Sanhedrin 24b — the Talmud in English

What

which oath is the Mishna speaking of? Is it

not those

who are obligated to take an oath [by Torah law,]

who swear

in order to exempt themselves from the payments, and through their oath

do not pay,

meaning: that the defendant is obligated to swear in order to remove the claim from himself, and the claimant said to him: “Swear to me by your life,”

which would be like

“

It is forgiven to you,”

for if you swear to me by your life, I will forgive you my claim.

And nevertheless Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree whether he can retract. We thus have proof that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree concerning “It is forgiven to you.” This is difficult for Rava.

And Rava answers:

No,

not as you said, that the Mishna is speaking of those who swear and do not pay, but

of those who

are claimants for whom the Sages instituted that they

swear

concerning their claims, and through their oath they

receive,

such as a hired worker, a victim of robbery, and the like, [as explained in Tractate Shevuot,] and the defendant said to the claimant: “Swear to me by your life and I will give you,”

which would be like

“

I will give you,”

and in this Rabbi Meir holds that the defendant can retract, but concerning “It is forgiven to you,” Rabbi Meir concedes to the Sages that he cannot retract.

It follows that, according to Rava, the Mishna is speaking, both in the first clause and in the latter clause, of “I will give you.” Therefore the Gemara asks—

But it already taught this in the first clause

the Mishna has already informed us that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree concerning “I will give you”; so why did the Mishna repeat the latter clause ?

And Rava answers—

The tanna

taught in the first clause in a case in which the defendant

relies

—that is, depends—

on the judgment of others—“my father and your father”—

and the tanna

taught in the latter clause in a case in which the defendant

relies on the judgment of himself,

that is, the claimant.

And it was necessary

to inform us of both cases.

For if the tanna had taught

only the first clause, in which he

relies on the judgment of others,

it could have been said that only

in this case

in this law

Rabbi Meir says that he can retract,

that he can retract,

because at the time he said, “My father is trusted by me

” —

he does not fully acquire

he does not firmly resolve in his mind to transfer [the money] to the claimant if the judge vindicates him,

for he says

thinking to himself: “

Who says

who says

that

the judge

will vindicate him

will vindicate the claimant?” And if he had known that the claimant would be vindicated in the case, he would not have agreed that an invalid judge should judge him.

And therefore Rabbi Meir holds that he can retract.

But when he relies

the defendant

on the judgment of himself,

the claimant, since it occurs to him that the claimant will certainly swear by his life in order to be exempt from a full oath ,

say

it could have been said

that he concedes

to them,

Rabbi Meir to the Sages,

that his statement, “Swear to me by your life,” obligates him, and he cannot retract.

Therefore the Mishna informs us—a novel point—that nevertheless Rabbi Meir holds that he can retract.

And

on the other hand—

if it had informed us in this case

in the latter clause, it could have been said:

in this case,

where he relied on the claimant’s judgment, and it occurred to him that the claimant would certainly swear, and therefore

the Sages say

that he cannot retract, since he waives the claimant’s taking a full oath,

but in that case

in the first clause, concerning “my father and your father,” where he relied on the judgment of others,

say

it could have been said

the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir

that he can retract.

Therefore the Mishna informs us that nevertheless the Sages hold that he cannot retract.

Summary: according to Rava, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree only concerning “I will give you,” both when he relies on the judgment of others and when he relies on the judgment of himself.

The amoraim further disagreed whether the Mishna is speaking when he came to retract before the completion of the judgment, or even after the completion of the judgment—that is, after the invalid judge had already issued his ruling .

And the reason for distinguishing between them is that it is possible to say that if he remained silent until the completion of the judgment, he certainly agreed in his mind that the invalid judge should decide between them, and resolved in his mind to transfer his claim to the other one. [Yad Ramah].

Said Reish Lakish: The disagreement

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages is when he comes to retract

before the completion of the judgment,

after they presented their arguments before the invalid judge;

but after the completion of the judgment—

everyone agrees that he cannot retract.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: After the completion of the judgment is the subject of disagreement.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Yohanan’s position.

It was raised before them

the scholars of the academy were uncertain: what is Rabbi Yohanan’s view? Does he intend to say: only

after the completion of the judgment is the subject of disagreement,

when the Sages hold that he cannot retract

from it, but before the completion of the judgment—

everyone

the Sages agree with Rabbi Meir

that he can retract. [And according to this possibility, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree from one extreme to the other: before the completion of the judgment, according to Rabbi Yohanan everyone holds that he can retract, while according to Reish Lakish they disagree; and after the completion of the judgment, according to Reish Lakish everyone holds that he cannot retract, while according to Rabbi Yohanan they disagree.]

Or perhaps

Rabbi Yohanan’s intention is that

both in this case

before the completion of the judgment

and in this case

after the completion of the judgment—

there is a disagreement.

The Gemara resolves the question from Rava’s statement. For Rava issued a halakhic ruling [and not according to his summary of the explanation of the Mishna], and from his words it is possible to resolve the question.

Come

and

hear: for Rava said:

A litigant who

accepted a relative or an invalid person

to judge him, as long as it is

before the completion of the judgment—

he can retract,

but

after the completion of the judgment he cannot retract.

Now, it is clear that Rava rules in accordance with the Sages and not in accordance with Rabbi Meir. And it is proven that he holds that before the completion of the judgment they did not disagree, and the Sages agree that he can retract; only after the completion of the judgment do they hold that he cannot retract.

And therefore—

If you say it is understandable

that Rabbi Yohanan holds

that after the completion of the judgment—

there is a disagreement, but before the completion of the judgment—

everyone can retract,

it is understandable that

Rava said like

him,

Rabbi Yohanan, and

Rava rules

according to the Sages.

But if you say

that Rabbi Yohanan holds that

both in this case and in that case there is a disagreement,

it is difficult:

according to whom did Rava speak?

Not according to Reish Lakish and not according to Rabbi Yohanan, for both of them hold that before the completion of the judgment the Sages hold that he cannot retract; so how did Rava rule that he can retract?

Rather,

we are compelled to say: is it not

learned from this

that Rabbi Yohanan holds that only

after the completion of the judgment is the subject of disagreement .

Learn from this

the question has been resolved.

The Gemara relates:

Rav Nahman bar Rav

Hasda

(Yitzhak

sent a messenger

to Rav Nahman bar Yaakov

to ask him:

Let our master teach us!

Is it

before the completion of the judgment that there is a disagreement, or after the completion of the judgment that there is a disagreement? And

he further asked him:

According to whose words is the halakha,

according to Rabbi Meir or according to the Sages?

He sent him

Rav Nahman bar Yaakov answered his questions:

After the completion of the judgment there is a disagreement, and the halakha is according to the words of the Sages. [And this is the view of Rabbi Yohanan and Rava.]

Another version:

Rav Ashi said: This

question

Rav Nahman bar Rav Hasda sent

to Rav Nahman bar Yaakov.

Is it

concerning “I will give you”

that there is a disagreement [as Rabbi Yohanan holds,]

or concerning “It is forgiven to you” that there is a disagreement [as Shmuel holds]?

as Shmuel holds?

And

they further asked:

According to whose words is the halakha,

according to Rabbi Meir or according to the Sages?

He sent him

Rav Nahman bar Yaakov to Rav Nahman bar Rav Hasda:

Concerning “I will give you” there is a disagreement, and the halakha is according to the words of the Sages.

In

the academy of

Sura they taught thus

these two versions.

But

in

the academy of

Pumbedita they taught thus

in this version:

Rabbi Hanina bar Shelamya said: They sent to him from the academy of Rav

the students of Rav, a messenger

to Shmuel

to ask him:

Let our master teach us!

It is clear to us that

before the completion of the judgment

he can retract,

and

our question is: if

they acquired from him

—that he performed an act of acquisition at the outset, when he said, “My father is trusted by me,” or when he said, “Swear to me by your life”—

what

is the law? Can he retract from his acquisition, since the judgment has not yet been issued or since he has not yet sworn?

Shmuel sent to them

the students of Rav:

There is nothing after an acquisition,

and the acquisition obligates him, and he cannot retract.

Mishna:

After we learned the law concerning a relative or an invalid person, the Mishna comes to explain who are invalid to judge and to testify, and in the following Mishna who are the relatives will be explained.

The Torah wrote (Exodus 23): “Do not place your hand with a wicked person to be a witness of violence”; its meaning is: “Do not appoint a wicked person as a witness .”

A wicked person because of violence, that is, a robber, is invalid for testimony by Torah law; but the Sages invalidated for testimony also one who takes his fellow’s money dishonestly—in the manner of a robber.

Our Mishna explains several examples of those invalid for testimony .

We learned in a Mishna in Tractate Niddah (49b): “Everyone who is fit to judge is fit to testify, and there are those who are fit to testify but are not fit to judge.” That is, all those who are invalid to testify are certainly invalid to judge.

And these are the invalid persons

to judge and to testify.

One who plays with dice

pieces of bone with which they play for a stake (Rashi, Rosh Hashana). They stipulate conditions between them: “If I defeat you, give me such and such, and if you defeat me, I will give you such and such” (Rabbeinu Hananel). The reason that he is invalid, as well as the reason why he is not an actual robber, will be explained in the Gemara.

And one who lends with interest.

And pigeon-flyers

will be explained in the Gemara.

And dealers

in produce

of the Sabbatical year,

and they violate what the Torah wrote (Leviticus 25): “And the Sabbath of the land shall be yours for food,” and we interpret: “For food, and not for commerce.”

And since they violate a Torah prohibition because of desire for money, they are like a wicked person because of violence, and are invalid to judge and to testify. And they are suspected of giving false testimony because of a bribe (Rashi, Rosh Hashana ).

Rabbi Shimon said: At first they used to call them gatherers of produce of the Sabbatical year; when the extortionists increased, they went back to calling them dealers in produce of the Sabbatical year.

This will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Judah said: When

are they invalid?

When they have no occupation

from which they earn their livelihood,

other than it,

playing dice and the like. Since they are not occupied with the settlement of the world, they are not proficient in the nature of laws and business dealings, and they are not fearful of sin. [Rashi, Eruvin: Since they do not recognize and understand the toil and suffering of people, they do not take care not to cause their fellow people to lose money.]

But

if

they have an occupation other than it,

they are

fit .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

One who plays with dice.

And the Gemara clarifies:

What is he doing!?

What evil act has he committed on account of which he is disqualified?

And Rami bar Hama answers: because it is “asmakhta.”

Introduction to the law of asmakhta.

We learned in the Mishna (Bava Batra 168a): If a borrower repaid the lender part of his debt, and because of the trouble of writing a receipt for the money that he repaid, the lender and the borrower gave the document to a third party, and the borrower said to him: “If I do not repay the remainder of the debt within thirty days, return the document to the lender,” and thirty days passed,

Rabbi Yosei says: the third party shall give the document to the lender; Rabbi Judah says: he shall not give it.

That is to say, the borrower relied in his heart upon being able to fulfill his condition, and his promise was made on the basis of uncertainty; he did not resolve in his mind that the third party would indeed give it. Therefore, Rabbi Judah holds that asmakhta lo kanya, “[an asmakhta] does not acquire.” And Rabbi Yosei holds that asmakhta kanya, “[an asmakhta] acquires.”

The halakha was decided: asmakhta lo kanya.

Rami bar Hama said: because it was

the one who plays with dice

an asmakhta,

at the outset relied upon something nonexistent, for he mistakenly thought that he would be able to defeat him; and when he lost, he does not give the money knowingly [of his own will].

And

the law is

that an asmakhta does not acquire,

it follows that the winner received money dishonestly, and it is in his possession like robbery.

This is the view of Rami bar Hama, whereas Rav Sheshet holds that it is not an asmakhta,

for an asmakhta applies only in a case in which he errs and thinks that he will be able to do it, such as the borrower who thought that he would be able to repay it; and if he had known that he could not repay it, he would not have undertaken the obligation, and his undertaking was not made with full resolve. But one who plays with dice knew at the outset that there was a possibility that he would lose, just as there was a possibility of winning, and nevertheless he plays. Therefore, we say that he transfers ownership with a whole heart, and the one who profits received the money honestly.

Rav Sheshet said: In any such case, it is not an asmakhta.

Rather,

what is the reason that one who plays with dice is disqualified? —

Because they do not engage in the settlement of the world.

And the Gemara clarifies:

What difference is there between them,

what is the practical difference between Rami bar Hama and Rav Sheshet?

There is a difference between them

in the following case:

when he has completed another profession,

that he earns his livelihood through another profession and indeed engages in the settlement of the world, but plays during his leisure time. According to Rav Sheshet, he is not disqualified, whereas according to Rami bar Hama, he still has the status of something like a robber, and he is disqualified.

As we learned,

we learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Judah said: When

are those who play with dice disqualified?

When they have no profession

other than it.

But

if

they have another profession other than it—

they are fit. Thus

it is clear that

the reason of the Mishna

for which they are disqualified

is because

they do not engage in the

settlement of the world—

it is.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

This proof

is difficult for Rami bar Hama,

for the words of Rabbi Judah prove that the reason for the disqualification is the settlement of the world, and not because “an asmakhta does not acquire.”

And if you would say

and if you would answer that Rami bar Hama holds that

the Sages disagree with Rabbi Judah,

that although Rabbi Judah holds this, nevertheless the first tanna disagrees with him and holds that he has the status of something like a robber, and Rami bar Hama interpreted the words of the first tanna—

That is not so, for

and

behold,

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: Wherever Rabbi Judah said: