Pesachim 9b — the Talmud in English

And a priest [

from among the members of the household, or he was a relative], and he stood at the edge of the pit,

and looked into it

in the pit,

to know whether

the miscarriage

was male, or whether it was female,

so that its mother would know how many days of impurity and purity of childbirth she must observe. And that priest did not take care lest he overshadow the dead miscarriage in the pit, and consequently be transgressing the prohibition stated concerning priests, that they may not become impure through a dead person.

And ultimately, the priest did not discern any miscarriage at all inside the pit.

And the

case

came before the Sages, and they declared him pure,

the priest, despite the possibility that the miscarriage had been there when he looked into the pit, and he became impure through it with the impurity of a tent,

because a weasel and a marten are common there,

and certainly dragged it into a hole that they have at the sides of the pit, which presumably contains an empty space of a handbreadth, and it interposes before the impurity, so that it does not render impure the one who overshadows it from above.

But here, where she certainly cast

the miscarriage into the pit, and it follows that the impurity is certain,

and

the dragging of the miscarriage into the hole by the weasel is not certain, but rather

perhaps it dragged it

from the pit

and perhaps it did not drag it

at

that time

when the priest overshadowed the pit.

And

even so,

does a doubt come

of dragging

and remove a certainty

of impurity?

And we answer:

Do not say:

“that she cast

the maidservant

a miscarriage into the pit,”

so that there was certainly impurity there,

but say: “that she cast

something that is

like a miscarriage into the pit,”

and it is possible that this was an empty shafir [the fetal sac], which does not render impure at all.

And

if so, it

is

only

a doubt and a doubt: a doubt whether it was a miscarriage, and opposite it a doubt of the weasel’s dragging. Therefore, the doubt of dragging can remove a doubt of a miscarriage. But to remove a certainty, a doubt cannot remove it.

And we challenge:

But “

he looked into it

to know whether it was male or whether it was female,” it teaches.

And it implies that it was certainly a miscarriage, but it was not known whether it was male or female?

And we answer:

This is what it says:

he looked into it

to know whether a spirit

had been expelled,

and she is not impure with the impurity of childbirth at all,

or whether she had expelled a miscarriage,

and she is impure.

And if you should say that she had expelled a miscarriage,

if he ascertained that it was indeed a miscarriage and not merely a spirit, he still had

to know whether it was male, and whether it was female,

in order to know how many days of impurity and purity she must observe.

And if you wish, say:

the maidservant indeed expelled a certain miscarriage. Nevertheless, the Sages declared the priest pure, because

there, it is certainty and certainty.

Since a weasel and a marten are common there, they certainly dragged it,

the miscarriage,

at that time

when the priest overshadowed it. That is, they dragged it before the priest overshadowed it, and there was no miscarriage there when the priest overshadowed the pit. For

although,

even though concerning leaven we are concerned lest the weasel did not eat all of it, but

leaves remnants

of it, and therefore one must search again in the place where we saw that the weasel brought leaven, here, concerning impurity, it is sufficient for us to say that

as for dragging, at any rate, they certainly dragged it

the miscarriage

at that time.

(Another version: Although we do not say that they certainly ate it

and therefore concerning leaven we are stringent to search again,

we do say that they certainly dragged it to their holes [

to their hole],

we do say.)

We learned in the Mishna: We are not concerned lest a weasel dragged [leaven] from house to house, or from place to place.

And we challenge:

And

is it so that

we say

that

we are not concerned lest a weasel dragged

the leaven from a place that was not searched to a place that was searched?

But the latter clause teaches [

in the following Mishna]:

Whatever he leaves over

from the leaven after the search for the purpose of eating it until tomorrow

he shall place in a concealed place [

in a hidden place], so that

he will not need to search after it.

And it implies that if he did not place it in a concealed place, he must search after it. And this is because of the concern lest a weasel dragged the leaven to a place that had already been searched!?

And we answer:

Abaye said: It is not difficult: This refers to the fourteenth.

That refers to the thirteenth.

And Abaye explains: Our Mishna, which says that we are not concerned lest a weasel dragged leaven, speaks of the time of searching for leaven, which is

on the thirteenth [

in the evening],

when bread is common in all the houses,

for then much bread is available to the weasel inside the houses, and it does not fear that it will have nothing to eat; therefore,

it does not conceal it,

there is no concern that the weasel will drag leaven from an unsearched place to conceal it in a searched place.

Whereas the following Mishna speaks of the concern

on

the day

of the fourteenth,

lest then it drag from the leaven that he left after the search, since

bread is not common in all the houses,

for the weasel does not then see as much bread in the houses as it is accustomed to see always, it fears that there will be nothing to eat, and

it conceals

some of the leaven.

Rava said: Is a weasel a prophet, that it knows that today is

today

the fourteenth

of Nisan,

and not until evening,

and can it take notice and foresee what is to come, that no more bread will be baked today, so that you should be concerned that because it does not now see bread in the house, it

leaves over

some of the leaven

and conceals it

and hides it?

Rather, Rava said:

There is indeed no need to be concerned at all lest a weasel drag from the leaven, even on the fourteenth. And what the Mishna says in its latter clause,

“Whatever he leaves over, he shall place in a concealed place,”

is because we are concerned

lest a weasel take it in our presence

from the remaining leaven,

and

then certainly

he will need to search after it.

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rava: One who wishes to eat leaven after

the

search, what should he do?

Whatever he leaves over

for the purpose of eating

he shall place in a concealed place,

so that

a weasel will not come and take it

from it

in our presence, and he will need to search after it!

Rav Mari said:

Therefore the Mishna says that he should place the remaining leaven in a concealed place, because of

a decree, lest

he place ten

pieces of leaven, and afterward

find

only

nine,

in which case one must certainly be concerned lest a weasel dragged away the tenth, for we see that it is missing.

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, now brings practical legal rulings concerning various situations of uncertainty relating to the search for leaven.

a. If there were before us

nine piles of matza and one

pile

of leaven, and a mouse came and took

a piece from one of the piles in our presence and entered a house that had already been searched,

and we do not know whether

from the pile of

matza it took, or whether

from the pile of

leaven it took,

the house must be searched again. a. In the case of nine piles of matza and one pile of leaven, the Gemara says that it is as though the mouse certainly took leaven and entered the searched house, because we follow the moment when the uncertainty arose. Since we saw the piece when the mouse took it from one of the piles, and we were uncertain whether it was leaven or matza, that piece must necessarily be forbidden for eating. Consequently, the house must be searched for it. [It is obvious that if the rule that an uncertainty concerning a Torah prohibition is treated stringently is a Torah rule, this piece is certainly forbidden to eat by Torah law. But even if that rule is only rabbinic, hard leaven, which is also forbidden only rabbinically, must be searched for, as explained at the beginning of the chapter.] The comparison to the nine shops concerns only the piece itself, which is forbidden to eat, and for which we do not follow the majority because it came from a fixed place. Alternatively, just as in the case of the nine shops we follow the beginning of the uncertainty—for this is the entire distinction between meat taken from a shop and meat found in the street—so too here: the initial uncertainty did not concern the search of the house, but the piece itself, whether it was leaven or matza. Since we forbid it because of the uncertainty, the house must necessarily be searched as well, since an object forbidden to eat entered it. b. This is not the case in the law below, concerning two piles, one of leaven and one of matza, when we saw two mice, one taking leaven and one taking matza. We had no uncertainty at all about the pieces themselves. The uncertainty arose only afterward, when each mouse entered a different house: did leaven enter the searched house, making a search obligatory, or not? Therefore, since the search for leaven is rabbinic, we say that one is lenient in a rabbinic uncertainty. The reason the Gemara elaborated by mentioning two piles, two mice, and two houses, rather than stating briefly that one mouse took leaven and we do not know whether it entered the searched house, is to teach an additional point concerning two houses. One might have said that since a mouse certainly entered one of the houses with leaven, this is considered an established presumption of prohibition, and the house must be searched again. The Gemara therefore teaches us that even in such a case we are lenient, as in the case of the two containers. c. Afterward, the Gemara presents the case of one pile of leaven with two searched houses before it: a mouse took leaven, and we do not know into which house it entered. Here too, there was certainly no uncertainty about the piece itself that the mouse took, but only about the houses. Nevertheless, this case cannot be derived from the preceding one. There, one could say: leave each house with its existing presumption—the searched house presumed searched, and the unsearched house remaining presumed unsearched. Here, however, one house’s presumption has certainly been damaged, since leaven certainly entered a searched house. Both houses would therefore have to be searched, even if they came to ask one after the other. Therefore, the Gemara brings the case of the two paths. It shows that where we are lenient because of an uncertainty, we are lenient even when the presumption of one object has certainly been damaged. The same applies to the search for leaven: since we are lenient there in a case of uncertainty, we should be lenient even when the presumption of one house has certainly been damaged. d. The case of uncertainty whether the mouse entered or did not enter, which the Gemara compares to an open field. At first glance, this is difficult: what novelty is there here? The preceding cases also involved uncertainty whether the mouse entered the searched house. Indeed, those cases were more stringent, since the mouse certainly entered one of the houses, and nevertheless we were lenient because of the uncertainty. All the more so here, where it is uncertain whether the mouse entered any house at all. Rather, the Gemara is discussing a case in which we saw a mouse enter one searched house. Must the other houses in the same courtyard also be searched? Just as if a mouse entered one side of the courtyard, the entire courtyard must be searched, so too perhaps all the houses in the courtyard constitute a single domain—or perhaps not. For this, the Gemara brings proof from an open field. Although the person certainly entered the field, with regard to a particular field containing the impurity, Rabbi Eliezer considers this an uncertainty whether he entered it at all. The Sages also agree with Rabbi Eliezer that this is called an uncertainty whether he entered, although they nevertheless render the person impure. Thus, we do not say that the entire open field is considered one field. The same should apply to the houses in a courtyard: they are not considered a single domain. d. The approach of

Rabbeinu David: Rabbeinu David cites in the name of the Ra'avad that this is why we are stringent in the case of the nine piles and require a search, even though the search is only rabbinic and one is generally lenient in a rabbinic uncertainty. The reason is that the entire institution of searching was enacted specifically for a case of uncertainty: the Sages required one to search the house because perhaps there is leaven there. Since leaven was used in the house throughout the year and its presence there was established, the house is not permitted to be considered free of leaven until it is searched. The same applies to the nine piles. Since the mouse certainly brought into the house a piece that is uncertainly leaven or matza, this is like a house in which the presence of leaven has been established, and it must be removed specifically through a search. What difference is there whether the uncertainty concerns the piece itself, or whether the uncertainty concerns the house—whether leaven is there or not? This is unlike the other cases, where it is uncertain whether the mouse entered the searched house at all. In those cases, the presence of leaven in the house was never established, and the original rule returns: one is lenient in a rabbinic uncertainty, and no search is required. [In the case of the two containers, although something that was uncertainly leaven or matza certainly entered each house, we nevertheless treat the matter as though the presence of leaven in the searched house was not established, since it is possible to attribute the leaven to the unsearched house and the matza to the searched house.] It still remains difficult: why did the Gemara not state the case of the nine piles on the basis of a double uncertainty? There is a double uncertainty here: perhaps the piece taken by the mouse was matza, and even if it was leaven, perhaps the mouse ate it? [See below in the note.] And he cited the Ramban, who adds to the reasoning of the Ra'avad that even in a double uncertainty one is stringent regarding the search for leaven. Since the Sages required a search because of an uncertainty, they treated it as certain leaven. A second uncertainty can no longer remove the matter from the status of certainty, and a search is specifically required. But Rabbeinu David raised the following difficulty against him: If so, rabbinic law has become more stringent than Torah law. By Torah law, even nullification is not required in a case of double uncertainty, whereas rabbinically one is required to search in a case of double uncertainty. Yet the entire institution of searching was enacted only in addition to nullification. Therefore, he explains the matter as follows: This commandment to remove leaven is different from the other commandments of the Torah. Regarding all the prohibitions of the Torah, the Torah commanded us only concerning certainty—for example, not to eat certainly forbidden fat or certainly forbidden blood. Because of the severity of a Torah prohibition, however, we are stringent even in a case of uncertainty, while in a double uncertainty we are lenient. But concerning this commandment to remove leaven, the Torah did not command only concerning certain leaven, to remove the leaven found before a person. It also commanded concerning uncertainty: one must search the houses for leaven in every place where leaven is used and remove it from there, or nullify it. This is clear from what the Gemara says below, that the search for leaven is rabbinic, because by Torah law mere nullification is sufficient. This indicates that the Torah obligation of nullification is equivalent to the rabbinic obligation of searching, and that even by Torah law one must remove or nullify possibly existing leaven. Therefore, even when an additional uncertainty is added, it is not treated as a double uncertainty, but as a first uncertainty, because the earlier uncertainty is like certain prohibition. Thus, in the case of the nine piles, one must be stringent even by Torah law: since the mouse certainly brought into the house something that is uncertainly leaven, the house has the status of a house in which leaven has been established, and one must search or nullify even though it is only uncertain leaven. The second uncertainty—perhaps the mouse ate it—is therefore like a first Torah uncertainty, which is treated stringently. This is also why, even concerning the obligation to search, which is only rabbinic, one cannot be lenient on the basis of a double uncertainty. This is the essential nature of the enactment concerning the search for leaven: the Sages enacted that one may not rely on nullification alone, but must specifically search for and remove the leaven. Therefore, the search must be treated as though it were a Torah obligation, regarding which we said that one is not lenient because of a double uncertainty. Indeed, every search involves a double uncertainty: in every hole and crevice, one must consider that perhaps there was no leaven there, and even if there was, perhaps a mouse ate it. Nevertheless, as stated, one may not be lenient regarding the search for leaven on the basis of a double uncertainty. The law is that the house must be searched again, despite the fact that there is a majority supporting leniency. This is because

this is

the law of

the nine shops

that we learned in a beraita: If there were nine shops in a city selling properly slaughtered meat, and one shop selling meat from an unslaughtered carcass, and a person bought meat without knowing from which shop he bought it, the meat is forbidden, despite the fact that most of the shops are kosher. This is because “anything fixed in its place is considered half-and-half.” That is, anything a person took from its fixed place, when he does not know from where he took it, is considered half-and-half because the uncertainty began at the fixed place. We do not follow the majority; rather, it is considered an evenly balanced uncertainty, and an uncertainty concerning a prohibition is treated stringently. This is learned from verses.

Here too, since the uncertainty began at the object’s fixed place, when we saw the mouse take

from one of the piles, which was the object’s fixed place, the law of a “fixed place” applies. We do not follow the majority; rather, we treat it as an evenly balanced uncertainty and rule stringently.

b. But if

the piece separated

on its own from one of the piles to another place, and we do not know from which pile it separated,

and a mouse came and took it

and entered the searched house, the house does not require a search. In such a case, we follow the majority and assume that the piece separated from one of the piles of matza.

This is

the law of the

latter part

of the beraita concerning the nine shops.

As it is taught in a beraita:

There were ten meat shops in a city:

nine shops

of

which all sold properly slaughtered meat, and

only

one sold meat from an unslaughtered carcass. And a person took

meat

from one of them, but did not know from which one he took it—

his uncertainty renders it forbidden!

The latter part of the beraita states:

But if it was found,

meat found in the street among those shops,

follow the majority.

The meat is kosher because the uncertainty began here only when the meat was found in the street. At that point it was not in the object’s fixed place, so the law of a “fixed place” does not apply. Rather, the rule is that “anything that separates is presumed to have separated from the majority,” and we say that the meat separated from the majority, namely, the kosher shops.

Here too, since the uncertainty arose before us only after the piece had separated from its fixed place, we follow the regular rule of following the majority.

c.

Two piles

that are before us,

one

of

which is of matza, and one of leaven, and before them are two houses, one searched and one not searched.

And two mice came, one taking

a piece of

matza, and one taking

a piece of

leaven,

and each of the two entered a different house.

And we do not know which [which]

mouse

entered this

house

and which

entered,

mouse

мышь

this

house

entered, and perhaps the mouse with the leaven entered the searched house.

This is

the law of

the two containers,

from which we can learn that in such a case we are lenient and say that the matza entered the searched house and the leaven entered the unsearched house.

из которого можно вывести, что в таком случае склоняются к разрешению и говорят, что маца была внесена в проверенный дом, а хамец — в непроверенный.

As it is taught in a beraita: Two containers

were before us,

one

of them being

of

ordinary produce and

one

being

of

produce designated as teruma, and

before them

stood

two se'a

of the same produce,

one

of them being

ordinary produce, and one teruma. And they fell

these two se'a

into

these

containers,

one se'a into each container, but we do not know which fell into the ordinary-produce container and which into the teruma container. The produce in the ordinary-produce container is

permitted

to be eaten even by a non-kohein, as it had been until now, and we are not concerned that perhaps the se'a of teruma fell into it and rendered all the produce forbidden to non-kohanim [because there was not ordinary produce there in a quantity one hundred times that of the teruma, so the teruma was not nullified in the ordinary produce]. This is

because “I say” [that is, we have the option of attributing the matter and saying]: the

то есть у нас есть возможность «подвесить» сомнение и сказать]: плоды

ordinary produce fell into

the

ordinary-produce container, and

the

teruma fell into

the

teruma container.

The same applies to the two piles and two houses. Since it is possible to attribute the matter in this way, “I say” that the mouse that took the leaven entered the unsearched house, while the mouse that took the matza entered the searched house. The house that had already been searched need not be searched again.

And we raise an objection: What proof is there from teruma to leaven?

Perhaps

we should say that what

we say

“I say,”

namely, that we attribute the permitted substance to the permitted substance and the forbidden substance to the forbidden substance, is applicable only there.