Sanhedrin 32b — the Talmud in English

And if so, if

the judges erred

and issued a ruling not in accordance with the halakha,

they will not pay

the loser for the loss that they caused him, for if they had been able to examine and investigate, perhaps they would have arrived at uncovering the truth!? And the Gemara answers: If you say that the judges do not have to pay because of their error, then

all the more so you will lock the door before borrowers.

For the lenders will be concerned lest the judges err to their detriment, and even if they succeed in proving their error, the judges will not pay them, and the lenders will refrain from lending their money.

The second answer is that of Rava [and it is marked by the letter R from Ḥarfa"ש].

Rava said

: There is no need to say that our Mishna was taught before the enactment concerning locking the door; rather,

the Mishna here

does not deal with all monetary laws, but deals only

with laws of fines,

which are also called “monetary laws,” but there is no concern of locking the door in them.

And the other one,

the Mishna and the beraita concerning postdated debt documents, deal

with admissions and loans,

in which there is concern of locking the door, and concerning them the Sages enacted that they should judge without examination and investigation.

The third answer is that of Rav Pappa [and it is marked by the letter P from Ḥarfa"ש].

Rav Pappa said: Both this and that,

the one and the other, speak

of admissions and loans.

Rather,

here,

in our Mishna, it is speaking

of a “fraudulent case,”

in which case one must examine and investigate thoroughly, in order to bring out the law according to its truth.

Whereas

here

—

in a case that is not fraudulent.

As

said

Resh Lakish,

who raised a difficulty:

Resh Lakish posed a contradiction,

on the surface, in the words of Scripture:

On the one hand, it is written [

Leviticus 19 ]

“With righteousness shall you judge your fellow.”

Scripture said “righteousness” only once, and did not double its language to say, “With righteousness, righteousness shall you judge your fellow.” And if it had doubled the word “righteousness,” we would have learned that the judge must scrutinize so thoroughly and examine and investigate, but Scripture did not say so.

And

on the other hand

, it is written [

Deuteronomy 16 ]

“Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue,”

and from the doubling of the language “righteousness” it is implied that the judge must scrutinize the words of the witnesses thoroughly and examine and investigate.

How

is the apparent contradiction in the words of the Scriptures to be resolved?

Here

—

in a fraudulent case,

you must examine and investigate thoroughly.

Here—

in a case that is not fraudulent.

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna,

the contradiction between the Mishna here and the Mishna and beraita concerning the postdated documents, should be answered

as we answered,

as the three amoraim answered with their three answers.

But the apparent contradiction of

the verses,

which Resh Lakish raised, should be resolved by saying that the verse “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue” does not come to teach the need for examination and investigation of the witnesses; rather, it comes to say: Make your judgment righteous, and make your compromise righteous, equally. That is, judge the case or establish a compromise, according to the matter and according to your view, and do not always pursue one of them specifically—specifically the judgment or specifically the compromise—for this reason Scripture said “righteousness” twice, to teach that one must pursue righteousness equally,

one for judgment and one for compromise.

As it was taught in a beraita: “Righteousness, righteousness, shall you pursue”—

As it was taught: “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue”

—

one for judgment,

and one for compromise.

How

do we find that one must pursue the righteousness of judgment, and how must one pursue the righteousness of compromise?

For example, if

two ships were passing in a river

in a narrow place,

and encountered

and met

one another. If both pass

together through the narrow passage,

both sink.

And if they pass

one after the other—

both pass. And likewise, two camels that were ascending the steps of Beit Horon,

on the slope of a steep mountain,

and encountered

and met the camels on the mountain ascent

one another. If both ascend

together,

both fall,

they will both roll downward—

one after the other—

both ascend.

How

should one act?

If the encounter was between a

loaded and

an

unloaded

ship—

the unloaded ship is pushed aside before the loaded one.

And if one ship was

close

to reaching its destination,

and

another ship

that is not close—

the close one is pushed aside before the one that is not close.

This is the righteousness of judgment.

But if

both were close,

or if

both were far—then

impose a compromise between them, and let them pay one another’s wages.

One of them will pass first and the other will be pushed aside, but the first will pay compensation to the second for the delay.

This is the righteousness of compromise.

And the Gemara brings a beraita, and there is an additional teaching derived from this verse:

The Sages taught: “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue”

:

—

follow an excellent court.

A person should bring his case to the most excellent court in his surroundings.

Follow

after

the court of

Rabbi Eliezer to Lod,

where his court sat. Or follow

after Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai to

the place called

“Baror Ḥayil.”

And since the Gemara mentioned the place “Baror Ḥayil,” it brings another beraita recounting how they acted in Baror Ḥayil at a time of persecution:

A tanna taught:

At a time of persecution, when the gentiles decreed that they should not circumcise, the Jews publicized the performance of the mitzva of circumcision by means of agreed-upon signs, and thus everyone knew about the feast of the circumcision, and they would come there.

When

the sound of millstones in

a place called

“Burnei”

was heard, it was a sign of the performance of the mitzva of circumcision and the feast afterward, because the sound of the millstones recalled the grinding of the substances with which to heal the circumcised infant. And it was a sign, as though the herald were announcing:

“The son’s week! The son’s week!”

That is, the circumcision, which is performed on the eighth day, after a week has passed from the time of the birth.

And if

the light of a lamp

was seen during the day

in Baror Ḥayil -

this was a sign as though the herald had stood and announced:

it is a sign as though the herald stood and announced:

A

feast

of circumcision is taking place

there! A feast there!

The Sages taught: “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue”; follow the Sages to the academy

:

The academy was the place of assembly of the Sages, and there too an excellent court would sit, and therefore one should go

after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod,

because the academy of the region was there.

After Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai to Baror Ḥayil. After Rabbi Yehoshua to Pekiin. After Rabban Gamliel to Yavne. After Rabbi Akiva to Bnei Brak. After Rabbi Mattia to Rome. After Rabbi Hanania ben Teradion to Sikhni. After Rabbi Yose to Sepphoris. After Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira to Nisibis. After Rabbi Yehoshua to exile, in Pumbedita,

after Rabbi to Beit Shearim.

the Great Sanhedrin,

And if there is a need to judge before the Great Sanhedrin, follow

after the Sages,

the Great Sanhedrin,

to the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Monetary laws begin

either for acquittal or for conviction; capital laws begin for acquittal, but do not begin for conviction.”

And the Gemara discusses: If the judges in capital cases accepted the testimony, examined and investigated the witnesses, and now they are coming to discuss their words, and they must begin with acquittal, as explained in the Mishna,

how do we say it,

what do the judges now say to the witnesses in order to begin with acquittal?

And the Gemara brings several opinions of amoraim:

A.

Rav Yehuda said: This is what we say to them

—to the witnesses testifying to the detriment of the defendant:

“Who can say that it is as you said!?”

Who will say to us that it is indeed as you say, and that you did not come here in collusion with one another to make the defendant liable for death!? And by this they begin with an opening for acquittal, by intimidating the witnesses with these words, as we make them understand as though they are not trustworthy in their testimony.

Ulla said to him: But we have silenced them!

If we deny their trustworthiness, we thereby block them from giving their testimony, and they will immediately retract within the time of speech, and the testimony will be nullified, and we will not be able to make a person who is liable for death liable for the punishment that reaches him.

But the Gemara is astonished at Ulla’s claim:

“And let us silence them!”

Indeed, we should cause their testimony to be blocked, and they will retract!

Is it not taught

that this is what must be done?

For it was taught:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: They move

—

the witnesses

before accepting their testimony,

from place to place,

each time telling them to come and testify in another place,

so that their minds become confused and they retract.

And the Gemara is astonished at the astonishment:

“Are they comparable!?”

For

there,

in the beraita, when the witnesses are moved from place to place before accepting the testimony, they are merely

moved on their own,

and are not moved by direct action. For before accepting the testimony, the obligation does not rest upon the court to accept their testimony, and therefore it is permitted for them to cause, by way of “on its own,” that the witnesses not testify to make a person liable for death.

But

here,

where their testimony has already been accepted in court, if we begin with acquittal and undermine their trustworthiness so that they retract their testimony,

we are moving them by direct action!

the judges say to the defendant [in order to begin with an argument in his favor]:

B.

Rather, Ulla said: This is what we say

the judges to the defendant [in order to begin with acquittal]:

“Do you have

witnesses to contradict them?”

And by this we are not rejecting the witnesses, and the witnesses will not retract if they are truthful witnesses. For they know that he cannot render them conspiring witnesses. Yet, on the other hand, this constitutes an opening to the side of acquittal, since the court arouses the defendant to seek witnesses who could render the witnesses testifying against him conspiring witnesses, and then he will be saved from a punishment that does not reach him.

Rabba said to him,

Rabba was astonished at Ulla’s explanation and said to him:

“Do we open with this person’s acquittal

—the defendant, about whom they testified that he is liable for death—by arousing him to bring witnesses who will render the first witnesses conspiring witnesses, at a time

when it is this person’s liability!?”

For with regard to the witnesses, this is an opening to their detriment, because if other witnesses come and render them conspiring witnesses, they will be liable for death; and what reason is there to open with this person’s acquittal, to seek conspiring witnesses, at a time when it is the other person’s liability!?

And Ulla was astonished:

“And is it his liability?”

Why is rendering the witnesses conspiring witnesses at this stage, when the court has not yet issued the defendant’s verdict, considered something to their detriment? For if they render them conspiring witnesses immediately now, they will not be punished with the punishment of conspiring witnesses, since—

And did we not learn

in tractate Makkot:

“Conspiring witnesses are not executed until the verdict has been completed!”

Rabba said to him: I

meant this,

this is how I was astonished and said:

“If this one remained silent

—the defendant—

until his verdict was completed, and brought witnesses

other witnesses,

and rendered them conspiring witnesses

—the witnesses who plotted to make him liable for death—then

it becomes this person’s liability!”

And therefore we should not even now begin with this person’s acquittal, the defendant, to teach him to seek conspiring witnesses, since it is possible that in the end this will be a liability for that one, the witnesses who came to make him liable for death.

C.

Rather, Rabba said,

this is what the court

says to him

—the defendant:

“Do you have witnesses to disprove them?”

And this is not to the detriment of the first witnesses, for contradicted testimony is merely nullified, but the witnesses are not punished for it.

D.

Rav Kahana said:

This is how the judges begin with acquittal, and say to the witnesses:

“From your words, so-and-so will be acquitted.”

For according to our view, we will not make him liable for death on the basis of your words, but in the end he will emerge acquitted. And these words themselves constitute the opening with acquittal.

E.

Abaye and Rava, both of them say: We say to him

—the court to the defendant:

“If you did not kill,

if indeed you did not take a life,

do not fear,

you have nothing to fear, for you will emerge acquitted in your judgment!”

F.

Rav Ashi said:

This is how they begin with acquittal: The court announces and says:

“Anyone who knows something concerning him

—this defendant—to teach in his favor,

let him come and teach in his favor.”

It was taught in accordance with the view of Abaye and Rava.

For it was taught:

Rabbi says:

It is stated concerning the priest with regard to the woman suspected of adultery, where too the matter concerns capital cases, for if the woman committed adultery, she dies from drinking the water [