Sanhedrin 3a — the Talmud in English

as it is stated: “

He who strikes an animal shall pay compensation, and he who strikes a person shall be put to death. You shall have one law.” The Torah taught, by a hekesh of a person who strikes an animal to a person who kills a person, that just as in the case of a person who kills a person there must be examination and interrogation of the witnesses in his case, as it is stated concerning capital cases (Deuteronomy 13), “And you shall inquire and investigate,” so too in monetary cases.

And for what reason did

the Sages say that

in monetary cases we do not require examination and interrogation? So that you should not lock the door before borrowers.

So that the lender will not fear that perhaps, if the borrower denies [the debt] and he brings witnesses against him, the witnesses will be interrogated and examined, and perhaps they will not make their testimony correspond, and the lender will lose; and because of this fear he will not wish to lend money.

And for the same reason they also abolished the need for a court of experts, because of the locking of the door, so that the lender would not fear that perhaps the borrower would deny [the debt], and he would not find three experts to judge him, and he would refrain from lending.

And therefore, Rabbi Abbahu said that indeed three [judges] and experts are required by Torah law on account of the intermingling of passages, but the Sages abolished the requirement of experts.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But from now,

if it is as you say, that ordinary judges judge because they received permission to judge cases of admissions and loans, they are therefore like expert judges; and the law is that expert judges who erred in their ruling do not pay from their own money to the one whom they caused to lose. And if so, it is difficult:

If the ordinary judges erred,

the ordinary judges,

they should not pay!

And why is the law that they are obligated to pay!?

And the Gemara answers:

All the more so,

if they would be exempt from paying,

you would lock the door before borrowers.

For the lender will fear that perhaps the judges will err and exempt the borrower, and even if he makes them aware of their error, they will not pay from their own pockets, and the lender will lose his money. And because of this fear he will not lend his money.

This is Rabbi Abbahu’s interpretation of the Mishna. And the Gemara raises an objection against him—

If so,

why does Rabbi Abbahu need to interpret the Mishna in a manner in which the latter clause explains the first clause, that “what are monetary cases?” means “admissions and loans”? But

two [separate matters] are taught!

According to Rabbi Abbahu, he admits that there is a distinction between admissions and loans, which may be judged by a court of ordinary judges, and robbery and personal injury, which must be judged specifically by expert judges. If so, he should have explained the Mishna in its straightforward sense: “Monetary cases” refers to admissions and loans, which are judged by three ordinary judges, whereas robbery and personal injury are judged by three expert judges. Since their laws are not alike, the tanna of the Mishna divided them into two statements.

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty with Rabbi Abbahu. If, as he says, the tanna teaches one law,

“three” and “three”—why do I need this?

Why did the tanna repeat, in each of these laws, that it is judged by “three” judges? He could instead have taught: “Monetary cases, namely robbery and personal injury, are judged by three.”

Rather, Rava said: Two [separate matters] are taught.

Although Rabbi Abbahu’s law is true—that robbery and bodily injury [are judged] by three experts, and admissions and loans do not require experts because of the locking of the door—nevertheless, in the words of the Mishna the explanation is as follows: monetary cases [are judged] by three ordinary judges; robbery and bodily injury [are judged] by three experts. And why do they not require experts?

Because of

the reason of

Rabbi Hanina,

that you should not lock the door before borrowers.

This is how Rava interpreted the Mishna, and Rava holds [and Rabbi Abbahu likewise holds] that by Torah law experts are required even for admissions and loans, because of the intermingling of passages. However, the Rabbis instituted that ordinary judges may judge.

But the view of Rav Aha son of Rav Ika [and Samuel likewise holds] is not so.

Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: By Torah law

one

one judge

is also valid

for admissions and loans. An explanation of the law of a single judge according to Rav Aha—and of Maimonides’ view: Maimonides wrote (Laws of the Sanhedrin, chapter 5, law 5): “Cases of fines, such as robbery and bodily injury, and so on, may be judged only by three experts, and they are those ordained in the Land of Israel. But other monetary cases, such as admissions and loans, do not require experts; rather, even three ordinary judges, and even one expert, may judge them.” The Ramakh raised the difficulty that in chapter 2 (law 10) he wrote: “Although a court is not fewer than three, it is permitted for one to judge by Torah law, as it is stated, ‘In righteousness shall you judge your fellow.’ And by rabbinic words [it is required] that there be three, and two who judged—their judgment is not a judgment.” Thus he ruled like Rav Aha, and if so, why is an expert required? [That is, he held that “expert” means ordained.] The Netivot (section 3, subsection 1) answered that he holds that from the verse, “In righteousness shall you judge your fellow,” we derive that one is valid, whereas the requirement that he be an expert is learned from the intermingling of passages. This is in accordance with Tosafot, that Rav Aha holds the principle of intermingling of passages. However, there are several proofs from Maimonides’ words that he holds that an expert is not required. A. In the Book of the Commandments (positive commandment 177), he wrote: “That every man is commanded to judge a Torah law when he knows, and so on, as it is stated, ‘In righteousness shall you judge your fellow.’” B. In chapter 4 (law 1), he wrote: “Whether the great court, or a minor Sanhedrin, or a court of three, it is necessary that each of them be ordained, and so on,” implying that with one, ordination is not required. C. The Ran (here, in our discussion) wrote that Maimonides’ view is that an expert is not required. D. In chapter 5 (law 18), he wrote: “A single person who is an expert for the public, even though he judges monetary cases alone, an admission before him is not an admission in court, even if he was ordained,” implying that he need not be ordained. E. From what he wrote in chapter 2, law 10: “And by rabbinic words [it is required] that there be three,” it follows that the one is not ordained; for if he were ordained, even by rabbinic words it would be permitted for him to judge. If we adopt that Maimonides holds that ordination is not required, it must be explained as the Ketzot HaHoshen (section 3, subsection 2) and the Netivot (there, subsection 1) explained: the fact that one judge suffices for admissions and loans is because this is not in the category of a judgment, but rather like an instruction concerning what is forbidden and permitted, for which one decisor suffices. And Maimonides’ wording is precise: “Although a court is not fewer than three, it is permitted for one to judge by Torah law,” implying that three are a court, whereas one is not a court, but is nevertheless permitted to judge. Accordingly, in the lessons of Rabbi Gershon David Pomerantz the reason is explained why, according to Rav Aha, three are required by Torah law for robbery and bodily injury, while one suffices for admissions and loans: the law of robbery and bodily injury differs, since their very obligation is a novelty of the Torah; therefore a “judgment” and the power of a court are required to judge it. But with admissions and loans, their very obligation is not from Torah law; rather, since his money came into his fellow’s possession, he makes a claim against him. Therefore they do not have the designation of “judgment” and do not require judges, but only clarification with whom justice lies. And the Kehillot Yaakov (section 2) likewise explains Samuel’s words, who holds that two who judged—their judgment is a judgment. Apparently, this is difficult, for there is no evenly balanced court. According to this, it is resolved that they do not have the designation of a court, and the laws of a court were not stated concerning them. And if even one is valid, although he is not a court, it inclines [see Rashi, 2b]; thus a court judgment is not required. Now, although they explained that a single person is not in the category of a court judgment, nevertheless Rabbi Gershon David Pomerantz holds that it may be said that it is in the category of a judgment and that he has the status of a judge, and it does not entirely resemble the law of what is forbidden and permitted. There, the decisor clarifies the law, whether something is forbidden or permitted. But after the ruling no change results from the situation before the ruling; previously there was lack of knowledge, and the decisor adds knowledge. But in admissions and loans there is a verdict and a change between the claimant and the defendant, and whoever emerges liable according to the judge becomes liable through an obligation imposed by the judge. Therefore it is clear why a single expert is disqualified from judging at night [see Netivot HaMishpat, section 5, subsection 2], why he can judge and obligate the one who is liable against his will, why he is disqualified if he is a relative or disqualified, and why, if there are several judges, they follow the majority, whereas in what is forbidden and permitted they do not follow [the majority]. See there.

For

so

it is stated

in the Torah: “

In righteousness shall you judge your fellow,”

in the singular. And he holds that there is no intermingling of passages.

Rather,

the Sages instituted that one should not judge

because of the corner-dwellers,

ordinary merchants, who are not proficient in the nature of laws, and will acquit the liable person and obligate the entitled person.

But the Gemara asks: What benefit is there in the ordinance that they instituted [requiring] three?

Is it really that with three,

for if three merchants gather together,

would they not be corner-dwellers? Are they not corner-dwellers!? And the Gemara answers:

Are they not still people who sit at street corners? The Gemara answers:

It is impossible,

there is no possibility

that there is not among them

that among the three of them there is not at least

one who is gמיר,

who heard from the Sages and judges the laws of judging a loan.

Therefore, the tanna divided them into two statements: admissions and loans are judged before three ordinary judges, while robbery and personal injury require experts.

And the Gemara raises an objection against Rav Aha son of Rav Ika:

But from now,

if the three are valid even by Torah law, if

they erred

in their ruling and acquitted the liable person and obligated the entitled person,

they should not pay,

for just as experts do not pay, so too these ordinary judges [see above].

And the Gemara answers: If the law were that when the judges err they do not pay from their own pockets,

all the more so they will increase,

so that the judges who are

corner-dwellers will multiply.

But if they pay when they err, they will have the desire to study the laws of the Torah, in order to know how to judge a true judgment.

And the Gemara discusses: Since according to both Rava and Rav Aha three are required, and they are valid when they are ordinary judges, if so,

what difference is there

what legal difference is there

between Rava and

between

Rav Aha son of Rav Ika?

And the Gemara answers:

There is a difference between them

there is a difference between them concerning the law

that Samuel said,

two

judges

who judged—their judgment is a judgment,

even by Torah law, and the litigants are obligated to accept their ruling,

except that

they

are called “an insolent court,”

for they transgressed the ordinance of the Sages that three are required.

According to Rava,

who holds that three are required by Torah law,

he does not hold Samuel’s view,

he does not hold like Samuel; rather, he holds that “their judgment is not a judgment.”

And according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika,

who holds that by Torah law even one judge is valid,

he holds Samuel’s view,

he can hold like Samuel that “their judgment is a judgment.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Full damages and half-damages, double payment and fourfold and fivefold payment [are judged] by three.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Full damages—

that is bodily injury.

For full damages are one of the five payments that one who injures his fellow pays, so why did the Mishna distinguish between full damages and bodily injury?

And the Gemara answers:

Because he wished

the tanna

to teach,

to teach a law in which one pays

half-damages,

therefore

he also taught full damages,

when the intention is to a payment of damages

in full.

But it is still not resolved, for

half-damages also—

that is bodily injury!

Since the tanna taught the payment for personal injury, this also includes payments for damage. It is obvious that half-compensation for damage is included in the general category of “damage.” If so, why did the tanna need to teach the law of half-compensation for damage?

And the Gemara answers:

He taught

bodily injury, whose payments are

monetary compensation,

that is, payments for what he caused the injured party to lose,

and he taught

in a separate statement also half-damages, in a case where an innocuous ox caused damage, whose payment is

a fine

for the owner of the ox, in order to urge him to guard his ox.

And since they are two types of payments, the tanna divided them in the Mishna into two statements, and since he taught half-damage, he also taught damage.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Granted,

this explanation is sound

according to the one who says

the payment

of half-damage

[the half-damage of an innocuous ox that caused damage] is

a fine,

for according to his view, the owner of the ox was not required to guard his ox so that it would not gore, since ordinary oxen do not gore; rather, the Torah fined him to pay half-damage in order to urge him to guard his ox. And according to his words, it is a distinct type of payment.

But according to the one who says

the payment

of half-damage

is

a monetary liability,

for according to his view, the owner of the ox is required to guard his ox, since ordinary oxen are goring oxen, and in truth he is liable to pay full damage; only the Torah reduced his payments and took pity on him, since he had not yet done so three times. And according to his words, the payment of half-damage is the same type of payment as the payment of every one who causes damage, so according to his words it is difficult:

what is there to say

—why did the tanna teach it separately, since it is included among injuries?

Therefore, the Gemara gives another answer:

The payment of the principal of the damage, as it is, without an addition, is called “paid at its principal,” according to the wording of the verse [Leviticus 5], “and he shall pay it at its principal” [this is payment of the principal], and if he pays more than the principal, such as double, or fourfold, or fivefold, which is already a fine according to all opinions, and the type of its payments differs from the type of payments for injuries, this is called “not paid at its principal”.

Rather,

the reason that the tanna divided them into two statements is

because,

since

he wanted to teach double payments and fourfold and fivefold payments,