Sanhedrin 24a — the Talmud in English

and his words were found correct

with regard to invalid witnesses, but the judges were fit,

for his words concerning the invalidity of the judges were not proven. And Rabbi Meir holds:

migo

from the fact that

he invalidated witnesses

—since his words concerning the witnesses were accepted, let us believe him also concerning his words about the judges—

he likewise invalidates the judges.

And this is the explanation: “This one invalidates the judge of that one.” And what the Gemara asked, “Is it entirely within his power to invalidate judges?” is not difficult, since indeed he invalidated the witnesses, and he has credibility. And the Sages say: When is this so? When he brings proof through witnesses that the judges are relatives or invalid. But if they were fit or experts, and he wants to invalidate them by the reasoning of migo, he cannot invalidate them.

The latter clause:

“This one invalidates that one’s witnesses” is speaking of one who claims invalidity concerning both the judges and the witnesses, and his words were found

with regard to the judges

to be true; therefore they are

invalid, but

his words concerning the

witnesses

were not proven, and they are

fit.

Therefore Rabbi Meir holds:

Since he invalidates the judges, he likewise invalidates the witnesses.

But the Sages disagree, as above.

Rava raised an objection

against Rabin’s interpretation:

Granted

what Rabbi Meir holds,

since he invalidates the witnesses, he likewise invalidates the judges:

it is possible to understand that the borrower’s claim is a valid one, and it is not the claim of an interested party in testimony, because even if these judges are invalidated,

there is another court

where he can sue him.

But what Rabbi Meir holds,

since he invalidates the judges, he likewise invalidates the witnesses—why should we believe him? Is he not an interested party in his testimony, since he wants to invalidate the witnesses,

and

as for the witnesses

other

there are no more?

The lender has no [other witnesses], so why should we believe him?

And the Gemara answers:

It is not necessary

to speak of a case in which he has no other group; rather, it is necessary to say that the case is

where there is

one that he has,

another group,

and consequently he is not an interested party in the testimony.

And the Gemara asks:

But

if

there is no other group

and he wants them to believe him on the basis of his own word, would you also say

that he likewise cannot invalidate them,

on the grounds that he is an interested party in the testimony? If so, it is difficult:

This is Rab Dimi’s [interpretation]—

it is exactly Rab Dimi’s interpretation, who said that the dispute is in the case of two groups of witnesses, [as explained above]. What novelty has Rabin taught us?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, the case is one in which there are two groups of witnesses, and nevertheless

there is a difference between them.

There is a difference between Rab Dimi and Rabin concerning the law of

a migo. For one master—

Rabin—

holds that we say migo, while the other master—

Rab Dimi—

holds that we do not say migo. [See the note.]

The Gemara returns to the beginning of the sugya.

As for the main matter,

we learned above:

Reish Lakish said:

Would Rabbi Meir, who is

a holy mouth, say this—

that one litigant can invalidate the other litigant’s witnesses?! Rather,

teach

it in the singular,

“his witness,”

as explained above.

And the Gemara asks:

Is that so?!

But it is not so.

For Ulla said: One who sees Reish Lakish in the beit-midrash

—he appears to him

as though he uproots mountains and grinds them against one another

and leaves no difficulty that could obstruct the grinding; that is, he was exceedingly sharp. How, then, did he call Rabbi Meir, by way of humility, “a holy mouth”? The Gemara’s assumption was that a sharp person is not humble.

Therefore the Gemara answers: Even according to your words, so what if Reish Lakish was sharp? Rabbi Meir was sharper. Therefore he called him “a holy mouth.”

Ravina said:

What is the difficulty?

For everyone who sees

Rabbi Meir in the beit-midrash

would see him

as though he uproots “mountains of mountains” and grinds them against one another; therefore Reish Lakish, despite the greatness of his sharpness, called Rabbi Meir “a holy mouth.”

.

And the Gemara explains that they did not intend to ask how Reish Lakish called Rabbi Meir “a holy mouth.”

Rather,

this is what he is saying:

the one asking was expressing wonder at the great affection of Torah scholars for their teachers, and he stated words of wonder in the form of a question:

Come and see how much they cherish one another,

for Reish Lakish, who uprooted mountains and ground them, nevertheless, with all his sharpness, endeavored to establish and uphold Rabbi Meir’s words, and furthermore called him “a holy mouth.”

And the Gemara tells a story about the affection of Torah scholars for one another.

As in this

example,

Rabbi

was sitting,

Rabbi—

our holy master—

and said: It is forbidden to insulate cold things

on Shabbat: cold water that one wants to insulate in sand in order to preserve its coldness. The reason is lest they come to permit insulating a hot thing in order to preserve its heat, which is forbidden because of the prohibition of insulating.

He said before him

—before Rabbi—

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: Father

—Rabbi Yosei—

permitted insulating cold things,

and he does not prohibit it on the grounds that they might come to insulate a hot thing.

He said to him

—Rabbi to Rabbi Yishmael—:

An elder has already ruled!

He is a great scholar, namely Rabbi Yosei, and I accept his ruling!

And concerning this story

Rav Pappa said: Come and see how much they cherish one another! For when

Rabbi Yosei was

Rabbi Yosei was alive

in this world,

, he would sit bent before Rabbi

like a student before a teacher.

And from where do we know this?

For Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei—

was the equal of his fathers

in importance,

and he would sit bent before Rabbi

because of the honor of his office as Nasi, and he would not issue rulings before him, despite being greater than him.

Nevertheless, Rabbi accorded honor to Rabbi Yosei and cherished his words,

and said: “An elder has already ruled.”

The Gemara expounds verses concerning the difference between the people of the Land of Israel and the people of Babylonia, regarding the affection of Torah scholars for one another.

Rabbi Oshaya said: What is

the exposition of the verse

as it is written,

that the prophet Zechariah, in his prophecy concerning the Babylonian exile, says:

“And I took for myself two staffs; one I called Noam, and one I called Chovlim.”

And we expound:

Noam—

these are the Torah scholars in the Land of Israel, who make things pleasant for one another

when they debate

halakha,

for they examine matters together, and each one corrects the words of the other, and the teaching emerges clarified. But

Chovlim—these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who wound

one another by asking questions in harsh and angry language

to one another

in halakha.

It is further written in Zechariah’s prophecy: “I saw, and behold, a golden menorah, entirely... and two olive trees beside it... What are these two olive trees?... These are the two sons of oil who stand...”

The Gemara expounds the allusion in oil and in the olive.

“And he said: These are the two sons of oil who stand, and so forth, and two olive trees beside it.”

And we expound:

“Oil”—

Rabbi Yitzchak said: These are the Torah scholars in the Land of Israel, who are easy [A0158]]

According to the reading of the Bach:

who make smooth

easy like oil

to one another in halakha, like olive oil.

And what is written,

“two olive trees beside it”—

these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who are bitter to one another in halakha, like an olive.”

It is further written in Zechariah’s prophecy:

“And I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold, two women were going out, and the wind was in their wings, and they had wings like the wings of the stork, and they lifted

and they carried

the ephah between the earth and between the heavens. And I said to the angel who spoke with me: Where are they taking the ephah? And he said to me: To build a house for it in the land of Shinar.”

“Ephah” is the evil inclination, for in the preceding verse it is written: “And he said: This is the wickedness, and he cast it into the ephah.”

Who are the two women carrying the ephah and taking it to build a house in Shinar, which is the land of Babylonia?

Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: This is

the trait of

flattery [A0174]]alluded to by “the wings of the stork”—that they present themselves as pious

alluded to by “the wings of a stork,” since they present themselves as pious]

and haughtiness of spirit

alluded to by “the wind in their wings”

which descended to Babylonia.

And the Gemara asks:

And

if

haughtiness of spirit descended to Babylonia,

did it descend? Surely it descended to Elam.

For the Master said: Ten measures of haughtiness

of spirit

descended into the world; Elam took nine, and the entire rest of the world one.

And the Gemara answers:

Yes,

indeed,

it descended to Babylonia;

it descended to Babylonia, but

it stretched itself out and was stretched out,

it changed its course and reached

Elam.

It is precise as well,

and this is also precise in the language of the verse,

for it is written: “to build for it a house in the land of Shinar”,

in the singular, and it is not written, “to build for them a house.” Thus, only one of them—flattery—descended and reached Babylonia, whereas haughtiness of spirit went to Elam.

And the Gemara’s conclusion is: Indeed,

learn from it.

And the Gemara asks: Did haughtiness of spirit not descend to Babylonia?

For the Master said,

as they said in a beraita:

A sign of haughtiness of spirit

is poverty, and poverty descended to Babylonia;

it descended to Babylonia.

And the Gemara answers: In Babylonia, poverty in wealth descended, whereas in Elam, poverty in Torah descended. And what we learned—that poverty is a sign of haughtiness of spirit—refers to poverty in Torah. For because of haughtiness of spirit, the students do not serve their teachers as fully as they should and do not review their learning; therefore the Torah does not settle easily upon them.

As it is written:

“We have a little sister, and she has no breasts.”

And “breasts” is expounded to mean that the scholars do not merit to nurse, that is, to teach. Therefore

Rabbi Yochanan said: This is Elam, which merited to learn

for Daniel was there,

, but did not merit to teach.

But Ezra the Scribe was in Babylonia, and he learned statute and judgment in Israel, as it is written in the Book of Ezra: “For he had prepared his heart to seek the Torah of the Lord, and to do it, and to teach in Israel statute and judgment.”

The Gemara expounds the allusion in the name “Babylonia.”

What is Babylonia?

Rabbi Yochanan said:

It is an expression of mixing, for it is a place of Torah

mixed with Scripture, mixed with Mishna, mixed with Talmud.

The prophet laments Israel’s exile in Babylonia:

“He made me sit in darkness, like those eternally dead.” Rabbi Yirmeya said: This is the Talmud of Babylonia,

for they are not easy with one another, and their learning is uncertain in their hands.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues discussing the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerning one who accepted upon himself a judge who is unfit to be a judge, whether he can retract.

He said to him

one litigant to the other:

“My father is trusted by me,”

,

or he said to him:

“Your father is trusted by me,”

or he said to him:

“Three cattle herders are trusted by me

to judge between us” [ for all of these are invalid to be judges ], and now he wants to retract and litigate before a fit judge.

The Tannaim disagreed about this.

Rabbi Meir says: He can retract.

Because these are merely words, without an act of acquisition.

And the Sages say: He cannot retract.

And likewise, if

was

one litigant

liable to his fellow

the other litigant

for an oath, and said to him: “

Instead of a complete oath,

swear to me by the life of your head,

and you will prevail in the judgment,” and now the opposing litigant wants to retract and obligate him to take a complete oath.

The Tannaim disagreed about this.

Rabbi Meir says: He can retract. And the Sages say: He cannot retract.

Gemara:

Rav Dimi, son of Rav Nahman, son of Rav

Yosef:

What we learned in the Mishna, that Rabbi Meir holds that if he accepted “my father and your father” he can retract, is speaking

for example, when he accepted him,

“my father and your father,”

as one,

as one of the three judges. And the novelty is that although there are two other fit judges with him, nevertheless Rabbi Meir holds that he can retract.

The Gemara discusses whether the disagreement is regarding “I waive it,” or regarding “I will give.”

That is, who is the one who says, “My father is trustworthy to me”: does the claimant say this to the defendant, that if the disqualified judge finds you meritorious, I will waive my claim against you?

Or even if the defendant says to the claimant that if the disqualified judge finds you meritorious, I will give you your claim.

And the reasoning for distinguishing between “I waive it” and “I will give” is this: Granted, with “I waive it,” the disqualified judge indeed has the power, since there is no need to take money out of the defendant and give it to the claimant, and the defendant’s prevailing consists in what remains with him. This is not so with “I will give,” for if the claimant prevails, the claimant will have to take money out of the defendant. Thus, there is reason to say that the claimant does not have the power to take money based on a disqualified judge, but only based on fit judges.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The disagreement

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages is

with “I waive it for you,” but with “I will give you”—

everyone

agrees, the Sages agree with Rabbi Meir, that he

can retract.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: With “I will give you” there is a disagreement.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Yohanan’s opinion.

It was raised before them

the members of the study hall were uncertain. Is Rabbi Yohanan’s intent:

with “I will give you” there is a disagreement

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages,

but with “I waive it for you”—

holds Rabbi Yohanan—

everyone

Rabbi Meir agrees with the Sages that he

cannot retract? [

And according to this possibility, Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with Shmuel from one extreme to the other: with “I waive it,” Shmuel holds that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree, whereas according to Rabbi Yohanan everyone holds that he cannot retract. And with “I will give,” Rabbi Yohanan holds that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree, whereas according to Shmuel everyone holds that he can retract.]

Or perhaps

it is possible that Rabbi Yohanan holds:

both with this “

waive it”

and with this “

I will give,”

there is a disagreement

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages. [And according to this possibility, Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with Shmuel only regarding “I will give”: according to Shmuel, everyone holds that he can retract, while according to Rabbi Yohanan, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree.]

The Gemara wishes to resolve the ibaya from the words of Rava.

Come

and came

and hear: for Rava said: The disagreement is with “I will give you,” but with “I waive it for you”—

the words of

all

he cannot retract.

Granted, if you say

that Rabbi Yohanan holds:

with “I will give you” there is a disagreement, but with “I waive it for you”—

the words of

all, he cannot retract,

it is understandable, for

Rava said li

ke

Rabbi Yohanan. But if you say

that Rabbi Yohanan holds:

both with this and with this there is a disagreement,

it is difficult:

Rava [

who was an amora several generations after Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan]

said li

ke

whom,

not like Shmuel and not like Rabbi Yohanan?

And the Gemara rejects the resolution of the ibaya.

Rava

does not hold like Shmuel or like Rabbi Yohanan; rather,

the reasoning of himself

his own reasoning

he stated. [

And we have three opinions in establishing the disagreement of Rabbi Meir and the Sages.] Rav Aha bar Tachlifa came to prove to Rava that Rabbi Meir and the Sages indeed disagree regarding “I waive it.”

Rav Aha bar Tachlifa raised an objection to

Rava: We learned in our Mishna: One was liable to his fellow for a complete oath

and

and said to him: “Swear to me by the life, by the life of your head,”

and now he wants to retract,

Rabbi Meir says: He can retract, and the Sages say:

he cannot

retract.