Sanhedrin 2b — the Talmud in English

In addition to the “judging assembly,” and there are therefore twenty-two.

And

the law is that

one does not

make

an even beit din,

of an even number, because if they are divided in half, the number of those who convict will equal the number of those who acquit, and there will be no inclination toward leniency by the decision of one judge. Therefore

they add to them,

to the twenty-two, one more judge,

so here there are twenty-three.

After we have explained the law of a Small Sanhedrin, which they establish in every city, the Mishna explains what size a city must be in order for a Sanhedrin to be appointed for it.

And how many shall there be in the city

people,

and shall

the city

be fit for

appointing for it

a Sanhedrin? —

One hundred twenty

residents of the city.

Rabbi Nehemiah says:

A Sanhedrin is appointed only in a city in which there are at least

two hundred thirty

residents of the city. And the reason is

corresponding to the officers of tens

whom Moses appointed upon Jethro’s advice, and we do not find an office of authority of fewer than one over ten. Therefore, only if there are two hundred thirty residents in the city is it possible to appoint from among them one over ten, and there will be twenty-three judges.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Monetary cases are [judged] by three; cases of robbery and bodily injuries [are judged] by three.

The Gemara assumed that “monetary cases” includes all monetary cases, and therefore it raises a difficulty:

Is it so,

that is,

are robbery and bodily injuries not monetary cases,

are they not monetary cases?! They are included among monetary cases, so why did the tanney divide them into two?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Abbahu said: “What are

monetary cases,”

it teaches.

That is, when the Mishna said “monetary cases,” it did not mean all monetary cases; rather, the tanney in the Mishna explains the opening clause and says as follows:

What are monetary cases

that the tanney said are judged by three? Specifically, cases of

robbery and bodily injuries. But

cases of

admissions and loans, not.

There is no need to judge those by three. “

Admissions,” are claims in which the claimant asserts against the defendant that the defendant admitted to him before two witnesses that he owed him money, while the defendant denies everything. And “loans” are claims in which the claimant asserts that the defendant borrowed money from him, while the defendant denies everything. And concerning both of them Rabbi Abbahu holds that they do not need to be judged before three expert judges. The reason will be explained later in the sugya.

But this explanation is still not understood: if so, why did the tanney divide them into two, in a manner in which the concluding clause explains the opening clause? He should have taught “monetary cases,” and it would have been understood that the intention is robbery and bodily injuries. Or he should have taught only “robbery and bodily injuries.” Therefore, the Gemara explains:

And it is necessary,

the tanney needed to teach both of them:

For if he had taught

only

“monetary cases,” we might have said,

we would have said that the intention is not specifically robbery and bodily injuries; rather, we would have said

that even admissions and loans

are judged by three. Therefore

he taught robbery and bodily injuries,

to inform us that specifically robbery and bodily injuries are judged by three.

And if he had taught robbery and bodily injuries

by three,

and had not taught monetary cases, we might have said

we would have said that robbery and bodily injuries are not specifically intended; rather,

the same law applies even to admissions and loans

that they require three. And if it had been difficult for us why the tanney taught specifically robbery and bodily injuries, we would have answered:

And this that he teaches robbery and bodily injuries,

which leads us to the mistake that he came to exclude admissions and loans, we would have said that it is

because the principal

derivation that monetary cases are

by three is written

in the Torah

in robbery and bodily injuries!

They are written in the laws of robbery and bodily injuries [as will be explained below], and the tanney in the Mishna teaches the law written in the Torah, and from there we learn the other monetary cases; therefore the tanney teaches robbery and bodily injuries. According to this reasoning, we would say that admissions and loans are also [judged] by three.

And now, before the Gemara finished explaining the conclusion of its words, it explains what we said, that the principal law of three was stated concerning robbery and bodily injuries.

It is stated in the Torah, in the section of the unpaid guardian [Exodus 22]: “When a man gives his fellow money or utensils to guard, and the thief is not found, the owner of the house shall approach the powers [the judges, to litigate with the guardian. Rashi] whether he did not send his hand into the work of his fellow [to swear to him that he did not send his hand into the deposit. Rashi]. For every matter of transgression, for every lost item, concerning which he says that this is it, the matter of both of them shall come before the powers. Whomever the powers condemn shall pay double to his fellow.”

The “powers” mentioned in this section are the judges. And the Sages expounded from the fact that “powers” is stated three times, to teach us that one must judge before three judges.

And from now,

robbery

is said concerning it that it must be judged by three,

as it is written: “The owner of the house shall approach the powers,”

and there “powers” is stated two more times; and the section speaks of a case in which the owner of the deposit claims against the guardian that he sent his hand into the deposit and took it for himself, and this is robbery.

And likewise

bodily injuries,

the principal law that they require three is explained by the implication of the Torah, for it is logical:

What difference is there between injuring his body and injuring his property?

Just as when he injures his property, namely, through robbery, three are required, so when he injures his body, three are required.

And now the Gemara explains the answer:

Since it was possible to say that the tanney therefore taught robbery and bodily injuries because the principal law of three was stated concerning them, but in truth the same law also applies to admissions and loans, therefore

he taught,

the tanney teaches in this wording, “monetary cases,” so that we understand that

what are monetary cases —

specifically

robbery and bodily injuries.

But

admissions and loans, not.

They do not have this law.

That is, Rabbi Abbahu holds that in our Mishna the tanney teaches only the law of robbery and bodily injuries [being judged] by three. And through the repetition of his wording, the tanney comes to emphasize and exclude, that in admissions and loans the same law does not apply.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

And for what purpose,

in what respect is the law of admissions and loans unlike that of robbery and bodily injuries?

If you say,

if we say

that we do not require

that they do not need

three

judges in admissions and loans, but it is possible to judge them before two judges—this cannot be!

For

did Rabbi Abbahu himself not say

:

Two

judges

who judged monetary cases,

according to everyone,

according to all the tannaim, even one who holds that “compromise” is made even by two,

their judgment is not a judgment!

And how is it possible to say that the intention of the tanney in our Mishna is to exclude admissions and loans from the law of three?

The Gemara answers:

Rather,

we are compelled to say that his intention is that although three are required,

we do not require

that the three judges be

experts.

And now, after we have explained Rabbi Abbahu’s words—that according to him the tanney in our Mishna holds that robbery and bodily injuries require three expert judges, and admissions and loans also require three, except that they do not need to be experts—the Gemara discusses the reason for the difference between them:

What does he hold,

what does the tanney in our Mishna hold, who taught that in admissions and loans experts are not required?

If he holds,

if he holds like the one who says

“a mixing of sections is written here,”

that the laws of loans are written in the section of guardians [as explained in the note], and according to him “powers” is stated three times in the laws of claims concerning loans, and from there we learn that three judges are required, then there is a difficulty:

let us also require

that the judges

be experts,

for “powers” implies the language of authority and expertise. Just as he learned the law of three from this section, so he should learn the law of experts from this section; why are experts not required? For just as we learned from these verses that experts are needed concerning the law of robbery [as explained above], so we should learn that experts are required for admissions and loans.

And

on the other hand,

if he holds,

if he holds like the one who says

“no mixing of sections is written here,”

that the laws of loans are not written in the section of guardians [as explained in the note], and it is then understandable why experts are not required, there is still a difficulty:

three —

why do I need them!?

From which verse did he know that three are required?

This is a difficulty of “whichever way you turn”: either he has a teaching for both three and experts, or he has a teaching neither for three nor for experts.

The Gemara answers:

In truth, he holds

that the tanney of the Mishna, according to Rabbi Abbahu,

that a mixing of sections is written here. And in strict law, experts too should be required,

just as three are required by Torah law.

And this that experts are not required,

the reason that the Mishna excludes the requirement of experts in admissions and loans is

because of Rabbi Hanina,

for the reason explained below: Rabbi Hanina said that the Sages abrogated the Torah law of examination and interrogation, and likewise they abrogated the law of experts. And three ordinary men who issue the judgment are authorized through the agency of the Sages of the Land of Israel to issue the judgment.

For Rabbi Hanina said: By Torah law,

from the Torah,

both monetary cases,

all monetary cases, both robbery and bodily injuries and admissions and loans,

and capital cases,

the witnesses must be examined

by detailed inquiry,

to investigate the witnesses thoroughly so that their testimony will be found consistent [corresponding],

and

likewise the witnesses must be examined

by interrogation,

concerning the exact day, hour, and place.