Sanhedrin 16a (טז.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Mattana said: Here

here

with regard to a prince

of a

tribe who sinned

by committing one of all the transgressions in the Torah for which the court imposes the death penalty,

we are dealing,

the Mishna is speaking.

And the reason that he is judged by the Great Sanhedrin, despite being only one individual, is as follows:

What,

is it so that

Rav Adda bar Ahava did not say

that the reason for what we learned later in the Mishna, that a High Priest is judged by the Great Sanhedrin, is that it is stated:

“Every great matter you shall bring to me,”

and we expound:

the matter of a “great” person,

an important person, such as the High Priest, is to be brought for judgment before the Sanhedrin. If so,

this

prince

is also “great”;

he is,

and therefore he is judged by the Great Sanhedrin.

And the Gemara brings the statement of Ulla, who explains the matter differently. The Mishna is not speaking of a tribe or a prince who sinned, but rather of a dispute that arose between one tribe and another concerning matters of inheritance and the boundaries of their land, as this matter is judged by the Great Sanhedrin.

Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said:

Our Mishna is speaking

of those who come

to litigate

over matters of inheritances.

And the reason that this matter must be judged by seventy-one is:

And just as at the beginning

of the division of inheritances

of the Land of Israel. What,

just as at

the beginning,

the land was divided into the inheritances of the tribes by Joshua and the elders, who numbered

seventy-one, so too here,

in later generations, matters of inheritances will be judged

by seventy-one.

And the Gemara challenges this: If so, why should we not say also as follows:

If,

just as

at the beginning,

the land was divided by means of

a lottery

and the

Urim ve-Tummim, and all Israel

as explained in tractate Bava Batra, on page 122,

so too here,

in later generations, we should determine the laws of inheritances specifically by means of

a lottery, the Urim ve-Tummim, and all Israel.

But this is certainly not correct!

Therefore, the Gemara rejects the statement of Ulla and says:

Rather, it is evident

that the correct explanation is

as Rav Mattana said,

that the Mishna is speaking of a tribal prince who sinned.

However, Ravina returns to explain that the Mishna is speaking of a tribe that was incited to idolatry.

Ravina said: Actually

the explanation of our Mishna is

with regard to a tribe that was incited.

And

this

that is difficult for you,

is it possible that

we judge him with the court of the many!?

After all, they are more than one hundred according to Rabbi Yashiya, and more than the majority of the tribe according to Rabbi Yonatan—

the answer is:

Yes!

Indeed, this is the law:

even though we execute him

by

the

judgment of

an individual,

by stoning, nevertheless,

the court of the many,

the Great Sanhedrin, is the one that

judges him,

and not a court of twenty-three.

And what Rabbi Yashiya and Rabbi Yonatan said means that in a city numbering more than one hundred people, or in an entire tribe, they are not judged by the sword, but by stoning. The tanna of our Mishna agrees with them in this. However, he maintains that a tribe that worshipped idolatry is judged by the Great Sanhedrin, and Rabbi Yashiya and Rabbi Yonatan also agree with this law.

And the reason that a tribe that worshipped idolatry is judged by the Great Sanhedrin is:

Did Rabbi Hama bar Yosei not

say—did he not

say that Rabbi Oshaya said:

It is stated in the Torah [Deuteronomy 17], concerning a man or woman who worshipped idolatry: “

And you shall bring out that man or that woman

who did this evil thing to your gates, the man or the woman, and you shall stone them with stones, and they shall die.” And we expound:

A man and a woman,

individuals,

you shall bring out to your gates,

to the court in each and every gate of the city, i.e., a lesser Sanhedrin,

but you shall not bring out

the

the entire city,

which worshipped idolatry,

to your gates,

but rather to the Great Court in Jerusalem, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin.

And this exposition that Rabbi Oshaya expounded with regard to an apostate city,

here,

with regard to a tribe that was incited,

also

we shall expound as follows:

A man and a woman you shall bring out to your gates, but you shall not bring out

the

the entire “tribe” to your gates,

but rather to the Great Sanhedrin.

We learned in our Mishna: “One may not judge, etc.,”

nor a false prophet

etc., except by a court of seventy-one.

And the Gemara asks:

From where are these matters

derived? From where do we learn that a false prophet is judged by seventy-one?

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: It is derived

by means of a

gzera shava, “acting presumptuously, acting presumptuously,” from the rebellious elder.

With regard to a false prophet it is stated [Deuteronomy 18]: “But the prophet who acts presumptuously to speak a word in My name,” and with regard to the rebellious elder it is stated [Deuteronomy 17]: “And the man who acts presumptuously.” And we expound:

Just as there,

just as the rebellious elder

is subject to seventy-one,

he is liable to the death penalty only if he rebels—that is, issues a ruling contrary to the ruling of the court—against a court of seventy-one sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone,

so too here,

a false prophet is judged

by seventy-one.

And the Gemara challenges this: This verse containing

“acting presumptuously”

with regard to the rebellious elder,

when it is written,

the context in which it appears,

with regard to execution,

concerning the court that will judge his liability to be put to death,

is the context in which it is written!

As it is stated in the passage concerning the rebellious elder: “And the man who acts presumptuously, refusing to listen, etc., and that man shall die.”

And

this is

execution,

the death penalty of the rebellious elder,

by twenty-three;

he is judged by twenty-three,

he

is judged by twenty-three and not by seventy-one! For among all those mentioned in the Mishna as being judged by seventy-one, the rebellious elder is not listed.

And what was said—that the rebellious elder is subject to seventy-one—applies only to the manner of his rebellion: he is liable only if he rebels against the ruling of the Great Court of seventy-one. If so, how can the law concerning the execution of a false prophet by seventy-one be derived through a gzera shava of “acting presumptuously, acting presumptuously” from the rebellion of the rebellious elder, when the verse containing “acting presumptuously” with regard to the rebellious elder concerns the law of his stoning, and his stoning is carried out by twenty-three?

Rather, Reish Lakish said: It is derived

through a gzera shava of

“word, word,” from his rebellion

of the rebellious elder. For with regard to the death of a false prophet it is stated: “A man who acts presumptuously to speak a word,” and with regard to the rebellion of the elder it is likewise stated: “And you shall act according to the word.” Just as the rebellion of the elder is against the ruling of seventy-one, so too the execution of a false prophet is by seventy-one.

And the Gemara challenges Reish Lakish: After we have learned through a gzera shava from the rebellion of the rebellious elder, which is against the ruling of seventy-one, that the execution of a false prophet is by seventy-one, if so:

Let him return,

and apply the law of the execution of

the rebellious elder, and derive “acting presumptuously, acting presumptuously” from the false prophet.

And let us say: Just as a false prophet is put to death by seventy-one—for we learned this from the rebellion of the rebellious elder against the ruling of seventy-one—so too a rebellious elder should be put to death by seventy-one.

The Gemara answers: Only the gzera shava of

“word, word,” he received,

the tanna received this tradition from his teachers. But the gzera shava of

“acting presumptuously, acting presumptuously,” he did not receive

from his teachers. And a person may not derive a gzera shava on his own, even when the verse appears superfluous and suitable for exposition, because he does not know whether it is indeed superfluous, as perhaps it is required for another exposition.

We learned in our Mishna: “One may not judge, etc.,”

nor a High Priest

except by a court of seventy-one.

And the Gemara asks:

From where are these matters

derived? From where do we learn that a High Priest who committed one of the transgressions for which one is liable to the death penalty is judged by seventy-one?

And the Gemara explains:

Rav Adda bar Ahava said, as the verse states:

It is stated in the Torah, in the passage concerning the appointment of the Sanhedrin [Exodus 18]:

“Every great matter you shall bring to me,”

that is, to Moses, who occupied the position of seventy-one. And we expound:

The matters of a

person who is

great,

a person of authority, such as a prince or High Priest, you shall bring to me, to a court of seventy-one.

However, the Gemara cites a tanna of a beraita who does not expound the verse in this manner.

The Gemara challenges:

from that which was taught in a beraita:

“A great matter”

means

a difficult matter,

one concerning which the Sanhedrin does not know how to decide, and they shall bring it to Moses.

You say it means a difficult matter—

or

perhaps it

does not

mean a difficult matter,

but rather the matters of a great person.

That is, they shall bring the case of an important person to Moses?

When it says

at the end of that same passage,

“The difficult matter they shall bring to Moses,” a difficult matter is already stated.

It is therefore proven that the reference is to a difficult matter. [And it will be explained below why, according to his opinion, two verses are needed to teach that they brought the difficult matter to Moses.]

[The reason that, according to this view, two verses are needed to teach that the difficult matter was brought to Moses will be explained later.]

And this is a difficulty against Rav Adda bar Ahava, who expounds it as “the matter of a great person.”

The Gemara answers:

He,

Rav Adda bar Ahava,

said [his ruling] in accordance with this tanna.

He followed the tanna of another beraita, and therefore interpreted the statement of the tanna of our Mishna in accordance with that tanna.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

“A great matter”—

the matters of a great person.

From where

do you say that it means the matters of a great person?—

Or

perhaps

it does not

mean the matters of a great person,

but rather “the difficult matter”? When it says

in another verse, “The

difficult matter

they shall bring to Moses,”

, a difficult matter

has already been

stated; and what do I establish

as the meaning of what is stated,

“a great matter”?

As

the matters of a great person.

And this is likewise the exposition of the tanna of our Mishna.

And the Gemara challenges the tanna of the first beraita:

And this tanna,

who says that “a great matter” means a difficult matter,

why do I need two verses!?

Why did the Torah write two verses to teach us that the difficult matter should be brought to Moses?

The Gemara answers: There is no superfluous verse here, because

one,

one verse, the first, is

merely for a command,

commanding the judges to bring the difficult matter to Moses.

And one

is stated

for the action,

as the Torah recounts that they indeed did so and brought the difficult matter to Moses.

The Gemara now challenges the tanna of the second beraita:

And the other one,

how does he derive this from the apparent redundancy of the verses? After all, they are not superfluous, since one is stated for a command and the other for the action.

The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a basis for the exposition, because

if so,

if both verses refer to the difficult matter, the Torah should have written

“great, great”

in both verses,

or “difficult, difficult”

in both verses.

What is the meaning of “great,” and what is the meaning of “difficult”?

Why did the verse change its wording?

Learn from this two matters:

The verse comes to teach us that a great matter is not a difficult matter, but rather the matters of a great person, and they brought that matter to Moses. Thus it is proven that the case of a great person is judged by seventy-one.

Rabbi Elazar raised

the following question:

The ox of a High Priest

that killed a person—

by how many

judges is it judged? Do

we compare it to the death of its owner,

meaning, do we compare it to the law governing the death of its owner, the High Priest, since the Torah wrote: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death,” and just as he is judged by seventy-one, so too his ox,

or perhaps

we should say

we compare it to the death of an ordinary owner.

We compare it to the death of other owners, which is judged by twenty-three.

The question is not resolved.

Abaye said: Since he raised the question only with regard to his ox,

as Rabbi Elazar considered only the possibility of comparing it to him, since the Torah wrote: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death,”

by inference

you learn from his words

that the property

of a High Priest, if he has a monetary case,

is obvious to him

to Rabbi Elazar that it is not judged by seventy-one, but by three, like all monetary cases.

The Gemara challenges:

Is that obvious!?

What is Abaye teaching us, and why is it necessary to infer this from Rabbi Elazar’s words? After all, it is only with regard to an ox sentenced to stoning that the Torah compared the property to the owner .

The Gemara answers that this is not entirely obvious—

Lest you say

we had grounds to think as follows:

Since it is written, “every great matter,”

we should expound:

“every” matter of a great person;

even monetary cases would require the Great Sanhedrin.

It teaches us

Abaye’s conclusion: the monetary cases of the High Priest are judged by three.

We learned in our Mishna:

And one may not bring out

the people for an optional war except by the authority of a court of seventy-one.

And the Gemara asks:

From where are these matters

derived? From where is this law derived?

Rabbi Abbahu said: As the verse states:

It is stated in the Torah: “And the Lord said to Moses, Take Joshua son of Nun, etc., and place your hand upon him, and stand him, etc.,

and he shall stand before Eleazar the priest

and seek counsel from him through the judgment of the Urim before the Lord; by his word they shall go out, and by his word they shall come in, he and all the children of Israel with him, and the entire congregation.” And we expound:

“He”—

this is the king,

as Joshua was a king;

“and all the children of Israel with him”—

this is

the

anointed for war,

as all the children of Israel go out to war with him;

“and the entire congregation”—this is the Sanhedrin.

And the Gemara rejects Rabbi Abbahu’s proof: The verse does not imply that the king must obtain permission from the Sanhedrin; rather, it means that the king, the anointed for war, and the Sanhedrin stand before Eleazar to inquire through the Urim ve-Tummim.

But perhaps

it is possible that

the Merciful One said this to the Sanhedrin:

that the Torah commands the Sanhedrin

to inquire

by asking

through the Urim ve-Tummim,

meaning that the Torah comes to teach us that one inquires through the Urim ve-Tummim only on behalf of a king, the anointed for war, or the Sanhedrin, but not on behalf of an ordinary person; and there is no proof from this verse for the law of our Mishna, that they may go out to war only by the authority of seventy-one.

And the Gemara retracts this exposition and learns this law from King David, who obtained permission from the Sanhedrin. And the Gemara cites a beraita that describes at length King David’s conduct and practices when he went out to war.

Rather, it is like

that

which Rav Aḥa bar Bizna said that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida said: A lyre was suspended above David’s bed,

with its openings facing north.

When midnight arrived—

the north wind would blow upon it,

as the north wind blows at midnight,

and

the lyre

would play by itself. Immediately David would rise and engage in Torah study,

as it is stated [Psalms 119]: “At midnight I rise,”

until the dawn rose.

When dawn rose—

the Sages of Israel entered before him and said to him: Our master, the king! Your people Israel require sustenance. He said to them,

David:

Go and sustain yourselves from one another. They said to him: A handful does not satisfy a lion,

meaning that a small amount of sustenance cannot satisfy the people,

and a pit is not filled from its own excavated earth,

meaning that if one removes a clod from a dug pit and then casts it back into it, the pit is not filled; the analogy is that there is not enough sustenance to fill the needs of the poor, and sustenance must be brought from elsewhere, just as earth must be brought from elsewhere to fill the pit,

he said to them

David:

Go and spread your hands against the troop,

meaning: go out with troops of war to bring sustenance from another land.

Immediately, they consult

which route they should take and how they should deploy their army and arrange their military tactics,

with Ahitophel

who was David’s adviser,

and they seek counsel from the Sanhedrin

they obtain permission from the Sanhedrin, as we learned in our Mishna,

and they inquire of the Urim ve-Tummim

concerning the word of God, whether they will succeed.

Rav Yosef said: What is the verse:

From which verse—from which verse is it derived that they consult the Sanhedrin and the Urim ve-Tummim?