow to worship idolatry.

Explanation: In the case of all other defendants liable to a court-imposed death penalty, the judges seek to find a merit on his behalf, in order to exempt him from death. But in the case of an “inciter,” they do not advance an argument on his behalf if he does not raise it himself.

And we object:

An inciter?! Who mentioned him?

Who mentioned his name?! What connection does the law of an inciter have here?

And we answer:

The beraita is incomplete,

the beraita as it was taught is missing a clause and is not understandable,

and this is what it teaches

and this is the correct version:

All this applies when he actually claimed, “I was only fooling you.” But

if

the debtor himself

did not claim

“I was only fooling you,” and now claims, “I will not pay until you bring witnesses who saw with their own eyes that you lent me the money,”

the

court

does not argue on his behalf

by raising the claim, “I was only fooling you.” Rather, they say to him: Since you acknowledged it, pay!

And the beraita continues:

And

if

in capital cases,

if there is an argument in his defense,

even though

he himself

did not raise it

because he does not know how to argue—the court [or the students sitting before the judges]

raises it on his behalf.

And regarding this the beraita concludes:

And they do not argue on behalf of an inciter.

And the Gemara clarifies:

What is different about an inciter,

why is his law different from all the laws of the Torah?

Rav Ḥama bar Ḥanina said: From the public discourse

the public lecture

of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba I heard

I heard:

An inciter is different, for the Merciful One said

in the passage concerning an inciter (Deuteronomy 13):

“You shall neither pity him nor conceal him.”

And concerning the statement “they do not argue on behalf of an inciter,” the Gemara cites another exposition.

Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: From where

do we learn

that they do not argue on behalf of an inciter?

From the primordial serpent,

which incited the woman to eat from the Tree of Knowledge, saying to her: “For God knows that on the day you eat of it… you will be like God, knowing good and evil,” which is a denial of the unity of God.

For Rabbi Simlai said: The serpent had many arguments it could have raised

in its defense [as will be explained],

but it did not raise them. And why did the Holy One, blessed be He, not raise an argument on its behalf

as the true Judge? Instead, He immediately said to it: “Because you have done this, cursed are you.”

Because it did not raise the argument itself

the serpent itself did not raise it; therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, did not raise it on its behalf, because “one does not argue on behalf of an inciter.”

The Gemara explains:

What

argument

could it have

the serpent

said

in its defense, but did not raise?

It should have argued:

“The words of the Master and the words of the disciple—which words does one obey?! One obeys the words of the Master!”

Likewise, Eve’s excuse, “The serpent beguiled me,” cannot exempt her from obeying the word of the Holy One, blessed be He, who commanded: “And of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, you shall not eat of it.” And Eve knew this, for she said to the serpent: “And of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, God has said: You shall not eat of it.”

And moving from one matter to another, the Gemara explains the verses stated there concerning that sin.

Eve said to the serpent: “And of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, God has said: You shall not eat of it, and you shall not touch it.” Yet the Holy One, blessed be He, did not command a prohibition against touching it.

Ḥizkiya said: From where

do we learn that

“whoever adds

to the mitzvot of the Torah ultimately

diminishes

its mitzvot”?

As it is stated: God said, “You shall not eat of it,” and she added, “You shall not touch it.”

And once she added the prohibition against touching, she came to diminish the mitzva of the Holy One, blessed be He. How? The serpent pushed the woman against the tree until she touched it, and the serpent said to her: “See! Just as there is no death for touching it, so too will you surely not die for eating it.”

The Gemara cites additional expositions showing that “whoever adds diminishes.”

Rav Mesharshiya said: From here,

it is stated in the Torah (Exodus 25), concerning the construction of the Ark:

“Two cubits and a half was its length.”

The word “amot” without the letter alef is read as “two hundred,” meaning two hundred cubits; the alef that was added diminished it to two cubits.

Rav Ashi said:

This may be derived from what is stated concerning the construction of the curtains:

“Eleven curtains,”

where without the letter ayin it would have been read “twelve curtains,” and with the addition of the letter ayin it was diminished to eleven.

The Gemara returns to the law of “acknowledgment.”

Rav Ashi said: They taught

in the beraita that one who claims, “I was only fooling you,” is exempt

only when he said

the following day:

“I was only fooling you,” but

if he

said: