Sanhedrin 27b — the Talmud in English

Before a thief [in another instance; another matter],

the socket of a spear,

the handle of a spear.

He said to him

Rav Abba bar Yaakov to Bar Hama:

What is your view,

what do you hold? Apparently,

according to Rabbi Meir,

who holds that one suspected in monetary law is suspected in capital law, and therefore you brought witnesses to disqualify the witness to the murder. But when

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree, the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei. And Rabbi Yosei indeed said: One who was refuted in monetary law is fit for capital law.

And he is a fit witness to testify against you in capital law.

Rav Pappi said to him

to Rabbi Abba bar Yaakov:

This matter—

this rule is stated only

where the

tan[n]ay did not state anonymously,

where an anonymous Mishna was not taught

according to Rabbi Meir.

But

here the tan[n]ay stated anonymously according to Rabbi Meir.

And Rav Abba asked him:

From what

from which Mishna did you learn this,

shall we say

you will say,

from that which we learned

that we learned in our Mishna in tractate Niddah:

“Anyone who is fit to judge capital law—

is fit to judge monetary law”

and you wish to interpret it: Anyone who is not suspected of a transgression is fit to judge capital law and is not suspected concerning monetary law; and you wish to infer:

Whose

whose Mishna is it,

shall we say it is Rabbi Yosei

it is impossible to say so, for

there is

indeed there is

a conspiring witness concerning money

who lied in testimony concerning money, concerning whom Rabbi Yosei holds

that he is fit for capital law and disqualified for

monetary law,

and he does not hold that “anyone fit for capital law is fit for monetary law.”

Rather,

you are forced to say: is it

not Rabbi Meir

who said that one suspected concerning money is suspected concerning capital law? Therefore, according to him, there is no one who is fit for capital law yet disqualified for monetary law.

And this Mishna stated its matter anonymously according to Rabbi Meir.

Concerning this there is a difficulty—

From what?

From where do you know that the Mishna’s intention is to suspected persons and sinners, and is according to Rabbi Meir?

Perhaps

it is possible to interpret it as

speaking of genealogical disqualifications.

And the interpretation of the Mishna is: All the genealogically qualified men [members of the Sanhedrin judging capital law must be free of genealogical disqualifications—such as converts and mamzerim, just as they must be free of injustice] whom they declared fit to judge capital law are fit to judge monetary law.

And not only is it possible to interpret it this way; it is necessary to interpret it as referring to genealogical disqualifications.

For if you do not say so,

if you do not say so, how will you interpret

the latter clause

of that same Mishna?

For it teaches

in the continuation of the Mishna:

There is

one who is

fit to judge monetary law, but is not

he

fit to judge capital law.

And if it is as you say, that the Mishna speaks of suspected persons, how will you interpret it?

Why

why

is he not fit

to judge capital cases? In what was he suspected? If you say

that he was refuted,

that they refuted him

in capital law,

does the Mishna say concerning him that he is “fit to judge monetary law”? Surely he is certainly disqualified, and even Rabbi Yosei agrees to this.

Rather,

the latter clause of the Mishna necessarily

speaks of genealogical disqualification,

speaking of converts and slaves, who are fit to judge monetary law and disqualified for capital law. If so,

here too,

also the first clause

speaks of genealogical disqualification.

And this is not the Mishna that was taught anonymously according to Rabbi Meir—

Rav Pappi said:

Rather, here

it is another Mishna,

in which the tan[n]ay stated anonymously

according to Rabbi Meir.

For we learned

that we learned in our Mishna in tractate Rosh Hashana [concerning witnesses who testify that they saw the new moon]:

These are the disqualified

for testimony:

one who plays with dice, one who lends with interest, pigeon flyers, merchants of seventh-year produce, and slaves

whose law is like that of women, who are disqualified for testimony.

This is the rule: Every testimony for which a woman is not fit

such as testimony concerning money, capital cases, and the sanctification of the new moon—

also they

the sinners

are not fit for it.”

Whose

whose Mishna is it,

shall we say

the Mishna of

Rabbi Yosei

it is not possible, for

and

behold,

there is

a contradiction to this rule, for concerning

testimony

to testify

in capital law,

for which a woman is not

fit, and they

these sinners—the dice player and so forth—

are fit for it

according to Rabbi Yosei, since they were suspected only concerning monetary law and are fit to testify concerning capital cases.

Rather,

you are forced to say: is it

not Rabbi Meir,

who holds that these sinners, who were suspected concerning monetary matters, are disqualified for capital cases?

And since the anonymous Mishna was taught according to Rabbi Meir, therefore the halakha is according to Rabbi Meir. And Rav Pappi ruled to disqualify the witness who testified that Bar Hama had committed murder.

And when they acquitted him,

Bar Hama arose and kissed his feet

he kissed Rav Pappi’s feet because he had turned the matter in his favor,

and accepted his poll-tax

he accepted upon himself to exempt him from the king’s taxes

for all his years

for all the days of his life.

Introduction to the Mishna

After we learned at the beginning of the chapter the law concerning one who accepted a relative or a disqualified person [as a judge or witness], and in the preceding Mishna the disqualified persons were taught, the Mishna explains the disqualified relatives, for judging and testifying.

Family relatives are disqualified from testifying for the benefit or against the interests of their relatives; and likewise, if the witnesses are relatives to one another, they are disqualified.

Principles of disqualified relatives

The wording of Maimonides (chapter 13 of the Laws of Testimony): “Brothers with one another are first-degree relatives, and their sons with one another are second-degree relatives. And their grandsons with one another are third-degree relatives.

And forever, a third-degree relative with a first-degree relative is fit, and needless to say, a third-degree relative with a second-degree relative. But second-degree relatives with one another, and needless to say, a second-degree relative with a first-degree relative—both are disqualified.

And the same law applies to females. How so? Two sisters, or a brother and his sister, are first-degree relatives with one another. Their children, whether males or females, are second-degree relatives with one another. Their grandchildren, or the daughters of their granddaughters, are third-degree relatives with one another. Just as you count among males first, second, and third degrees, so do you count among females.

Any woman concerning whom you are disqualified, you are likewise disqualified concerning her husband, for the husband is considered like his wife. And any husband concerning whom you are disqualified, you are likewise disqualified concerning his wife, for the wife is considered like her husband.”

Here are the three principles for disqualified relatives,

and these are they:

a.

Disqualified relatives are those of a second-degree relationship or closer. Those more distant from them are fit.

b.

Just as you count relationship among males, so do you count it among females.

c.

A husband is considered like his wife, and a wife like her husband.

The principles of the Mishna—

the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva

d.

The Mishna enumerates nine primary relatives, and for each of them two extensions—a son and a son-in-law—and together they are twenty-seven relatives [in addition to his stepson]. (Table A)

e.

The Mishna did not enumerate a father and son, because it is obvious that they are disqualified. Likewise, it did not enumerate a father and his son’s son, and the amoraim disagreed about this (Bava Batra 128a). The halakha is that they are disqualified. And some explain that his son’s son was not enumerated because his son-in-law—that is, his son’s son-in-law—is fit (Ritva).

f.

Among those enumerated in the Mishna, there are six relatives who are enumerated twice. (Table B)

g.

All those enumerated in the Mishna are those who are disqualified from testifying for me. And the correct view is that the same law applies that I am disqualified from testifying for them. It follows that to those enumerated in the Mishna one must add several other relatives, who were not taught explicitly—and they are called in the language of Rashi and Tosafot: “by inference,” meaning that they are learned from the “rule” of those enumerated in the Mishna. (Table C)

h.

What is stated in the Mishna, “and their sons and sons-in-law,” refers only to the nine “primary relatives.” But the sons and sons-in-law of the “extensions,” and likewise the sons and sons-in-law of those learned “by inference,” some of them are disqualified if their degree of relationship conforms to principles a–c above, while if their relationship does not conform to a–c, they are not disqualified.

i.

When we examine each of the relatives enumerated in the Mishna, and likewise those learned “by inference,” we will see that they are relatives according to principles a–c. Examine and you will find.

j.

All disqualified persons whose relationship is due to marriage are disqualified, through their sons and sons-in-law, only if those are sons of the same woman who creates the relationship. For example, the husband of one’s sister who has sons from another woman [who is not his sister]—his sons are not disqualified, since they are not relatives, but relatives of relatives. (Table D)

k.

All relatives whose relationship is due to marital ties, if the marriage is ended through divorce or death, return to being fit. (Table E)

l.

Anyone who was not enumerated in our Mishna, neither explicitly nor “by inference,” is not disqualified [except for a father and son].

And this is the wording of Maimonides (there) “

This that the Torah disqualified the testimony of relatives is not because they are presumed to love one another, for he does not testify for him—neither for his benefit nor to his detriment—but it is a scriptural decree.”

Mishna:

And these are the relatives

who are disqualified from testifying and judging:

his brother, his father’s brother, his mother’s brother, and his sister’s husband,

and his father’s sister’s husband, his mother’s sister’s husband, his mother’s husband, his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law

the husband of his wife’s sister.

All these are disqualified,

they

themselves

and their sons and sons-in-law.

And

likewise

his stepson

his wife’s son is disqualified. And only he

alone,

but not his son or son-in-law.

Rabbi Yosei said:

Mishna

this

is

the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva.

According to it, all the relatives enumerated above are disqualified.

But the first Mishna,

which was taught in the generations preceding Rabbi Akiva, enumerated only

his uncle

his father’s brother,

and his uncle’s son

his father’s brother’s son,

and all the

relatives on his father’s side who are

fit to inherit from him.

This excludes relatives on the mother’s side. For example, his mother’s brother is permitted to testify for me, since he is not fit to inherit from me. But I am forbidden to testify for him, since I am fit to inherit from him, in a case where he has no other heir.

Now the Mishna returns to the words of the first tanna—and this is the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva.

Relatives are disqualified only if they were relatives at the time of the testimony—that is, either at the time of seeing the act or at the time of giving the testimony before the court; but if their kinship was severed before the seeing of the act, he is fit.

Was a relative

such as his son-in-law,

and became unrelated

because his wife, who establishes the kinship, died or was divorced,

he is fit.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if his daughter died

and because of this the ties of kinship were severed,

and [

another version:

if he has ]

sons from her—

he is

the son-in-law

a relative,

since his sons, who are his grandsons, establish the kinship.

Rabbi Yehuda adds other persons disqualified from testimony, in addition to a relative or a disqualified person, and they are—

the one who loves and the one who hates.

His fellow who loves him with an intense love, and likewise one who hates him with a great hatred, are disqualified.

The Mishna explains the definition of one who loves:

One who loves: this is his shushbin. He was disqualified during the period of their friendship, that is, during the days of the wedding. And if their love is not so intense, he is not called “one who loves” for purposes of our Mishna.

In their time, it was customary for a friend to send a gift to the groom during the wedding celebration and eat with him. Such a person was disqualified during the period of their friendship, that is, during the wedding celebration. But if their love was not so strong, he was not considered “one who loves” for purposes of this Mishna].

And likewise, the definition of

one who hates

is:

anyone who has not spoken with him for three days out of enmity

because of hatred. And if their hatred did not reach this point, he is not called “one who hates” for purposes of our Mishna.

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda:

The Jewish people have not been suspected of this,

of giving false testimony because of love or hatred.

What the Sages dispute applies only to testimony, but the Sages agree that they are disqualified from judging. The reason is that witnesses testify about what they saw, as they saw it; therefore, they have not been suspected of intentionally changing their testimony. This is not so with a judge—he relies on reasoning and impression, and the thoughts of his heart change because of love or hatred, even involuntarily and without an intention of wickedness.

Gemara:

From where are these words

from which verse do we derive that relatives are disqualified from testimony? It is stated in the Torah (Deuteronomy 24): “Fathers shall not be put to death because of sons, and sons shall not be put to death because of fathers; each man shall be put to death for his own sin.” And from this verse we derive:

For the Sages taught: “Fathers shall not be put to death because of sons”—what does this teach?

What did the verse come to teach us,

if

it came

to teach that fathers shall not be put to death b

ecause of the

sin of sons, and sons

shall not be put to death

because of the sin of fathers?

It has already been stated: “Each man shall be put to death for his own sin”?

Rather,

it came to teach the law of testimony:

“Fathers shall not be put to death because of sons”—

through the testimony of sons, and sons shall not be put to death because of fathers—

through the testimony of fathers.

And we derive “fathers” in the plural, meaning two brothers, as will be explained.

And we challenge this:

“And sons shall not be put to death because of the sin of fathers”

—are they not put to death?!

But it is written (

Exodus 34):

“He visits the sin of fathers upon sons.”

And we answer: What is stated

there,

that the Holy One, blessed is He, exacts payment from sons for the sin of their fathers, is speaking

when they hold the deeds

the evil deeds of

their fathers in their hands,

and payment is exacted from them for their sins and for the sin of their fathers. But we have not heard from this verse that payment is exacted from the sons for the sin of their fathers alone.

As it is taught:

It is stated in the Torah, in the section of rebuke (Leviticus 26):

“And even in the iniquities of their fathers with them”

they shall waste away,

and we derive from “with them”

when they hold the deeds of their fathers in their hands .

And the beraita asks:

You say: “When they hold them”!

They are punished for the sin of their fathers,

or perhaps it is only

even

when they do not hold them?

And it answers:

When it says: “Each man shall be put to death for his own sin,”

and payment is not exacted for the sin of the fathers,

then

we must say that what is stated: “And even in the iniquities of their fathers with them they shall waste away,” is speaking

when they hold the deeds of their fathers in their hands.

And we challenge this:

Is that so?!

Is payment not exacted from sons for the sin of their fathers?

But it is written

there, in the section of rebuke:

“And each man shall stumble over his brother,”

and we derive:

“A man because of the sin of his brother”—this teaches that

the Children of Israel

are all guarantors for one another,

and one is punished for the sin of his brother.

And we answer: What is stated

there:

It is speaking of a situation in which

it was in their power to protest, but they did not protest,

and therefore they are punished.