Sanhedrin 15b — the Talmud in English

Say rather,

it is possible to say that

it comes to impose execution!

The Torah comes to obligate the owner of the ox that killed a person to die. And from where do we have grounds to remove the verse from its plain meaning?

Rava answered him:

If so,

if we say as you say, that the Torah obligates the owner of the ox to die,

let it write,

it should have written only, “The ox shall be stoned,”

“and also its owner,”

merely,

and let it be silent,

without adding the word “shall be put to death.” And I would know that the ox and its owner are to be put to death.

And since Scripture added the word “shall be put to death,” this comes to teach that they do not execute the owner of the ox; rather, the Torah’s intention is to say that just as is the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox.

But Abaye challenged him: How could the Torah write “also its owner” without adding the word “shall be put to death”?

For

if the Merciful One had written so,

if the Torah had written in this manner,

I would have thought

that they should execute the owner of the ox

by stoning,

just as the ox is stoned. Therefore Scripture had to say, “and also its owner shall be put to death,” in order to teach us that the owner of the ox is liable only to death by strangulation [the unspecified death mentioned in the Torah is none other than strangulation]. And the question returns: Why should we not explain the verse according to its plain meaning, that the owners too are liable to death, except that they are not stoned like the ox, but their death is by strangulation?

Rava answers: Even had the Torah not written “shall be put to death,” we would not have executed the owner of the ox by stoning, and this follows from a simple logical consideration:

What,

stoning—

could it enter your mind!?

How did it enter your mind to say that the owner of the ox would be liable to stoning? For even if

he himself killed,

if the owner of the ox himself murdered a person, with his own hands—he is judged

by the sword,

as is the law of a murderer.

If so, how is it possible to say that if

his property [his ox]

killed a person, so that the owner of the ox merely transgressed by failing to guard it properly, the owner of the ox would be liable

to stoning,

which is the most severe capital punishment of all four deaths imposed by the court?

Accordingly, the word “shall be put to death” is indeed superfluous, since we do not need to learn from it that the owner of the ox is not judged by stoning. Rather, it comes to derive from it the halakha that “just as is the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox.”

But Abaye still argues that the word “shall be put to death” is not superfluous. For it is possible that it comes to teach that the owner of the ox is to be judged by strangulation. That is, if he himself murdered a person with his hands, he would be liable to death by execution with the sword, whereas if he did not guard his ox, and his ox killed, he would be liable to death by strangulation, which is lighter than execution.

But perhaps,

it is possible to say that

this that the Merciful One wrote “shall be put to death”—

was to make it lenient for him,

to be lenient with the owner of the ox,

to exclude him from the sword,

to remove him from the death of execution, to which he would be liable had he murdered with his own hands, and

to

obligate him for the fact that his ox killed a person

by strangulation

alone!

For

that works well

—it can properly be said that the word “shall be put to death” is superfluous

according to the one who says

that the punishment of death by

strangulation is more severe

than the punishment of death by execution with the sword, because according to him it is indeed impossible that the word “shall be put to death” comes to say that the owner’s death is by the more severe death of strangulation. For such a thing is impossible: that the punishment of the owner of the ox for the fact that his ox killed a person should be more severe than the punishment for a murder that he himself committed with his own hands.

But according to the one who says

that the punishment of

strangulation is lighter

than the punishment of execution,

what is there to say!?

What will you answer according to him? For according to him it is possible that the Torah’s intention is to say that he should be judged by strangulation for the death caused by his ox, which is a less severe punishment than execution; and that is why the Torah wrote “shall be put to death.”

And since according to him the word “shall be put to death” is not superfluous, the question returns: From where do we know that the Torah’s intention in the verse “and also its owner shall be put to death” is to teach us that the ox’s death is judged by twenty-three, and why should we not say that the Torah’s intention is actual capital punishment, by strangulation, for the owner of the ox?

And Rava answered:

It cannot enter your mind!

It should not enter your mind to obligate the owner of the ox to die. Since

it is written

in the following verse,

“If a ransom shall be imposed upon him.”

And if it enters your mind

that the owner of the ox

is liable to execution,

that he is liable to die, and the Torah gave him the possibility of redeeming his death through a ransom—this is impossible. For

and it is written,

the Torah wrote elsewhere,

“You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer!”

And if he were truly liable to die, the Torah would not give him the possibility of redeeming himself through payment of a ransom.

But the Gemara asks:

On the contrary!

The opposite is correct!

Precisely because of that itself,

because the Torah does not permit redeeming a murderer’s life through payment of a ransom, and there would have been room to think that even if his ox killed, no ransom is taken, therefore the Torah wrote that only if

he himself killed,

he himself, with his own hands,

it is not sufficient for him,

his punishment is not satisfied

with money,

to exempt himself through payment of a ransom,

but

specifically

by execution,

his punishment is death alone. But if

his ox killed

a person, the Torah comes to say

that he may redeem his life with money!

He is given the possibility of redeeming his life through payment of a ransom; but if he does not pay a ransom, he is killed.

And the question returns: Indeed, the owner of the ox can redeem his life with a ransom. But if he does not pay a ransom, he is liable to death; and from where do we know that he is entirely exempt from death?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, Hizkiya said, and likewise the school of Hizkiya taught,

and this is also what they would teach in the beit-midrash of Hizkiya [or: this is what they would teach in the Mishna of Hizkiya]:

The verse says,

the Torah says there, in the section concerning a murderer,

“The one who struck shall surely be put to death—

he is a murderer.”

And the words “he is a murderer” are superfluous, in order to derive from them:

For his murder

with his hands—

you execute him, but you do not execute him for the murder committed by his ox.

And from here we learn that he is entirely exempt from death.

And what the Torah wrote, “and also its owner shall be put to death,” is only for a derivation, to say that “just as is the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox.” Just as if they were executing the owner, he would be judged by twenty-three, so too the ox is judged by twenty-three.

It is stated in the Torah, at the revelation at Mount Sinai [Exodus 19]: “Beware for yourselves of ascending the mountain and touching its edge. Whoever touches the mountain shall surely be put to death. No hand shall touch him, for he shall surely be stoned or surely be shot; whether animal or man, he shall not live.”

A person who was approaching Mount Sinai when the Divine Presence descended upon it was liable to death by a court. And since Sanhedrin had already been established for the people of Israel, from the time of Jethro’s arrival, this person was judged to death by twenty-three, as in all laws of capital cases.

The Gemara now raises a question: What was the law concerning an animal that approached Mount Sinai at that time? Was it judged specifically by twenty-three, or not?

They raised a dilemma before them:

They were uncertain in the beit-midrash:

the ox of Sinai,

an ox that approached Mount Sinai while the Divine Presence was there,

by how many

judges was it to be judged?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we derive,

do we learn the law of stoning that was stated for

that time,

for the time of the revelation at Mount Sinai alone,

from

the law of stoning that was stated for

the generations,

that is, from an ox that killed a person, which is liable to stoning, and its stoning is by twenty-three, and likewise they should conduct themselves regarding the animal that approached the mountain?

Or not:

do we learn a law that applies only for that time from a law established for the generations?

And the Gemara resolves it from a beraita:

Come and hear:

Come and hear a proof from that

which Rami bar Yehezkel taught,

which he taught:

Rami bar Yehezkel:

It is stated in the Torah [Exodus 19]:

“Whether animal or man, he shall not live.”

And we derive:

Just as a man

is judged

by twenty-three, so too an animal

is judged

by twenty-three.

We learned in our Mishna:

The wolf and the lion,

the bear, the leopard, the bardelas, and the snake—their death is by twenty-three. Rabbi Eliezer says: Whoever is first to kill them has acquired them.

It is obvious that what the first tanna said, “their death is by twenty-three,” refers to when they killed a person, so that the ox is to be judged for stoning, according to the law of an ox that is stoned.

But the amoraim disagree concerning Rabbi Eliezer’s view, who says, “Whoever is first to kill these predatory animals has acquired them.” Does this refer to killing these animals only when they killed a person, and Rabbi Eliezer comes to disagree with the Sages and say that their killing does not require a court?

Or does Rabbi Eliezer maintain that even if they did not kill a person, whoever is first to kill these predatory animals has acquired them?

Resh Lakish said: And this is when they killed.

What Rabbi Eliezer said, “Whoever is first to kill them has acquired them,” refers only when these animals had already killed a person.

But

if

they did not kill, he did not

say that it is permitted to kill them; rather, it is forbidden to kill them, even though they are predatory animals.

Apparently,

it is demonstrated from here that

he holds

Rabbi Eliezer that if

they have

these predatory animals

habituation,

it is permitted to raise them. For a person can train them not to cause harm.

And

therefore

they have owners,

that is, their owners’ name is associated with them and they are not ownerless, and it is forbidden to kill them if they have not killed a person.

But if they killed a person, their end proves concerning their beginning that these predatory animals are not trainable, and he has no permission to raise them, and they are ownerless, and it is not necessary to judge them.

Whereas

Rabbi Yohanan said

that Rabbi Eliezer maintains, “Whoever is first to kill them has acquired them,”

even though they did not kill.

According to him, Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the first tanna in two matters: First, regarding what the first tanna maintains, that they are killed only if they killed, he disagrees and maintains that they are killed even if they did not kill. Second, regarding what the first tanna maintains, that they are judged by twenty-three, he disagrees and maintains that whoever is first to kill them has acquired them.

And it is demonstrated that

he holds

Rabbi Eliezer

that they are not trainable.

It is impossible to raise them without their causing harm, and it is forbidden to raise them,

and

therefore

they have no owners;

their owners’ name is not associated with them, but they are ownerless, and it is permitted to kill them without legal proceedings.

The Gemara now infers from the wording of the Mishna, “has acquired,” whose meaning is “has profited,” and this is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan’s words.

We learned:

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Whoever is first to kill them—

has acquired them.

And the Gemara infers:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who maintains that it is permitted to kill them even when they did not kill a person,

for what purpose,

for what matter

“has acquired”

the one who killed them?—

He has acquired their hides,

so that the killer can take the hide for himself, since they have no owners and are not forbidden for benefit, since they have not yet killed.

But according to Resh Lakish,

who maintains that according to Rabbi Eliezer it is permitted to kill them only when they killed a person, it is difficult: In what matter has the person who killed them “acquired” them after they killed a person!?

For he cannot take the hide.

Because

since they killed

a person, and according to Rabbi Eliezer it is not necessary to judge them in court in order to kill them,

the Sages made them

gave the killing of the person the force of law

as though their judgment had been concluded,

as though their judgment to die had been concluded in court.

And

since their judgment to die was as though concluded, and this person came and killed them, from now on

they are forbidden for benefit!

All these animals, when this person killed them after they had killed a person and become liable to death, become forbidden for benefit, according to the law of an ox that is stoned, which becomes forbidden for benefit after the conclusion of judgment, even though it has not yet been stoned. If so, in what way did this person “acquire” them!?

And the Gemara answers: Resh Lakish explains,

What is “has acquired”?—

He has acquired [a reward] from Heaven!

He performed a good deed, and he will receive reward for it from Heaven.

And now the Gemara brings a beraita in which we learned in accordance with the words of Resh Lakish.

It was taught:

We learned in a beraita,

in accordance with him,

like

Resh Lakish:

For it was taught:

Both an ox that killed, and both a domesticated animal and a beast that killed—

all are judged

by twenty-three.

These are the words of the first tanna.

Whereas

Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox that killed

is judged

by twenty-three, but the rest of the domesticated animals and beasts that killed—

whoever is first to kill them has acquired them for Heaven.

Thus the meaning of “has acquired” is “has acquired [them] for Heaven.”

We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Akiva says: Their death is by twenty-three.

And the Gemara asks:

Rabbi Akiva—is that not the first tanna!?

In what way is his law different from the words of the first tanna?

And the Gemara answers:

There is a difference between them

concerning the law of

a snake,

for the first tanna maintains that a snake too is judged by twenty-three. And Rabbi Akiva disagrees with him concerning a snake and maintains like Rabbi Eliezer, that whoever is first to kill it has acquired it, since it is accustomed to kill. But concerning all the other animals, he disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer and maintains like the first tanna, that their judgment is by twenty-three.

We learned in our Mishna: One does not judge either a tribe, and so on, except by a court of seventy-one.

In all the transgressions of the Torah there is no distinction between individuals and many—whether a city or a tribe—and the law of the many who sinned is like the law of an individual.

But concerning idolatry, the Torah distinguished between an individual who worshipped idolatry, whose law is stoning and who is judged by a court of twenty-three, and a city that was led astray—entirely or for the majority—to idolatry, whose law is execution by the sword and who are judged by the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one.

The Mishna implies that there is a third law, that of a “tribe” that sinned, which is judged by the Great Sanhedrin, and the Gemara explains the words of the Mishna.

And the Gemara asks:

This tribe that sinned—concerning what,

in what sin did the members of the tribe sin?

If you say

that it refers to

a tribe that desecrated Shabbat,

this cannot be! For

I can say that the Merciful One distinguished

when the Torah distinguished

between individuals and the many,

it was only

concerning idolatry.

But

concerning the other mitzvot,

which he did not do,

did it distinguish!?

Have we found that the Torah distinguished between an individual and the many!?

Therefore the Gemara explains:

Rather,

the case in our Mishna is

a tribe that was led astray

to idolatry.

But the Gemara is astonished:

Does this mean

that the Mishna comes to teach us

that we judge it by the law of the many?

That they judge the tribe as the many are judged, like an apostate city, by the sword and in the Great Sanhedrin.

But this is difficult to say!

For

according to whom,

like which tanna does the tanna of our Mishna hold? For he holds

neither like Rabbi Yoshiyya nor like Rabbi Yonatan!?

For

behold

it was taught

we learned in a beraita:

How many,

what is the number of people who worshipped idolatry, such that they

make

their city through their actions into

“an apostate city”?—

From ten to one hundred.

For a city in which there are not ten people is not considered a city. And a city in which there are more than one hundred people—the people dwelling in it are not called “the people of the city,” but are defined as a “public.” Whereas the Torah was particular in the law of an apostate city that it be specifically a “city,” that there be neither fewer than ten people nor more than one hundred.

And if it is not a city, then each and every one is judged in a court of twenty-three [according to the initial hypothesis], and by stoning.

These are

the words of Rabbi Yashya.

Rabbi Yonatan says: From one hundred to the majority of a tribe.

Less than one hundred is not considered a city, and likewise, more than the majority of a tribe is a community.

And hence, our Mishna follows neither the view of Rabbi Yashya, for he holds that even a city larger than one hundred has the status of individuals, and all the more so an entire tribe.

And it is also not in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yonatan, for

even Rabbi Yonatan did not say

that every large community becomes a condemned city,

but

specifically from one hundred until

the majority

of a tribe.

But the whole of it,

when the entire tribe sinned—

did not

Rabbi Yonatan say that their status is like that of many who sinned. Yet our Mishna speaks of an entire “tribe” that sinned, and nevertheless gives it the status of many who sinned.

And later in the Gemara, Ravina will answer this difficulty.

And now Rav Mattana explains another interpretation of the words of the Mishna.