Sanhedrin 28b (כח:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara relates:

Rav happened to come

and arrived

to purchase

parchment,

to buy sheets of parchment.

They asked him

and questioned him:

what is the halakha

—is it permitted

for a man to testify concerning his stepson

in a lawsuit over her property against an unrelated person?

The sides of the doubt are as follows: Although he is disqualified with regard to his stepson, just as his stepson is disqualified with regard to him, and this is derived by inference, it is possible that he is not disqualified with regard to his wife. Indeed, concerning all relatives, if one is disqualified with regard to him, he is also disqualified with regard to his wife, as explained above (Rule 3). Nevertheless, it is possible that with other relatives the reason is that the relationship to the woman arises on account of the relationship to her son, who is fit to inherit from her; therefore, since he is disqualified with regard to her son, he is also disqualified with regard to her. But in the case of one’s stepson, whose son is not a relative, as explained in the Mishna, her status may be different, since he has no relationship to her through her son, who is not a relative.

The Gemara resolves the doubt:

In

the academy of

Sura they say: A husband is like his wife.

In

the academy of

Pumbedita they say: A wife is like her husband,

and just as his wife is her mother-in-law, so he is considered as though he were her father-in-law, and he is therefore disqualified.

As Rav Huna said in the name of Rav

(Naḥman): From where

do we derive

that a wife is like her husband?

As it is written

in the Torah, in the passage concerning forbidden relationships (Leviticus 18):

“You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s brother; you shall not approach his wife; she is your aunt.”

And we derive from this: Is she his aunt

? Surely she is his uncle’s wife!

Rather,

by inference

this comes to teach us:

that a woman is like her husband.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And his mother’s husband, he, his son, and his son-in-law.”

The Gemara discusses the phrase “his son,” and initially suggests that it refers to a son who is also her son, that is, his maternal brother. Therefore, we raise the following objection:

“His son”! That is his brother

on his mother’s side! We have already learned “his brother.”

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: It was necessary

for the Mishna to teach not about an actual brother, as the questioner assumed,

but about the

son of his mother’s husband, who is not his mother’s son, and he is

a brother of a brother,

meaning, the brother on the father’s side of the brother who is his maternal brother.

Rav Ḥisda deemed him fit

and deemed him fit to testify

in the case of a brother of a brother,

maintaining that he is not a relative, but merely the relative of a relative.

They said to him: Have you not heard

—have you not heard

that which Rabbi Yirmeya said,

who maintains that he is disqualified?

He said to them

Rav Ḥisda:

I have not heard it

—it has not reached me,

meaning, I do not hold so

—I do not maintain this view.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so,

if the Mishna is referring to an actual brother,

that is his brother

! It has already taught us “his brother.”

The Gemara answers:

The tanna

of the Mishna teaches

“his brother” on his father’s side, and teaches

the son of his mother’s husband, who is his mother’s son, and he is

“his brother” on his mother’s side.

The Gemara discusses the fathers of the groom and the bride, the in-laws, asking whether the relationship between their children causes a relationship between them that renders them disqualified relatives.

Rav Ḥisda said: The father of the groom and the father of the bride—

may testify for one another, and they are not comparable to one another

and their relationship is not considered a relationship,

but rather like the stopper of a barrel,

like a lid that is not similar to the barrel.

The Gemara discusses whether a betrothed man is fit to testify concerning his betrothed before their marriage, or whether they are considered relatives.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: A man may testify concerning his betrothed wife,

in a lawsuit against an unrelated person.

Ravina said: We said this

—this permission was stated even according to Rabba bar bar Ḥana—

only

when he comes to testify

to remove money from her,

to take money away from her, meaning, to rule against her and in favor of the opposing litigant, for then he is not a party with an interest in the testimony.

But

if he comes to testify

to bring money to her,

to give her money, meaning, to rule in her favor and against the opposing litigant—

he is not believed,

even though she is not his relative, since he is suspected of wishing to benefit her so that the money will come into his possession when they marry.

This is according to Rabba bar bar Ḥana. But Ravina himself maintains:

That is not so

and the law is not this way. Rather,

it makes no difference whether he is removing from her or bringing to her,

whether the testimony is to her detriment or to her benefit—

he is not believed,

and his status is that of a relative.

And why? Because

what is your reasoning

in saying that he is not her relative? Is it because you wish to compare the law of a relative with regard to testimony to the other laws of relationship that apply between them from the time of betrothal?

And what are these other laws of relationship?

As

in

that which Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla:

Ulla summarizes the laws of relationship between a betrothed man and his betrothed.

His betrothed wife,

if she dies,

he does not observe acute mourning,

and does not observe the laws of aninut that prohibit him from eating sacrificial food, as he does when his married wife dies,

nor does he become impure for her

if he is a kohen, as he becomes impure for his wife.

And likewise, she does not observe acute mourning

when he dies, as a woman does for her husband,

nor does she become impure for him

—she is not commanded to attend to his burial. If

she dies,

he does not inherit her,

as a husband inherits his wife; and if

he dies,

she collects her ketuba,

if he wrote her a ketuba at the time of betrothal [a standard ketuba is written only from the time of marriage].

And if you wish to compare the law of relationship with regard to testimony to the law of relationship concerning impurity from the dead—just as they are not relatives with regard to impurity, so too they are not relatives with regard to testimony—this comparison does not hold, because:

There,

with regard to the laws of impurity and inheritance,

the Torah made it dependent on “his relative”,

the Torah made these two laws dependent on the relationship of “the relative who is closest to him,” which is marriage. As it is stated concerning impurity (Leviticus 21): “Except for his relative who is closest to him—for her he may become impure”; and it is likewise stated concerning inheritance (Numbers 27): “For his relative who is closest to him, from his family, he shall inherit it.” From this verse the Sages derived that a husband inherits his wife.

As long as they have not married, they are not “relatives” of one another; therefore, he does not become impure for her and does not inherit her.

But

here,

with regard to the law of testimony, the definition of relationship is

because of closeness of mind

—anyone between whom there is emotional closeness.

And this

betrothed man

has closeness of mind toward her

—he is emotionally attached to her, and therefore he is disqualified from testifying concerning her, like a husband concerning his wife, whether the testimony is to her detriment or to her benefit.

We learned in our Mishna:

“His stepson alone.”

The Sages taught: “His stepson alone. Rabbi Yosei says: His brother-in-law.”

And it was taught in another beraita

in another beraita:

“His brother-in-law alone.”

Rabbi Yehuda says: “His stepson.”

The Gemara explains:

What is it saying?

If you say

that

this is what it is saying,

the first tanna of the first beraita, who is Rabbi Yehuda, says:

“His stepson alone,” and the same law applies to his brother-in-law alone,

whereas his son and son-in-law are not disqualified.

And

he came

Rabbi Yosei came to say

that:

“His brother-in-law alone,” and the same law applies to his stepson

alone.

It follows [according to the version of the Baḥ] that both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei maintain that both his brother-in-law and his stepson are disqualified on their own. Their dispute is only that each of the tannaim stated the law concerning one of them.

According to this approach, the second beraita is likewise explained as follows: The first tanna, who is Rabbi Yosei, says: “His brother-in-law alone,” and the same law applies to his stepson; Rabbi Yehuda says: “His stepson alone,” and the same law applies to his brother-in-law.

This interpretation is difficult:

Rather,

how are we to explain

our Mishna,

our Mishna,

which teaches:

“His brother-in-law, he, his son, and his son-in-law”—whose

Mishna is it,

neither Rabbi Yehuda’s nor Rabbi Yosei’s?

Rather, this is what it is saying:

The first tanna of the first beraita, who is Rabbi Yehuda, says:

“His stepson alone, but his brother-in-law includes him, his son, and his son-in-law”; and Rabbi Yosei came to say: “His brother-in-law alone, but his stepson includes him, his son, and his son-in-law.”

And the second beraita is explained similarly: Rabbi Yosei says: “His brother-in-law alone,” and Rabbi Yehuda says: “His stepson alone.”

According to this interpretation, our Mishna is the Mishna of Rabbi Yehuda.

Indeed, according to this interpretation the Mishna and the beraitot are explained.

But

another difficulty arises:

The teaching of Rabbi Ḥiyya: “Eight primary categories that are twenty-four”

derivative categories—

according to whom

was this taught?

Not according to Rabbi Yosei and not according to Rabbi Yehuda,

since according to Rabbi Yosei there are nine primary categories [and eight of them have two derivatives, making a total of twenty-five], and the same is true according to Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara answers:

Rather, this is what it is saying:

This is how the first beraita is to be understood: The first tanna, who is Rabbi Yehuda, maintains:

“His stepson alone, but his brother-in-law includes him, his son, and his son-in-law”; and Rabbi Yosei came to say: “His brother-in-law alone, and all the more so his stepson”—

alone, without his son and son-in-law.

And the second beraita is likewise explained: The first tanna, who is Rabbi Yosei, says: “His brother-in-law alone, and all the more so his stepson”; Rabbi Yehuda says: “His stepson alone, but his brother-in-law includes him, his son, and his son-in-law.”

And

now everything is resolved:

The Mishna

is the Mishna of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who maintains that his stepson alone is disqualified, whereas his brother-in-law includes him, his son, and his son-in-law. But

the beraita

of Rabbi Ḥiyya, which counted only eight primary categories and their derivatives, is the teaching of

Rabbi Yosei,

who maintains that neither his brother-in-law nor his stepson is a primary category, since they have no derivatives.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara discusses whether Shmuel ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yosei of our Mishna, which is the first Mishna. Accordingly, his brother-in-law is fit, since he is not fit to inherit from him, as explained there; or whether he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yosei of the beraita, who disqualifies his brother-in-law alone. This is clarified through an incident:

There was this gift

—a deed of gift—

upon which were signed

two people who had signed it,

two brothers-in-law,

two men whose wives were sisters.

The amora

Rav Yosef considered

deeming it fit

—he wished to validate the deed and obligate the owner of the deed to give the gift.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

and he understood this to refer to Rabbi Yosei of the Mishna, who deems one brother-in-law fit to testify for another; therefore, he also deemed “a brother-in-law for an unrelated person” fit.

Abaye said to him

to Rav Yosef:

From where

do you know that Shmuel was referring to

the

words of

opinion of Rabbi Yosei in our Mishna, who deems a brother-in-law fit; perhaps

Shmuel was referring to

the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in the beraita, who disqualifies a brother-in-law?

Rav Yosef replied:

It cannot enter your mind

—this is not plausible,

for Shmuel said,

explaining the term “brother-in-law”:

“For example, myself and Pinḥas, who were

who are

brothers and brothers-in-law,”

two brothers married to two sisters, so that they are both brothers and brothers-in-law.

Rav Yosef inferred from Shmuel’s words that only they are disqualified because they are brothers,

but an ordinary brother-in-law is entirely acceptable

and fit to testify. It therefore follows that Shmuel must have meant Rabbi Yosei of the Mishna.

Abaye objected to him:

But perhaps

when Shmuel said

“for example, myself and Pinḥas,”

he was explaining what a brother-in-law is, and he brought an example from himself,

and

his disqualification

is because he said “brother-in-law,”

meaning, even if we were not brothers, we would be disqualified on account of being brothers-in-law.

Rav Yosef then retracted his ruling and disqualified the witnesses to the deed.

Nevertheless, he wished to validate the deed through the law of witnesses to the delivery. That is: If witnesses who saw the donor deliver the deed to the recipient were produced, the deed could be validated in this manner.

Rav Yosef said to the recipient of the gift: “

Go

and bring witnesses who saw the delivery of the deed, and through this

you will acquire it

and acquire the gift

through witnesses to the delivery.”

In accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

who maintains that even if no witnesses signed a deed, if it was given “in the presence of” witnesses, the deed is valid with all the laws of a deed.

Abaye replied to him: Indeed, if it contains no witnesses at all, Rabbi Elazar maintains that the deed is valid; but this deed has witnesses who are disqualified signed upon it.

And

is it not the case that

Rabbi Abba said: Rabbi Elazar concedes with regard to a

deed

that is intrinsically forged,

in which disqualified witnesses signed,

that it is invalid,

and it is inferior to a deed on which no one signed at all? The reason is that if no one signed it, the acquisition effected through the deed—which is a valid deed—is accomplished by delivering the deed before witnesses; but if disqualified witnesses signed it and the deed is invalid, there is no deed here at all, merely a piece of paper. Through what, then, is the acquisition effected?

He said to him,

Rav Yosef to the recipient of the gift: “

Go! My students do not permit me

to give you

the right to receive the gift,

that I should give you the right to receive the gift.”

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

even if his daughter died and he has sons from her, he is still considered a relative.

Rabbi Tanḥum said that Rabbi Tavla said that Rabbi Bruna said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Whereas

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda. And similarly, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

There are those

who

teach

who taught

this statement of Rabba bar bar Ḥana with regard to

this beraita:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili expounded this verse.

It is stated in the Torah (Deuteronomy 17):

“And you shall come to the kohanim, the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days.”

And this is difficult:

Could it enter your mind that a person would go to a judge who was not alive in his days!?

Rather,

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili explains:

This is

the judge

who was a relative and subsequently became unrelated;

you may come to him, but if he is still a relative, he is disqualified.

And with regard to these words,

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who holds that one who was a relative and subsequently became unrelated is fit.