Sanhedrin 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

And his words were found to be correct

with regard to disqualified witnesses, while the judges were fit,

as his words concerning the disqualification of the judges had not been proven. And Rabbi Meir maintains that

through the principle of migo

since

he disqualified the witnesses

and his claim concerning the witnesses was accepted, we should also believe his claim concerning the judges,

and disqualify the judges as well.

And this is the interpretation: “This one disqualifies the other’s judge.” The Gemara’s question, “Does he have the power to disqualify judges?” is therefore not difficult, since he did in fact disqualify the witnesses, and he is consequently believed. And the Sages say: When is this so? When he brings proof through witnesses that the judges are related to one another or disqualified. But if they were fit or experts, and he wants to disqualify them through the reasoning of migo, he cannot disqualify them.

The latter clause, “This one disqualifies the other’s witnesses,” speaks of one who claims that the judges and the witnesses are disqualified, and his words were found to be

true

with regard to the judges,

as they were indeed

disqualified, and

his claim concerning the

witnesses

was not proven, and they were

fit.

Therefore Rabbi Meir maintains

that since he disqualified the judges, he can also disqualify the witnesses.

But the Sages disagree, as stated above.

Rava raised an objection

to Rabin’s interpretation:

Granted,

what Rabbi Meir maintains,

that since he disqualified the witnesses, he can also disqualify the judges,

can be understood: The debtor’s claim is a valid one, and he is not an interested party in the testimony, because even if these judges are disqualified,

there is another court

before which the creditor can sue him.

But regarding what Rabbi Meir maintains,

that since he disqualified the judges, he can also disqualify the witnesses,

why should we believe him? He is surely an interested party in his testimony, since he wants to disqualify the witnesses,

and witnesses

other

than these no longer exist;

the creditor has no other witnesses. Why, then, should we believe him?

And the Gemara answers:

No, it is necessary—

the case is not one in which he has no other group of witnesses. Rather, we must say that the case is one in which

there is

another group

of witnesses,

and consequently he is not an interested party in the testimony.

The Gemara asks:

But

if

there is no other group of witnesses

and he wants them to believe him on the basis of his own statement, would you indeed say that

he likewise cannot disqualify them

because he is an interested party in the testimony? If so,

this is the same as Rav Dimi’s opinion:

it is precisely Rav Dimi’s interpretation, who said that the dispute concerns two groups of witnesses, as explained above. What, then, has Rabin taught us?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, the case involves two groups of witnesses, and nevertheless

there is a difference between them.

The difference between Rav Dimi and Rabin concerns the law of

migo. One

—Rabin—

maintains that we apply migo, while the other

—Rav Dimi—

maintains that we do not apply migo. [See the note.]

The Gemara returns to the beginning of the sugya.

Concerning the matter itself,

we learned above:

Reish Lakish said:

Would Rabbi Meir, who is

a holy mouth, say such a thing,

that one litigant can disqualify the witnesses of the other litigant?! Rather,

teach

the Mishna in the singular,

“his witness,”

as explained above.

The Gemara asks:

Is that so?!

But this is not so.

But Ulla said: One who sees Reish Lakish in the study hall

sees him

as though he uproots mountains and grinds them against one another,

leaving nothing difficult that could obstruct the grinding—in other words, he was exceedingly sharp. How, then, did he refer to Rabbi Meir, in a display of humility, as “a holy mouth”? That is, the Gemara thought that a sharp person is not humble.

Therefore the Gemara answers: Even according to your statement, so what if Reish Lakish was sharp? Rabbi Meir was sharper still. That is why he referred to him as “a holy mouth.”

Ravina said:

What is the difficulty?

For anyone who sees

Rabbi Meir in the study hall

would see him

as though he uproots “mountains upon mountains” and grinds them against one another. Therefore, despite Reish Lakish’s great sharpness, he referred to Rabbi Meir as “a holy mouth.”

.

The Gemara explains that they did not intend to ask how Reish Lakish could refer to Rabbi Meir as “a holy mouth.”

Rather,

this is what he is saying:

The questioner was expressing his amazement at the great affection that Torah scholars have for their teachers, and he expressed this amazement in the form of a question:

Come and see how much they cherish one another,

for Reish Lakish, who uprooted mountains and ground them together, nevertheless, with all his sharpness, exerted himself to uphold and establish Rabbi Meir’s words—and even called him “a holy mouth.”

The Gemara relates a story demonstrating the affection Torah scholars have for one another.

As in this incident:

As it happened,

Rabbi

was sitting,

Rabbi,

our holy master,

and said: It is prohibited to insulate cold items

on Shabbat: cold water that one wishes to place in sand in order to preserve its chill. The reason is that people might come to permit insulating a hot item in order to preserve its heat, which is prohibited under the prohibition against insulating food.

He said to him,

to Rabbi,

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: My father

Rabbi Yosei

permitted insulating cold items,

and did not prohibit it out of concern that people might come to insulate a hot item.

He said to him,

Rabbi said to Rabbi Yishmael:

An elder has already issued a ruling!

He is a great sage—namely, Rabbi Yosei—and I accept his ruling!

Concerning this story,

Rav Pappa said: Come and see how much they cherish one another! For while

Rabbi Yosei was

still alive

in this world,

he would sit bent before Rabbi

like a student before his teacher.

And from where do we know this?

For Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei,

was the successor to his fathers

and was as distinguished as his father,

yet he would sit bent before Rabbi

out of respect for Rabbi’s position as Nasi, and he would not issue rulings in his presence, even though he was greater than Rabbi.

Nevertheless, Rabbi accorded honor to Rabbi Yosei and cherished his words,

saying, “An elder has already issued a ruling.”

The Gemara expounds verses concerning the difference between the scholars of Eretz Yisrael and those of Babylonia regarding the affection Torah scholars have for one another.

Rabbi Oshaya said: What

is the exposition of the verse

that is written,

in which the prophet Zechariah, in his prophecy concerning the Babylonian exile, says:

“And I took for myself two staffs; one I called Noam, and the other I called Hovlim.”

And we expound:

“Noam”—

these are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who make things pleasant for one another

when they debate

halakha,

as they examine matters together, each correcting the other’s words, and the teaching emerges clarified. Whereas

“Hovlim”—these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who wound

one another by asking questions in a harsh and angry manner

to one another

in halakha.

It is further written in Zechariah’s prophecy: “I saw, and behold, a golden menorah entirely... and two olive trees beside it... What are these two olive trees... These are the two sons of oil who stand...”

The Gemara expounds the allusion contained in the oil and the olive.

“And he said: These are the two sons of oil who stand, and so on, and the two olive trees beside it.”

And we expound:

“Oil”—

Rabbi Yitzhak said: These are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are accommodating [

According to the reading of the Bach:

who make one another oily

like oil]

to one another in halakha, like olive oil.

And what is written,

“the two olive trees beside it”—

these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who are bitter to one another in halakha, like an olive.”

It is further written in Zechariah’s prophecy:

“And I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold, two women going forth, with the wind in their wings, and they had wings like the wings of a stork, and they lifted

and carried

the ephah between the earth and the heavens. And I said to the angel speaking with me: Where are they taking the ephah? And he said to me: To build a house for it in the land of Shinar.”

“Ephah” is the evil inclination, as the previous verse states: “And he said: This is the wickedness, and he cast it into the ephah.”

Who are the two women carrying the ephah and taking it to build a house in Shinar, which is Babylonia?

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: This is

the trait of

flattery [

alluded to by “the wings of the stork”—for they present themselves as pious]

and arrogance [

alluded to by “the wind in their wings”]

that descended to Babylonia.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But

if

arrogance descended to Babylonia,

did it descend there? Surely it descended to Elam.

But the Master said: Ten measures of arrogance

of spirit

descended upon the world; Elam took nine, and the entire rest of the world took one.

The Gemara answers:

Yes,

indeed,

it descended to Babylonia

and descended to Babylonia, but

it extended itself and was extended,

changing its course and reaching

Elam.

This is also precise,

as is precise in the wording of the verse,

for it is written: “To build a house for it in the land of Shinar”,

in the singular; it does not say, “To build a house for them.” Thus, only one of them—flattery—descended and reached Babylonia, whereas arrogance went to Elam.

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

conclude from this.

The Gemara asks: Did arrogance not descend to Babylonia?

But the Master said,

as was taught in a beraita:

A sign of arrogance is

poverty, and poverty descended to Babylonia

and descended to Babylonia.

The Gemara answers: Poverty in monetary matters descended to Babylonia, whereas poverty in Torah descended to Elam. And when we learned that poverty is a sign of arrogance, the reference is to poverty in Torah. As a result of arrogance, the students do not serve their teachers as fully as they should and do not review their studies; therefore, Torah does not settle properly upon them.

As it is written

“We have a little sister, and she has no breasts.”

And “breasts” is expounded as referring to the fact that the scholars do not merit nursing—that is, teaching—therefore

Rabbi Yohanan said: This is Elam, which merited learning

for Daniel was there

, but did not merit teaching .

But Ezra the Scribe was in Babylonia, and he learned statute and judgment in Israel, as it is written in the Book of Ezra: “For he had prepared his heart to seek the Torah of the Lord, and to do it, and to teach in Israel statute and judgment.”

The Gemara expounds the allusion contained in the name “Babylonia.”

What is “Babylonia”?

Rabbi Yohanan said,

it is an expression of mixture, for it is a place where Torah is

mixed with Scripture, mixed with Mishna, and mixed with Talmud.

The prophet laments Israel’s exile in Babylonia:

“He has made me dwell in dark places, like those who have been dead forever.” Rabbi Yirmeya said: This is the Talmud of Babylonia,

for its scholars are not accommodating to one another, and their learning remains uncertain to them.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues discussing the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerning one who accepted upon himself a judge who is unfit to serve as a judge, whether he can retract.

He said to him

one litigant to the other:

“My

father is trusted by me,”

or he said to him:

“Your father is trusted by me,”

or he said to him:

“Three cattle herders are trusted by me

to judge between us,” [ as all of these are disqualified from serving as judges], and now he wants to retract and litigate before a qualified judge.

The tanna’im disagree about this.

Rabbi Meir says: He may retract.

Because these are merely words, without an act of acquisition.

And the Sages say: He may not retract.

And likewise, if

one litigant

was

obligated to the other litigant

to take an

oath, and he said to him

“Instead of a formal oath,

swear to me by the life of your head,

and you will prevail in the case,” and now the opposing litigant wishes to retract and obligate him to take a formal oath.

The tanna’im disagree about this.

Rabbi Meir says: He may retract. And the Sages say: He may not retract.

Gemara:

Rav Dimi, son of Rav Naḥman, son of Rav

Yosef

said: What we learned in the Mishna, that Rabbi Meir maintains that if one accepted “my father and your father” as judges he may retract, is speaking

of a case where he accepted him,

that is, “my father and your father,”

as one,

as one of the three judges. The novelty is that although two other qualified judges are sitting with him, Rabbi Meir nevertheless maintains that he may retract.

The Gemara discusses whether the disagreement concerns a case of “I waive it” or a case of “I will give it.”

That is, who is the one who says, “My father is trusted by me”: Does the claimant say this to the defendant, that if the disqualified judge finds you entitled, I will waive my claim against you?

Or does the defendant say to the claimant that if the disqualified judge finds you entitled, I will give you the amount of your claim?

The rationale for distinguishing between “I waive it” and “I will give it” is as follows: Granted, in the case of “I waive it,” the disqualified judge has the power to decide, since there is no need to extract money from the defendant and transfer it to the claimant; the defendant’s victory consists in retaining what is already in his possession. That is not so in the case of “I will give it”: If the claimant prevails, the claimant will have to extract money from the defendant. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the claimant does not have the power to extract money on the basis of the ruling of a disqualified judge, but only on the basis of qualified judges.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The disagreement

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages is

in a case of “I waive it to you,” but in a case of “I will give it to you”—

everyone

agrees; the Sages agree with Rabbi Meir that he

may retract.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The disagreement is in a case of “I will give it to you.”

The Gemara explains Rabbi Yoḥanan’s position.

It was raised as a dilemma

by the scholars of the study hall: Is Rabbi Yoḥanan’s intention

that the disagreement is in a case of “I will give it to you”

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages,

but in a case of “I waive it to you”—

does Rabbi Yoḥanan maintain—

everyone

agrees, with Rabbi Meir conceding to the Sages that he

may not retract? [

And according to this possibility, Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with Shmuel in every respect: In a case of “I waive it,” Shmuel maintains that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree, whereas according to Rabbi Yoḥanan everyone maintains that he may not retract. And in a case of “I will give it,” Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree, whereas according to Shmuel everyone maintains that he may retract.]

Or perhaps

Rabbi Yoḥanan may maintain

both in this case

of “I waive it”

and in that case

of “I will give it,”

there is a disagreement

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages. [And according to this possibility, Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with Shmuel only with regard to “I will give it”: According to Shmuel, everyone maintains that he may retract, whereas according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree.]

The Gemara seeks to resolve the dilemma from a statement of Rava.

Come

and

hear: For Rava said: The disagreement is in a case of “I will give it to you,” but in a case of “I waive it to you”—

all

agree—

he may not retract.

If you say

that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains:

“In a case of ‘I will give it to you’ there is a disagreement, but in a case of ‘I waive it to you’”

everyone—

he may not retract—

that is understandable, for

Rava said in accordance with

the view

of Rabbi Yoḥanan. But if you say

that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains:

“Both in this case and in that case there is a disagreement,”

it is difficult:

Rava,

[who was an amora several generations after Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan,]

said in accordance with

the view

of whom

—not in accordance with Shmuel and not in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan?

The Gemara rejects the proposed resolution of the dilemma.

Rava

does not hold in accordance with either Shmuel or Rabbi Yoḥanan; rather,

he is stating

an independent rationale

of his own. [There are therefore three views regarding the framing of the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.] Rav Aḥa comes to prove to Rava that Rabbi Meir and the Sages indeed disagree in a case of “I waive it.”

Rav Aḥa bar Taḥlifa

Rav Aḥa bar Taḥlifa raised an objection

to Rava: We learned in our Mishna: If one was obligated to his fellow to take an oath

a formal one,

and he said to him: “Swear to me by the life of your life,”

and now he wishes to retract,

Rabbi Meir says: He may retract, and the Sages say:

he may not

retract.