Sanhedrin 2a — the Talmud in English

The tractate Sanhedrin was taught after the tractate Bava Batra, because after we learned the laws, we must know with how many judges they are judged.

There are laws decided and adjudicated in a court of three ordinary judges, and there are laws requiring three expert judges. And there are laws requiring a court of twenty-three judges who have received semikha, called the Minor Sanhedrin. And there are laws requiring a court of seventy-one, called the Great Sanhedrin.

Likewise, there are several laws decided by five judges, and there are also laws for which seven judges are needed, or nine and a kohen.

A larger number of judges provides greater consideration and enables a more comprehensive clarification of the aspects of liability and exemption, and therefore the laws are divided according to the magnitude of their severity and responsibility: some require more judges for a deeper clarification, and a larger court, and with greater authority. And in the Gemara they learn from the verses, for each and every law, which court judges it.

Mishna:

Monetary cases,

the adjudication of monetary claims between one person and his fellow must be

in

a court of

three

judges.

Robberies,

the judgments of robberies, when a person claims against his fellow that he snatched money or an object from his hand; or when the claimant asserts that the defendant is the custodian of his object, and extended his hand against the deposit, wishing to take it for himself, and his law is that of a robber. Or when the claimant asserted that he deposited a deposit with the defendant, and the defendant is its custodian, and the defendant denies the deposit.

And injuries,

the judgments of a person who injures his fellow, where the injured person claims against the person who injured him to pay for the bodily damage, and the other payments for which the injurer is liable, are also conducted

before

a court of

three

judges.

Damage,

the judgment of the owners of an ox that caused damage through damage by its tooth and foot, or through horn damage [in a forewarned ox, after three goring incidents], and the injured party claims full damage from him. Or the judgment of a person who damaged his fellow’s property, and the injured party claims from the damager that he pay him the payments for the damage;

And half-damage,

the judgment of an ox that damaged another person’s ox, when it was innocuous [on the first occasions], whose law is to pay half-damage.

Double payment,

the judgment of a thief in whose possession the stolen object was found, whose law is to pay double, as it is stated [Exodus 22]: “If the theft is surely found in his hand, he shall pay double”;

Payments of four and five,

the judgment of a person who steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it, whose law is to pay five cattle for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep. [Exodus 21]

All these claims must be adjudicated before a court of

three

judges.

And now the Mishna brings that there are additional claims that must be adjudicated before a court of three, except that concerning some of them there is a dispute among the tannaim whether it is possible to adjudicate them in a court of only three judges, or whether it is necessary to adjudicate them with a larger number of judges.

The rapist,

the judgment of a person who raped a virgin girl, who is liable [Deuteronomy 22] to pay a fine of fifty silver pieces to the girl’s father;

And likewise the judgment of

the seducer

of the virgin, whose law is [Exodus 22] to pay fifty silver pieces to her father;

And likewise the judgment of

one who brings an evil name

upon his wife, immediately after he married her, who brought against her an accusation, claiming that he did not find her a virgin when he married her, but that she had committed adultery with another while she was betrothed to him,

and the matter was found to be false,

he is liable to pay one hundred silver pieces to the girl’s father [Deuteronomy 22]; the girl’s father’s claim against the husband is conducted

before

a court of

three

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

the judgment of one who brings an evil name is conducted

before

a court of

twenty-three, because it contains,

in the judgment of one who brings an evil name, a discussion also of

capital cases.

For if the matter is true, as the husband said, that his wife committed adultery while she was betrothed, with witnesses and warning, she is stoned. Therefore, the Sages hold that this case must be conducted specifically in a court of twenty-three.

When a person is judged for violating a prohibition in the Torah for which

lashes

are imposed, namely forty lashes, he is judged

before

a court of

three.

This is the view of the first tanna.

In the name of Rabbi Ishmael they said

his students: They judge him

before

a court of

twenty-three.

The months of the year, according to which the festivals of Israel are determined, are “lunar months.” “

A lunar month” is determined according to the time between one conjunction of the moon and the next conjunction. The interval between them is twenty-nine days, plus twelve hours, plus 793 parts of an hour [in an hour there are 1,080 “parts”].

The “month” is composed of complete days, without additional hours. And in order to overcome the difference of the twelve hours [and the additional remainder of the parts] added to the twenty-nine days between one conjunction and the next, one must add one complete day to the twenty-nine days and make the month thirty days, or subtract the additional twelve hours and make it only twenty-nine days.

And therefore, sometimes the month is full, containing thirty days, and sometimes it is deficient, containing only twenty-nine days. And the Sages instituted that the order of the months should be one full, of thirty days, and one deficient, of twenty-nine days.

But when they used to sanctify the month “on the basis of sighting,” through witnesses who saw the renewal of the moon, they would determine everything according to the sighting of the witnesses. For if witnesses came on the thirtieth day of the month and testified that they had seen the new moon the previous night, at the beginning of the thirtieth day, then the court would sanctify that day so that it would be the beginning of the following month.

And it resulted that it was the first day of the following month, while the month that had passed was a deficient month, of only twenty-nine days.

But if the moon was not seen, and witnesses did not come on the thirtieth day, the court would establish the thirty-first day as the beginning of the following month. And it resulted that the month that had passed was a full month, of thirty days, and it is called an “intercalated month,” from the language of addition.

Our Mishna discusses in which court this matter is determined and decided.

Intercalation of the month,

the sanctification of the beginning of the following month on the thirty-first day from the beginning of the month that had passed, thereby making the preceding month “intercalated”; this sanctification is performed

in

a court of

three.

A solar year has 365 days, whereas a lunar year has 354 days [on average]. It follows that the solar year is eleven days longer than the lunar year.

The seasons of the year—spring, summer, autumn, and winter—are determined by the solar year. Therefore, if we were to follow only lunar years, the festival of Passover would not necessarily fall specifically during the spring season; rather, it would also fall during the other seasons of the year. And since the Torah states that the festival of Passover must be observed specifically during the spring season [Exodus 13], we must adjust the lunar years to the solar years by adding one month to the lunar year from time to time.

A year that contains an additional month is called a “leap year,” and the additional month is called the intercalated month. [However, it is impossible to make a year consisting of twelve months and several additional days, since the year is composed only of complete months].

Besides this reason—that the festival of Passover should fall during the spring season—there are additional reasons that necessitate intercalating the year, even if Passover would in fact fall during the spring. They are explained in the Gemara.

Intercalation of the year,

the decision whether or not to intercalate the year by adding an additional month is made

by

a court of

three —

these are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A

court of

three begins

the deliberation: Is it indeed necessary to sit and examine whether there is some doubt as to whether this year should be a leap year, or is there no doubt here, and it is unnecessary to convene a court for this purpose?

And if the three decide that there is reason to deliberate on the matter, then

with five

judges

they deliberate

whether this year should indeed be intercalated or not, because the deliberation concerning the intercalation of the year requires five judges. And once they reach the decision that this year must be intercalated, two additional judges are added,

and they conclude

the judgment

with seven

judges. That is, the decision and proclamation that this year is a leap year must be made by seven judges.

And if they concluded with three,

when the first three judges had no doubt concerning the matter, and at the beginning of the deliberation all three agreed that the year should be intercalated, and they intercalated the year with only three, this year is

a leap year.

a. A person who brings a sacrifice for his sin must perform semikha, placing his hands upon it.

The practice of semikha is that the owner of the sacrifice places both hands with all his strength upon the head of the animal. He confesses his sin if it is a sin-offering, and his guilt if it is a guilt-offering. At the time of semikha he says: “I have sinned, I have acted perversely, and I have transgressed, and I did such-and-such; and now I repent.” If it is another sacrifice, he recites over it words of praise and thanksgiving to the Omnipresent.

When the sacrifice is brought by a single individual, the person bringing it performs semikha upon it. When a sacrifice is brought jointly, all the partners perform semikha upon it, one after the other.

The sacrifice called “the bull for an unintentional matter of the community” is a sacrifice that must be brought when the judges of the Great Sanhedrin erred in their ruling and permitted something for which one would be liable to karet if it were done intentionally. For example, they permitted eating the forbidden fat of the stomach because they thought it was permitted fat and was not included among the fats forbidden for consumption. As a result of this erroneous ruling of the court [“an unintentional matter”], the majority of the people transgressed the prohibition. In such a case, one bull is brought as a sin-offering, called “the bull for an unintentional matter of the community.” Each individual from the community who sinned on the basis of their erroneous ruling does not, at that time, need to bring an individual sin-offering.

For “the bull for an unintentional matter of the community,” the entire community did not perform semikha upon the sacrifice; rather, only the elders, the members of the Great Sanhedrin, did so [the Great Sanhedrin]. Below it will be explained how many judges of the Sanhedrin must perform semikha upon the bull.

b. The Torah states [Deuteronomy 21]: If a slain person is found on the road and it is not known who struck him, the elders and judges go out and measure which city is nearest to the corpse. The inhabitants of that city bring a heifer and break its neck. This breaking of the heifer’s neck serves as atonement for the blood of the murdered person. This measurement is performed by judges from the Great Sanhedrin, called the Great Sanhedrin.

The laying of hands by the elders

upon the head of “the bull for an unintentional matter of the community.”

And the breaking of the heifer’s neck,

the measurement of the distance between the city and the corpse, with regard to the obligation to bring a beheaded heifer.

Both are performed

with three

judges—

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Yehuda says: With five

judges.

The rite of halitza,

the act of halitza and the recitation of the passage of halitza, which are performed in the presence of the elders, the judges, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 25]: “When brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, and so on. And if the man does not wish to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate, to the elders, and say: ‘My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; he does not wish to perform levirate marriage with me.’ And the elders of his city shall summon him and speak to him, and so on. Then his yevama shall approach him before the eyes of the elders, remove his shoe from his foot, spit before him, and respond and say,” and so on.

And refusal.

A minor whom her mother and brothers betrothed to a husband is not, according to Torah law, a married woman. The minor herself cannot betroth herself, since a minor’s act has no legal effect, and only her father was granted permission by the Torah to marry her off. However, the Sages instituted betrothal for her benefit, so that her husband would care for her and she would not be treated as ownerless; they likewise allowed her mother and brothers to betroth her, by rabbinic law. Since her betrothal has no validity according to Torah law, she can leave her husband without a bill of divorce, and does not require a bill of divorce even by rabbinic law. It is sufficient for her to perform mi’un, refusing her husband, when she says before a court: “I do not desire this man.” The halitza and mi’un mentioned here are performed

before

a court of

three.

The assessment of the redemption value of

fourth-year produce and second tithe whose value is unknown—

with three.

The fruit of a tree in the fourth year after its planting must be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there. If one cannot take it there, one redeems it with money, takes the money to Jerusalem, purchases food with it, and eats it in Jerusalem.

Likewise, there is produce from which one is obligated to separate second tithe, and the law concerning second-tithe produce is that it must be taken to Jerusalem; or, if one cannot take the produce itself there, one redeems it with money and takes the money to Jerusalem. If it happens that the redemption value is unknown, meaning that these fruits had no market price, such as fruit that had rotted, they must be assessed in order to determine their redemption price. The price assessment of fourth-year produce and second tithe is performed with three.

The Mishna continues to explain the laws of assessment:

Consecrated property,

the assessment [the valuation] for the redemption of consecrated property—an animal or vessels consecrated for the maintenance of the Temple—which the one who consecrated them wishes to redeem from the possession of consecrated property, is performed

with three

people who are expert in the value of objects.

Likewise, the assessment of

movable objects subject to valuations,

as the Gemara will explain, this assessment is performed

with three

assessors. This is the view of the first tanna.

But

Rabbi Yehuda

says:

And one of them,

of the three, must be

a kohen.

For it is written in the passage of valuations: “according to your valuation by the kohen.”

But

однако

land,

the assessment of land belonging to one who wishes to redeem land that he consecrated, this assessment is performed

with nine

assessors,

and

the tenth is

a kohen.

And a person

who comes to redeem himself from consecrated property, he is

like them.

That is, the law of assessing a person is like the law of assessing land: ten are required, and one of them must be a kohen.

Until this point, the Mishna has taught the laws of monetary cases and the like. From this point onward, it teaches the laws of capital cases: how many judges are required to adjudicate them.

When they come to adjudicate

capital cases,

to impose the death penalty upon a person who transgressed one of the Torah prohibitions for which one is liable to one of the four court-imposed deaths, they adjudicate them

in

a lesser Sanhedrin of

twenty-three

ordained judges.

And not only the punishment of a person liable for a court-imposed death is adjudicated in a lesser Sanhedrin, but also the capital cases of an animal, such as the case of an ox

that copulated with

the woman,

and the one with which copulation was performed,

an animal with which a man copulated, whose law is that they are to be stoned; these are adjudicated

in

a lesser Sanhedrin of

twenty-three

judges.

For the Torah likened the law of an animal that copulated with a person or with which a person copulated to the law of a person who copulated with an animal or with whom an animal copulated, according to

as it is stated

concerning an animal that copulated with a woman [Leviticus 20]

“And you shall kill the woman and the animal.”

And through this, the law of killing an animal that copulated with a person was likened to the law of killing a person with whom the animal copulated, so that both of them are [judged] in a court of twenty-three.

And

so

says

the writer concerning an animal with which a person copulated, that the man who copulated with an animal is liable to death, and Scripture likened the law of the animal with which the man copulated to it, saying [there]

“And you shall kill the animal.”

That is, both in the case of an animal that copulated with a person and in the case of an animal with which a person copulated, the Torah likened and equated the law of the animal’s death to the law of the person’s death; and just as the man’s death is adjudicated by twenty-three, so too the animal’s death is adjudicated by twenty-three.

An ox sentenced to stoning,

an ox that killed a person, whose death is by stoning, is adjudicated in a lesser Sanhedrin of

twenty-three

judges. And the reason is because

as it is stated [Exodus 21]

“The ox shall be stoned, and also its owner shall be put to death.”

“The ox shall be stoned, and also its owner shall be put to death”.

Certainly, the meaning is not that they actually kill the owner of the ox, but Scripture comes to say that

as the death of the owners,

if the owner of the ox had been judged liable to death, he would have been judged before a court of twenty-three,

so is the death of the ox.

Its death must be adjudicated in a court of twenty-three.

And although “ox” is written in the Torah, the intention is not specifically an ox, but also

the wolf, the lion, the bear, the leopard, and the bardelas

and the snake

that killed a person, whose law is that they are to be stoned; these are adjudicated

in

a lesser Sanhedrin of

twenty-three.

But

Rabbi Eliezer says:

if they killed then they are not civilized, and their owners are not owners; rather, they are ownerless for everyone. Therefore, there is no need to judge them at all in court; rather,

whoever is first to kill it

has performed an act of charity and

merited

reward from Heaven.

Rabbi Akiva says: Their death

of these animals

is by twenty-three .

And now the Mishna explains which judgments are adjudicated in the great Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges.

They do not adjudicate

in a court of twenty-three

neither the tribe,

the majority of a tribe among the tribes of Israel, who served idolatry.

And

likewise they do not adjudicate by twenty-three

neither the false prophet,

who prophesies what he did not hear in a prophetic vision, even though he does not prophesy in the name of idolatry.

And

likewise they do not adjudicate by twenty-three the

High Priest,

if he is liable to death for having transgressed one of the commandments of the Torah for which one is liable to a court-imposed death.

Rather

all these are judged

by a court of seventy-one.

And

likewise

they do not take out

the people

for an optional war,

which is not a mitzva war,

except by

the authorization of

a court of seventy-one.

They do not expand the city

Jerusalem, which was sanctified with a sanctity greater than that of the other cities of the Land of Israel, in that lesser holy offerings and second tithe are eaten within its walls, if they wish to expand its boundaries and extend its walls, so that the added area too will have the sanctity of Jerusalem,

and

likewise they do not expand

the Temple courts

of the Temple, whose sanctity is greater than the sanctity of Jerusalem,

except by a court of seventy-one.

They do not make,

they do not establish

Sanhedrins,

courts of twenty-three judges,

for the tribes,

in every city and every city,

except by

the authorization of

a court of seventy-one.

For the great court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in Jerusalem appoints them.

And

likewise

they do not establish

a law of

an apostate city,

where the majority of the city’s inhabitants served idolatry, whose law is that they are killed by the sword and their property is destroyed; they are not judged by a lesser Sanhedrin, as is an individual who serves idolatry,

but

they are judged

by a court of

seventy-one.

And since we learned the law of an apostate city incidentally, the Mishna adds further laws of an apostate city.

No

great court

makes

the law of

an apostate city in

a city on

the border,

the boundary separating the Land of Israel from outside the Land of Israel;

And

likewise

they do not

make the law of an apostate city in

three

cities adjacent to one another—that is, they do not kill them by the sword and do not destroy their property; rather, each one of them is judged by stoning, and their property passes to their heirs.

But

they do make the law of an apostate city in

one

or

two

cities adjacent to one another.

And now, after the Mishna has explained the laws brought before a court of seventy-one, a court of twenty-three, and courts of three, the tanna teaches the expositions of the verses from which it is learned that the Great Sanhedrin consists of seventy-one judges, while the lesser one consists of twenty-three.

The Sanhedrin

the Great one consisted of seventy-one

judges,

while the lesser one

consisted

of twenty-three

judges—

From where

do we learn, from which verse,

the

Sanhedrin

Great one, that it consists of seventy-one

judges?

As it is stated

in the Torah, when Moses our teacher complained , “ I cannot carry all this people alone, for it is too heavy for me,” and the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded him: “

Gather [

gather]

for Me seventy men from the elders of Israel,

and they shall bear the burden of the people with you.” Thus, there were seventy men.

And Moses

was appointed

over them,

making seventy-one.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

In the Great Sanhedrin there were only

seventy

judges.

And from where

do we learn, from which verse,

the

law that the

lesser one consists of twenty-three

judges?

As it is stated

in the portion concerning a murderer [Numbers 35], “And the assembly shall judge,” which is an expression of punishment; this teaches that the court must contain “an assembly that judges,” which sees that judgment should be carried out against him. And likewise it is stated there: “

And the assembly shall save,”

so that it contains “an assembly that saves.” Thus, the Torah requires that the court contain

an assembly that judges and an assembly that saves. Here there are

together

twenty.

For an “assembly” consists of ten [as explained later in the Mishna]. The Torah thereby teaches us that twenty judges are required, so that if they divide into opposing sides, ten [“the assembly”] will acquit and ten will convict.

And from where

do we know

that an assembly

mentioned in the Torah

consists of ten

people?

Because we find [there, chapter 14] that the Holy One, blessed be He, called the ten spies an “assembly.”

As it is stated,

the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses:

“How long shall I bear with this evil assembly

Joshua and Caleb went out

from the general scheme of the spies, leaving only ten evil spies. Thus you learn that an “assembly” mentioned in the Torah consists of ten.

And from where

do we derive, from which exposition,

to bring,

to add to those twenty

another three?

From what is stated in the Torah: “You shall not follow the majority to do evil; after the majority you shall incline.”

From the implication of what is stated,

from the meaning of the words of the verse, “

You shall not follow the majority to do evil,”

I would ostensibly learn that if the majority of the judges convict [“to do evil,” that is, to impose a harmful judgment], one may not follow them to execute the one liable for the death penalty; rather, one must rule according to the minority, who acquit him. If so,

I would infer

from here, all the more so,

that I should be with them,

with the majority,

for good,

so that if the majority acquits, we certainly follow them and acquit the litigant. But now there is a difficulty:

if so,

since the Torah has already taught us that we follow the majority for good,

why is it stated

in the Torah again, later in the verse,

“After the majority [

for good]

you shall incline”!?

Rather, necessarily, this is the explanation of the verse: Indeed, one follows the majority in every matter, both for acquittal and for conviction, as is stated later in the verse, “After the majority you shall incline.” But the Torah commands that

your inclination for good

—following the majority to acquit—shall not be like

your inclination for evil.

For the number of judges required to tip the scale toward acquittal is not equal to the number required to tip it toward conviction. Rather,

Your inclination for good—

shall be even

by one,

even if there is only one more judge who acquits than judges who convict, the ruling is decided in favor of acquittal. But

your inclination for evil

shall be only

by two

If the judges who convict outnumber those who acquit by two judges, which is a “properly constituted majority,” only then is the case decided for conviction.

This resolves the verses: “You shall not follow the majority to do evil” refers to a majority of one, which is a “simple majority”; one does not follow it to convict the litigant. Whereas “After the majority you shall incline” applies both to acquittal and to conviction. However, as stated, a simple majority is sufficient for acquittal, while conviction requires a properly constituted majority.

Therefore, at least twenty-two judges are required, so that even if there is an “assembly that saves” consisting of ten judges, the case can be decided for conviction by twelve judges who convict, since they outnumber those who acquit by two judges.