Sanhedrin 15a — the Talmud in English

One who says: “The valuation of this utensil is upon me!” —

he gives its monetary value,

that is, he gives the monetary value of the utensil to the Temple treasury, because sanctity has taken effect upon the utensil with regard to its value. Therefore, three appraisers are required to assess its value, and he gives that amount to the Temple treasury.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

There is no language of a commitment to give “money” to the Temple treasury in his statement. Rather, he committed himself through the law of “valuations,” which is a fixed value, as the Torah established in the passage concerning valuations. But the law of “valuations” does not apply to a utensil at all, since the laws of valuations were stated only with regard to the valuations of people—according to a person’s age and sex, male or female—and no concept of a fixed “valuation” was stated with regard to utensils or animals.

Rather, since

a person knows that there is no

concept of

“valuation” for a utensil, and

since a person does not utter words in vain, it is clear to us that he

resolved and said it with regard to money,

meaning that by using this expression he intended to commit himself to give the monetary value of the utensil to the Temple treasury, and sanctity with regard to its value took effect upon the utensil.

But the Gemara challenges this explanation, because it does not fit the wording of the Mishna.

This—

is this matter, according to the explanation you have just given, the meaning of

“the valuations of movable property,”

which the tan­ nay stated? Surely, according to your words,

it should have said: “the valuations of movable property,”

which is what the tannay should have said. “The valuations of movable property” means: What is the law of valuations involving movable property? But according to the explanation you gave, the tannay is saying that movable property has a valuation. The Gemara answers:

Read it as follows:

Revise the wording of the Mishna to say:

“The valuations of movable property.”

The Gemara offers another explanation:

Rav Ḥisda said

in the name of

Avimi:

Our Mishna is speaking

about designating movable property for valuations.

A person says: “My valuation is upon me,” or: “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,” and becomes obligated to give the Temple treasury the amount fixed by the Torah according to his age. He wishes to give movable property in place of money, and says: “These utensils are hereby consecrated for payment of the valuation debt that I incurred!” Sanctity takes effect upon them. Now he wishes to redeem them from the Temple treasury and give money in exchange for them. Therefore, three appraisers are required, in order to assess the value of the utensils.

The Gemara challenges this as well, since it too does not fit the wording of the Mishna.

Is

this—

the matter you stated—included in the meaning of

“the valuations of movable property,”

which the tannay stated in the Mishna? Surely,

it should have said: “movable property of valuations,”

which is what the tannay should have taught if he intended the matter you stated.

The Gemara answers:

Read it as follows:

Revise the Mishna to say:

“Movable property of valuations.”

The Gemara offers another explanation:

Rabbi Abbahu said:

The Mishna is speaking

about one who says: “My valuation is upon me,”

but he has no money with which to pay the Temple treasury,

and a priest

who is the treasurer

comes to collect from him,

that is, to take collateral from him. The law is that if the treasurer takes

movable property

from him, its value must be assessed

by three

appraisers; and if he takes

land

from him, it must be assessed

by ten.

According to Rabbi Abbahu, this is the meaning of the Mishna: In the case of a person’s valuation, when he does not have the means to pay and the treasurer comes to take his property as collateral, the value of the collateral must be assessed by three appraisers.

But this explanation is difficult:

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Granted

according to Rav Giddel’s explanation, and likewise according to Rav Ḥisda’s explanation, that the tannay is speaking about

taking something out of the Temple treasury,

redeeming and purchasing from the Temple treasury, it is understandable

that we require

three

three

appraisers, so that he will not pay the Temple treasury less than the item’s value.

But

according to Rabbi Abbahu’s explanation, where the matter concerns one who comes

to bring in

the collateral

to the Temple treasury—

why do I need three?

What concern is there? On the contrary, the Temple treasury will gain if the utensils are assessed by only one appraiser, because he will assess them at less than their true value, and the Temple treasury will acquire utensils worth more than the amount assessed.

Ravina said

to Rav Aḥa:

It follows logically

that if only one appraiser assesses the utensils, he may also err in the opposite direction and thereby cause a loss to the Temple treasury. For

what difference is there between bringing in and taking out?

When taking out, for what reason

are three appraisers required?

Perhaps they will err:

perhaps a single appraiser will reduce the item’s value. If so,

when bringing in as well,

three are required,

perhaps he will err

and the single appraiser will assess the utensil at more than its true value, causing the Temple treasury a loss.

We learned in our Mishna: The valuations of movable property are assessed by three;

Rabbi Yehuda says: And one of them is a priest.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda—

this is why it is written

in the Torah, in the passage concerning valuations and in the passage concerning the redemption of consecrated property, the word

“priest.” But according to the Sages,

it is difficult:

why do I need “priest”?

Why did the Torah write “priest”?

The Gemara remains with the difficulty: Indeed,

the matter remains difficult.

We learned in our Mishna:

Land requires nine and a priest.

The Gemara discusses the source for the requirement of ten appraisers, and also why it is unnecessary for all ten to be priests.

From where are these matters derived?

From which exposition do we derive these laws?

Shmuel said: Ten priests are written in the passage

concerning the redemption of consecrated property.

One

of them is expounded

for its own purpose,

to teach that a priest is required. As for

the others,

the remaining nine,

they constitute a repeated exclusion,

because the word “priest” excludes an Israelite, as it implies specifically a priest and not an Israelite. We have a rule, one of the principles by which the Torah is interpreted, that

“a repeated exclusion serves only to include.”

Thus, after the Torah first stated “priest,” it excluded an Israelite. By repeating the same exclusion nine times—priest and not Israelite—the Torah teaches us that even nine Israelites and one priest may assess consecrated property.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, challenged this exposition:

He raised a difficulty against it:

Say

that perhaps the Torah means that five

priests and five Israelites

are required. For from the exclusion derived from the first “priest,” we would derive that a priest is required. It would then follow that the exclusion derived from the second “priest” serves to include—even an Israelite, according to the rule that a repeated exclusion serves only to include. If so, the third “priest” is no longer considered a repeated exclusion, since the second “priest” served as an inclusion. The third “priest” therefore teaches an exclusion: specifically a priest and not an Israelite. The fourth “priest” is a repeated exclusion and serves to include an Israelite, and so on. From one “priest” we derive an exclusion, teaching that it must specifically be a priest; and from the next “priest” we derive an inclusion, teaching that it may even be an Israelite.

The Gemara’s conclusion is: Indeed,

the matter remains difficult.

We learned in our Mishna:

And a person is like them,

like land.

The Gemara asks: For what purpose are ten appraisers required to assess a person, as they are required for land?

Can a person become consecrated?

A person cannot be consecrated.

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Abbahu said:

The matter does not concern a person who was consecrated. Rather, it concerns

one

who

says: “My monetary value is upon me,”

meaning: I must give my monetary value to the Temple treasury.

As it was taught in a beraita,

a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

One who says, “My monetary value is upon me”—

his value is assessed as that of a slave sold in the marketplace.

Regarding this, the Mishna stated that ten appraisers are required. For

a slave

Canaanite

was compared to land,

as the Torah equated and included him with land regarding inheritance, as it says in the passage concerning slaves: “And you shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you.” Therefore, from this comparison we learn that just as land is assessed by ten, so too a slave, and likewise every person.

We learned in the Mishna that the redemption of consecrated movable property requires three appraisers, while land requires ten.

The Gemara now discusses the law concerning the hair of a person that is about to be cut.

Rav Avin asked:

He asked:

The hair

of a slave, which is fit to be made into utensils,

that is about to be cut,

and has grown enough to be cut, if he consecrated it and then came to redeem it,

by how many

appraisers is it assessed? Shall we say that since this hair is about to be cut,

it is considered as already cut

and has the status of movable property,

and

is assessed

by three? Or

perhaps it has the status of

attached property, and

is assessed

by ten.

The Gemara resolves this question by citing a dispute between the Sages.

Come and hear a proof

from what we learned in a beraita:

As it was taught:

One who consecrates his slave—

one may not misuse him for personal benefit.

A slave has the status of land, as explained above, and the law of misuse does not apply to land. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Although one may not misuse the slave, nevertheless

one may misuse his hair,

because the hair is not considered part of his body. Rather, it has the status of movable property, with regard to which the law of misuse does apply. If one benefited from it to the value of a peruta, he must repay the principal and an additional fifth, and bring a guilt-offering.

And it is established,

as the Gemara concludes elsewhere [Gittin 39a],

that they disagree concerning hair that is about to be cut.

Their dispute concerns hair that is about to be cut. According to the Sages, it is considered attached and has the status of the slave’s body, which has the status of land and may not be misused. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the hair is considered already cut, and therefore one may misuse it. Likewise, with regard to assessing the hair of a consecrated slave, according to the Sages it is assessed by ten, while according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it is assessed by three.

The Gemara’s conclusion is: Indeed,

infer from this

that this is the resolution of the question.

The Gemara now discusses whether this dispute should be linked to another dispute.

Should

we say

that

these tannaim,

the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, hold

like those tannaim:

As we learned

in a Mishna in tractate Shevuot [42b]:

Rabbi Meir says: There are things that are

like

land, but are not

like

land. And the Sages do not agree with him.

What are the circumstances?

The owner who deposited property says to the guardian:

“I gave you ten grapevines bearing

grapes

to guard,”

and

the other

the guardian

says: “They were not ten

but

only five.”

Rabbi Meir obligates

the guardian to take an oath admitting part of the claim concerning the five grapevines. The novelty of his ruling is that although “one does not take an oath concerning land,” Rabbi Meir nevertheless holds that in this case one does take an oath.

And the Sages say: Anything attached to the land—

it is

like

land,

and one does not take an oath concerning it.

The reason for their dispute is as follows:

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: We are dealing with grapes that are

ready to be harvested;

the Mishna is discussing grapes that have fully matured and whose harvest time has arrived.

One master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds that they are considered like grapes already harvested,

and therefore they do not have the status of land, and one takes an oath concerning them.

And the other master,

the Sages,

holds that they are not considered like grapes already harvested,

and they have the status of land, concerning which one does not take an oath.

The Gemara assumed that hair about to be cut is like grapes about to be harvested. Therefore, the Sages, who say with regard to hair that even when it is about to be cut it is still considered attached, follow the view of the Sages who said that grapes about to be harvested are considered attached. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says that hair about to be cut is considered detached, follows the view of Rabbi Meir, who says that grapes about to be harvested are considered already harvested.

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

It is not necessary to say this. Rather,

even if you say

that the Sages agree with

Rabbi Meir

concerning the law of an oath admitting part of the claim regarding grapes about to be harvested, that they are considered detached,

there is a distinction between hair and grapes. For

For

Rabbi Meir said

that grapes are considered already harvested only

there,

in the case of grapes that have fully matured, because

the longer one leaves them,

the longer they remain attached to the vines,

the more they deteriorate;

they become thin and dry, and they are ready to be harvested immediately. Therefore, they have the status of grapes already harvested.

But his hair,

on the contrary,

the longer one leaves it,

the longer a person leaves it on his head,

the more it improves,

becoming more attractive and longer. Its attachment benefits it. Therefore, with regard to hair, even Rabbi Meir agrees with the Sages that it is not considered already cut.

We learned in our Mishna:

Cases involving capital punishment

require twenty-three judges;

an animal that copulated with a person and an animal with which a person copulated

also require twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “You shall kill the woman and the animal,” and it says: “And you shall kill the animal.”

Introduction

An animal that copulated with a woman is called an animal that copulated with a person. Both—the woman and the animal—are judged by stoning before a court of twenty-three judges. As it is stated: “And a woman who brings any animal near her to copulate with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal. They shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon them.” The verse compared the death of the animal to the death of the woman, teaching that just as the woman is put to death, so too the animal is put to death.

An animal with which a person copulated is an animal that was mounted by a man; that is, a man who has intercourse with an animal.

The Torah likewise compares this case to stoning and to a court of twenty-three judges. As it is stated: “And a man who gives his emission to an animal shall surely be put to death, and you shall kill the animal.”

The Mishna further implies a third case: If a bull copulated with a man, the bull is judged liable to death by a court of twenty-three judges.

Regarding this law, the Gemara explains the exposition of the verses and from where this law is derived. The Gemara cites a third verse [Exodus 22], from which this law is learned.

The Gemara derives a precise point from the wording of the tannay in the Mishna:

He states the ruling categorically,

meaning that the tannay of our Mishna taught the law of an animal that copulated with a person in categorical language, which means:

It makes no difference whether it is a bull

that

copulated

with a male person,

and it makes no difference whether it is a bull

that

copulated

with a female person; in either case, it is stoned by a court of twenty-three judges.

The Gemara discusses this:

Granted,

a bull that

copulated

with a female person,

a woman,

the animal is judged liable to death by a court of twenty-three judges,

as it is written: “You shall kill the woman and the animal.” The verse compared the death of the animal that copulated with the woman to the death of the woman, with regard to death by a court of twenty-three judges.

The verse juxtaposed the death of the animal that copulated with the woman to the death of the woman, with regard to death by a court of twenty-three.

But a bull that

with regard to an ox that

copulated

with a

male person— from where do we know

that the animal is judged liable to death by a court of twenty-three judges?

The Gemara explains:

As it is written [Exodus 22]:

[Exodus 22]:

“Anyone who lies with an animal shall surely be put to death.”

Although the plain meaning of the verse concerns an animal with which a person copulated—that is, a person who had intercourse with an animal—we nevertheless expound it with regard to an animal that copulated with a male person, because

if it does not refer to

a person who

lies

with an animal, since this law was already stated in another verse [Leviticus 20]: “And a man who gives his emission to an animal shall surely be put to death, and you shall kill the animal,” then

apply it to

a man who is

lain with

by an animal—that is, one who brings an animal upon himself.

And

since

the Merciful One expressed it

and the verse referred to the person who was mounted

with the expression “one who lies,”

even though it refers to a person who is “lain with” by an animal, the verse comes

to compare

the law of

the one who is lain with to that of the one who lies,

to teach us:

Just as in the case of one who

with regard to the matter of one who

lies

with an animal,

he and his animal

are both judged liable to death

by a court of twenty-three judges,

as that verse says: “And you shall kill the animal,”

so too a man who is

a man who is

lain with

by an animal,

he and his animal

are both judged liable to death

by a court of twenty-three judges.

We learned in our Mishna:

An ox sentenced to stoning requires twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death.” Just as the owner is put to death, so too the ox.

The Gemara discusses this: Why should we expound this verse with regard to the death of the ox before a court of twenty-three judges? Why not interpret the verse according to its plain meaning, that the owner of the ox is also put to death?

Abaye said to Rava: From where,

do we learn,

that this

verse

“And also its owner shall be put to death,” for

the exposition stating “

“Just as the owners’ death, so is the ox’s death” is what it came for,

that it came for this purpose.