Sanhedrin 25a — the Talmud in English

In the wording

“When”

and

in the wording

“In what”

the matter is stated,

he is not

coming to disagree with the Sages [mentioned in the first clause]

but

is coming

to explain the words of the Sages, and the Sages do not disagree with him.

and the Sages do not dispute him.

Rabbi Yohanan said: In the place where Rabbi Yehuda says

Where Rabbi Yehuda says

“When,”

he is coming

to explain, and

in the place where he said

“In what

the matter is stated,” he is coming

to disagree

with the Sages [mentioned in the first clause].

And

in any event,

everyone

all the amoraim hold that when Rabbi Yehuda says

“When,”

he is coming to explain, and here, in our Mishna, since he said “When,” the Sages do not disagree with him; and this is difficult for Rami bar Hama, who holds that according to the Sages, one who plays dice is disqualified on account of robbery?

and here, in our Mishna, when he said “When,” the Sages do not dispute him. This is difficult for Rami bar Hama, who holds that according to the Sages, one who plays dice is disqualified as a robber?

And the Gemara answers:

Is it from the method of

one person,

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi and Rabbi Yohanan,

against one person,

Rami bar Hama,

that you raise a contradiction,

that you ask a contradiction?

For it is possible to say that

the master,

Rami bar Hama,

held: they disagree,

the Sages disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, and according to the Sages, one who plays dice is disqualified on account of robbery.

And

if

the master,

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi and Rabbi Yohanan,

held

they hold

they do not disagree,

the Sages do not disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, and they hold that one who plays dice is disqualified because he is not occupied with the settlement of the world, and not on account of robbery, because it is not in the category of an asmakhta.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And

even if

they do not disagree

the Sages with Rabbi Yehuda!?

And

yet

it was taught

that we learned a beraita in which the Sages disqualify one who plays dice on account of robbery.

For it was taught:

Whether he has

an occupation other than playing dice

or whether he has no occupation except it—

“he is disqualified.”

And this is difficult for Rav Sheshet.

And Rav Sheshet answers: In our Mishna they did not disagree. And if the beraita taught this opinion, it is not the opinion of the Sages, but that beraita

is Rabbi Yehuda

himself

in the name of Rabbi Tarfon.

For according to Rabbi Tarfon, it is an asmakhta.

That is to say, from Rabbi Tarfon’s words concerning the laws of naziriteship, Rabbi Yehuda learned that the same law applies concerning playing dice.

For it was taught: There we learned: Two people are sitting, and one person passes beside them. One of those sitting says: “So-and-so, the passerby, is a nazirite.” And the other says: “He is not a nazirite.” One says: “I hereby accept naziriteship upon myself if he is like him, who is a nazirite.” And the other says: “I hereby accept naziriteship upon myself if he is like him, who is not a nazirite.” And it turns out that he is a nazirite like one of them, or it turns out that he is not a nazirite; and concerning this case we learned—

Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: Neither of them is ever a nazirite, because naziriteship is not conferred

through acceptance based on uncertainty,

but through clear declaration,

when he accepted it upon himself with clear words [from the wording of the verse: “When a man clearly declares”—whose translation is “he explains”]; but now, when he accepted it upon himself conditionally and uncertainly, it is not an acceptance.

It follows that Rabbi Tarfon holds that if he made his condition dependent upon something not in his control, and he does not know it with certainty, even though he knows that it is possible that it is not as he says, it is not an acceptance.

And likewise concerning playing dice, even though he knows that it is possible that he will lose, nevertheless he does not accept upon himself the losses, and he does not wholeheartedly transfer the money that he lost; consequently, according to Rabbi Tarfon, it is an asmakhta, and it does not acquire, and the money is in his possession in a manner resembling robbery.

But the authors of the Mishna hold—according to Rav Sheshet—that it is not an asmakhta, and he is disqualified because he is not occupied with the settlement of the world.

We learned in our Mishna: “And these are the disqualified ones”...

“And one who lends with interest.”

Rava said: One who borrows

money from his fellow

with interest—

is disqualified from testimony,

for the borrower also violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “You shall not make your brother take interest”; “make take interest” is in the causative form, meaning that he causes the lender to violate the prohibition . And since, on account of desire for money, he violates religion, he is like a robber for monetary gain .

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And

but

we learned

in our Mishna: “One who lends with interest,” and apparently this means that only the lender is disqualified? And the Gemara answers: The meaning of our Mishna is:

A loan

that is

coming with interest,

which includes all those who violate the prohibition, both the lender and the borrower .

And the Gemara relates an incident, and it will constitute an objection against Rava.

There was a certain man named

Bar Binitus; they testified against him

that they testified against him

two witnesses

to disqualify him from testimony.

One

witness

said: “Before me

he

lent

money

with interest.”

And one

the second witness

said: “

To me

personally

he lent

money

with interest.”

And Rava accepted their testimony and

Rava disqualified Bar Binitus

from being a fit witness.

And the Gemara raises an objection: Why did Rava disqualify him? For the second witness is not trustworthy for testimony, since he admits that he borrowed money with interest .

But Rava

himself

is the one who said: One who borrows with interest is disqualified from testimony, and he is

therefore

wicked. And the Torah said: “Do not place a wicked man as a witness”?

And the Gemara answers: Since the second witness himself admitted concerning himself that he is wicked, and others did not testify concerning him, he is not a disqualified witness. And why did he—

Rava according to his own position

according to his method,

for Rava said: A person

is

“a relative” with respect to himself,

and a relative is disqualified from testimony; therefore he cannot testify concerning himself, even to his own disadvantage,

and

it follows from this that

a person does not render himself wicked.

And this is the reason Rava accepted his testimony concerning Bar Binitus, but did not accept his testimony concerning himself.

From one matter to another, the Gemara relates another story.

That certain slaughterer

a slaughterer

who was found

to have been

that an animal with a tereifa defect came out from beneath his hand,

meaning that he sold non-kosher meat as presumed fit.

Rav Nahman disqualified him

6, and removed him

and removed him from his presumption of fitness.

He went

the slaughterer,

Rabbi Meziya and tore him

he grew his hair and fingernails and disfigured himself in the manner of penitents.

Rav Nahman considered restoring him to fitness

Rav Nahman wished to restore him to his presumption.

Rava said to him

to Rav Nahman: What reliability does he have,

perhaps

maybe

he is acting deceitfully.

He is acting deceitfully so that they will declare him fit?

Rather, what is his remedy

what is his remedy so that they should restore him?

As Rav Idi bar Avin. For Rav Idi bar Avin said: One suspected of selling tereifa meat—

has no remedy until he goes to a place where they do not know him,

where he will not act deceitfully,

and

when he finds a lost object

he returns a lost object

to its owner

with regard to an important item,

an expensive item, for since he returns a lost object, he demonstrates that he has repented of his desire for money

, or he brings a tereifa out from beneath his hand

with regard to an important item—

of his own.

That is, he causes himself to lose the tereifa, and thereby proves that he has repented .

We learned in our Mishna: “And these are the disqualified ones”...

“And those who release pigeons.”

The Gemara explains the meaning of those who release pigeons.

What is “those who release pigeons”?

Here

here [in Babylonia]

its interpretation

they explained it as a type of game in which one says to his fellow: “

If it precedes

it precedes

your pigeon to the pigeon

of mine to a certain place, I will give you such-and-such.” [And the Gemara will explain: “One who plays dice” was already taught.]

Rabbi Hama bar Oshaya said: Arai.

A person who is practiced in bringing pigeons from their place to the house of another owner, and he is not actually a robber, because these are ownerless pigeons nesting in people’s dovecotes, but the owners of the dovecotes have not acquired them; nevertheless, there is robbery on account of the ways of peace .

And the Gemara explains:

The one who says, “If your pigeon precedes my pigeon”—what is the reason that he did not say: “Arai”?

He can say to you: Arai

is not disqualified from testimony

because

he is not a robber, but

merely on account of the ways of peace .

And the one who says “Arai”—what is the reason that he did not say: “If your pigeon precedes my pigeon”?

He can say to you:

If your pigeon precedes my pigeon,

that is playing dice,

and it was already taught.

And the other one,

what will the one who says “If your pigeon precedes my pigeon” answer—why was it taught twice?

And he answers: There is a difference between them, and each one contains a novelty that the other does not contain.

The tannay taught

one who plays dice, who

makes it dependent upon his own judgment,

and

afterward

the tannay taught

those who release pigeons, who

make it dependent upon the judgment of their pigeon.

And it is necessary,

they needed to teach both.

For if it had taught one who makes it dependent upon his own judgment,

we would have thought

there

it is a kind of robber, because

he does not wholeheartedly transfer,

he does not transfer wholeheartedly,

for he says

in his heart, according to his mistake,

I know myself

I know myself

that I know more,

and there was no doubt in his heart; he plays in order to win, and when he loses, he does not transfer [the money] wholeheartedly,