Sanhedrin 28b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara relates:

Rav happened to come

arrived

to purchase ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

parchment,

to buy scroll sheets.

They asked him

they questioned him:

what is the law

is it permitted

for a person to testify concerning the wife of his stepson

in her lawsuit over her property with an outsider?

And the sides of the doubt are: although he is disqualified with regard to his stepson, just as his stepson is disqualified with regard to him, and this is learned mikalal—perhaps he is not disqualified with regard to his wife. Indeed, with all other relatives, if he is disqualified with regard to him, he is also disqualified with regard to his wife, as explained above (Rule 3). Nevertheless, perhaps in the case of the other relatives the reason is that the relationship to the woman comes because of the relationship to her son, who is fit to inherit him; therefore, since he is disqualified with regard to her son, he is also disqualified with regard to her. But in the case of his stepson, whose son is not a relative, as explained in the Mishna, perhaps her status is different, since she has no relationship because of her son, who is not a relative.

The Gemara resolves it:

In

the academy of

Sura they say: The husband is like his wife.

In

the academy of

Pumbedita they say: The wife is like her husband,

and just as his wife is his mother-in-law, so he is as though he were her father-in-law, and therefore he is disqualified.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav

(Naḥman): From where

do we derive

that the wife is like her husband?

For it is written

it is stated in the Torah, in the section of forbidden sexual relations (Leviticus 18):

“The nakedness of your father’s brother you shall not uncover; you shall not approach his wife; she is your aunt.”

And we expound: Is she his aunt!?

But she is his uncle’s wife!

Rather,

from this

it follows that this comes to teach us:

the wife is like her husband.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And his mother’s husband: he, his son, and his son-in-law.”

The Gemara discusses “his son,” and reasons that it refers to his son who is also her son, and he is his maternal brother. Therefore, we raise the difficulty:

“His son”! That is his brother

on his mother’s side!? We already learned, “his brother.”

And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: It was necessary

the Mishna did not come to teach us about an actual brother, as the questioner reasoned,

but for the

son of his mother’s husband, who is not the son of his mother, and he is

the brother of a brother,

that is, the brother on the father’s side of the brother on the mother’s side.

Rav Ḥisda declared fit

he declared him fit for testimony

in the case of the brother of a brother,

and held that he is not a relative, but only a relative of a relative.

They said to him: Have you not heard

have you not heard

that teaching of Rabbi Yirmeya

who holds that he is disqualified!?

He said to them

Rav Ḥisda:

I have not heard it

it has not reached me,

that is, I do not hold so

I do not maintain this opinion.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so,

if it refers to an actual brother,

that is his brother?

We have already been taught “his brother.”

And the Gemara answers:

The tanna

the Mishna teaches

“his brother” on the father’s side, and it teaches “his son”

of his mother’s husband, who is his mother’s son, and he is

“his brother” on the mother’s side.

The Gemara discusses the fathers of the groom and the bride [“the in-laws”]: does the relationship between their children cause a relationship between them, making them disqualified as relatives?

Rav Ḥisda said: The father of the groom and the father of the bride—

may testify for one another, and they are not comparable to one another

and their relationship is not a relationship,

but they are like the stopper of a barrel

like a lid that is not similar to the barrel.

The Gemara discusses whether a betrothed man is fit to testify for his betrothed before the marriage: are they considered relatives?

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: A person may testify for his betrothed wife,

in her lawsuit with an outsider.

Ravina said: We said this only

this permission was stated even according to Rabba bar bar Ḥana

but

when he comes to testify

to remove from her

to take money away from her, that is, against her and in favor of the opposing litigant; in that case he is not “interested in his testimony,”

but

to testify

to bring in for her

to bring money to her, that is, in her favor and against the opposing litigant—

he is not believed,

even though he is not a relative, because he is suspected of wishing to benefit her, so that the money will come into his possession when they marry.

And this is according to Rabba bar bar Ḥana, but Ravina himself holds—

But it is not so

and the law is not so, rather,

it makes no difference whether to remove from her or whether to bring in for her

whether against her or in her favor—

he is not believed,

and his law is that of a relative.

And why? Because

what is your reasoning

what is your reasoning for saying that he is not her relative? It is because you wish to compare the law of a relative regarding testimony with the other laws of relationship that apply between them from the time of betrothal.

And what are these other laws of relationship?

As

in

that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla:

[Ulla summarizes the laws of relationship between a betrothed man and his betrothed.]

His betrothed wife

if she dies—

he does not observe mourning

he does not observe the laws of acute mourning, to be prohibited from eating sacrificial food, as he is prohibited upon the death of his married wife,

and he does not become impure for her

if he is a koen, as he becomes impure for his wife.

And likewise she does not observe mourning

upon his death, as a woman does for her husband,

and she does not become impure for him

she is not commanded to attend to him. If

she dies—

he does not inherit her

as a husband inherits his wife; and if

he dies—

she collects her ketuba

in a case where he wrote a ketuba for her from the time of betrothal [a standard ketuba is written only from the time of marriage].

And your wish to compare the law of relationship regarding testimony with the law of relationship regarding impurity through contact with the dead—just as they are not relatives with regard to impurity, so they are not relatives for the law of testimony—this comparison does not stand, because—

there

with regard to the law of impurity and inheritance—

the Torah made it dependent on “his relative”,

the Torah made these two laws dependent on the relationship of “kin of his flesh,” which is marriage. As it says regarding impurity (Leviticus 21): “Except for his relative who is close to him, for her he may become impure,” and likewise it says regarding inheritance (Numbers 27): “To his relative who is close to him, from his family, and he shall inherit it”; from this verse the Sages derived that a husband inherits his wife.

And as long as they have not married, they are not “kin of flesh” to one another; therefore, he does not become impure for her and he does not inherit her—

But

here,

in the law of testimony, the definition of relationship

is because of closeness of mind,

whoever has closeness of mind between them,

and this

betrothed man

has closeness of mind toward her

he has closeness of mind toward her, and therefore he is disqualified from testifying for her, like a husband for his wife, whether against her or in her favor.

We learned in our Mishna:

His stepson alone.

The Sages taught: His stepson alone. Rabbi Yosei says: His brother-in-law.

And it was taught in another beraita

in another beraita:

His brother-in-law alone.

Rabbi Yehuda says: His stepson.

The Gemara explains:

What is it saying?

If you say

if it is said

this is what it is saying

the first tanna of the first beraita, who is Rabbi Yehuda:

His stepson alone, and the same law applies to his brother-in-law

alone, whereas his son and son-in-law are not disqualified.

And

he came

Rabbi Yosei to say

to say:

His brother-in-law alone, and the same law applies to his stepson

alone.

And it follows [according to the version of the Bach] that both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei hold that both his brother-in-law and his stepson are disqualified alone. Their dispute is only that each of the tannaim stated the law regarding one of them.

And according to this approach, the second beraita is also explained in this way: the first tanna, who is Rabbi Yosei, says: His brother-in-law alone, and the same law applies to his stepson; Rabbi Yehuda says: His stepson alone, and the same law applies to his brother-in-law.

This explanation is difficult—

Rather,

how shall we explain the

Mishna,

our Mishna,

which teaches: “

His brother-in-law: he, his son, and his son-in-law,”

whose Mishna is it,

not Rabbi Yehuda’s and not Rabbi Yosei’s?

Rather, this is what it is saying

the first tanna in the first beraita, who is Rabbi Yehuda:

His stepson alone, but his brother-in-law: he, his son, and his son-in-law; and Rabbi Yosei came to say: His brother-in-law alone, but his stepson: he, his son, and his son-in-law.

And likewise the second beraita is explained: Rabbi Yosei says: His brother-in-law alone, and Rabbi Yehuda says: His stepson alone.

And according to this explanation, our Mishna is the Mishna of Rabbi Yehuda.

Indeed, according to this explanation, the Mishna and the beraitot are explained,

but

another difficulty arises:

that which Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Eight primary relatives that are twenty-four

secondary relatives—

according to whom

was it taught,

not according to Rabbi Yosei and not according to Rabbi Yehuda,

for according to Rabbi Yosei there are nine primary relatives [and eight of them have two secondary relatives, making twenty-five], and likewise according to Rabbi Yehuda?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, this is what it is saying

the first beraita is explained as follows: the first tanna, who is Rabbi Yehuda, holds:

His stepson alone, but his brother-in-law: he, his son, and his son-in-law; and Rabbi Yosei came to say: His brother-in-law alone, and all the more so his stepson

“alone,” without his son and son-in-law.

And likewise the second beraita is explained: the first tanna, who is Rabbi Yosei, says: His brother-in-law alone, and all the more so his stepson; Rabbi Yehuda says: His stepson alone, but his brother-in-law: he, his son, and his son-in-law.

And

now everything is resolved:

the Mishna

is the Mishna of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that his stepson is alone, while his brother-in-law is he, his son, and his son-in-law. Whereas the

beraita

of Rabbi Ḥiyya, which counted only eight primary relatives and their secondary relatives, is the Mishna of

Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that his brother-in-law and his stepson are both not primary relatives, because they have no secondary relatives.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara discusses whether Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosei of our Mishna, which is the first Mishna—and accordingly, his brother-in-law is fit, since he is not fit to inherit him, as explained there—or like Rabbi Yosei of the beraita, who disqualifies his brother-in-law alone. And they clarify this from an incident—

That gift document

a deed of gift,

upon which were signed

which had signed upon it

two brothers-in-law

two men whose wives are sisters.

Rav Yosef thought

the amora

Rav Yosef—

to declare it valid

he wished to validate the document and obligate the owner of the document to give the gift.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei,

and he held that this referred to Rabbi Yosei of the Mishna, who declares one’s brother-in-law fit to testify for his brother-in-law; therefore, he also declares “one’s brother-in-law for the world” fit.

Abaye said to him

to Rav Yosef:

From where

do you know that Shmuel was referring to

the

words of

Rabbi Yosei of the Mishna, who declares his brother-in-law fit; perhaps

it is possible that Shmuel was referring to

Rabbi Yosei of the beraita, who disqualifies his brother-in-law?

Rav Yosef replied:

It does not enter your mind

this is not plausible,

for Shmuel said

the meaning of “his brother-in-law” is:

such as I and Pinḥas, who were

we were

brothers and brothers-in-law,

two brothers married to two sisters, and they are both brothers and brothers-in-law.

And Rav Yosef inferred from Shmuel’s words: only they are disqualified because they are brothers,

but an ordinary brother-in-law, it is perfectly acceptable

they are fit for testimony. Therefore, it is reasonable that Shmuel’s intention is that the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei of the Mishna.

Abaye objected to him:

But perhaps,

perhaps Shmuel’s intention in saying

such as I and Pinḥas

was to explain what a brother-in-law is, and he gave an example from himself,

and

their disqualification

is because he said, “his brother-in-law”,

that is, even if we were not brothers, we would be disqualified because of “his brother-in-law.”

And Rav Yosef retracted his position and disqualified the “witnesses” to the document.

Nevertheless, he wished to validate the document through the law of “witnesses to delivery.” That is: if witnesses who saw the giver “deliver” the document to the recipient of the gift were brought, the document could thereby be validated.

Rav Yosef said to the recipient of the gift: “

Go

go and bring witnesses who saw the delivery of the document, and through this

you will acquire

acquire the gift

through witnesses to delivery.”

According to Rabbi Elazar

who holds: a document, even if witnesses have not signed it, but it was given “in the presence” of witnesses, is valid as all the laws of a document.

Abaye replied to him: Indeed, if there are no witnesses in it at all, Rabbi Elazar holds that the document is valid; but witnesses who are disqualified have signed this document,

and

does he not

say Rabbi Abba: Rabbi Elazar concedes regarding a

document

forged within itself,

in which disqualified witnesses signed,

that it is disqualified,

and it is worse than if they had not signed it at all. The reason is that if they had not signed at all, the acquisition of the document—which is a valid document—would be effected by delivery of the document in the presence of witnesses; but if disqualified witnesses signed it and the document is disqualified, there is no document here, but merely a piece of paper, and through what is the acquisition effected?

He said to him

Rav Yosef to the recipient of the gift: "

Go! My students do not allow me

to appoint him

for you

that I should give you the right to receive the gift."

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Judah says

even if his daughter died and he has sons from her, behold, he is a relative.

Rabbi Tanḥum said that Rabbi Tavla said that Rabbi Brona said that Rav said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Judah.

But

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is not according to Rabbi Judah. And likewise Rabbah bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is not according to Rabbi Judah.

There are those

who

teach

who taught

this statement of Rabbah bar bar Ḥana, concerning this

baraita:

This did Rabbi Yose the Galilean expound.

It is stated in the Torah (Deuteronomy 17):

“And you shall come to the priests, the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days.”

And it is difficult:

Would it enter your mind that a person goes to a judge who was not in his days!?

Rather,

Rabbi Yose the Galilean explains:

This

judge

who was a relative and became distant

to him you shall come, but if he is a relative, he is disqualified.

And concerning these words

Rabbah bar bar Ḥana said that

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean,

who holds that one who was a relative and became distant is fit.