Sanhedrin 28a — the Talmud in English

Now we return to expound interpretations of the verses in order to disqualify relatives from testimony.

From what is stated: “Fathers shall not be put to death on account of sons, and sons shall not be put to death on account of fathers,”

we find

we have learned:

fathers to sons

Reuben may not testify for the son of Simeon; and likewise we find

sons to fathers

the son of Simeon may not testify for Reuben; and all the more so Reuben may not testify for his brother Simeon [first to first], for their relationship is closer than first to second and second to first.

Sons to sons,

the sons of Reuben to the sons of Simeon [second to second]],

from where do we know

to disqualify them?

And the Gemara answers:

If so,

according to your words, that only second to first is disqualified,

let the verse write

—it would be sufficient for it to have written:

“Fathers shall not be put to death on ‘son,’”

and it would have been understood that the son of one of the fathers is disqualified for the two fathers;

what

did the Torah include by saying

“sons”?

It indicates

that even sons to each other,

who are second to second, are disqualified from testifying.

Just as relatives are disqualified from testifying for their relatives, so too, when the witnesses are relatives of one another, they are disqualified from testifying together. And now the Gemara expounds this law.

From the exposition that we expounded,

we find sons to each other

relatives for their relatives—

sons,

that is, relatives who come together to testify

for the world

about a man from the marketplace who is not their relative—

from where do we know it?

Rami bar Hama said: It is logical!

This law does not require an exposition from Scripture, as we find in a beraita in tractate Makkot, which derives from a decree of Scripture that the law of false witnesses is not fulfilled by punishing them with what they plotted to punish the defendant unless both of them are contradicted, that is, the contradicting witnesses testify about the “two” witnesses that they were with them at that same time in another place. [But if they contradict only one of them, then although their testimony is nullified, because only one witness remains, nevertheless the witness who was contradicted is not punished with the punishment of what he plotted].

As it was taught: The witnesses do not become false witnesses until both of them are contradicted .

And Rami bar Hama proves:

And if it enters your mind that sons for the world are fit, it follows that a false witness is killed through the testimony of his brother.

How so? For if they are contradicted, each one of them has a part in contradicting the other, because without him the law of false witnesses would not be fulfilled upon them; and if they testified to a capital matter, they would put the two relatives to death, each because of the other.

Therefore one must say that they are not accepted for testimony initially, so that a situation would not arise in which this relative has a part in killing his relative.

Rava said to him: And according to your reasoning—

Rava disagrees with Rami bar Hama’s logical argument and raises an objection from a Mishna in the chapter “The Presumption of Ownership of Houses,” concerning a three-year presumption of ownership.

One who maintained possession of his fellow’s land for three years has the presumption that the land is his, and he need not prove his ownership with a document; it is sufficient for him to bring witnesses who saw him maintaining possession of the land.

These witnesses need not be continuous, meaning that it is sufficient if one group testifies about one year, a second group about the second, and a third about the third, provided that together they all testify about three consecutive years.

This is what we learned: Three brothers

each one of them testifies about a different year,

and one

from the marketplace, who is not their relative,

joins with them

and testifies about all three years—

these are three testimonies,

and the presumption of ownership stands, and there is no disqualification of relatives testifying, since each of the brothers testifies with a separate testimony about a separate year.

And

the four of them

are one testimony for

the law of

false witnesses,

meaning that if the first landowner brings witnesses and they contradict them, they do not pay him the value of the land that they sought to cause him to lose and from which to dispossess him until they contradict all four of them. The reason is that the presumption of ownership was established through the testimony of all four.

And Rava concludes his objection: And according to your reasoning,

it follows that a false witness pays money through the testimony of his brother?!

It follows that each one pays his share only because the other witnesses, who are his relatives, joined with him.

Rather,

you are forced to say that one witness is not a “part” of the testimony of the other, and the reason that they do pay is that

the contradiction—

comes from the world

through the contradicting witnesses, and they obligate them to pay, and not one another, each to his fellow.

So too,

likewise, in capital testimony, one witness is not a part of the testimony of the other,

and the contradiction comes from the world;

the contradicting witnesses obligate them to the punishment of death, because this is what the Torah decreed.

And Rami bar Hama’s reasoning has been refuted; therefore the Gemara brings an exposition to disqualify “sons for the world”—

Rather,

it is expounded from the end of the verse:

If so, let the verse write: “And son” concerning fathers; alternatively,

let the verse write:

“They” concerning fathers.

What

is the reason the Torah was precise to write

“and sons”?

Therefore we expound:

even sons for the world

are disqualified.

And the Gemara objects: From these expositions

we find the father’s relatives,

but

the mother’s relatives,

who are enumerated in our Mishna, such as his mother’s brother,

from where do we know

that they are disqualified?

And the Gemara answers:

The verse said: “fathers,” “fathers,” twice.

It would have been sufficient to write: “Fathers shall not be put to death on account of sons, and sons ‘on account of them.’” Therefore we expound:

If

the word is superfluous,

make it refer to the mother’s relatives,

and this is a principle in the Torah, which says that a superfluous word is made available to be expounded concerning something similar to it.

And the Gemara objects: From these expositions

we find,

we find that we can learn that relatives are disqualified from testifying

for liability,

for such is the meaning of the verse, “shall not be put to death,” in the testimony of fathers concerning sons. But relatives who come to testify

for acquittal

of their relatives,

from where do we know

that they are disqualified? And the Gemara answers:

The verse said:

not “shall be put to death” fathers on account of sons, and sons shall not “be put to death,”

twice,

two times; and one of them is superfluous, for it should have written: “Fathers shall not be put to death on account of sons, and sons on account of fathers.” And we expound:

If it does not refer to liability—

make it refer to acquittal.

And the Gemara objects: Indeed, from this verse, which is stated regarding the sin of death,

we find,

we find that relatives are disqualified

in capital cases,

but

in monetary cases, from where do we know

that they are disqualified?

And the Gemara answers:

The verse said:

another verse was stated (Leviticus 24): “One who strikes an animal shall pay [monetary cases], and one who strikes a person shall be put to death [capital cases],”

one judgment shall be for you.”

And we expound:

a judgment that is equal for you,

monetary cases are equal to capital cases.

From the verse “They shall not be put to death,” through a superfluity and through the plural wording, the following are expounded: a. fathers to each other, and sons to each other, even though they are second to second, and all the more so first to second and first to first. b. Sons for the world. c. The mother’s relatives. d. Both for acquittal and for liability.

A husband as his wife and a wife as her husband is expounded below from another verse.

Rav holds that even third to first is disqualified.

Rav said: My father’s brother may not testify for me, neither he nor his son nor his son-in-law;

as explained in the Mishna,

and I too may not testify for him, neither I nor my son nor my son-in-law.

And the Gemara objects:

Why?

Are not my son and my son-in-law

third to first for him, whereas we learned second to second

in our Mishna, and likewise

we learned second to first, and

whereas

third to first—

we did not learn,

so why does Rav hold that it is disqualified?

The Gemara attempts to interpret the Mishna according to Rav’s view.

And the Gemara answers:

What

is the meaning of

“his son-in-law,” which it teaches in the Mishna,

his father’s brother and his son and his “son-in-law”?—

the son-in-law of “his son,”

the son of his father’s brother’s son; and he is third, and disqualified for his father’s brother.

And the Gemara objects: If the Mishna intended the third generation,

let it teach

it should have said explicitly

“his grandson,”

and not say by implication the son-in-law of his son?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, the Mishna could have said this; rather,

it teaches us a matter incidentally,

the Mishna wanted to add and make known incidentally another law,

that a husband is like his wife.

Since his wife is disqualified, and she is third to first, therefore her husband, “the son-in-law of his son,” is also disqualified.

And now the Mishna makes known two laws: a. third to first is disqualified; b. a husband is like his wife.

And we object to Rav from the words of Rabbi Hiyya.

Rabbi Hiyya taught a beraita summarizing those disqualified as eight primary relatives, each of whom has two derivatives, a son and a son-in-law, and together they are twenty-four. [In our Mishna nine primary relatives are enumerated, and the Gemara will explain below why Rabbi Hiyya said eight].

But rather,

there is a difficulty against Rav:

this that Rabbi Hiyya taught: Eight primary relatives, which are twenty-four.

But according to Rav’s words, it emerges that

these are thirty-two.

They are thirty-two: eight primary relatives, eight sons, eight sons-in-law of sons, and eight grandsons. [In truth they are forty, and eight “sons-in-law of the primary relatives” must be added. And Rashi answers that there is no need to mention those, since he has already made known that “a son-in-law is like a son”] . And why did Rabbi Hiyya teach only twenty-four?

Now the Gemara retracts what they answered, that “his son-in-law” in the Mishna means “the son-in-law of his son”:

Rather, in fact, his actual son-in-law

of his father’s brother.

Nevertheless Rav derives from the Mishna that even third is disqualified, since his son-in-law is not actually descended from him, and his relationship comes through marriage; Rav considers him a degree lower than “second,” and he is like third. And “from here” Rav proves that third is disqualified.

And why

and why

does Rav call him “the son-in-law of his son,” since he comes from the world

the son-in-law is not descended from his father’s brother,

he resembles another generation,

and he is third.

Rashi objects: Rav said explicitly, “I too may not testify for him”—for my father’s brother—“neither I nor my son nor my son-in-law.” This son-in-law is already “fourth” relative to my father’s brother. How so? I am second to my father’s brother, my son is third, and my son-in-law is “fourth”—according to this approach that a son-in-law is distanced by a generation. If so, is it possible that Rav holds that even fourth is disqualified !?

And he answers that indeed the Gemara could have raised this objection, but it raised another objection, until Rav retracts from interpreting our Mishna in this way.

And the Gemara objects:

If so,

since Rav holds that a “son-in-law” is distanced by a generation, what the Mishna taught—his father’s brother and his son and his “son-in-law”—it follows that this son-in-law, who is disqualified from testifying for me,

would be

to me in the relationship of

third to second, and

whereas

Rav considers third to second fit. [And this is precise from Rav’s words: “I” too may not testify for him, and Rav did not say, “My son” too may not testify for him, “and for his son”; it indicates that Rav concedes that third to second is fit.] And how is it possible to interpret our Mishna and say that the son-in-law is distanced by a generation?!

Therefore the Gemara retracts from forcing the interpretation that the Mishna disqualifies third to first and that a son-in-law is like another generation; rather, the correct explanation is that the tan­​nay of our Mishna indeed holds that third to first is fit. Rav, however, does not hold like him, but like Rabbi Elazar, who holds that third to first is disqualified.

Rather,

let us answer:

Rav spoke

in accordance with

the view of

Rabbi Elazar.

As it was taught: Rabbi Elazar says: Just as my father’s brother may not testify for me, neither he nor his son nor his son-in-law—

so “the son of my father’s brother” may not testify for me, neither he nor his son nor his son-in-law.

And the Gemara objects:

And still,

it is not answered, for according to Rabbi Elazar,

it would be

among those disqualified also

third to second [as follows: the son of my father’s brother may not testify “for me,” he and “his son”—“his son” is third to me, who am second],

and

whereas

if

Rav considers

fit

third to second

[as explained above].

And how did you answer that Rav holds like Rabbi Elazar?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav

indeed

agrees with him in one matter,

in one law, namely, in that he disqualifies third to first,

and disagrees with him in one matter,

and differs from him in one law, namely, in that he disqualifies third to second; Rav holds that it is fit.

And the Gemara clarifies:

What is Rav’s reason?

From what exposition did Rav learn to disqualify third to first?

For the verse said: “Fathers shall not be put to death on account of sons,” and “sons”;

the vav comes

to include another generation,

namely, grandsons who are disqualified for the fathers, and they are third to first.

And

the exposition of

Rabbi Elazar

to disqualify third to second is this: After he accepts Rav’s exposition to disqualify third to first, he adds to expound:

“On account of sons”

the Merciful One said,

to teach us that every

disqualification of the fathers,

that is, all those disqualified for the fathers, even third,

is cast upon the sons

—the disqualification “on account of sons,” that is, upon the sons of the fathers. And they are third to second .

Rav Nahman adds several more relatives who are disqualified from testimony, those learned “by implication” (rule 7, table 3).

Rav Nahman said: My mother-in-law’s brother may not testify for me,

and likewise

the son of my mother-in-law’s brother may not testify for me,

and likewise

the son of my mother-in-law’s sister may not testify for me.

And the tan­​nay teaches likewise

and the tan­​nay of our Mishna taught likewise:

his wife’s sister’s husband, his father’s sister’s husband, and his mother’s sister’s husband, they and their sons and their sons-in-law,

and now, just as they are disqualified for me, so I am disqualified for them; and I, for the son-in-law of my wife’s sister, am “his mother-in-law’s brother”; and I, for the son-in-law of my father’s sister, am “the son of his mother-in-law’s brother”; and likewise I, for the son-in-law of my mother’s sister, am “the son of his mother-in-law’s sister.”

Rav Ashi adds to Rav Nahman’s words, to disqualify additional relatives learned “by implication.”

Rav Ashi said: When we were

when we were

in the presence of

in the academy of

Ulla, we asked:

my father-in-law’s brother—

what

is the law; is he disqualified? And likewise

the son of my father-in-law’s brother—

what is the law?

And likewise

the son of my father-in-law’s sister—

what is the law?

He said to him,

Ulla:

You have learned it

we learned this law in our Mishna:

his brother, his father’s brother, and his mother’s brother, they and their sons and their sons-in-law;

and now, I, for the son-in-law of my brother— \-

“my father-in-law’s brother”; I, for the son-in-law of my father’s brother— \-

“the son of my father-in-law’s brother”; and likewise I, for the son-in-law of my mother’s brother— \-

“the son of my father-in-law’s sister.”