Sanhedrin 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

As it is stated: “

One who strikes an animal shall pay for it, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death. There shall be one law for you.” The Torah taught, by means of a hekesh—a comparison—between a person who strikes an animal and a person who kills another person, that just as, in the case of one who kills another person, the witnesses’ testimony must be subjected to examination and interrogation, as it is stated concerning capital cases (Deuteronomy 13): “And you shall inquire and investigate,” so too in monetary cases.

And what is the reason the

Sages said that

in monetary cases we do not require examination and interrogation? So as not to lock the door in the face of borrowers.

The lender should not be concerned that perhaps, if the borrower denies the loan and the lender brings witnesses against him, the witnesses will be interrogated and examined, and perhaps they will not align their testimony precisely, causing the lender to lose. Because of this concern, he might be unwilling to lend money.

For the same reason, they also abolished the requirement for a court of experts, because of the locking of the door, so that the lender would not be concerned that perhaps the borrower would deny the loan and he would be unable to find three experts to judge the case, and would consequently refrain from lending.

Therefore, Rabbi Abbahu said that, indeed, three judges and experts are required by Torah law, on account of the intermingling of the passages, but the Sages abolished the requirement for experts.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But if that is so,

if, as you say, ordinary judges may adjudicate because they were granted authority to adjudicate cases of admissions and loans, they are equivalent to expert judges; and the law is that expert judges who erred in their ruling do not pay from their own funds to the one whom they caused to lose. If so, it is difficult:

if the

ordinary judges

erred, they should not pay!

Why, then, is the law that they are liable to pay!?

The Gemara answers:

All the more so,

if they were exempt from paying,

you would lock the door in the face of borrowers.

For the lender would be concerned that perhaps the judges would err and exempt the borrower, and even if he showed them their error, they would not pay from their own pockets, and the lender would lose his money. Because of this concern, he would not lend his money.

This is Rabbi Abbahu’s interpretation of the Mishna. And the Gemara raises an objection against him—

If that is so,

why did Rabbi Abbahu need to interpret the Mishna in a manner in which the latter clause explains the former clause, namely, that “What are monetary cases?” means “admissions and loans”? After all,

it teaches two separate matters!

For according to Rabbi Abbahu, he concedes that there is a distinction between admissions and loans, which may be adjudicated by a court of ordinary judges, and robbery and personal injury, which must be adjudicated specifically by expert judges. If so, he should have explained the Mishna according to its plain meaning: “Monetary cases” refers to admissions and loans, which are adjudicated by three ordinary judges, whereas robbery and personal injury are adjudicated by three experts. Since their laws are not alike, the tanna of the Mishna divided them into two statements.

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty with Rabbi Abbahu: If, as he says, the tanna is teaching one law,

why do I need “three” and “three”?

Why did the tanna repeat, in connection with each of these cases, that it is adjudicated by “three” judges? He could have taught as follows: “Monetary cases, [namely,] robbery and personal injury, [are adjudicated] by three.”

Rather, Rava said: It teaches two separate matters.

Although Rabbi Abbahu’s law is indeed correct—that robbery and personal injury require three experts, whereas admissions and loans do not require experts because of the locking of the door—the explanation of the Mishna is as follows: Monetary cases are [adjudicated] by three ordinary judges; robbery and personal injury, by three experts. And why do they not require experts?

Because of

the reason

of Rabbi Ḥanina,

so as not to lock the door in the face of borrowers.

This is how Rava interpreted the Mishna, and Rava holds [as does Rabbi Abbahu] that by Torah law experts are required even for admissions and loans, because of the intermingling of the passages. However, the Sages instituted that ordinary judges may adjudicate.

But the view of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika [and Shmuel likewise holds], is not so.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: By Torah law,

one

judge

is also valid

for admissions and loans. An explanation of the law of a single judge according to Rav Aḥa—and of Maimonides’ view: Maimonides wrote (Laws of the Sanhedrin 5:8): “Cases involving fines, such as robbery and personal injury, etc., may be adjudicated only by three experts, who are ordained in the Land of Israel. But other monetary cases, such as admissions and loans, do not require experts; even three ordinary judges, and even one expert, may adjudicate them.” The Ramakh challenged this, since in chapter 2 (halakha 10) he wrote: “Although a court may not consist of fewer than three, one person is permitted by Torah law to adjudicate, as it is stated: ‘In righteousness shall you judge your fellow.’ By rabbinic enactment, there must be three, and two who adjudicated—their judgment is not a judgment.” Thus he ruled in accordance with Rav Aḥa; if so, why is an expert required? [That is, he understood “expert” to mean an ordained judge.] The Netivot answered (section 3, subsection 1) that the verse “In righteousness shall you judge your fellow” teaches that one person is valid, while the requirement that he be an expert is learned from the intermingling of the passages. This is in accordance with Tosafot, that Rav Aḥa holds that there is an intermingling of the passages. However, there are several proofs from Maimonides’ words that he holds that an expert is not required. (a) In the Book of the Commandments (positive commandment 177), he wrote: “That every person is commanded to adjudicate a Torah case when he knows [the law], etc., as it is stated: ‘In righteousness shall you judge your fellow.’” (b) In chapter 4 (halakha 1), he wrote: “Whether it is the Great Court, a lesser Sanhedrin, or a court of three, each of them must be ordained, etc.” This implies that a single judge need not be ordained. (c) The Ran (in our sugya) wrote that Maimonides’ view is that an expert is not required. (d) In chapter 5 (halakha 18), he wrote: “A single judge who is an expert recognized by the public, although he adjudicates monetary cases alone, does not render an admission before him an admission before a court, even if he was ordained.” This implies that he need not be ordained. (e) From what he wrote in chapter 2, halakha 10—“By rabbinic enactment, there must be three”—it follows that the single judge is not ordained, for if he were ordained, it would be permitted for him to adjudicate even by rabbinic law. If we accept that Maimonides holds that he need not be ordained, we must explain this as the Ketzot HaḤoshen (section 3, subsection 2) and the Netivot (there, subsection 1) explained: The reason one judge suffices for admissions and loans is that this is not categorized as adjudication, but is like a ruling concerning what is prohibited and permitted, for which one decisor is sufficient. This is precise in Maimonides’ wording: “Although a court may not consist of fewer than three, one person is permitted by Torah law to adjudicate.” This implies that three constitute a court, whereas one is not a court; he is merely permitted to adjudicate. Accordingly, the lessons of Rabbi Dov Povarsky explain why, according to Rav Aḥa, three are required by Torah law for robbery and personal injury, whereas one suffices for admissions and loans: Robbery and personal injury differ in that the very liability involved is a Torah innovation; therefore, they require a formal adjudication and the authority of a court. But in admissions and loans, the liability itself is not based on a Torah law; rather, since the defendant’s money came into the possession of another, he claims it from him. If so, they are not categorized as a “judgment” and do not require judges, but only an ascertainment of with whom the truth lies. The Kehillot Yaakov likewise explains (section 2) Shmuel’s position, that the judgment of two who adjudicated is a judgment; ostensibly, this is difficult, since there is no evenly numbered court. According to this explanation, the difficulty is resolved: they are not categorized as a court, and the laws governing a court do not apply to them. And if even one person is valid, although he is not a court [see Rashi, 2b], this demonstrates that a formal court judgment is not required. Although they explained that a single judge is not categorized as a court judgment, Rabbi Dov Povarsky nevertheless maintains that one can say that it is considered a form of adjudication and that the law of a judge applies to him. It is not entirely comparable to a ruling concerning what is prohibited and permitted, where the decisor clarifies whether something is prohibited or permitted. There, after the ruling, no change has occurred from the situation before the ruling: previously there was a lack of knowledge, and the decisor adds knowledge. But in admissions and loans, there is a final ruling and a change in the relationship between claimant and defendant, and the person whom the judge found liable becomes liable by virtue of the judge’s ruling. Therefore, it is understandable why a single expert may not adjudicate at night [see Netivot HaMishpat, section 5, subsection 2], why he can adjudicate and obligate the liable party against his will, why he is disqualified if he is a relative or otherwise disqualified, and why, when there are several judges, the majority prevails, whereas this is not the case with rulings concerning what is prohibited and permitted. See there.

For

so it is

stated

in the Torah, “

In righteousness shall you judge your fellow,”

in the singular. And he holds that there is no intermingling of the passages.

Rather,

the Sages instituted that one person may not adjudicate

because of the shopkeepers,

ordinary merchants who are not proficient in the nature of laws, and who might acquit the liable party and obligate the זכאי.

But the Gemara asks: What benefit is there in the enactment that they instituted [a court of] three?

Are they, when there are three,

for if three merchants gather together,

not shopkeepers?

Are they not shopkeepers!? The Gemara answers:

It is impossible

that there is no possibility

that among them

there is, among the three, at least

one who is learned,

who heard from the Sages and judges the laws governing the adjudication of a loan. The Ketzot HaḤoshen (section 37) brings proof for the view that the ruling is not void from our sugya: only one is learned, while the other two are shopkeepers, who are disqualified, yet the law is that they are valid. This implies that their ruling is valid. The Kehillat Yaakov there rejects the Ketzot’s proof and explains that shopkeepers are not categorized as disqualified; rather, they are not judges at all. See there. He further explains that they are not considered part of the judicial combination at all. That is, just as with witnesses, if a relative or disqualified person joins them but does not testify, instead merely engaging in idle chatter, he is not part of the testimony and does not invalidate all the testimony, so too with shopkeepers: their joining is not considered a joining, their words are not considered words, and they are needed only so that there will be a likely possibility that one learned person is among them. In fact, Tosafot wrote this explicitly in Tractate Horayot (2b), concerning the Mishna: “If the court issued a ruling, etc., or if one of them was a convert, etc.” Tosafot wrote: “One who is unfit to issue rulings becomes like a stone.”

Therefore, the tanna divided them into two statements: admissions and loans are adjudicated before three ordinary judges, while robbery and personal injury require experts.

And the Gemara raises an objection against Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika:

But if that is so,

if the three are valid even by Torah law, then if they

erred

in their ruling and acquitted the liable party and obligated the זכאי,

they should not pay,

for just as experts do not pay, so too these ordinary judges [see above].

The Gemara answers: If the law were that when the judges err they do not pay from their own funds,

all the more so, there would be many

judges who are

shopkeepers.

But if they pay when they err, they will be motivated to study the laws of the Torah, in order to know how to judge a true judgment.

The Gemara deliberates: Since both according to Rava and according to Rav Aḥa three are required, and they are valid even when they are ordinary judges, if so,

what difference is there,

what legal difference is there

between Rava and

between

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika?

The Gemara answers:

There is a difference between them

with regard to the ruling

that Shmuel stated:

Two

judges

who adjudicated—their judgment is a judgment,

even by Torah law, and the litigants are obligated to accept their ruling,

except that

they

are called “an insolent court,”

because they violated the Sages’ enactment that there must be three.

According to Rava,

who holds that three are required by Torah law,

he does not accept Shmuel’s position,

but holds that “their judgment is not a judgment.”

And according to Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika,

who holds that even one judge is valid by Torah law,

he accepts Shmuel’s position

and can hold like Shmuel, that “their judgment is a judgment.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Damage and half-damage, double payment, and fourfold and fivefold payment [are adjudicated] by three.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Damage—

that is personal injury.

Damage is one of the five payments that one who injures another must pay; why, then, did the Mishna distinguish between damage and personal injury?

The Gemara answers:

Because he wishes

the tanna

to teach

a law involving a payment of

half-damage,

therefore he

also taught damage,

with the intention of referring to payment for

full damage.

But this still does not resolve the difficulty, for

half-damage too—

that is personal injury!

Since the tanna taught the payment for personal injury, this also includes payments for damage. And it is obvious that half-damage is included within the category of “damage.” If so, why did the tanna need to teach the law of half-damage!?

The Gemara answers:

He taught

personal injury, whose payments are

monetary,

that is, payments for the loss suffered by the injured party,

and he taught

in a separate statement the case of half-damage, where an innocuous ox caused damage, whose payment is

a fine

imposed on the owner of the ox in order to urge him to guard his ox.

And since they are two types of payments, the tanna divided them in the Mishna into two statements; and since he taught half-damage, he also taught full damage.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Granted,

this explanation is sound

according to one who says

that the payment of

half-damage

[the half-damage payment for an innocuous ox that caused damage] is

a fine,

as, according to his view, the owner of the ox was not required to guard his ox so that it would not gore, because ordinary oxen do not gore; rather, the Torah imposed a fine upon him to pay half the damage, in order to encourage him to guard his ox. And according to his view, it is a distinct type of payment.

But according to one who says

that the payment of

half-damage

is

a monetary payment,

as, according to his view, the owner of the ox is required to guard his ox, because ordinary oxen are prone to gore, and in truth he is liable to pay the full damage; it is only that the Torah reduced his payment and took pity on him, since the ox has not yet done so three times. And according to his view, the payment of half-damage is the same type of payment as that of every one who causes damage. According to his view, this is difficult:

what can be said

as to why the tanna taught it separately, since it is included among bodily injuries?

Therefore, the Gemara offers another explanation:

The payment of the principal of the damage, as it stands, without any addition, is called “paid at its head,” in accordance with the wording of the verse [Leviticus 5]: “And he shall pay it at its head” [this is payment of the principal]. But if he pays more than the principal, such as double, or fourfold, or fivefold, which is already a fine according to all opinions, and the type of payment differs from the type of payments for bodily injuries, it is called “not paid at its head.”

Rather,

the reason the tanna divided them into two statements is

since

because

he wished to teach the payments of double, and the payments of fourfold and fivefold,