Sanhedrin 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

We now return to expounding the verses in order to disqualify relatives from giving testimony.

From what is stated: “Fathers shall not be put to death on account of sons, nor shall sons be put to death on account of fathers,”

ashkakhan

we find that we have learned:

fathers to sons

Reuven may not testify concerning Shimon’s son; and likewise

sons to fathers

Shimon’s son may not testify concerning Reuven. And all the more so, Reuven may not testify concerning his brother Shimon [first degree to first degree], since their relationship is closer than second degree to first degree and first degree to second degree.

Sons to sons,

the sons of Reuven to the sons of Shimon [second degree to second degree],

minlan

from where do we derive that they are disqualified?

The Gemara answers:

If so,

if, as you say, only second degree to first degree is disqualified,

likhtov kra

the verse should have written only

“Fathers shall not be put to death on account of a ‘son,’”

and it would have been understood that the son of one of the fathers is disqualified from testifying concerning both fathers.

Mai

why did the Torah add the word

“sons”?

It indicates

that even sons to one another,

who are second degree to second degree, are disqualified from testifying.

Just as relatives are disqualified from testifying concerning their relatives, so too, when the witnesses are relatives of one another, they are disqualified from testifying together. The Gemara now expounds this law.

From the exposition that we derived,

ashkakhan sons to one another

relatives concerning their relatives—but

sons,

that is, relatives who come together to testify

la-alma

concerning an unrelated person from the marketplace,

minlan?

Rami bar Ḥama said: It is a logical inference!

This law does not require an exposition from the verse, as we find in a beraita in tractate Makkot. The beraita derives from a decree of the verse that the law of conspiring witnesses is applied—namely, that they are punished with the punishment they intended to impose upon the defendant—only if both of them are contradicted by the testimony of conspiring witnesses; that is, the witnesses who disprove them testify concerning “the two” witnesses that they were with them at that same time in another place. [But if they disprove only one of them, then although their testimony is nullified, since only one witness remains, nevertheless the witness who was disproved is not punished with the punishment that he intended to impose].

As it is taught in a beraita: Witnesses do not become conspiring witnesses until both of them are shown to have conspired .

Rami bar Ḥama proves this:

And if it should enter your mind that sons concerning unrelated people are fit, then a conspiring witness is executed on the basis of his brother’s testimony.

How so? If they are shown to have conspired, each one has a part in disproving the other, because without him the law of conspiracy could not be applied to them. And if they testified in a capital case, the two relatives would be executed, each because of the other.

Therefore, one must say that they are not accepted as witnesses from the outset, so that a situation would not arise in which one relative has a part in executing his relative.

Rava said to him: According to your reasoning—

Rava disagrees with Rami bar Ḥama’s reasoning and raises an objection from the Mishna in the chapter Ḥezkat HaBatim, concerning the presumption of ownership established by three years.

If someone maintains possession of another’s land for three years, his possession establishes that the land is his, and he need not prove his ownership with a deed; it is sufficient for him to bring witnesses who saw him maintaining possession of the land.

These witnesses need not testify continuously. That is, it is sufficient if one group testifies concerning one year, a second group concerning the second year, and a third group concerning the third year, provided that together they testify concerning three consecutive years.

This is what we learned in the Mishna: Three brothers,

each of whom testifies concerning a different year,

and one

unrelated person from the marketplace, who is not their relative,

joins with them

and testifies concerning all three years,

these are three testimonies,

and the presumption of ownership is established. There is no disqualification of relatives testifying, since each of the brothers gives a separate testimony concerning a separate year.

And

the four of them

are one testimony for

the purposes of the law of

conspiracy.

That is, if the original landowner brings witnesses who disprove them, they do not pay him the value of the land that they sought to cause him to lose and from which they sought to dispossess him until all four of them are disproved. The reason is that the presumption of ownership was established through the testimony of all four.

Rava concludes his objection: According to your reasoning,

a conspiring witness is found to pay money on the basis of his brother’s testimony?!

It follows that each one pays his share only because the other witnesses, who are his relatives, joined him.

Rather,

you are forced to say that one witness is not a “part” of the other’s testimony. And the reason they indeed pay is that

the conspiracy

comes from elsewhere

through the testimony of those who disprove them; they obligate them to pay, and it is not that one witness causes his fellow to pay.

So too here,

in the case of capital testimony, one witness is not a part of the other’s testimony;

and the conspiracy comes from elsewhere,

and those who disprove them obligate them to receive the death penalty, because that is what the Torah decreed.

Rami bar Ḥama’s reasoning is refuted. Therefore, the Gemara brings an exposition to disqualify “sons concerning unrelated people”—

Rather,

it is derived from the latter part of the verse.

If so, the verse should have written: “And a son” concerning fathers; alternatively,

the verse should have written:

“They” concerning fathers.

Mai

why did the Torah take care to write

“and sons”?

Therefore we expound:

even sons concerning unrelated people

are disqualified.

The Gemara raises an objection: From these expositions

we find the father’s relatives;

but as for

the mother’s relatives,

who are listed in our Mishna, such as his mother’s brother,

minlan

from where do we derive that they are disqualified?

The Gemara answers:

The verse says “fathers” and “fathers” twice.

It would have been sufficient to write: “Fathers shall not be put to death on account of sons, and sons ‘on account of them.’” Therefore we expound:

If

the extra word

does not refer to the father’s relatives, apply it to the mother’s relatives.

This is a hermeneutical principle of the Torah: an extra word is applied to a matter analogous to the matter for which it was originally stated.

The Gemara raises another objection: From these expositions

ashkakhan,

we find that relatives are disqualified from testifying

to the detriment

of their relatives, since this is the meaning of the verse, “They shall not be put to death,” concerning the testimony of fathers against sons. But relatives who come to testify

for the benefit

of their relatives,

minlan

from where do we derive that they are disqualified? The Gemara answers:

The verse says:

not “shall be put to death” fathers concerning sons, and sons shall not “be put to death,”

twice,

two times. One of them is superfluous, since it could have written: “Fathers shall not be put to death concerning sons, and sons concerning fathers.” And we expound:

If it does not refer to testimony to the detriment—

apply it to testimony for the benefit.

The Gemara raises an objection: Although from this verse, which is stated with regard to the sin punishable by death,

ashkakhan,

we find that relatives are disqualified

in capital cases,

but

in monetary cases, from where

do we derive that they are disqualified?

The Gemara answers:

The verse says:

another verse is stated (Leviticus 24): “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it [monetary cases], and one who strikes a person shall be put to death [capital cases],

one judgment shall there be for you.”

And we expound:

a judgment that is equal for you;

monetary cases are equal to capital cases.

From the verse “They shall not be put to death,” through the extra wording and the plural form, the following are derived: (a) fathers concerning one another, and sons concerning one another, even though they are second degree to second degree, and all the more so first degree to second degree and first degree to first degree; (b) sons concerning unrelated people; (c) the mother’s relatives; (d) both testimony for the benefit and testimony to the detriment.

A husband is regarded as his wife and a wife as her husband is derived below from another verse.

Rav holds that even third degree to first degree is disqualified.

Rav said: My father’s brother may not testify concerning me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law,

as explained in the Mishna,

and likewise I may not testify concerning him, neither I, nor my son, nor my son-in-law.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And why?

Surely my son and my son-in-law

would be third degree to first degree, whereas we learned second degree to second degree

in our Mishna, and likewise

we learned second degree to first degree, and

as for

third degree to first degree—

we did not learn it.

Why, then, does Rav hold that it is disqualified?

The Gemara attempts to interpret the Mishna in accordance with Rav’s opinion.

The Gemara answers:

What

is the meaning of

“his son-in-law,” which the Mishna teaches?

His father’s brother, his son, and his “son-in-law”—

the son-in-law of his son,

that is, the son-in-law of his father’s brother’s son. He is third degree and is disqualified from testifying concerning his father’s brother.

The Gemara raises an objection: If the Mishna intended the third generation,

let it teach

it explicitly

“his grandson,”

rather than alluding to it by saying “his son’s son-in-law.”

The Gemara answers: Indeed, the Mishna could have said so. However,

it teaches us another matter incidentally,

the Mishna wished to teach us an additional law by the way,

that a husband is regarded as his wife.

Since his wife is disqualified, and she is third degree to first degree, her husband, “the son-in-law of his son,” is likewise disqualified.

The Mishna is therefore teaching us two laws: (a) third degree to first degree is disqualified; (b) a husband is regarded as his wife.

We raise an objection to Rav from the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya.

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught a beraita summarizing those disqualified witnesses as eight primary relationships, each with two derivative relationships—a son and a son-in-law—for a total of twenty-four. [Our Mishna lists nine primary relationships, and the Gemara will explain below why Rabbi Ḥiyya said eight.]

But rather,

this is difficult for Rav:

concerning that which Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: There are eight primary relationships, which are twenty-four.

But according to Rav’s statement,

these would be thirty-two.

They would be thirty-two: eight primary relationships, eight sons, eight sons-in-law of sons, and eight grandsons. [In truth, they would be forty, since eight sons-in-law of the primary relationships must also be added. Rashi answers that there is no need to mention them, since he has already taught that “a son-in-law is like a son” ]. Why, then, did Rabbi Ḥiyya teach only twenty-four?

The Gemara now retracts what it had answered, that “his son-in-law” in the Mishna means “his son’s son-in-law.”

Rather, “his son-in-law” always means his actual son-in-law

of his father’s brother.

Nevertheless, Rav infers from the Mishna that even third degree is disqualified. Since the son-in-law is not actually descended from the father’s brother, and his relationship comes through marriage, Rav regards him as one degree more remote than “second,” making him equivalent to third degree. From this Rav proves that third degree is disqualified.

And why

why, then,

does Rav call him “his son’s son-in-law,” since he comes from elsewhere,

the son-in-law is not descended from the father’s brother,

he is comparable to another generation,

and is third degree?

Rashi raises the following objection: Rav explicitly said, “Likewise I may not testify concerning him—concerning my father’s brother—neither I, nor my son, nor my son-in-law.” This son-in-law is already fourth degree from the father’s brother. How so? I am second degree from my father’s brother, my son is third degree, and my son-in-law is fourth degree—according to this approach, that a son-in-law is removed by an additional generation. If so, is Rav of the opinion that even fourth degree is disqualified !?

The answer is that the Gemara could indeed have raised this objection, but it raised another objection instead, until Rav retracts his interpretation of our Mishna.

The Gemara raises an objection:

If so,

since Rav holds that a son-in-law is removed by an additional generation, when the Mishna teaches: “His father’s brother, his son, and his son-in-law,” it follows that this son-in-law, who is disqualified from testifying concerning me,

would be

to me in the relationship of

third degree to second degree, and

as for

third degree to second degree, Rav holds it is fit. [This is also precise from Rav’s statement: “Likewise I may not testify concerning him,” but Rav did not say, “Likewise I and my son may not testify concerning him and his son.” This indicates that Rav agrees that third degree to second degree is fit.] How, then, can the Mishna be interpreted as referring to a son-in-law removed by an additional generation?

Therefore, the Gemara retracts its attempt to force the interpretation that the Mishna disqualifies third degree to first degree and that a son-in-law is equivalent to another generation. The correct interpretation is that the tanna of our Mishna indeed holds that third degree to first degree is fit. Rav, however, does not agree with him; rather, he follows Rabbi Elazar, who holds that third degree to first degree is disqualified.

Rather,

let us answer:

Rav speaks in accordance with

the opinion of

the same view as

Rabbi Elazar.

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Elazar says: Just as my father’s brother may not testify concerning me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law,

so too, my father’s brother’s son may not testify concerning me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And still,

it has not been resolved, for according to Rabbi Elazar

there would be, among those who are disqualified, also

third degree to second degree

[for the son of my father’s brother may not testify “concerning me,” and his “son” is third degree to me, who am second degree],

and

as for

Rav

Rav considers

fit

third degree to second degree

[as explained above].

How, then, did you explain that Rav follows Rabbi Elazar?

The Gemara answers:

Rav

indeed

agrees with him in one matter,

namely, that he disqualifies third degree to first degree,

but disagrees with him in one matter,

namely, regarding his disqualification of third degree to second degree; Rav holds that it is fit.

The Gemara clarifies:

What is Rav’s reason?

From which exposition did Rav learn to disqualify third degree to first degree?

For the verse says: “Fathers shall not be put to death on account of sons,” and the “and” in “sons”

is intended

to include another generation,

namely, grandsons, who are disqualified from testifying concerning the fathers; they are third degree to first degree.

And

the exposition of

Rabbi Elazar

to disqualify third degree to second degree is as follows: After accepting Rav’s exposition disqualifying third degree to first degree, he adds the following exposition:

“Concerning sons”

the Merciful One said,

to teach us that all

those disqualified concerning the fathers,

that is, all those disqualified concerning the fathers, even one who is third degree,

the disqualification is cast upon the sons,

that is, upon the sons of the fathers. And they are third degree to second degree .

Rav Naḥman adds several other relatives who are disqualified from testimony, those who are learned “by implication” (general rule 9, table 3).

Rav Naḥman said: My mother-in-law’s brother may not testify concerning me,

and likewise

my mother-in-law’s brother’s son may not testify concerning me,

and likewise

my mother-in-law’s sister’s son may not testify concerning me.

And the tanna likewise taught

and the tanna of our Mishna likewise taught:

The husband of his sister, the husband of his father’s sister, and the husband of his mother’s sister, together with their sons and sons-in-law.

Accordingly, just as they are disqualified from testifying concerning me, I am disqualified from testifying concerning them: I, concerning the son of my sister’s husband, am “his mother-in-law’s brother”; I, concerning the son-in-law of my father’s sister’s husband, am “his mother-in-law’s brother’s son”; and likewise I, concerning the son-in-law of my mother’s sister’s husband, am “his mother-in-law’s sister’s son.”

Rav Ashi adds to Rav Naḥman’s statement and disqualifies additional relatives learned “by implication.”

Rav Ashi said: When we were

in the presence of

the

academy of

Ulla, we asked:

My father-in-law’s brother—

what

is the law? Is he disqualified? And likewise

my father-in-law’s brother’s son—

what is the law? And likewise

And likewise

my father-in-law’s sister’s son—

what is the law?

He said to him,

Ulla:

You have learned it

in our Mishna:

His brother, his father’s brother, and his mother’s brother, together with their sons and sons-in-law.

Accordingly, I, concerning the son-in-law of my brother— -

“my father-in-law’s brother”; I, concerning the son-in-law of my father’s brother— -

“my father-in-law’s brother’s son”; and likewise I, concerning the son-in-law of my mother’s brother— -

“my father-in-law’s sister’s son.”