Sanhedrin 27a — the Talmud in English

Lzhesvidetel'

— svidetel', kotorogo izoblachili drugie svideteli, yavlyaetsya neprigodnym dlya svidetel'stva, potomu chto on schitaetsya «zlodeem», a zlodei neprigodny dlya svidetel'stva —

No Abaye i Rava sporyat o tom, deystvitel'no li ego svidetel'stvo, dannoe v period mezhdu momentom lozhnogo svidetel'stva i momentom izoblicheniya. Naprimer, on dal svidetel'stvo v nisane, a v sleduyushchem tishree ego izoblachili; i v promezhutke dal eshche neskol'ko svidetel'stv. Yavlyayutsya li oni nedeystvitel'nymi zadnim chislom — kak budet ob"yasneno.

Abaye skazal:

lzhesvidetel', dazhe

zadnim chislom stanovitsya neprigodnym.

A Rava skazal:

tol'ko

s etogo momenta i vpred' on stanovitsya neprigodnym.

Snachala Gemara — talmudskoe obsuzhdenie Mishny — ob"yasnyaet mnenie Abaye.

Abaye skazal: «On stanovitsya neprigodnym s etogo momenta i vpred'»,

potomu chto

s momenta, kogda on dal svidetel'stvo,

s togo momenta, kogda on dal lozhnoe svidetel'stvo, to est' nachinaya s nisana,

on yavlyaetsya zlodeem. A Tora skazala: «Ne kladi ruku tvoyu vmeste so zlodeem».

Slovno napisano:

«Ne stav' zlodeya svidetelem».

Deystvitel'no, tol'ko teper', v tishree, kogda ego izoblachili, nam stalo izvestno, chto on zlodey; no ego zlodeyanie nachalos' s togo, kak on dal svidetel'stvo v nisane, i s etogo momenta on neprigoden dlya svidetel'stva.

Teper' Gemara ob"yasnyaet mnenie Ravy i privodit dva ob"yasneniya ego pozitsii.

Pervoe ob"yasnenie:

Rava skazal: «S etogo momenta i vpred' on stanovitsya neprigodnym»,

potomu chto ves' zakon o

lzhesvidetele,

to est' priznanie poslednim svidetelyam, izoblichayushchim pervonachal'nykh svideteley i delayushchim ikh neprigodnymi,

yavlyaetsya novovvedeniem,

ustanovlennym pisaniem Tory, a ne sledstviem logicheskogo rassuzhdeniya. Ved' logika podskazyvaet skazat':

«Pochemu ty uveren,

chto ty uveren

v etikh,

chto ty verish' i prinimaesh' svidetel'stvo oblichayushchikh,

pover' tem,

primi svidetel'stvo pervonachal'nykh. Poetomu, poskol'ku eto novovvedenie,

u tebya net osnovaniya

priznavat' ikh neprigodnymi

ran'she momenta etogo novovvedeniya i vpred'.»

That is, if it were indeed clear that their testimony in Nisan was false, there would be reason to disqualify them already from Nisan. But since we did not disqualify them as certainly false witnesses—for who tells us that they lied? It is possible that the latter witnesses who exposed them were the ones who lied. Rather, the Torah established by a scriptural decree that from the time they exposed the first witnesses, their status is that of liars. Therefore, they are considered liars only from Tishrei, and not before then.

Explanation of the final answer The eminent Rabbi Akiva Eger raised the following difficulty: Here, they did not seek to derive a law from the law of conspiracy, concerning which one could say, “One does not derive from a novelty.” Rather, we wanted to say that there is no need to derive the disqualification of the first witnesses from conspiring witnesses, because they are disqualified by logical reasoning, since they are also disqualified in contradictory testimony. What, then, did Tosafot answer? One may add to his difficulty that Tosafot of the Rosh (cited in the Shita Mekubetzet to Bava Batra, there) cites this answer of Tosafot in the name of the Riva, and this is his language: “Here too, it is a novelty that the witnesses who expose them as conspirators are fit when the witnesses exposed as conspirators are disqualified. What difference is there between these and those? Therefore, since the witnesses who expose them are fit, it would be appropriate for the witnesses exposed by them to be fit as well; therefore, it is a novelty.” These words require explanation: Does the fact that the witnesses who expose them are fit require that the witnesses exposed by them also be fit?! On the contrary, if the witnesses who expose them are fit, the witnesses exposed by them are disqualified! Rabbi Shmuel Shtrasson explains (Ketubot, siman 26, and Bava Batra, siman 16): Seemingly, Rav Ḥisda’s reasoning requires examination. Why should we disqualify both sets, and why should we not say that each set independently has a presumption of fitness, as in the case of two paths? He explains: Granted, in the case of two paths, the ritual impurity of each path does not result from the purity of the other; rather, each individual is subject to uncertainty, and in every case of uncertainty we leave him with his presumption of fitness [but when they came before us simultaneously, they contradict one another, and with regard to this it was said that one may rely on the presumption]. But here, in contradictory testimony, the entire discussion of the fitness of each set results directly from the uncertainty concerning the other set. For if we establish that one set is fit, it necessarily follows that the other is disqualified; and if we establish that one set is disqualified, the other is fit. Therefore, since the uncertainty concerns the interrelationship of the two sets, it is impossible to leave each set with its presumption, since its status is intertwined with that of the other set, which testifies against it that, because of the uncertainty, it is disqualified. It therefore follows that if there were a situation in which there were no discussion and no practical consequence concerning one set, and it did not stand for consideration before us at all, thereby severing the connection between them, and only one set remained to be considered, we would leave it with its presumption of fitness. Therefore, with regard to conspiring witnesses, where the Torah gave complete credence to the second witnesses through the Torah’s novelty concerning conspiring witnesses and not through factual logical reasoning, there is no uncertainty concerning the first witnesses that undermines their presumption, and we should have left the first set with its presumption of fitness [and this is the explanation of Tosafot of the Rosh]. The Torah therefore came to introduce the novelty that nevertheless the first set is disqualified. The essential point of Rabbi Shmuel Shtrasson’s explanation is that the disqualification of the first witnesses in a case of conspiracy is a greater novelty than the disqualification of each set in a case of contradiction. Therefore, Rava maintains that conspiring witnesses are a novelty even if he follows Rav Ḥisda. This is the explanation of Tosafot’s answer. Rabbi Akiva Eger’s difficulty is thereby resolved: The disqualification of the first witnesses in a case of conspiracy does not result from the reasoning that their status is no better than in a case of contradiction; it is superior and far more novel. Explanation of the difference between the first and second answers. In the first answer, Tosafot maintain that Rav Ḥisda cannot maintain that a conspiring witness is a novelty. For they wrote that when Rava says that it is a novelty, he does not say so according to Rav Ḥisda. This is difficult: Ultimately, it is a novelty, since in the case of contradictory witnesses they are disqualified only because of uncertainty and are believed—at the very least—to establish money in its owner’s possession. The Torah’s novelty in the case of conspiring witnesses is that they are certainly disqualified and are not believed even to establish money in its owner’s possession [as stated in the second answer]. The Sha’ar HaMishpat explains this based on the words of Maimonides (Hilchot Edut, chapter 9, halakha 3): “Similarly, a tumtum and an androgynos are disqualified because they are of doubtful female status. And anyone whose status is doubtful—fit or disqualified—is disqualified, since a witness comes only to remove money on the basis of his testimony or to impose punishment on the basis of his testimony, and money is not removed because of uncertainty, nor is punishment imposed because of uncertainty, by Torah law.” It follows that Maimonides maintains that there is no concept of witnesses whose status is doubtful, neither for establishing money in a person’s possession nor for removing it, since witnesses clarify and establish a matter, and something that is not clarified is not testimony; witnesses whose status is doubtful are not witnesses. Tosafot, in their first answer, maintain this reasoning; therefore, according to Rav Ḥisda, they are completely disqualified, even from establishing money in a person’s possession. Explanation of Abaye’s reasoning The Leḥem Mishne (Hilchot Edut, chapter 18, halakha 2) explains that Abaye’s reason for disqualifying the witness retroactively is that he maintains that a conspiring witness is not a novelty, based on the Tur’s explanation of the reason for the law of conspiring witnesses. The Tur wrote (siman 38), and this is his language: “And for this reason the latter witnesses are believed, since they testify about the bodies of the witnesses, and it is as though they testified about them that they killed a person or desecrated Shabbat, and they are not believed regarding themselves to say, ‘We did such and such.’” (See also Kovetz Shiurim, Bava Kamma, section 43, and the lessons of Rabbi Shimon Shkop, Makkot, section 138.) It follows from the words of the Leḥem Mishne that Abaye and Rava disagree on this reasoning. It is difficult to say this, first, because it is not only Rava who says that conspiring witnesses are a novelty; Rabbi Akiva also maintains this—without dissent—in tractate Makkot (2b). Maimonides rules there in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, whereas in our sugya he rules in accordance with Abaye. Furthermore, Rava himself says below that if two witnesses disqualified other witnesses as robbers, they are believed without any novelty; see there in the name of the Yad Ramah and Ramban. If so, what is the novelty concerning conspiring witnesses? The Divrei Ḥayyim responsa (part 1, Ḥoshen Mishpat, siman 11, and the additions at the end of the book, siman 31) further challenged the Tur’s words: Conspiring witnesses are not comparable to witnesses who testify about others that they are wrongdoers. In the case of witnesses who testify that the first witnesses desecrated Shabbat, and the first witnesses deny it, the witnesses are testifying about themselves and are not believed, since they are בעלי דבר and have an interest in their testimony. In the case of conspiring witnesses, however, when they came to testify that so-and-so borrowed money, they had no interest whatsoever in this testimony. If they are subsequently exposed as conspirators, and now they dispute whether they saw the loan or not, although they now have an interest in the matter and are testifying about themselves, nevertheless, at the time of their testimony concerning the loan they had no interest in the matter, and their testimony was accepted in the court. If there is still a dispute whether they saw the loan, then “What did you see that caused you to rely on these? Rely on those.” Perhaps the first witnesses are truthful and the second witnesses are liars. Therefore, the Torah requires a novelty whereby the latter are believed and not the first. Rather, certainly the Tur’s intention is that the Torah’s novelty is that we believe the latter as though they had testified that the first witnesses were wrongdoers. That is, the first witnesses are now giving two testimonies: one concerning the loan and the other concerning themselves. Without the Torah’s novelty, we would not relate to their testimony about themselves—for they are not believed—but only to their testimony concerning the loan. The Torah came to teach us that we do indeed relate to their testimony concerning themselves [as the Tur wrote]. Returning to our matter: The Tur does not maintain that there is no novelty concerning conspiring witnesses, and Abaye agrees that conspiring witnesses are a novelty. The later authorities explained that his reason for disagreeing with Rava is that although it is a novelty, nevertheless they are disqualified because they gave false testimony, and they are disqualified retroactively from the time that they gave false testimony. Rava maintains that the disqualification is not based on the reality of false testimony, but on the legal status of false testimony, and one has in it only the consequence of the novelty from the time of its novelty and onward. The second approach:

Nekotorye govoryat: Rava tozhe soglasen s Abaye,

to est' ikh zlodeyanie nachalos' s nisana, s momenta, kogda oni dali lozhnoe svidetel'stvo.

Chto zhe imel v vidu Rava,

govorya, chto lzhesvidetel' stanovitsya neprigodnym tol'ko

s etogo momenta

i vpred',

nesmotrya na to, chto ego zlodeyanie nachalos' uzhe v nisane?

Iz-za vozmozhnogo ushcherba pokupatelyam.

This is to prevent the purchasers who bought fields between Nisan and Tishrei, and had this witness sign the sale document, from suffering a loss, since they did not know that he was disqualified. If we disqualify his testimony on the document, the purchasers will suffer a loss. Therefore, Rava maintains that, as a rabbinic enactment, the conspiring witness is not disqualified retroactively. [Abaye was not concerned about this.]

Gemara utochnyaet:

«V chem mezhdu nimi raznitsa?»

Kakoe prakticheskoe pravovoe razlichie est' mezhdu dvumya ob"yasneniyami slov Ravy?

Raznitsa mezhdu nimi

voznikayet, naprimer, v sluchae,

kogda dva svidetelya svidetel'stvovali protiv odnogo

[variant teksta Bakha]:

«i dva protiv odnogo»,

to est' kogda dve gruppy svideteley prishli izoblichit' svidetel'stvo dvukh pervykh svideteley: odna gruppa izoblichaet odnogo svidetelya i govorit: «V etot den' ty byl s nami v drugom meste i ne mog videt' sobytiya, o kotorom svidetel'stvuesh' v drugom meste», a vtoraya gruppa izoblichaet vtorogo svidetelya. Poetomu, po pervomu ob"yasneniyu Ravy, Rava soglasen, chto zdes' oni stanovyatsya neprigodnymi zadnim chislom. Ved' to, chto dva svidetelya mogut izoblichit' odnogo, i neprigodnost' pervykh, ne yavlyaetsya novovvedeniem: logichno, chto dva svidetelya sil'nee odnogo.

A po ob"yasneniyu, osnovannomu na vozmozhnom ushcherbe pokupatelyam, oni ne stanovyatsya neprigodnymi zadnim chislom iz-za ushcherba pokupatelyam.

Inache,

eshche odno prakticheskoe razlichie voznikayet v sluchae,

kogda

second witnesses did not expose the first witnesses as conspirators, but merely

priznali ikh neprigodnymi

pervykh

iz-za grabitel'stva,

to est' zasvidetel'stvovali protiv nikh, chto oni byli grabitelyami uzhe v proshedshem nisane i s tekh por byli neprigodny dlya svidetel'stva. Po pervomu ob"yasneniyu Ravy Rava soglasen, chto oni stanovyatsya neprigodnymi zadnim chislom, ved' doverie k dvum svidetelyam i neprigodnost' pervykh ne yavlyayutsya novovvedeniem: logichno, chto dva svidetelya, svidetel'stvuyushchie, chto drugie sovershili grabitel'stvo, mogut sdelat' ikh neprigodnymi. A po ob"yasneniyu, osnovannomu na ushcherbe pokupatelyam, oni ne stanovyatsya neprigodnymi zadnim chislom iz-za ushcherba pokupatelyam.

Teper' Gemara obsuzhdaet, ch'emu mneniyu sootvetstvuet galarha.

And Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti said: Rav Pappa carried out

a ruling and acted upon it

as a practical legal ruling,

in actual practice,

in accordance with

his opinion,

that of Rava.

But

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with Abaye,

who holds that the witness is disqualified retroactively.

Although whenever Abaye and Rava disagree, the halakha is generally in accordance with Rava, here the halakha follows Abaye, because the rule is:

And the halakha is in accordance with Abaye in the six cases known by the mnemonic Ya'al Kagem,

in these six laws: an ownerless object found without the owner’s knowledge; a conspiring witness is disqualified retroactively; a lehi that stands by itself; betrothal that was not given for consummation; disclosure of intent concerning bills of divorce; and a habitual transgressor who eats meat from animals that were not slaughtered according to halakha [which is the law discussed next].

The Torah states: “Do not join your hand with a wicked person to be a corrupt witness.” Abaye and Rava disagree concerning the definition of a “wicked person” who is disqualified from bearing witness.

A Jewish person who is

a habitual transgressor

who defiantly rejects the commandments, by

eating meat from animals that were not slaughtered according to halakha out of appetite,

because of his great desire for it—

according to everyone,

both Abaye and Rava agree that he is

disqualified

from bearing witness. Since he does this because of his desire for money—for meat from animals that were not slaughtered according to halakha is cheaper than meat from a properly slaughtered animal—his status is like that of a “corrupt person” motivated by monetary desire, and he is disqualified from bearing witness.

But concerning a habitual transgressor

who transgresses defiantly,

who transgresses in order to anger his Creator, without gaining any monetary benefit from it [for example, when both improperly slaughtered and properly slaughtered meat are before him and both are free, yet he eats the improperly slaughtered meat; or when he transgresses a prohibition that provides no monetary benefit or pleasure], Abaye and Rava disagree:

Abaye says: He is disqualified

from bearing witness.

Rava says: He is qualified.

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, explains the basis of their dispute:

Abaye says he is disqualified,

because

he is considered a wicked person,

and the Torah says: “Do not place a wicked person as a witness.”

And Rava says he is qualified,

because

a corrupt person motivated by monetary desire,

one motivated by desire for money,

is what we require

in order to disqualify someone from bearing witness. Similarly, in a case where testimony in the formal legal sense is not required, and a woman is qualified to testify, but the truth of the matter is established through credibility—for example, in matters of forbidden and permitted status, or a woman’s testimony that her husband died, and the like—the Netivot (Beurim, Choshen Mishpat 46:17) cites the rulings of the authorities (Yoreh De'a 127 and the Shakh, subsection 20) that such a person is not believed [except when he testifies that something is permitted in a matter that does not belong to him, from which he derives no benefit and in which he is not suspected of lying]. Thus, he is disqualified because of suspicion, even though these areas of law do not require the formal law of witnesses. By contrast, the Ketzot HaChoshen (ibid., subsection 17) cites the Nimmukei Yosef on our passage, who holds that such a person is qualified with regard to forbidden and permitted matters and other forms of testimony for which a woman is qualified—that is, matters in which the formal law of witnesses is not required. Indeed, this is the view of the Nimmukei Yosef, who holds that the disqualification is based on a specific Torah decree and not on concern that he will lie.

In a case where testimony is required, but there is no concern that he is lying. The author (Choshen Mishpat 46:34–35, based on the Gemara in Bava Batra 159a) writes that if a witness signed a document before he became disqualified from bearing witness, and afterward became disqualified, while other people testify that this is his signature, the question is whether the document is valid. If he became disqualified because he became a relative of one of the parties, the document is valid. But if he became disqualified because he became a robber, the law is as follows: if witnesses saw the document before he became a robber, it is a valid document; but if they did not see it—even though they recognize his signature—the document is invalid, because there is reason to suspect that this robber has now forged the document and written an earlier date. The Beit Yosef, citing Rabbenu Yerucham (Sefer Meisharim, part 2, section 6), writes that this applies when he became a robber, who is suspected of forging documents. But when he became disqualified through a transgression that is not motivated by monetary corruption, the Tosaafot are uncertain whether the document is invalid. The Ketzot explains the uncertainty: if his disqualification is based on suspicion, he is suspected of forging; but if it is based solely on a specific Torah decree, his status is no worse than that of a relative. A relative who signed the document while qualified does not invalidate it, because the document was written when he was qualified; the same applies to a transgressor who is not motivated by monetary corruption, since there is no suspicion that he forged the document. Thus, Rabbenu Yerucham is uncertain regarding this inquiry. Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky writes that Maimonides certainly disagrees with Rabbenu Yerucham. When Maimonides states this law (Laws of Testimony 14:5), he writes “one who is disqualified because of a transgression,” and does not write “a robber.” Likewise, cited above (page 26, note 27), are the words of Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky that one suspected of illicit sexual relations is not disqualified from bearing witness. The Rif writes there that his inclination overcame him. It follows that if there is no suspicion that he is lying, he is qualified, even though he is a wicked person. This indicates that the early authorities hold that his disqualification is based on the concern that he will lie. See the Ketzot, section 52, which explains another practical consequence of this inquiry. The Kovetz Ha'arot (section 22) examines the case of one who ate lamb while thinking that it was pork [and the case is one of eating defiantly]. In that case, if his disqualification is based on his being a wicked person by virtue of a specific Torah decree, he is not wicked, since he ate lamb. But if it is based on suspicion that he will lie, he is disqualified, since he is suspected of eating meat from improperly slaughtered animals. He also writes there another practical consequence: if the disqualification is based solely on the concern that he will lie, then if the court does not know that he is disqualified, while he himself knows that his testimony is true, it may be permitted for him to testify [this requires further examination: in any event, he is a witness whom the Torah disqualified, and do we expound the reason for a verse in this manner?]. But if it is a specific Torah decree, he is forbidden to testify. From many expressions of the early authorities—for example, Rashi in our passage, 27b, s.v. “like Rabbi Meir,” as well as the Yad Ramah and others—it is clear that they hold that the reason is suspicion. But the Nimmukei Yosef holds that he is disqualified because of a specific Torah decree, as stated above. Rabbenu Yerucham is uncertain. The Turei Even (Rosh HaShana 22) and the Minchat Chinukh prove from our passage that he is certainly disqualified because of a specific Torah decree and not because of concern that he will lie. After all, the conspiring witness over whom Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree is not a person motivated by monetary corruption (see note 10). If he were such a person, why would the Gemara link this dispute to the dispute between Abaye and Rava? Abaye and Rava do not disagree concerning a person motivated by monetary corruption. Rather, he is a transgressor because he gave false testimony. If so, why does Rabbi Meir disqualify him even by an inference from a less serious matter to a more serious one? There is no concern that one who lied in a less serious matter will lie in a more serious one. This is understandable if we say that his disqualification is based on a specific Torah decree; but if it is based on the concern that he will lie, there is no such concern in this case. (See Avi Ezri there.) In the Chiddushei Rabbi Shmuel (section 18), it is explained that if his disqualification is based on suspicion, then this itself is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei: whether one suspected of lying in a less serious matter is suspected of lying in a more serious matter. See Keren Ora. The Gemara brings a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna, which supports Abaye and presents a difficulty to Rava.

They raise an objection from a source

from the following teaching: It is stated in the Torah [Exodus 23:1], “Do not join your hand to be a corrupt witness.” We expound the verse as though it had been written as follows:

“Do not place a wicked person as a witness; do not place a corrupt person as a witness”—

these are robbers and those who violate oaths.

What

does the phrase “those who violate oaths,” in the plural, mean? Is it

not one,

whether

a false oath,

one who swears that a stone pillar is made of gold ,

and one

whether

a monetary oath,

in which he denies under oath a monetary obligation that rests upon him to pay?

But a false oath provides him with no monetary benefit or pleasure, and he is not a “person motivated by monetary corruption.” Yet the beraita derives from the verse that he is disqualified. This is a difficulty for Rava! The Gemara answers:

No,

not as you said. Rather,

both this and that,

the “oaths” that the beraita mentioned in the plural are

monetary oaths. And what

is the meaning of the plural expression

“oaths”

used by the beraita? It means

many oaths,

many oaths taken by many people, who swear to one another.

The Gemara brings another beraita, which supports Rava and presents a difficulty to Abaye.

They raise an objection from a source

from what we learned in a beraita:

“Do not place a wicked person as a witness; do not place a corrupt person as a witness”—

these are robbers and those who lend money at interest.

It follows that only those who transgress because of monetary desire, as well as those who eat improperly slaughtered meat out of appetite, who resemble monetary transgressors, are disqualified from bearing witness. Only in their case is there concern that just as their desire for money causes them to violate a Torah prohibition, so too it will cause them to give false testimony for a bribe. But a habitual transgressor who acts defiantly is not disqualified from testifying—

!? A conclusive refutation of Abaye:

the words of the beraita are a difficulty for Abaye, and the Gemara concludes that they are indeed

a conclusive refutation.

Abaye does not provide an answer to them.

The Gemara now discusses the question:

Shall we say

that the dispute between Abaye and Rava concerning whether a habitual transgressor who acts defiantly is qualified to testify

is a dispute between authorities,

a dispute between tannaim, sages of the Mishnaic period?

For we learned in a beraita:

A conspiring witness,

he is

disqualified for all

forms of testimony, throughout

the entire Torah; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: In what case is this statement said

that he is disqualified for all forms of testimony? It is when

he was exposed as a conspiring witness,

that is, when his testimony seeking to impose liability

in a capital case was refuted by witnesses who established that he could not have been present. Since he was suspected of violating the grave prohibition of giving false testimony in a capital case, thereby causing a person to be killed, he is suspected with regard to all testimony in the entire Torah, all of which is less serious than it [or comparable to it].

Since he was suspected of violating the severe prohibition of giving testimony in capital cases, thereby killing a person through false testimony, he is suspected with regard to all testimony throughout the Torah, all of which is less severe than this [or similar to it].

But if he was exposed as a conspirator

when his testimony concerned

monetary cases,

he is still not considered suspect, and he is

qualified to

testify in

capital cases,

because one suspected of violating a less serious prohibition is not yet suspected of violating a more serious prohibition.

Rabbi Meir does not distinguish in this way. He holds that even one suspected with regard to a less serious matter is suspected with regard to a more serious matter.

Is it possible that

we should say that Abaye

holds

like Rabbi Meir, while Rava

holds

like Rabbi Yosei?

The Gemara now explains how the dispute between Abaye and Rava can be linked to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei:

Abaye

holds

like Rabbi Meir, who says that we apply

the disqualification from testimony even

from a less serious

act of giving false testimony in a monetary case

to the more serious

capital cases, because one suspected with regard to the less serious matter is also suspected with regard to the more serious matter.

Abaye says this as well. A habitual transgressor who eats improperly slaughtered meat defiantly is considered suspect with regard to the less serious matter, since he is not harmful to other people but is harmful only in the realm of obligations toward Heaven. Nevertheless, Abaye holds that he is also suspected with regard to the more serious matter—the grave offense of giving false testimony—for he is harmful both in the realm of obligations toward Heaven and to other people, by causing them monetary loss.

But

Rava,

who holds that one suspected with regard to a less serious matter is not suspected with regard to a more serious matter—for according to him, one suspected of eating improperly slaughtered meat, who is not harmful to other people, is not suspected of giving false testimony, which is harmful both in the realm of obligations toward Heaven and to other people—holds

like Rabbi Yosei, who says that only

from

from a more serious matter to a less serious matter,

is one suspected with regard to the more serious matter also suspected with regard to the less serious matter

we say

in order to disqualify him. But

from a less serious matter to a more serious matter,

one suspected with regard to the less serious matter is suspected with regard to the more serious matter—

we do not say this

in order to disqualify him.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion:

No!

We cannot say that the dispute between Abaye and Rava depends on the dispute between the tannaim, either according to Abaye or according to Rava. Rather, we must say:

According to Rabbi Yosei, everyone agrees.

That is, it is certain that Abaye cannot reconcile his position with the view of Rabbi Yosei. For if Rabbi Yosei holds that even when moving from monetary cases to capital cases—where both offenses are harmful both in the realm of obligations toward Heaven and to other people—we do not disqualify someone by moving from the less serious to the more serious, then all the more so Rabbi Yosei holds that one suspected of eating improperly slaughtered meat, who is harmful only in the realm of obligations toward Heaven and not to other people, is not suspected of giving false testimony, which is harmful both in the realm of obligations toward Heaven and to other people. This contradicts Abaye’s view, which disqualifies him. Therefore, Abaye’s position indeed depends on the dispute between the tannaim.

They disagree according to Rabbi Meir.

That is, according to Rava, we do not have to force ourselves to say that Rava does not hold like Rabbi Meir. Rava too can reconcile his position even with Rabbi Meir. What, then, is their dispute?

Abaye

holds

like Rabbi Meir,

just as Rabbi Meir disqualifies a person by moving from the less serious to the more serious, so too does Abaye. The Minchat Chinukh proves that Rabbi Meir also holds that this is a specific Torah decree requiring us to suspect him and not accept his testimony. If we were to say that his disqualification is based only on suspicion, this would make sense if we sought to disqualify him for a conviction [for example, when he seeks through his testimony to have someone executed], because he is suspected. But if we seek to disqualify him for an acquittal—for example, if two witnesses come to contradict witnesses in a capital case, and on the basis of their testimony the court would save the murderer—would we really refuse to accept them merely because they are suspected? We must therefore say that it is a specific Torah decree that disqualifies them from bearing witness. The Tosaafot intended only to say that concerning other suspected persons—not in relation to testimony—Abaye does not hold like Rabbi Meir, who maintains that one suspected with regard to one matter is suspected with regard to the entire Torah.

Rava would say to you:

Rabbi Meir said that only there

that one suspected with regard to the less serious matter is suspected with regard to the more serious matter,

in the case of a conspiring witness in a monetary case, who is harmful both in the realm of obligations toward Heaven and to other people.

Although monetary cases are less serious than capital cases, the severity of both monetary and capital offenses is nevertheless equal in that the person is harmful both in the realm of obligations toward Heaven and to other people. Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that one suspected with regard to the relatively less serious of the two is suspected with regard to the more serious.

But here,

in the case of one who eats improperly slaughtered meat defiantly,

for

he is

harmful in the realm of obligations toward Heaven but not harmful to other people—

no.

Even Rabbi Meir would not disqualify him from bearing witness, since the offense relevant to testimony is certainly more serious, as it is harmful both in the realm of obligations toward Heaven and to other people.

In summary: Rava can hold like Rabbi Meir, and certainly like Rabbi Yosei. Abaye, however, can hold only like Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara rules:

And the halakha is in accordance with Abaye.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But it was refuted!

For we raised an objection against Abaye from the beraita, above, and he did not answer.

And the Gemara answers: That beraita

that one

is not according to everyone, but is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that one suspected concerning the minor is not suspected concerning the major. Whereas Abaye holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And let it also be so,

even if it is the teaching of

Rabbi Yosei,

and Rabbi Meir disagrees with him, is it not an established principle for us that when

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

disagree, the halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei,

and how did Abaye rule not according to Rabbi Yosei!?

And the Gemara answers:

It is different there [in the version of the Yad Ramah:

the wording of the Yad Ramah:

here],

for the tan­ nay taught an anonymous ruling,

that an “anonymous Mishna” was taught,

according to Rabbi Meir,

and the halakha follows an “anonymous Mishna.”

And where

did

the tan­ nay teach an anonymous ruling

for us according to Rabbi Meir?

And the Gemara recounts a story in which they found, concerning this halakha, an anonymous Mishna according to Rabbi Meir.

As in this

case,

that

a certain man whose name was

Bar Ḥama killed a person,

he killed the person.

The Exilarch said [the head of the Babylonian exile, who was appointed by the kingdom to judge the Jews]

to Rav Abba bar Yaakov: Go out,

, said to Rav Abba bar Yaakov: Go out,

go out,

examine it,

investigate the matter.

If he certainly killed,

if he indeed killed,

let them blind his eyes,

let them gouge out his eyes!

Two witnesses came,

two witnesses came,

they testified against him,

they testified concerning Bar Ḥama

that he certainly killed,

that he had killed.

He went,

Bar Ḥama went,

he brought two witnesses,

he brought two other witnesses,

they testified against one of those,

they testified to disqualify one of the two witnesses who had testified against him. However, those two witnesses disqualified him on the basis of seeing two different acts.

One,

one of the two whom Bar Ḥama brought,

said

concerning the witness who had testified against him:

Before me,

in my presence,

this witness stole

this witness

a kav

a kav

of peeled barley,

peeled barley.

And one,

whereas the second testified concerning that same man:

Before me,