Sanhedrin 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

One who says: “The valuation of this vessel is upon me!” –

he gives its value,

that is, he gives the monetary value of the vessel to the Temple treasury, since sanctity has taken effect upon the vessel with regard to its value. Therefore, three appraisers are required to assess its value, and he gives that amount to the Temple treasury.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

For his statement contains no language of an obligation to the Temple treasury of “monetary value”; rather, it expresses an obligation of “valuations,” which is a fixed value, as the Torah established in the passage concerning valuations. Yet the law of “valuations” does not apply to a vessel at all, since the concept of valuations was stated only with regard to the valuations of people—according to a person’s age and according to whether the person is male or female—and no concept of “valuation” was stated with regard to vessels or animals.

Rather, since

a person knows that there is no

concept of

“valuation” for a vessel, and

since a person does not utter his words in vain, it is therefore clear to us that he

resolved and said it with regard to monetary value,

meaning that by this language he intended to obligate himself to give the vessel’s monetary value to the Temple treasury, and sanctity with regard to its value took effect upon the vessel.

But the Gemara raises an objection to this explanation, since it does not fit the language of the Mishna.

This,

does this matter, according to the interpretation you have just stated, have the meaning of

“valuations of movable property,”

as the tanna said? Yet according to your words,

he should have needed to say: “the valuations of movable property”;

this is what the tanna should have said. For “valuations of movable property” means: what is the law of the valuations of movable property. But according to the interpretation you stated, the tanna is saying that movable property has a valuation. And the Gemara answers:

Teach

and emend the language of the Mishna as follows:

“The valuations of movable property.”

The Gemara offers another explanation:

Rav Ḥisda said

in the name of

Avimi:

Our Mishna is speaking

of designating movable property for valuations.

He says: “My valuation is upon me,” or: “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,” and he becomes obligated to give the Temple treasury the sum fixed by the Torah according to his age. He wishes to give movable property in place of money, and says: “These vessels are hereby consecrated for payment of the valuation debt that I have undertaken to pay.” Sanctity takes effect upon them. He now wishes to redeem them from the Temple treasury and give money in exchange for them; therefore, three appraisers are required in order to assess the value of the vessels.

The Gemara raises an objection, that this too does not fit the language of the Mishna.

Does

this,

the matter you stated, fall within the meaning of

“valuations of movable property,”

as the tanna said in the Mishna? Surely

he should have needed to say: “movable property of valuations,”

which is what the tanna should have taught if his intention was as you stated.

And the Gemara answers:

Teach

the Mishna as follows:

“Movable property of valuations.”

The Gemara offers another explanation:

Rabbi Abbahu said:

The Mishna is speaking

of one who says: “My valuation is upon me,”

but does not have the means to pay the Temple treasury,

and a priest comes

the treasurer

to collect from him,

to take collateral from him. The law is that if the treasurer takes

movable property

as collateral from him, its value must be assessed

by three

appraisers; and if he takes

land

as collateral from him, it must be assessed

by ten.

According to Rabbi Abbahu, this is the meaning of the Mishna: The valuations of a person who does not have the means to pay, and the treasurer comes to take his property as collateral— the value of the collateral must be assessed by three appraisers.

But there is a difficulty with this explanation:

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Granted,

according to the explanation of Rav Giddel, and likewise according to the explanation of Rav Ḥisda, that the tanna is speaking about

taking property out of the possession of the Temple treasury,

redeeming and purchasing from the Temple treasury, it is understandable

that we require

three

appraisers

so that he will not pay the Temple treasury less than its value.

But

according to Rabbi Abbahu, who is speaking of one who comes

to bring in

the collateral

to the Temple treasury –

why do I need three!?

What is the concern? On the contrary, the Temple treasury will profit if the vessels are assessed by only one appraiser, because he will assess them at less than their value, and the Temple treasury will acquire vessels worth more.

He said to him,

Ravina to Rav Aḥa:

It is a matter of reasoning:

if only one appraiser assesses the vessels, he might err in the other direction as well, thereby causing a loss to the Temple treasury. For

what difference is there between bringing in and taking out!?

When taking out, for what reason

do we require three appraisers?

Perhaps they will err;

perhaps a single appraiser will reduce its value, and if so,

when bringing in as well,

we require three,

perhaps he will err,

and the single appraiser will assess the vessel at more than its value, causing the Temple treasury to lose.

We learned in our Mishna: The valuations of movable property are assessed by three;

Rabbi Yehuda says: And one of them is a priest.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda –

this is why it is written

in the Torah, in the passage concerning valuations and in the passage concerning the redemption of consecrated property,

“priest.” But according to the Rabbis,

there is a difficulty:

why do I need “priest”?

Why did the Torah write “priest”?

The Gemara remains with the objection: Indeed,

the matter is difficult.

We learned in our Mishna:

“For land, nine and a priest.”

The Gemara discusses from where we learn that ten appraisers are required, and likewise why it is unnecessary for all ten to be priests.

From where are these matters

derived? By what exposition do we derive these laws?

Shmuel said: Ten instances of “priest” are written in the passage

concerning the redemption of consecrated property.

One

of them is expounded

for itself,

to teach that a priest is required, whereas

the others,

the remaining nine,

constitute a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression,

since the first occurrence of “priest” excludes an Israelite, as it implies specifically a priest and not an Israelite, and we have a principle—one of the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded—

“A restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to include.”

It follows that after the verse stated the first “priest,” it thereby excluded an Israelite; and by repeating the same exclusion nine times—priest and not Israelite—the verse teaches us that even nine Israelites and one priest may assess the consecrated property.

He challenges it,

raising an objection to this exposition,

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan: Say

that perhaps the Torah’s intention is that

five priests and five Israelites are required.

For from the exclusion of the first “priest” we will derive that a priest is required, and consequently the exclusion of the second “priest” comes to include—even an Israelite, by the rule that “a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to include.” If so, the third “priest” is no longer considered a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, since the second priest serves as an inclusion; therefore, the exclusion of the third priest teaches that specifically a priest, and not an Israelite, is required. The fourth priest is a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, and comes to include an Israelite, and so on. From one “priest” we derive an exclusion, that it must specifically be a priest, and from the next “priest” we derive an inclusion, that it may even be an Israelite.

The Gemara’s conclusion is: Indeed,

the matter is difficult.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And a person, like them,”

like land.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: For what purpose are ten appraisers required to assess a person, as in the case of land?

A person—can he become consecrated!?

Surely it is impossible to consecrate a person.

And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Abbahu said:

The reference is not to a person who was consecrated. Rather, it is referring

to

one who

says: “My monetary value is upon me,”

meaning: I undertake to give my monetary value to the Temple treasury.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

One who says: “My monetary value is upon me” –

his value is assessed as that of a slave sold in the marketplace.

And concerning this the Mishna said that ten appraisers are required. For

a slave

Canaanite

is juxtaposed to land;

the Torah equated and included him with land with regard to inheritance, as it is stated in the passage concerning slaves: “And you shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you.” Therefore, by virtue of this juxtaposition, we learn that just as land is assessed by ten, so too a slave, and likewise every person.

We learned in the Mishna that the redemption of consecrated movable property is performed by three, and of land by ten.

The Gemara now discusses the law governing a person’s hair that is about to be cut.

He raised

the following question:

Rav Avin: Hair

of a slave, from which vessels can be made,

that is about to be cut,

when the hair has grown to the point that there is enough to cut, if one consecrated it and came to redeem it,

by how many

appraisers is it assessed? Shall we say that since this hair is about to be cut,

it is considered as already cut,

and its status is that of movable property,

and

it is assessed

by three. Or

perhaps its status is

that of something attached, and

it is assessed

by ten.

The Gemara resolves the question by establishing that this is a dispute between the Sages.

Come and hear

a proof from what we learned in a beraita:

As it was taught:

One who consecrates his slave –

there is no misuse of consecrated property involving him.

For a slave has the status of land, as explained above, and there is no law of misuse of consecrated property with regard to land. This is the statement of the Sages.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Although there is no misuse of consecrated property involving him, nevertheless,

there is misuse of consecrated property involving his hair,

since the hair is not considered part of his body; rather, its status is that of movable property, with regard to which there is misuse of consecrated property.

And we have established,

as the Gemara concludes elsewhere [Gittin 39a],

that they disagree with regard to hair that is about to be cut.

Their dispute concerns hair that is about to be cut. According to the Sages, it is considered attached, and its law is like that of the slave’s body, which has the status of land and is not subject to misuse of consecrated property. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the hair is considered already cut, and therefore there is misuse of consecrated property involving it. Likewise, with regard to assessing the hair of a slave that was consecrated: according to the Sages, it is assessed by ten; according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, by three.

The Gemara’s conclusion is: Indeed,

infer from here

that this is the resolution of the question.

The Gemara now discusses whether this dispute should be associated with another dispute.

Shall we

say

that

these tanna’im,

the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, hold

like those tanna’im:

As we learned,

in a Mishna in tractate Shevuot [42b]:

Rabbi Meir says: There are matters that are like

land

and are not like

land.

And the Sages do not agree with him.

How so?

The one who deposits property says to the watchman:

“I entrusted you with ten grapevines laden

with grapes,

I gave them to you

to guard,”

and the other,

the watchman,

says: “They were not

ten

but five.”

Rabbi Meir obligates

the watchman to take an oath of partial admission concerning the five grapevines. The novelty of his statement is that although “one does not take an oath concerning land,” Rabbi Meir nevertheless maintains that in this case one does take an oath.

And the Sages say: Everything attached to the land –

it is like

land,

and one does not take an oath concerning it.

and one does not take an oath concerning it.

The reason for their dispute is:

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: We are dealing with grapes that are

ready to be harvested;

the Mishna is discussing grapes that have fully grown and whose time for harvesting has arrived.

One master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds that they are considered like harvested grapes;

they are similar to harvested grapes and therefore do not have the status of land, and one takes an oath concerning them.

And the other master,

the Sages,

holds that they are not considered like harvested grapes,

and their status is that of land, concerning which one does not take an oath.

The Gemara assumed that hair that is about to be cut is like grapes that are ready to be harvested. Therefore, the Sages, who say with regard to hair that even when it is about to be cut it is still considered attached, hold like the Sages who said that grapes ready to be harvested are considered attached. Whereas Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says that hair about to be cut is considered detached, holds like Rabbi Meir, who says that grapes ready to be harvested are considered harvested.

And the Gemara rejects this:

No!

It is not necessary to say so. Rather,

even if you say

that the Sages hold like

Rabbi Meir

with regard to the law of an oath of partial admission concerning grapes ready to be harvested, that they are considered detached.

For there is a distinction between hair and grapes.

For

Rabbi Meir stated

that they are considered like harvested grapes only

there,

with regard to grapes that have fully grown, because

as long as one leaves them,

the longer they remain attached to the vines,

they become diminished,

they become thin and dry, and they are ready to be harvested immediately; therefore, their status is that of harvested grapes.

But his hair,

on the contrary,

as long as one leaves it,

as long as a person leaves it on his head,

it improves,

it becomes more abundant and longer, and its attachment benefits it. Therefore, with regard to hair, even Rabbi Meir agrees with the Sages that it is not considered cut.

We learned in our Mishna:

Capital cases

are adjudicated by twenty-three;

an ox that copulated

and an animal with which a person copulated are judged by twenty-three, as it is stated: “And you shall kill the woman and the animal,” and it says: “And you shall kill the animal.”

Introduction

An ox that copulated is an ox that copulated with a woman. Both of them—the woman and the ox—are judged by stoning, before a court of twenty-three. As it is stated: “And a woman who approaches any animal to copulate with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon them.” The verse juxtaposes the death of the ox to the death of the woman, teaching you that just as the woman is put to death, so is the animal.

An animal with which a person copulated is an animal with which a man copulated. That is, a man who had intercourse with an animal.

The Torah likewise equates them with regard to stoning and with regard to a court of twenty-three, as it is stated: “And a man who gives his lying with an animal, shall surely be put to death, and you shall kill the animal.”

Our Mishna implies a third case as well: If an ox copulated with a man, the ox is judged liable to death by a court of twenty-three.

With regard to this law, the Gemara explains the exposition of the verses and from where it is derived. The Gemara cites a third verse [Exodus 22], from which this law is derived.

The Gemara infers from the tanna’s language in the Mishna:

He states and teaches it categorically,

the tanna of our Mishna taught the law of an ox that copulated in categorical language, meaning

it makes no difference

whether it is an ox

that copulated

with a male person,

and it makes no difference

whether it is an ox

that copulated

with a female person; it is stoned by a court of twenty-three.

The Gemara discusses:

Granted,

with regard to an ox that

copulated

with a

female

person, the animal is judged liable to death by a court of twenty-three,

as it is written: “And you shall kill the woman and the animal.”

The verse juxtaposed the death of the animal that copulated with the woman to the death of the woman, with regard to death by a court of twenty-three.

But

with regard to an ox that

copulated

with a

male person, from where do we know

that the animal is judged liable to death by a court of twenty-three!?

The Gemara explains:

As it is written

[Exodus 22]:

“Whoever lies with an animal shall surely be put to death.”

Although the plain meaning of the verse concerns an animal with which a person copulated—that is, a person who had intercourse with an animal—nevertheless, we must expound it with regard to an animal that copulated with a male person, because

if it does not apply,

if this verse contains no novel point with regard to a person who

lies

with an animal, since this law was already stated in another verse [Leviticus 20]: “And a man who gives his lying with an animal shall surely be put to death, and you shall kill the animal,”

apply it,

it must come to teach with regard to a man who is

lain with

by an animal, meaning that he brings an animal upon himself.

And

since

the Merciful One expressed it,

the verse referred to the person with whom the act was performed

in the language of “one who lies,”

although it refers to a person who is “lain with” by the animal, the verse comes

to juxtapose,

to equate the law of

the one who is lain with to that of the one who lies,

teaching us:

Just as,

with regard to the matter of one who

lies

with an animal,

he and his animal

are both judged liable to death

by a court of twenty-three,

as that verse states: “And you shall kill the animal,”

so too

a man who is

lain with

by an animal,

he and his animal

are both judged liable to death

by a court of twenty-three.

We learned in our Mishna:

“An ox that is to be stoned is judged by twenty-three. As it is stated: ‘The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death’; just as the death of the owner is judged by twenty-three, so is the death of the ox.”

The Gemara discusses: Why should we expound this verse with regard to the ox’s death before a court of twenty-three, rather than interpret the verse according to its plain meaning, that the ox’s owner is also put to death?

Abaye said to Rava: From where [do we derive]

do we learn

that this

verse

“and its owner shall also be put to death,” for

the exposition stating

“Just as the owners’ death, so is the ox’s death” is what it came for,

that this is the purpose for which it came.