Sanhedrin 24b (כד:) — the Talmud in English

What

oath is the Mishna speaking of? Is it

not concerning those

who are obligated to take an oath [by Torah law,

who swear

in order to exempt themselves from payment, and through their oath

do not pay;

that is, the defendant is obligated to swear in order to remove the claim against him, and the claimant said to him: “Swear to me by your life,”

which is equivalent to

“

I waive your claim,”

meaning: If you swear to me by your life, I will waive my claim against you.

Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree as to whether he can retract. This provides us with proof that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree concerning “I waive your claim.” And this is difficult for Rava.

Rava answers:

No,

not as you said, that the Mishna is speaking of those who swear and do not pay. Rather, it is speaking

of those who

claim, for whom the Sages instituted that they

swear

concerning their claim, and through their oath they

collect

—for example, a hired laborer or one who was robbed, and the like, as explained in tractate Shevuot—and the defendant said to the claimant: “Swear to me by your life, and I will give you,”

which is equivalent to

“

I will give you,”

and in this case Rabbi Meir holds that the defendant can retract. But concerning “I waive your claim,” Rabbi Meir concedes to the Sages that he cannot retract.

It follows that, according to Rava, the Mishna is speaking, both in its first clause and in its latter clause, of “I will give you.” Therefore, the Gemara asks:

But the first clause already taught this

—the Mishna already informed us that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree concerning “I will give you.” Why, then, did the Mishna repeat the latter clause ?

Rava answers:

The tanna

taught in the first clause a case in which the defendant

relies [- depends]

—that is, depends—

on the judgment of others—“my father and your father”—

and the tanna

taught in the latter clause a case in which the defendant

relies on the judgment of the claimant himself,

that is, the claimant.

And it is necessary

to inform us of both cases.

For if the tanna had taught

only the first clause, in which he

relies on the judgment of others,

there would be room to say that only

in this case,

in this law,

did Rabbi Meir say that he can retract,

that he can change his mind,

because when he said: “I accept my father as trustworthy

”—

he does not fully acquire,

he does not resolve in his mind [- he does not seriously intend] to transfer the claim to the claimant if the judge finds in his favor,

as he says,

thinking to himself: “

Who says

—who says

that

the judge

will find in his favor

and find for the claimant?” If he had known that the claimant would prevail in the case, he would not have agreed to have an unfit judge adjudicate the case.

And therefore Rabbi Meir holds that he can retract.

But when he relies

—the defendant—

on the judgment of the claimant himself,

who thinks that the claimant will certainly swear by his life in order to be exempted from a full oath ,

say

—there would be room to say—

that Rabbi Meir concedes

to

the Sages

that his statement, “Swear to me by your life,” obligates him, and he cannot retract.

Therefore, the Mishna informs us of a novelty: nevertheless, Rabbi Meir holds that he can retract.

And

conversely—

if it had informed us of this case,

the latter clause, there would be room to say:

in this case,

where he relied on the claimant’s judgment, and it occurred to his mind that the claimant would certainly swear,

the Sages say

that he cannot retract, because he waives the claimant’s obligation to take a full oath;

but in that case,

in the first clause, concerning “my father and your father,” where he relied on the judgment of others,

say

—there would be room to say—

that the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir

that he can retract.

Therefore, the Mishna informs us that nevertheless the Sages hold that he cannot retract.

Summary: According to Rava, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree only concerning “I will give you,” both when he relies on the judgment of others and when he relies on the judgment of the claimant himself.

The amoraim further disagreed as to whether the Mishna is speaking of one who comes to retract before the conclusion of the trial, or even after the conclusion of the trial—that is, after the unfit judge has already issued his ruling .

The reason for distinguishing between them is that one might say that if he remained silent until the conclusion of the trial, he certainly agreed in his mind that the unfit judge should decide between them, and resolved in his mind to transfer his claim to the other party. [Yad Ramah].

Reish Lakish said: The dispute

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages applies when he comes to retract

before the conclusion of the trial,

after they had presented their claims before the unfit judge.

But after the conclusion of the trial—

everyone agrees that he cannot retract.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: After the conclusion of the trial is the subject of the dispute.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Yoḥanan’s position.

It was raised before them

by the members of the academy: What is Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion? Does he mean that only

after the conclusion of the trial is the subject of the dispute,

so that the Sages hold that he cannot retract

from it, but before the conclusion of the trial—

everyone

agrees, the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir,

that he can retract? [According to this possibility, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree diametrically: Before the conclusion of the trial, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan everyone agrees that he can retract, whereas according to Reish Lakish they disagree. And after the conclusion of the trial, according to Reish Lakish everyone agrees that he cannot retract, whereas according to Rabbi Yoḥanan they disagree.]

Or perhaps

Rabbi Yoḥanan means that

both in this case,

before the conclusion of the trial,

and in that case,

after the conclusion of the trial,

they disagree.

The Gemara resolves the question from Rava’s statement. Rava issued a halakhic ruling [and not merely an explanation of the Mishna], and his words can resolve the question.

Come

and

hear: For Rava said:

A litigant who

accepted a relative or an unfit person

to adjudicate his case, as long as he is

before the conclusion of the trial—

he can retract,

but

after the conclusion of the trial he cannot retract.

It is clear that Rava rules in accordance with the Sages and not in accordance with Rabbi Meir. And it is proven that he holds that before the conclusion of the trial they did not disagree, and the Sages agree that he can retract; only after the conclusion of the trial do they hold that he cannot retract.

Therefore:

Granted,

that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that

after the conclusion of the trial—

they disagree, but before the conclusion of the trial—

everyone agrees that he can retract,

it is understandable that

Rava is in accordance with

the opinion of

Rabbi Yoḥanan, and

Rava rules

in accordance with the Sages.

But if you say that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that

that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that

both in this case and in that case they disagree,

it is difficult:

in accordance with whom is Rava speaking?

He follows neither Reish Lakish nor Rabbi Yoḥanan, since both hold that before the conclusion of the trial the Sages hold that he cannot retract. How, then, did Rava rule that he can retract?

Rather,

we are compelled to say:

is it not evident

that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that only

after the conclusion of the trial is the subject of the dispute ?

Conclude from this

that the question has been resolved.

The Gemara relates:

Rav Naḥman bar Rav

Ḥisda

(Yiẓḥak)

sent a messenger

to Rav Naḥman bar Yaakov

to ask him:

Let our Master teach us!

Is it

before the conclusion of the trial that they disagree, or after the conclusion of the trial that they disagree? And

he further asked him:

In accordance with whose opinion is the halakha,

that of Rabbi Meir or that of the Sages?

He sent him

Rav Naḥman bar Yaakov answered his questions:

After the conclusion of the trial is the subject of the dispute, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Sages. [This is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rava.]

Another version:

Rav Ashi said: This

question

was sent to him

by Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda, to Rav Naḥman bar Yaakov.

Is it

concerning “I will give you”

that they disagree [as in the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan],

or is it concerning “I waive your claim” that they disagree [as in the opinion of Shmuel].

as Shmuel holds?

And

they further asked him:

In accordance with whose opinion is the halakha,

that of Rabbi Meir or that of the Sages?

He sent him

Rav Naḥman bar Yaakov sent to Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda:

They disagree concerning “I will give you,” and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Sages.

In

the academy of

Sura they taught it this way,

these two versions.

But

in

the academy of

Pumbedita they taught it this way,

in the following version:

Rabbi Ḥanina bar Shelamya said: They sent to him from the house of Rav

—the students of Rav, a messenger

to Shmuel

to ask him:

Let our Master teach us!

It is clear to us that

before the conclusion of the trial

he can retract,

and

our question is: If

they effected a formal acquisition from him,

meaning that he performed an act of acquisition at the outset, when he said: “I accept my father as trustworthy,” or when he said: “Swear to me by your life,”

what

is the law? Can he retract from his acquisition, since the judgment has not yet been issued or since he has not yet sworn?

Shmuel sent to them

—the students of Rav:

There is nothing after an acquisition,

and the acquisition obligates him, and he cannot retract.

Mishna:

After we learned the law concerning a relative or an unfit person, the Mishna comes to explain who is unfit to adjudicate and to testify; the following Mishna will explain who the relatives are.

The Torah wrote (Exodus 23): “Do not join your hand with a wicked person to be a corrupt witness,” meaning: “Do not appoint a wicked person as a witness” .

A wicked person guilty of monetary wrongdoing, that is, a robber, is disqualified from testimony by Torah law. But the Sages also disqualified from testimony one who takes another’s money dishonestly—similar to a robber.

Our Mishna explains several examples of those disqualified from testimony .

We learned in the Mishna in tractate Nidda (49b): “Anyone who is fit to adjudicate is fit to testify, and there are those who are fit to testify but are not fit to adjudicate.” That is, all those who are disqualified from testifying are certainly disqualified from adjudicating.

And these are the disqualified

to adjudicate and to testify.

One who plays with dice

—pieces of bone with which they play for a stake (Rashi, Rosh HaShana). They stipulate among themselves: “If I defeat you, give me such and such, and if you defeat me, I will give you such and such” (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). The reason that he is disqualified, as well as the reason why he is not an actual robber, will be explained in the Gemara.

And a lender at interest.

And pigeon racers

—this will be explained in the Gemara.

And those who trade in

the produce of the

Sabbatical year,

and violate what the Torah wrote (Leviticus 25): “The Sabbath of the land shall be yours to eat,” which we interpret: “For eating, but not for commerce.”

Since they violate a Torah prohibition because of desire for money, they are like a wicked person guilty of monetary wrongdoing and are disqualified from adjudicating and testifying. They are suspected of giving false testimony because of a bribe (Rashi, Rosh HaShana) .

Rabbi Shimon said: At first they would call them gatherers of produce of the Sabbatical year; when the extortionists increased, they went back to calling them traders in produce of the Sabbatical year.

This will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Yehuda said: When

are they

disqualified?

When they have no

occupation,

from which they earn their livelihood,

but

if their only occupation is

that, playing with dice and the like. Since they do not engage in the constructive activities of the world, they are not knowledgeable in the nature of law and commerce, and they are not God-fearing. [Rashi, Eruvin: Since they do not recognize and understand the effort and suffering of people, they do not have compassion for their fellows and are not concerned about causing them monetary loss.]

But if they have an occupation other than that, then they are

fit .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

One who plays with dice.

And the Gemara inquires:

What is he doing!?

What wrongful act has he committed on account of which he is disqualified?

Rami bar Hama answers: Because it is an “asmakhta.”

Introduction to the law of asmakhta.

We learned in the Mishna (Bava Batra 168a): If a borrower repaid part of his debt to the lender, and, in order to avoid the trouble of writing a receipt for the money he had repaid, the lender and the borrower entrusted the document to a third party, and the borrower said to him: “If I do not repay the remainder of the debt within thirty days, return the document to the lender,” and thirty days passed,

Rabbi Yosei says: The third party should give the document to the lender; Rabbi Yehuda says: He should not give it.

That is, the borrower relied in his heart on his ability to fulfill his condition, and his undertaking was made on the basis of uncertainty; he did not firmly resolve that the third party would in fact give the document. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda maintains that an asmakhta “does not acquire.” Rabbi Yosei maintains that an “asmakhta acquires.”

The halakha was decided: An asmakhta does not acquire.

Rami bar Hama said: Because he was

the one who plays with dice

an asmakhta,

as from the outset he relied on something that was not certain, mistakenly thinking that he would be able to defeat his opponent; and when he lost, he did not give the money willingly [voluntarily].

And

the law is

that an asmakhta does not acquire,

so it follows that the winner received money dishonestly, and it is in his possession as something akin to stolen property.

This is the position of Rami bar Hama, whereas Rav Sheshet maintains that it is not an asmakhta.

An asmakhta applies only in a case in which a person errs and thinks that he will be able to do something—for example, the borrower who thought that he would be able to repay the debt. Had he known that he could not repay it, he would not have undertaken the obligation, and his undertaking was not made with full resolve. But one who plays with dice knew from the outset that there was a possibility that he would lose, just as there was a possibility that he would win, and nevertheless he played. Therefore, we say that he transfers ownership wholeheartedly, and the winner received the money honestly.

Rav Sheshet said: In any case of this kind, it is not an asmakhta.

Rather,

what is the reason that one who plays with dice is disqualified?

Because they do not engage in the settlement of the world.

And the Gemara inquires:

What is the practical difference between them,

what is the practical difference between Rami bar Hama and Rav Sheshet?

The practical difference between them is

in a case

where he has completed another profession,

that is, he supports himself through another profession and indeed engages in the settlement of the world, but he plays during his leisure time. According to Rav Sheshet, he is not disqualified, whereas according to Rami bar Hama, he is still akin to a robber and is disqualified.

As we learned,

we learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda said: When

are those who play with dice disqualified?

When they have no profession

other than this one,

but

if

they have another profession

they are fit. Apparently,

it follows that

the reason for the Mishna

that they are disqualified

is because

they do not engage in

the settlement of the world—

that is the reason.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

This proof

is difficult for Rami bar Hama,

for Rabbi Yehuda’s words prove that the reason for the disqualification is the settlement of the world, and not that “an asmakhta does not acquire.”

And if you would say

and if you were to answer that Rami bar Hama maintains that

the Sages disagree with Rabbi Yehuda,

so that even if Rabbi Yehuda maintains this position, nevertheless the first tanna disagrees with him and maintains that the dice player is akin to a robber, and Rami bar Hama interpreted the words of the first tanna,

this is not so, for

and

behold,

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Wherever Rabbi Yehuda said: