Sanhedrin 27b (כז:) — the Talmud in English

before a thief [in another instance; alternatively, another interpretation:

the handle of a lance,

the handle of a spear.

He said to him

Rav Abba bar Yaakov, to Bar Ḥama:

What is your reasoning,

what do you maintain? Apparently,

in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

who maintains that one suspected with regard to monetary law is suspected with regard to capital law, and therefore you brought witnesses to disqualify the witness to the murder. But when

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei. And Rabbi Yosei did say: If he was found conspiring with regard to monetary law, he is fit with regard to capital law.

Thus, he is a fit witness to testify against you in a capital case.

Rav Pappi said to

Rabbi Abba bar Yaakov:

This statement applies

this principle applies only

where a tanna did not establish an anonymous ruling

as the tanna,

where an anonymous Mishna was not taught

in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

But

here, the tanna established an anonymous ruling in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

Rav Abba asked him:

From where

from which Mishna did you learn this?

If you say

that you would say:

from that which we learned

in our Mishna in tractate Nida:

“Anyone who is fit to adjudicate capital law

is fit to adjudicate monetary law”—

and you wish to interpret it as follows: Anyone who is not suspected of a transgression is fit to adjudicate capital law and is not suspected with regard to monetary law; and you wish to infer:

Whose

Mishna is this?

If you say it is Rabbi Yosei’s,

that cannot be said, for

there is

indeed

a conspiring witness with regard to money

who lied in testimony concerning money, and Rabbi Yosei maintains

that he is fit with regard to capital law but disqualified with regard to

monetary law;

he does not maintain that “anyone who is fit with regard to capital law is fit with regard to monetary law.”

Rather,

you are compelled to say that it is

not Rabbi Meir’s

who said that one suspected with regard to money is suspected with regard to capital law; therefore, according to him, there is no one who is fit with regard to capital law but disqualified with regard to monetary law.

And this Mishna is one in which the tanna expressed an anonymous ruling in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

This is subject to the following objection:

From where?

From where do you know that the Mishna refers to suspects and transgressors, and is in accordance with Rabbi Meir?

Perhaps

it is possible to interpret it as referring to

those disqualified by lineage.

The interpretation of the Mishna would then be: All those of proper lineage [the members of the Sanhedrin who adjudicate capital law must be free of lineage disqualifications—such as converts and mamzerim—just as they must be free of injustice] whom they deemed fit to adjudicate capital law are fit to adjudicate monetary law.

And not only is it possible to interpret it in this manner; it is necessary to interpret it as referring to those disqualified by lineage.

For if you do not say so,

if you do not say this, how will you interpret

the latter clause

of that Mishna?

As it teaches

in the continuation of the Mishna:

There is

one who

is fit to adjudicate monetary law, but is not

fit to adjudicate capital law.

And if it is as you say, that the Mishna is speaking of suspects, how will you interpret it?

Why

why

is he not fit

to adjudicate capital law? What was he suspected of? If you say

that he was found conspiring,

that they proved him to be conspiring

with regard to capital law,

did the Mishna say of such a person that he “is fit to adjudicate monetary law”? Surely he is certainly disqualified, and even Rabbi Yosei agrees to this.

Rather,

the latter clause of the Mishna necessarily

refers to lineage disqualification;

it speaks of converts and slaves, who are fit to adjudicate monetary law but disqualified with regard to capital law. If so,

here too,

the first clause

refers to lineage disqualification.

This is not the Mishna that was taught anonymously in accordance with Rabbi Meir—

Rav Pappi said:

Rather, here

it is a different Mishna,

in which the tanna established an anonymous ruling

in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

As we learned

in our Mishna in tractate Rosh HaShana [with regard to witnesses who testify that they saw the new moon]:

These are the ones who are disqualified

from bearing witness:

one who plays with dice, one who lends with interest, pigeon flyers, merchants who trade in produce of the Sabbatical year, and slaves

whose legal status is like that of women, who are disqualified from bearing witness.

This is the principle: Any testimony for which a woman is not fit

such as testimony concerning money, capital cases, and the sanctification of the new moon—

they too

the transgressors

are not fit for it.”

Whose

Mishna is this?

If you say

it is the Mishna of

Rabbi Yosei,

that is impossible, for

and

indeed

there is

a contradiction to this principle: With regard to

testimony

to testify

in capital law,

for which a woman

is not fit, and they

these transgressors—the one who plays with dice and the like—

are fit for it

according to Rabbi Yosei, since they were suspected only with regard to monetary law and are fit to testify in capital cases.

Rather,

you are compelled to say that it is

not Rabbi Meir’s,

who maintains that these transgressors, who were suspected with regard to monetary law, are disqualified with regard to capital law.

And since an anonymous Mishna was taught in accordance with Rabbi Meir, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir. Rav Pappi therefore ruled that the witness who testified that Bar Ḥama had committed murder was disqualified.

And when they acquitted him,

Bar Ḥama arose and kissed his feet

he kissed Rav Pappi’s feet because he had argued in his defense,

and accepted upon himself his poll tax

he undertook to exempt him from the king’s taxes

for his entire life

for all his days.

Introduction to the Mishna

After we learned at the beginning of the chapter the law concerning one who accepted a relative or a disqualified person [as a judge or witness], and the previous Mishna listed those who are disqualified, the Mishna now explains which relatives are disqualified from adjudicating and testifying.

Family relatives are disqualified from testifying either in favor of or against their relatives. Likewise, if the witnesses are relatives of one another, they are disqualified.

The principles governing relatives’ disqualification

The wording of Maimonides (chapter 13 of the Laws of Testimony) is: “Brothers with one another are first-degree relatives of one another, and their sons with one another are second-degree relatives. And the sons of their sons with one another are third-degree relatives.

And in all cases, a third-degree relative with a first-degree relative is fit, and it is unnecessary to say that a third-degree relative with a second-degree relative is fit. But second-degree relatives with one another, and it is unnecessary to say second-degree relatives with first-degree relatives, are both disqualified.

The same law applies to females. How so? Two sisters, or a brother and his sister, are first-degree relatives of one another. Their children, whether male or female, are second-degree relatives. The children of their children, or the daughters of their daughters, are third-degree relatives. Just as you count among males first, second, and third degree, so you count among females.

With regard to every woman to whom you are disqualified, you are likewise disqualified with regard to her husband, because the husband is considered like his wife. And with regard to every husband to whom you are disqualified, you are likewise disqualified with regard to his wife, because the wife is considered like her husband.”

Here, then, are the three principles governing relatives’ disqualification,

and they are:

A.

Relatives are disqualified when the degree of relationship is second degree with second degree or closer. Those more distant than them are fit.

B.

Just as you count degrees of relationship among males, so you count them among females.

C.

A husband is considered like his wife, and a wife like her husband.

The principles of the Mishna—

the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva

D.

The Mishna lists nine primary relatives, and for each of them two derivative relatives—a son and a son-in-law—making twenty-seven relatives altogether [in addition to one’s stepson]. (Table A)

E.

The Mishna did not list a father and son, since it is obvious that they are disqualified. Nor did it list a father and his son’s son, and the amoraim disagree about this (Bava Batra 128a). The halakha is that they are disqualified. Some explain that the son’s son was not listed because his son-in-law—that is, the son’s son’s son-in-law—is fit (Rashba’s novellae).

F.

Among those listed in the Mishna, there are six relatives who are listed twice. (Table B)

G.

All those listed in the Mishna are those who are disqualified from testifying for me. The correct interpretation is that the same law applies in the reverse: I am disqualified from testifying for them. Consequently, several additional relatives must be added to those listed in the Mishna, although they were not explicitly taught; in the language of Rashi and Tosafot, they are called “by implication,” meaning that they are derived from the “principle” of those listed in the Mishna. (Table C)

H.

The phrase in the Mishna “and their sons and sons-in-law” refers only to the nine “primary relatives.” But the sons and sons-in-law of the “derivative relatives,” and likewise the sons and sons-in-law of those derived “by implication,” are disqualified only if their degree of relationship accords with the above principles A–C. If their relationship does not accord with principles A–C, they are not disqualified.

I.

When we examine each of the relatives listed in the Mishna, as well as those derived “by implication,” we will see that they are relatives in accordance with principles A–C. Examine this and you will find it so.

J.

With regard to all those whose relationship is through marriage, their sons and sons-in-law are disqualified only if they are sons of the same woman who creates the relationship. For example, if one’s sister’s husband has sons from another woman [who is not one’s sister], his sons are not disqualified, since they are not relatives; rather, they are relatives of relatives. (Table D)

K.

With regard to all relatives whose relationship is through a marital bond, if the marriage ends through divorce or death, they become fit again. (Table E)

L.

Anyone who is not listed in our Mishna, either explicitly or “by implication,” is not disqualified [with the exception of a father and son].

And this is the wording of Maimonides (there): “

The fact that the Torah disqualified the testimony of relatives is not because they are presumed to love one another—for he does not testify for him, neither to his advantage nor to his disadvantage—but rather it is a decree of the verse.”

Mishna:

And these are the relatives

who are disqualified from testifying and adjudicating:

his brother, his father’s brother, his mother’s brother, his sister’s husband,

his father’s sister’s husband, his mother’s sister’s husband, his mother’s husband, his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law,

his wife’s sister’s husband.

All these are disqualified,

they

themselves,

and their sons and sons-in-law.

And

likewise,

his stepson,

his wife’s son, is disqualified. And only he

alone,

but not his son or son-in-law.

Rabbi Yosei said:

Mishna

this

is

the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva.

According to it, all the relatives listed above are disqualified.

But the first Mishna,

which was taught in the generations preceding Rabbi Akiva, listed only

his paternal uncle,

his father’s brother,

and his paternal uncle’s son,

his father’s brother’s son,

and all

the relatives on his father’s side who

are fit to inherit from him.

This excludes relatives on his mother’s side. For example, his mother’s brother is permitted to testify for him, since he is not fit to inherit from him. But he is forbidden to testify for his mother’s brother, since he is fit to inherit from him if the latter has no other heir.

The Mishna now returns to the words of the first tanna—and this is the Mishna of Rabbi Akiva.

Close relatives are disqualified only if they were relatives at the time of the testimony—that is, either at the time they saw the act or at the time they gave testimony before the court; but if their relationship ended before they saw the act, he is fit.

If he was a relative

such as his son-in-law,

and then ceased to be one

because his wife, who connected them as relatives, died or was divorced,

he is fit.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if his daughter died

and as a result the relationship ended,

and [

another version:

if ]

he has sons from her—

then

the son-in-law

remains a relative,

since his sons, who are the grandchildren, maintain the relationship.

Rabbi Yehuda adds other individuals disqualified from testimony, in addition to a relative or one otherwise disqualified. They are—

the loving friend and the hater.

One who loves his fellow with an intense love, and likewise one who hates him with a powerful hatred, are disqualified.

The Mishna explains the definition of a loving friend:

A loving friend: this is his shushbin [

In their time, it was customary for a friend to send the groom a gift during his wedding celebrations and eat with him], and he is disqualified during the period of their friendship, that is, during the wedding celebrations. If their love is not so intense, he is not called a “loving friend” for purposes of our Mishna.

Likewise, the definition of a

hater

is:

Anyone who has not spoken with him for three days out of enmity

because of hatred. If their hatred has not reached this degree, he is not called a “hater” for purposes of our Mishna.

They said to him,

the Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda:

The Jewish people are not suspected of this,

of giving false testimony because of love or hatred.

The Sages’ dispute applies only to testimony, but the Sages agree that such individuals are disqualified from judging. The reason is that witnesses testify about what they saw, as they saw it; therefore, they are not suspected of intentionally altering their testimony. A judge, by contrast, relies on reasoning and impressions, and his thoughts may be changed by love or hatred, even involuntarily and without any wicked intent.

Gemara:

From where are these matters

derived? From which verse do we derive that relatives are disqualified from testimony? It is stated in the Torah (Deuteronomy 24): “Fathers shall not be put to death for sons, and sons shall not be put to death for fathers; each man shall be put to death for his own sin.” And from this verse we derive:

As the Sages taught: “Fathers shall not be put to death for sons”—what does this teach?

What did the verse come to teach us,

if

it came

to teach that fathers shall not be put to death for

the sake of

the sin of sons, and sons

shall not be put to death

for the sin of fathers?

Is it not already stated: “Each man shall be put to death for his own sin”?

Rather,

it came to teach the law of testimony:

“Fathers shall not be put to death for sons”—

through the testimony of sons, and sons shall not be put to death for fathers—

through the testimony of fathers.

And we expound “fathers” in the plural as referring to two brothers , as will be explained.

And we raise an objection:

“And sons shall not be put to death for the sin of fathers”

—are they not put to death?!

But it is written (Exodus 34):

(Exodus 34):

“He visits the sin of fathers upon sons.”

And we answer: What is stated

there,

that the Holy One, blessed be He, exacts retribution from sons for the sin of their fathers, refers to a case

when they hold the deeds

the evil deeds of

their fathers in their hands,

and they are punished both for their own sins and for the sin of their fathers. But we have not learned from this verse that they are punished for the sin of their fathers alone.

As it is taught

in the Torah, in the passage of rebuke (Leviticus 26):

“And even for the sins of their fathers with them

they shall waste away,”

and we expound “with them” as meaning

when they hold the deeds of their fathers in their hands .

The beraita raises an objection:

You say that when they hold on to them!

they are punished for the sin of their fathers;

or perhaps it is only

even

when they do not hold on to them?

And it answers:

When it says: “Each man shall be put to death for his own sin,”

and they are not punished for the sin of their fathers,

it is

necessary to say that what is stated, “And even for the sins of their fathers with them they shall waste away,” refers to

when they hold the deeds of their fathers in their hands.

And we raise an objection:

Is that so?!

Are sons not punished for the sin of their fathers?

But it is written

there, in the passage of rebuke:

“And each man shall stumble through his brother,”

and we expound:

“A man for the sin of his brother”—this teaches that

the Children of Israel

are all guarantors for one another,

and one is punished for the sin of his brother.

And we answer: What is stated

there

refers to a case

when it was in their power to protest, but they did not protest;

therefore, they are punished.