Sanhedrin 32b (לב:) — the Talmud in English

And if so, if

the judges erred

and issued a ruling not in accordance with halakha,

they would not pay

the losing party for the loss they caused him, for if they had been able to examine and investigate, perhaps they would have arrived at the truth of the matter!? The Gemara responds: If you say that the judges need not pay because of their error, then

all the more so you will lock the door in the face of borrowers.

For lenders will fear that perhaps the judges will err to their detriment, and even if they succeed in proving the judges’ error, the judges will not pay them; consequently, the lenders will refrain from lending out their money.

The second answer is that of Rava [indicated by the letter R within the mnemonic ḥarfaḥ].

Rava said:

There is no need to say that our Mishna was taught before the enactment concerning locking the door, but rather

the Mishna here

does not deal with all monetary cases; instead, it deals only

with cases involving fines,

which are also called “monetary cases,” but in which there is no concern about locking the door.

But the other one,

the Mishna and the beraita concerning postdated promissory notes, deals

with admissions and loans,

where there is a concern about locking the door, and in those cases the Sages enacted that the judges should adjudicate without examination and investigation.

The third answer is that of Rav Pappa [indicated by the letter P within the mnemonic ḥarfaḥ].

Rav Pappa said: Both this and that,

the one and the other, speak

of admissions and loans.

Rather,

here,

in our Mishna, the matter concerns

a case of deceit,

in which case one must examine and investigate thoroughly, in order to establish the law according to the truth.

But

here—

in a case that is not one of deceit.

And we find such a distinction

as

said

Reish Lakish.

For Reish Lakish posed a difficulty:

he raised an apparent contradiction in the words of the verse:

On the one hand,

it is written

[Leviticus 19]

“Judge your fellow with righteousness.”

The verse says “righteousness” only once, and does not repeat the word by saying, “With righteousness, with righteousness, judge your fellow.” Had it repeated the word “righteousness,” we would have learned that the judge must scrutinize the matter exceedingly and examine and investigate; but the verse does not say this.

And

on the other hand,

it is written

[Deuteronomy 16]

“Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue,”

and the repetition of the word “righteousness” indicates that the judge must scrutinize the words of the witnesses carefully and examine and investigate.

How

can the apparent contradiction in the verses be resolved?

Here—

in a case of deceit,

you must examine and investigate thoroughly.

Here—

in a case that is not one of deceit.

The fourth answer is that of Rav Ashi [indicated by the letter S within the mnemonic ḥarfaḥ].

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna,

the apparent contradiction between the Mishna here and the Mishna and beraita concerning postdated promissory notes, should be resolved

as we explained,

in accordance with the three answers given by the three amoraim.

But the apparent contradiction in

the verses,

which Reish Lakish raised, should be resolved by saying that the verse “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue” does not come to teach the need for examination and investigation of the witnesses. Rather, it comes to say: Render your judgment righteously, and render your compromise righteously, equally. That is, adjudicate the case or establish a compromise, as appropriate, according to your judgment, and do not always pursue one of them specifically—either judgment specifically or compromise specifically. Therefore, the verse says “righteousness” twice, to teach that one must pursue righteousness equally:

one for judgment and one for compromise.

As it is taught in a beraita: “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue”—

one for judgment,

and one for compromise.

How

do we find that one must pursue the righteousness of judgment, and how must one pursue the righteousness of compromise?

For example, if

two ships were passing through a river

in a narrow place,

and encountered

and met

each other. If both pass

together through the narrow passage,

both will sink.

But if they pass

one after the other—

both will pass. And likewise, if two camels were ascending the ascent of Beit Ḥoron,

on the slope of a steep mountain,

and encountered

and met one another on the mountain’s ascent,

if both ascend

together,

both will fall,

and both will roll downward

, one after the other—

both will ascend.

How

should one proceed?

If the encounter was between a

loaded

ship and a

ship that is not loaded—

the ship

that is

not loaded must yield to the loaded one.

And if one ship was

near

reaching its destination,

and

another ship

was not near—

the near one must yield to the one that is not near.

This is the righteousness of judgment.

But if

both were near,

or if

both were far—

then

impose a compromise between them, and they should compensate one another.

One of them should pass first and the other yield, but the first should pay compensation to the second for the time it was delayed.

This is the righteousness of compromise.

And the Gemara cites a beraita and brings an additional teaching derived from this verse:

The Sages taught: “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue”—

:

pursue an excellent court.

A person should bring his case before the finest court in his vicinity.

Pursue

after

the court of

Rabbi Eliezer to Lod,

where his court sat. Or pursue

Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai to

the place called

“Beror Ḥayil.”

And once the Gemara mentioned the place “Beror Ḥayil,” it cites another beraita that recounts how they conducted themselves in Beror Ḥayil during a time of persecution:

A tanna:

During a time of persecution, when the gentiles decreed that circumcision was forbidden, the Jews publicized the performance of the mitzva of circumcision through agreed-upon signals. Thus everyone knew about the circumcision feast, and they would come there.

When

the sound of a millstone was heard in

the place called

“Borni,”

it was a sign that the mitzva of circumcision and the feast afterward had been performed, because the sound of the millstone recalled the grinding of the ingredients used to heal the circumcised infant. It was as though the herald were proclaiming:

“The son’s week! The son’s week!”

That is, the circumcision performed on the eighth day, after a week had passed from the time of the birth.

And if

the light of a lamp

was seen during the day

in Beror Ḥayil \-

in Baror Ḥayil -

this was a sign as though the herald had stood and announced:

A feast

for a circumcision is taking place

there! A feast there!

The Sages taught: “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue”; pursue the Sages to the study hall:

The study hall was the place where the Sages assembled, and an excellent court also sat there; therefore, one should go

after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod,

because the study hall of the region was there.

After Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai to Beror Ḥayil. After Rabbi Yehoshua to Peki’in. After Rabban Gamliel to Yavne. After Rabbi Akiva to Bnei Brak. After Rabbi Mattia to Rome. After Rabbi Ḥanania ben Teradion to Sikhnin. After Rabbi Yosei to Sepphoris. After Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira to Netzivin. After Rabbi Yehoshua to the Exile,

in Pumbedita,

after Rabbi to Beit She’arim.

And if it is necessary to adjudicate before the Great Sanhedrin, one should go

after the Sages,

the Great Sanhedrin,

to the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

We learned in the Mishna:

In monetary cases, they begin

whether for acquittal or conviction; in capital cases, they begin with acquittal, but they do not begin with conviction:

And the Gemara discusses: If the judges in a capital case accepted the testimony, examined and investigated the witnesses, and now they are coming to deliberate over their statements, and they must begin with acquittal, as explained in the Mishna,

how do we say it,

what do the judges now say to the witnesses in order to begin with acquittal?

The Gemara cites several opinions of amoraim:

1.

Rav Yehuda said: This is what we say to them,

the witnesses testifying against the defendant:

Who can say that it is as you said!?

Who can tell us that it is indeed as you say, and that you did not come here in collusion with one another to have the defendant sentenced to death!? In this way they begin with an opening toward acquittal, by intimidating the witnesses with these words and making them understand as though they were not considered trustworthy in their testimony.

Ulla said to him: But we would silence them!

If we deny their reliability, we thereby prevent them from testifying, and they will immediately retract their testimony within the time required for retraction, the testimony will be nullified, and we will be unable to sentence to the punishment he deserves a person who is liable for the death penalty.

But the Gemara is astonished at Ulla’s claim:

Let us silence them!

Indeed, we should cause their testimony to be blocked, and they will retract it!

Is it not taught,

that this is what should be done?

For it is taught:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: They move

and transfer

the witnesses

before accepting their testimony

from place to place,

as each time they tell them to come and testify in another place,

so that they become confused and retract their testimony.

The Gemara is astonished at the astonishment:

Are they comparable!?

After all,

there,

in the beraita, when the witnesses are moved from place to place before the testimony is accepted,

they are merely moved incidentally

and are not actively rejected. Before the testimony is accepted, the court is not yet obligated to accept it; therefore, it is permitted for the court to cause, by means of this incidental circumstance, that the witnesses not testify to have a person sentenced to death.

But

here,

once their testimony has already been accepted in court, if we begin with acquittal and undermine their reliability so that they retract their testimony,

we are actively rejecting them!

here,

2.

Rather, Ulla said: This is what we say

the judges say to the defendant [in order to begin with acquittal]:

Do you have

witnesses who can refute them?

In this way we do not reject the witnesses, and the witnesses will not retract their testimony if they are truthful witnesses, since they know that he cannot refute them. On the other hand, this constitutes an opening toward acquittal, since the court prompts the defendant to seek witnesses who can refute the witnesses testifying against him, in which case he will be spared a punishment he does not deserve.

Rabba said to him,

Rabba was astonished at Ulla’s explanation and said to him:

Do we open with this person’s acquittal

the defendant, against whom they testified that he is liable for the death penalty, by prompting him to bring discrediting witnesses who will refute the first witnesses, at a time

when it is this other person’s liability!?

For with regard to the witnesses, this is an opening toward conviction, because if other witnesses come and discredit them, they will be liable for the death penalty. So why should we open with this person’s acquittal by prompting him to seek discrediting witnesses, when it will be to the detriment of the other?

Ulla was astonished:

And is it considered “his liability”?

Why is discrediting the witnesses at this stage, when the court has not yet issued its verdict concerning the defendant, considered something that is to their detriment? If they discredit them immediately now, they will not be punished with the punishment of conspiring witnesses, since—

But didn’t we learn

in tractate Makkot:

Conspiring witnesses are not put to death until the verdict has been issued!

Rabba said to him: I

meant this,

this is what I was wondering and saying:

If this one were silent,

the defendant,

until his verdict was concluded, and brought witnesses

others,

and discredited them,

the witnesses who had plotted to have him sentenced to death, then

it would be this person’s liability!

Therefore, we should not even now open with this person’s acquittal—the defendant’s—by teaching him to seek discrediting witnesses, since it is possible that ultimately this will be to the detriment of the other person, the witnesses who came to have him sentenced to death.

3.

Rather, Rabba said,

this is what

we say to him,

the court says to the defendant: Do you

have witnesses who can contradict them?

This does not work to the detriment of the first witnesses, because contradicted testimony is merely invalidated; the witnesses are not punished for it.

4.

Rav Kahana said:

This is how the judges begin with acquittal, saying to the witnesses:

“By your statements, so-and-so has been acquitted.”

That is, in our judgment, we will not sentence him to death on the basis of your statements; rather, he will ultimately emerge acquitted. These words themselves constitute the opening toward acquittal.

5.

Abaye and Rava, both of them say, this is what we say to him,

the court says to the defendant:

“If you did not kill,

if you indeed did not take a life,

do not fear,

you have nothing to fear, for you will be acquitted in your judgment!

6.

Rav Ashi said:

This is how they begin with acquittal: The court proclaims and says:

“Anyone who knows something about him

this defendant, that can be presented on his behalf

should come and present it on his behalf.”

It is taught in accordance with the opinion of Abaye and Rava.

For it is taught:

Rabbi says:

With regard to a woman suspected of adultery, it is stated concerning the koen and the woman in the matter of the sota, which is also a matter of life and death, since if the woman committed adultery, she dies upon drinking the water [Numbers 5]:

“If no man has lain with you,

be acquitted,

and if you have not gone astray,” and so on.