Sanhedrin 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

The tractate Sanhedrin is taught after the tractate Bava Batra, because after learning the laws, we must know before how many judges they are adjudicated.

There are laws that are decided and adjudicated in a court of three ordinary judges, and there are laws that require three expert judges. There are also laws that require a court of twenty-three judges who possess semikha, known as a Minor Sanhedrin. And there are laws that require a court of seventy-one, called the Great Sanhedrin.

Similarly, there are several laws that are decided by five judges, and there are laws that require seven judges, or nine and a kohen.

A larger number of judges provides greater deliberative capacity and enables a more comprehensive clarification of the considerations for and against, and therefore the laws are divided according to the degree of their severity and responsibility: some require more judges for a deeper clarification, and a larger court with greater authority. And in the Gemara, the verses teach us, for each law, which court adjudicates it.

Mishna:

Monetary cases,

the adjudication of monetary claims between one person and another must take place

before

a court of

three

judges.

Robbery cases,

the laws governing robbery, when one person claims against another that he seized money or an object from him; or when the claimant asserts that the defendant was the guardian of one of his objects, unlawfully appropriated the deposit, and wished to take it for himself, in which case his status is that of a robber. Or when the claimant asserts that he deposited an object with the defendant, who was its guardian, and the defendant denies possessing the deposit.

And cases of personal injury,

the laws governing a person who injures another, where the injured party claims from the person who injured him payment for bodily damage, as well as the other payments for which the injurer is liable, are also adjudicated

before

a court of

three

judges.

Damage,

the legal claim of the owner of an ox that caused damage through eating or trampling, or through goring [in the case of an ox that had been warned, after three gorings], where the injured party claims full compensation. Or the legal claim of a person who damaged another’s property, where the injured party demands that the damager pay him the payments for the damage;

And half-damage,

the legal claim concerning an ox that damaged another person’s ox while it was still innocuous [during its first incidents], in which case it is liable to pay half the damage.

Double payment,

the legal claim concerning a thief who was found with the stolen object in his possession, and who is liable to pay double, as it is stated [Exodus 22]: “If the theft is surely found in his possession, he shall pay double”;

Payments of fourfold and fivefold,

the legal claim concerning one who steals an ox or a sheep and then slaughters or sells it, in which case he is liable to pay five cattle for an ox and four sheep for a sheep. [Exodus 21]

All these claims must be adjudicated before a court of

three

judges.

The Mishna now presents additional claims that must be adjudicated before a court of three, although regarding some of them the tannaitic authorities disagree as to whether they may be adjudicated before only three judges, or whether they must be adjudicated by a larger number of judges.

The rapist,

the case of a man who raped a virgin girl, who is required [Deuteronomy 22] to pay a fine of fifty silver coins to the girl’s father;

and likewise the case of

the seducer

of the virgin, who is required [Exodus 22] to pay her father fifty silver coins;

and likewise the case of

one who defames his wife

immediately after marrying her, by bringing against her a false allegation that she was not a virgin when he married her, but had committed adultery while betrothed to him,

and the allegation proves false,

in which case he is required to pay the girl’s father one hundred silver coins [Deuteronomy 22]. The girl’s father’s claim against the husband is adjudicated

before

a court of

three judges.

The statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

The case of one who defames his wife is adjudicated

before

a court of

twenty-three, because it includes

in the case of one who defames his wife, a discussion also concerning

capital cases.

For if the husband’s claim is true—that his wife committed adultery while betrothed to him, in the presence of witnesses and after a warning—she is stoned. Therefore, the Sages maintain that this case must be adjudicated specifically before a court of twenty-three.

When a person is tried for violating a prohibition of the Torah for which he is liable to receive

lashes,

namely, forty lashes, he is tried

before

a court of

three.

This is the view of the first tanna.

In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said,

his students: He is tried

before

a court of

twenty-three.

The months of the year, by which the festivals of Israel are determined, are “lunar months.” “

A lunar month” is determined according to the time between one new moon and the next. The interval between them is twenty-nine days, twelve hours, and 793 parts of an hour [an hour contains 1,080 “parts”].

The “month” consists of complete days, without additional hours. To compensate for the additional twelve hours [and the remaining parts] added to the twenty-nine days between one new moon and the next, one must add one complete day to the twenty-nine days and make the month thirty days long, or subtract the additional twelve hours and make it only twenty-nine days long.

Therefore, sometimes the month is full, containing thirty days, and sometimes it is deficient, containing only twenty-nine days. The Sages instituted that the months should alternate: one full, consisting of thirty days, and one deficient, consisting of twenty-nine days.

But when the month was sanctified “on the basis of sighting,” by witnesses who had seen the renewal of the moon, everything was determined according to the witnesses’ testimony. If witnesses came on the thirtieth day of the month and testified that they had seen the new moon the previous night, the night leading into the thirtieth day, the court would sanctify that day as the beginning of the following month.

It follows that it was the first day of the following month, while the preceding month was a deficient month of only twenty-nine days.

But if the moon was not seen and no witnesses came on the thirtieth day, the court would establish the thirty-first day as the beginning of the following month. It follows that the preceding month had been a full month of thirty days, called an “extended month,” from the notion of adding.

Our Mishna discusses which court decides and determines this matter.

The intercalation of the month,

the sanctification of the beginning of the following month on the thirty-first day from the beginning of the preceding month, thereby making the preceding month “extended”; this sanctification is performed

before

a court of

three.

A solar year has 365 days, whereas a lunar year has 354 days [on average]. It follows that the solar year is eleven days longer than the lunar year.

The seasons of the year—spring, summer, autumn, and winter—are determined by the solar year. Therefore, if we were to follow only lunar years, the festival of Passover would not necessarily fall specifically during the spring season; rather, it would also fall during the other seasons of the year. And since the Torah states that the festival of Passover must be observed specifically during the spring season [Exodus 13], we must adjust the lunar years to the solar years by adding one month to the lunar year from time to time.

A year that contains an additional month is called a “leap year,” and the additional month is called the intercalated month. [However, it is impossible to make a year consisting of twelve months and several additional days, since the year is composed only of complete months].

Besides this reason—that the festival of Passover should fall during the spring season—there are additional reasons that necessitate intercalating the year, even if Passover would in fact fall during the spring. They are explained in the Gemara.

Intercalation of the year,

the decision whether or not to intercalate the year by adding an additional month is made

by

a court of

three —

these are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

See note 18.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A

court of

three begins

the deliberation: Is it indeed necessary to sit and examine whether there is some doubt as to whether this year should be a leap year, or is there no doubt here, and it is unnecessary to convene a court for this purpose?

And if the three decide that there is reason to deliberate on the matter, then

with five

judges

they deliberate

whether this year should indeed be intercalated or not, because the deliberation concerning the intercalation of the year requires five judges. And once they reach the decision that this year must be intercalated, two additional judges are added,

and they conclude

the judgment

with seven

judges. That is, the decision and proclamation that this year is a leap year must be made by seven judges.

And if they concluded with three,

when the first three judges had no doubt concerning the matter, and at the beginning of the deliberation all three agreed that the year should be intercalated, and they intercalated the year with only three, this year is

a leap year.

The requirement that additional judges be added, which we learned, applies only when they were uncertain about the matter and the three did not all agree that the year should be intercalated. But if they immediately agreed to intercalate it, they intercalate it with three. This is the view of the Ramah and Rabbeinu Hananel, and it is also implied by the commentary on the Rambam’s Laws of the Sanctification of the New Moon, chapter 4, law 10. That is, in their view, the reason for adding judges is to increase examination and deliberation concerning a matter whose consequences can even include capital law, as stated in the Jerusalem Talmud and cited by the Rashash. This applies specifically where there is uncertainty, in which case the decision is reached through a plurality of opinions, but not where the matter is certain. For what the Gemara derives from verses is not a derivation in the full sense, but merely an asmakhta. This is also implied by the Tosafot Yom Tov, who hold that it is a rabbinic requirement. However, the Ran and Rabbeinu Yonah maintain that judges are added even where the matter is certain, for this is the law, since the Gemara derives this law from verses. See Minhat Hinukh, mitzva 4, letter 33, and the Rashash. According to them, the Mishna must be explained as follows: “And if they concluded with three”—that is, after the fact, if they concluded with three, it is a leap year.

a. A person who brings a sacrifice for his sin must perform semikha, placing his hands upon it.

The practice of semikha is that the owner of the sacrifice places both hands with all his strength upon the head of the animal. He confesses his sin if it is a sin-offering, and his guilt if it is a guilt-offering. At the time of semikha he says: “I have sinned, I have acted perversely, and I have transgressed, and I did such-and-such; and now I repent.” If it is another sacrifice, he recites over it words of praise and thanksgiving to the Omnipresent.

When the sacrifice is brought by a single individual, the person bringing it performs semikha upon it. When a sacrifice is brought jointly, all the partners perform semikha upon it, one after the other.

The sacrifice called “the bull for an unintentional matter of the community” is a sacrifice that must be brought when the judges of the Great Sanhedrin erred in their ruling and permitted something for which one would be liable to karet if it were done intentionally. For example, they permitted eating the forbidden fat of the stomach because they thought it was permitted fat and was not included among the fats forbidden for consumption. As a result of this erroneous ruling of the court [“an unintentional matter”], the majority of the people transgressed the prohibition. In such a case, one bull is brought as a sin-offering, called “the bull for an unintentional matter of the community.” Each individual from the community who sinned on the basis of their erroneous ruling does not, at that time, need to bring an individual sin-offering.

For “the bull for an unintentional matter of the community,” the entire community did not perform semikha upon the sacrifice; rather, only the elders, the members of the Great Sanhedrin, did so [the Great Sanhedrin]. Below it will be explained how many judges of the Sanhedrin must perform semikha upon the bull.

b. The Torah states [Deuteronomy 21]: If a slain person is found on the road and it is not known who struck him, the elders and judges go out and measure which city is nearest to the corpse. The inhabitants of that city bring a heifer and break its neck. This breaking of the heifer’s neck serves as atonement for the blood of the murdered person. This measurement is performed by judges from the Great Sanhedrin, called the Great Sanhedrin.

The laying of hands by the elders

upon the head of “the bull for an unintentional matter of the community.”

And the breaking of the heifer’s neck,

the measurement of the distance between the city and the corpse, with regard to the obligation to bring a beheaded heifer.

Both are performed

with three

judges—

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Yehuda says: With five

judges.

The rite of halitza,

the act of halitza and the recitation of the passage of halitza, which are performed in the presence of the elders, the judges, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 25]: “When brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, and so on. And if the man does not wish to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate, to the elders, and say: ‘My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; he does not wish to perform levirate marriage with me.’ And the elders of his city shall summon him and speak to him, and so on. Then his yevama shall approach him before the eyes of the elders, remove his shoe from his foot, spit before him, and respond and say,” and so on.

And refusal.

A minor whom her mother and brothers betrothed to a husband is not, according to Torah law, a married woman. The minor herself cannot betroth herself, since a minor’s act has no legal effect, and only her father was granted permission by the Torah to marry her off. However, the Sages instituted betrothal for her benefit, so that her husband would care for her and she would not be treated as ownerless; they likewise allowed her mother and brothers to betroth her, by rabbinic law. Since her betrothal has no validity according to Torah law, she can leave her husband without a bill of divorce, and does not require a bill of divorce even by rabbinic law. It is sufficient for her to perform mi’un, refusing her husband, when she says before a court: “I do not desire this man.” The halitza and mi’un mentioned here are performed

before

a court of

three.

The assessment of the redemption value of

fourth-year produce and second tithe whose value is unknown—

with three.

The fruit of a tree in the fourth year after its planting must be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there. If one cannot take it there, one redeems it with money, takes the money to Jerusalem, purchases food with it, and eats it in Jerusalem.

Likewise, there is produce from which one is obligated to separate second tithe, and the law concerning second-tithe produce is that it must be taken to Jerusalem; or, if one cannot take the produce itself there, one redeems it with money and takes the money to Jerusalem. If it happens that the redemption value is unknown, meaning that these fruits had no market price, such as fruit that had rotted, they must be assessed in order to determine their redemption price. The price assessment of fourth-year produce and second tithe is performed with three.

The Mishna continues to explain the laws of assessment:

Consecrated property,

the assessment [the valuation] for the redemption of consecrated property—an animal or vessels consecrated for the maintenance of the Temple—which the one who consecrated them wishes to redeem from the possession of consecrated property, is performed

with three

people who are expert in the value of objects.

Likewise, the assessment of

movable objects subject to valuations,

as the Gemara will explain, this assessment is performed

with three

assessors. This is the view of the first tanna.

But

Rabbi Yehuda

says:

And one of them,

of the three, must be

a kohen.

For it is written in the passage of valuations: “according to your valuation by the kohen.”

But

land,

the assessment of land belonging to one who wishes to redeem land that he consecrated, this assessment is performed

with nine

assessors,

and

the tenth is

a kohen.

Rashi’s words imply that this refers to one who consecrated a purchased field and wishes to redeem it. In the case of an ancestral field [inherited from his forefathers], no assessment is required, since its price is fixed by the Torah [the passage of Bechukotai]: “the seed of a homer of barley at fifty silver shekels.” See the Hiddushei HaMeiri, which explains that this law applies even according to the final conclusion. We must say that when the Gemara explains the law of redeeming land in the case of one who wishes to repay his debt after saying, “My valuation is upon me,” this is not specifically the case; there are other ways of redeeming land. Rather, the Gemara associates this law with its explanation of valuations involving movable objects: “A kohen comes to collect movable property with three, and land with ten.” It is somewhat difficult to understand the Rambam [there], who writes the law of assessing the redemption of land in the context of valuations, since this law also applies to one who consecrated a purchased field. The reason will be explained in the Gemara. See note 32.

And a person

who comes to redeem himself from consecrated property, he is

like them.

That is, the law of assessing a person is like the law of assessing land: ten are required, and one of them must be a kohen.

Until this point, the Mishna has taught the laws of monetary cases and the like. From this point onward, it teaches the laws of capital cases: how many judges are required to adjudicate them.

When they come to adjudicate

capital cases,

to impose the death penalty upon a person who violated one of the Torah prohibitions for which one is liable to one of the four court-imposed deaths, they adjudicate the case

in

a small Sanhedrin of

twenty-three

ordained judges.

The small Sanhedrin adjudicates not only the punishment of a person liable to a court-imposed death, but also capital cases involving an animal, such as the case of an ox

that had intercourse with

a woman,

and one that was the passive partner,

an animal with which a man had intercourse, whose prescribed deaths are by stoning; these cases are adjudicated

in

a small Sanhedrin of

twenty-three

judges.

For the Torah compared the law governing an animal that had intercourse with a person, or with which a person had intercourse, to the law governing a person who had intercourse with an animal, or with whom an animal had intercourse,

as it is stated

with regard to an animal that had intercourse with a woman [Leviticus 20]:

“You shall kill the woman and the animal.”

Through this, the law governing the killing of an animal that had intercourse with a person is equated with the law governing the killing of a person with whom an animal had intercourse: Both are to be judged before a court of twenty-three.

And

similarly

the verse says

concerning an animal with which a person had intercourse, that the person who had intercourse with the animal is liable to death, and the verse compared to it the law governing the animal with which the person had intercourse, saying [there]:

“And you shall kill the animal.”

That is, both in the case of an animal that had intercourse with a person and in the case of an animal with which a person had intercourse, the Torah compared and equated the animal’s death penalty with the person’s death penalty. Just as the death of the person is adjudicated by twenty-three judges, so too the death of the animal is adjudicated by twenty-three judges.

An ox sentenced to stoning,

an ox that killed a person, for which the prescribed death is stoning, is judged by a small Sanhedrin of

twenty-three

judges. The reason is

as it is stated [Exodus 21]: “

the ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death

.”

Certainly, this does not mean that the owner of the ox is actually killed, but rather the verse comes to state that

as the death of the owner,

if the owner of the ox were subject to the death penalty, he would be judged before a court of twenty-three,

so is the death of the ox.

Its death must therefore be adjudicated by a court of twenty-three.

Although the Torah says “ox,” this does not mean specifically an ox, but also

the wolf, the lion, the bear, the leopard, and the bardelas,

and the snake

that killed a person, whose prescribed death is stoning, are judged

in

a small Sanhedrin of

twenty-three.

But

Rabbi Eliezer says:

If they killed a person, then they are not domesticated, and their owners are not considered owners; rather, they are ownerless and available to all. Therefore, there is no need to judge them in court at all. Rather,

whoever is first to kill it

has performed an act of charity and

merited

a reward from Heaven.

Rabbi Akiva says: Their death

of these animals

is by twenty-three .

The Mishna now explains which cases are adjudicated by a Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges.

One does not adjudicate

in a court of twenty-three

either the tribe,

the majority of one of the tribes of Israel, who worshipped idolatry.

And

likewise, one does not adjudicate by twenty-three

either a false prophet,

who prophesies something that he did not hear through prophetic vision, even if he does not prophesy in the name of idolatry.

And

likewise, one does not adjudicate by twenty-three

a High Priest,

if he is liable to death for having transgressed one of the Torah’s commandments for which one is liable to a court-imposed death.

Rather,

all these cases are adjudicated

by a court of seventy-one.

And

likewise,

one may not take

the people

out to a discretionary war,

which is not a war of mitzva,

except by authority of

the

court of seventy-one.

One may not enlarge the city

of Jerusalem, which was sanctified with a sanctity greater than that of the other cities of the Land of Israel, in that lesser sacrificial offerings and second tithe are eaten within its walls, if they wish to expand its boundaries and extend its walls so that the added area will also possess the sanctity of Jerusalem,

and

likewise one may not enlarge

the Temple courtyards

whose sanctity is greater than that of Jerusalem,

except by authority of a court of seventy-one.

One does not establish,

one does not appoint

Sanhedrins,

courts of twenty-three judges,

for the tribes,

in each and every city,

except by authority of

the

court of seventy-one.

For the Great Court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in Jerusalem appoints them.

And

likewise

one does not establish

a court for

an apostate city,

where the majority of the city’s inhabitants worshipped idolatry and are liable to be killed by the sword, while their property is destroyed; they are not judged by a small Sanhedrin, as is an individual who worships idolatry,

but

they are judged

by a court of

seventy-one.

Since the Mishna taught the law of an apostate city, it adds further laws concerning an apostate city.

The

Great Court

does not establish

the law of

an apostate city in

a city on the

border,

the boundary separating the Land of Israel from outside the Land;

And

likewise,

one does not

establish the law of an apostate city in

three

neighboring cities—that is, their inhabitants are not killed by the sword and their property is not destroyed; rather, each individual is judged separately by stoning, and their property passes to their heirs.

But

one does establish the law of an apostate city in

one

or

two

neighboring cities.

And now, after the Mishna has explained the laws brought before a court of seventy-one, a court of twenty-three, and courts of three, the tanna teaches the expositions of the verses from which it is learned that the Great Sanhedrin consists of seventy-one judges, while the lesser one consists of twenty-three.

The Sanhedrin

the Great one consisted of seventy-one

judges,

while the lesser one

consisted

of twenty-three

judges—

From where

do we learn, from which verse,

the

Sanhedrin

Great one, that it consists of seventy-one

judges?

As it is stated

in the Torah, when Moses our teacher complained , “ I cannot carry all this people alone, for it is too heavy for me,” and the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded him: “

Gather [

gather]

for Me seventy men from the elders of Israel,

and they shall bear the burden of the people with you.” Thus, there were seventy men.

And Moses

was appointed

over them,

making seventy-one.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

In the Great Sanhedrin there were only

seventy

judges.

And from where

do we learn, from which verse,

the

law that the

lesser one consists of twenty-three

judges?

As it is stated

in the portion concerning a murderer [Numbers 35], “And the assembly shall judge,” which is an expression of punishment; this teaches that the court must contain “an assembly that judges,” which sees that judgment should be carried out against him. And likewise it is stated there: “

And the assembly shall save,”

so that it contains “an assembly that saves.” Thus, the Torah requires that the court contain

an assembly that judges and an assembly that saves. Here there are

together

twenty.

For an “assembly” consists of ten [as explained later in the Mishna]. The Torah thereby teaches us that twenty judges are required, so that if they divide into opposing sides, ten [“the assembly”] will acquit and ten will convict.

And from where

do we know

that an assembly

mentioned in the Torah

consists of ten

people?

Because we find [there, chapter 14] that the Holy One, blessed be He, called the ten spies an “assembly.”

As it is stated,

the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses:

“How long shall I bear with this evil assembly

Joshua and Caleb went out

from the general scheme of the spies, leaving only ten evil spies. Thus you learn that an “assembly” mentioned in the Torah consists of ten.

And from where

do we derive, from which exposition,

to bring,

to add to those twenty

another three?

From what is stated in the Torah: “You shall not follow the majority to do evil; after the majority you shall incline.”

From the implication of what is stated,

from the meaning of the words of the verse, “

You shall not follow the majority to do evil,”

I would ostensibly learn that if the majority of the judges convict [“to do evil,” that is, to impose a harmful judgment], one may not follow them to execute the one liable for the death penalty; rather, one must rule according to the minority, who acquit him. If so,

I would infer

from here, all the more so,

that I should be with them,

with the majority,

for good,

so that if the majority acquits, we certainly follow them and acquit the litigant. But now there is a difficulty:

if so,

since the Torah has already taught us that we follow the majority for good,

why is it stated

in the Torah again, later in the verse,

“After the majority [

for good]

you shall incline”!?

Rather, necessarily, this is the explanation of the verse: Indeed, one follows the majority in every matter, both for acquittal and for conviction, as is stated later in the verse, “After the majority you shall incline.” But the Torah commands that

your inclination for good

—following the majority to acquit—shall not be like

your inclination for evil.

For the number of judges required to tip the scale toward acquittal is not equal to the number required to tip it toward conviction. Rather,

Your inclination for good—

shall be even

by one,

even if there is only one more judge who acquits than judges who convict, the ruling is decided in favor of acquittal. But

your inclination for evil

shall be only

by two

If the judges who convict outnumber those who acquit by two judges, which is a “properly constituted majority,” only then is the case decided for conviction.

This resolves the verses: “You shall not follow the majority to do evil” refers to a majority of one, which is a “simple majority”; one does not follow it to convict the litigant. Whereas “After the majority you shall incline” applies both to acquittal and to conviction. However, as stated, a simple majority is sufficient for acquittal, while conviction requires a properly constituted majority.

Therefore, at least twenty-two judges are required, so that even if there is an “assembly that saves” consisting of ten judges, the case can be decided for conviction by twelve judges who convict, since they outnumber those who acquit by two judges.