Sanhedrin 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

In addition to the “assembly of judges,” we would then have twenty-two.

And

the rule is that

a

court

of an even number,

whose members could be divided equally, is not established, because if they were divided equally, the number of those who obligate would equal the number of those who acquit, and it would not be possible to incline the judgment toward leniency on the basis of a single judge. Therefore

they add one to them,

to the twenty-two, one additional judge;

there are then twenty-three.

After we have explained the law of the small Sanhedrin that is established in every city, the Mishna explains what size a city must be in order to be suitable for establishing a Sanhedrin there.

And how many people must there be in the city

so that

the city will be

suitable

for

appointing

a Sanhedrin? —

One hundred twenty

residents of the city.

Rabbi Neḥemya says:

A Sanhedrin is appointed only in a city that has at least

two hundred thirty

residents. The reason is

corresponding to the officers of tens

whom Moses appointed at Jethro’s advice, and we never find an office of authority over fewer than ten people. Therefore, only if there are two hundred thirty residents in the city is it possible to appoint one out of every ten, resulting in twenty-three judges.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Civil cases are adjudicated by three judges; cases involving robbery and bodily injury are adjudicated by three judges.

The Gemara assumed that “civil cases” includes all monetary cases, and therefore it asks:

Is that so?

That is to say,

are robbery and bodily injury not civil cases?

Are they not included among civil cases? Why, then, did the tanna divide them into two categories?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Abbahu said: What are

meant by “civil cases,”

it teaches.

That is, when the Mishna says “civil cases,” it does not refer to civil cases generally. Rather, the tanna of the Mishna is explaining the first clause and is saying as follows:

What are the civil cases

that the tanna said are adjudicated by three judges? Specifically, cases of

robbery and bodily injury. But

cases of

admissions and loans are not.

Those cases do not need to be adjudicated by three judges. “

Admissions,” are claims in which the claimant asserts against the defendant that he admitted before two witnesses that he owed the claimant money, while the defendant completely denies the claim. “Loans” are claims in which the claimant asserts that the defendant borrowed money from him, while the defendant completely denies the claim. Rabbi Abbahu holds with regard to both that they need not be adjudicated before three expert judges. The reason will be explained later in the sugya.

Yet this explanation is still not understandable: If so, why did the tanna divide them into two, in a manner in which the latter clause explains the first? He should have taught “civil cases,” and it would have been understood that the reference is to robbery and bodily injury. Alternatively, he could have taught only “robbery and bodily injury.” Therefore, the Gemara explains:

And it was necessary,

the tanna needed to state both clauses:

Had he taught

only

“civil cases,” we might have said

that the reference is not specifically to robbery and bodily injury. Rather, we might have said

that even admissions and loans

are adjudicated by three judges. Therefore,

he taught robbery and bodily injury

to teach us that specifically robbery and bodily injury are adjudicated by three judges.

And had he taught robbery and bodily injury

as adjudicated by three judges,

but had not taught “civil cases,” we might have said

that robbery and bodily injury are not specifically intended. Rather,

the same law applies even to admissions and loans:

they too require three judges. And if we had asked why the tanna taught specifically robbery and bodily injury, we would have answered:

And the reason that he taught robbery and bodily injury

—which might lead us to err and think that he came to exclude admissions and loans—would be that

the principal

source for the derivation that civil cases are adjudicated

by three, is written

in the Torah

with regard to robbery and bodily injury!

Those cases are written in the laws of robbery and bodily injury [as will be explained below], and the tanna of the Mishna teaches the law written in the Torah; from there the law is derived for other civil cases. Therefore, the tanna teaches robbery and bodily injury. According to this reasoning, we would say that admissions and loans are also adjudicated by three judges.

Now, before the Gemara has finished explaining the conclusion of its statement, it explains what we said: that the principal law requiring three judges was stated with regard to robbery and bodily injury.

It is stated in the Torah, in the section concerning an unpaid bailee [Exodus 22]: “If a man gives his fellow money or vessels to safeguard, and the thief is not found, the owner of the house shall approach the judges [to litigate against the bailee. Rashi] if he did not stretch out his hand against the property of his fellow [to swear to him that he did not stretch out his hand against the deposit. Rashi]. For every matter of transgression, for every lost item, of which he says, ‘This is it,’ the claim of both of them shall come before the judges. Whomever the judges condemn shall pay double to his fellow.”

The “judges” mentioned in this passage are the judges. And the Sages derived from the fact that the term “judges” is stated three times that the case must be adjudicated by three judges.

From this point onward,

robbery

is said to require adjudication by three judges,

as it is written: ‘The owner of the house shall approach the judges.’

The passage also states “judges” two other times, and it is discussing a case in which the owner of the deposit claims against the bailee that he appropriated the deposit and took it for himself; this constitutes robbery.

Likewise,

bodily injury

is principally shown to require three judges by the implication of the Torah, for it is logical:

What difference is there between injuring his body and injuring his property?

Just as when he injures his property—that is, through robbery—three judges are required, so too, when he injures his body, three judges are required.

The Gemara now explains the answer:

Since it could have been said that the tanna taught robbery and bodily injury because the principal source of the law requiring three judges is stated with regard to them, but that in fact the same law applies to admissions and loans as well,

the tanna

worded the teaching in this manner, “civil cases,” so that we would understand that

what are civil cases

—specifically

robbery and bodily injury.

But

admissions and loans are not.

They do not have this requirement.

That is, Rabbi Abbahu holds that in our Mishna the tanna taught only the law that robbery and bodily injury are adjudicated by three judges. Through the repetition in his wording, the tanna came to emphasize and exclude the possibility that the same law applies to admissions and loans.

The Gemara asks:

For what purpose?

In what respect is the law of admissions and loans unlike that of robbery and bodily injury?

If you say

that

we do not require

three

judges

for admissions and loans, and that they may be adjudicated before two judges, this cannot be so!

For,

did Rabbi Abbahu himself not say

:

Two

judges

who adjudicated civil cases,

according to everyone,

according to all the tannaim, including even one who holds that “compromise” may be made even with two judges,

their judgment is not a judgment!

How, then, can it be said that the intention of the tanna in our Mishna was to exclude admissions and loans from the requirement of three judges?

The Gemara answers:

Rather,

we are compelled to say that his intention is that although three judges are required,

we do not require

the three judges to be

experts.

Now, after we have explained Rabbi Abbahu’s statement—that according to him the tanna of our Mishna holds that robbery and bodily injury require three expert judges, while admissions and loans also require three judges but they need not be experts—the Gemara discusses the reason for the distinction between them:

What does he hold?

What does the tanna of our Mishna hold, such that he taught that admissions and loans do not require expert judges?

If he holds

like the one who says,

“The intermingling of passages is written here,”

that the laws of loans are written in the section concerning bailees [as explained in the note], and according to him the term “judges” is stated three times with regard to claims involving loans, from which we derive that three judges are required, then it is difficult:

should it not also require

that the judges be

experts,

since “judges” implies expert judges? Just as the requirement of three judges is derived from this passage, so too the requirement of experts should be derived from this passage. Why, then, are experts not required? Just as we learned from these verses that experts are required for adjudicating robbery [as explained above], so too we should learn that experts are required for admissions and loans. “Judges” is an expression denoting authority, as [Exodus 7] “See, I have appointed you as a judge over Pharaoh.”

And

conversely,

if he holds

like the one who says,

“The intermingling of passages is not written here,”

that the laws of loans are not written in the section concerning bailees [as explained in the note], and it is therefore understandable why experts are not required, it is still difficult:

Three—

why do I need them!?

From which verse did he know that three judges are required?

This is a dilemma based on either possibility: either he has a derivation for both three judges and experts, or he has a derivation for neither three judges nor experts.

The Gemara answers:

Actually, he holds

that the tanna of the Mishna, according to Rabbi Abbahu, holds that

the intermingling of passages is written here. And by rights, it should also require experts,

just as three judges are required by Torah law.

And the fact that we do not require experts

—the reason that the Mishna excludes the requirement of experts in admissions and loans—is

because of Rabbi Ḥanina,

for the reason explained below: Rabbi Ḥanina said that the Sages abrogated the Torah requirement of examination and interrogation, and likewise abrogated the requirement of expert judges. Three ordinary judges who issue a ruling are authorized through the agency of the Sages of the Land of Israel to issue the ruling.

For Rabbi Ḥanina said: By Torah law,

by Torah law,

both civil cases,

all civil cases, whether robbery and bodily injury or admissions and loans,

and capital cases

require that the witnesses be examined

through detailed examination,

by thoroughly questioning the witnesses so that their testimony will be found to correspond [to be consistent],

and

the witnesses must likewise be examined

through interrogation,

as to the precise day, time, and place.