Pesachim 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

This applies specifically

to teruma,

which in the present era is observed only by

rabbinic decree,

and therefore we are lenient with regard to it. But

with regard to the

prohibition of

hametz,

which is

from Torah law, may we say

that one should be lenient and assume this by virtue of “I say”?

And we answer:

Is it so [that

one asks whether]

the search for hametz

is an obligation

from Torah law

? Surely it is only an obligation

by rabbinic decree, for according to Torah law, mere nullification suffices;

it is enough for one merely to nullify the hametz. Since the entire issue here is whether the Sages obligated him to search the house again or not, in a matter of rabbinic law we assume and say, “I say.”

d. There is

one pile of hametz

before us,

and two checked houses are before it, and a mouse came and took

a piece from the pile and entered one of the houses,

but we do not know whether

the mouse

entered this

house

after [that is, whether it entered]

or

entered that

house

after.

This is

the same law as

“two paths.”

As we learned

in tractate Taharot:

Two paths, one

of

them is impure, and one

of

them is pure,

but it is unknown which of them is the impure one. For example, it is established that in one of the paths there is a grave extending across the entire width of the path, and it is impossible to pass through it without spreading over the grave, but we do not know which path it is.

And a person walked

along

one of them and

afterward

prepared [that is, touched]

the

pure objects [If the issue concerned only him, we would declare him and the pure objects he touched pure, because the paths are a public domain, and the law is that uncertainty concerning impurity in a public domain is pure. But]

[Had the issue concerned only him, we would have declared him and the pure foods he touched pure, because the paths are a public domain, and the law is that in a case of uncertain impurity in a public domain, the uncertainty is treated as pure. But]

his fellow came and walked

also

along

the

second path and prepared pure objects

of his own. The question is whether it is possible to declare both of them pure, since one of them is certainly impure.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If they were asked [that is, they asked]

a sage

each separately,

with each one asking separately what his status is, both are

pure.

The sage rules to each of them that he is pure, since each one individually is only possibly impure, and he may be left with his established presumption of purity.

But if

both

came to ask a sage

at the same time—

both are

impure.

Since the sage must issue one ruling for both of them—whether you are impure or whether you are pure—he cannot tell them that both are pure, since one of them is certainly impure. Therefore, he rules that both of them are impure.

Rabbi Yosei says: Whether in this case or in that,

even if they asked separately, both are

impure.

Rava said, and some say Rabbi Yoḥanan:

If both came

at the same time

to ask the sage,

everyone agrees

that both are

impure.

Likewise, if they came to ask

one after the other,

even if each one tells the sage, “This is what happened: my fellow also entered the second path, but I am asking only about myself,”

everyone agrees

that both are

pure.

They disagree

only in a case where

one came

of them

to ask about himself and about his fellow,

asking, “What is the status of both of us?”

Rabbi Yosei compares it to

their coming to ask

at the same time,

for although only one of them is standing before the sage, since he must issue a single ruling for both, he cannot say, “You are pure.” Therefore, he must say: Both of you are impure.

And Rabbi Yehuda compares it to

their coming to ask

one after the other,

for since there is only one questioner here, he need not answer him regarding his fellow. Rather, they tell him, “You are pure,” and he will consequently understand that his fellow is pure as well.

But when both ask at the same time—that is, within the time required for speech—the sage must answer them together. Necessarily, he must rule that both of them are impure.

With regard to two houses as well, if the two householders come to ask at the same time, they are told that both must search again. If they come to ask one after the other, each one is told that he need not search, because the search for hametz is only rabbinic, and in a matter of rabbinic uncertainty one is lenient. e. We saw a mouse take hametz from the room, and

it is uncertain

whether it

entered

the checked house,

or certainly did not enter it.

There is no need to search the house again, because

this is

the same law as

the valley, and it is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages. [This resembles the law over which Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disputed, but in our case everyone agrees that no further search is necessary.]

[This resembles the law over which Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagreed; however, in our case, everyone agrees that another search is unnecessary.]

As we learned

in tractate Taharot:

One who enters a valley [

many adjoining fields]

during the rainy season,

when the crops have already grown in the fields and not everyone is permitted to enter there. Therefore, at that time the valley is considered a private domain with regard to the law stated concerning uncertainty about impurity in a private domain: the uncertain case is impure.

And

we know of

impurity

that was found

in a certain field

in the valley [for each field is separately marked by its boundaries].

And one said: I walked in that place [

in this valley],

but I do not know whether I entered that field

in which the impurity was located and spread over it,

or [

whether]

I did not enter

there—

Rabbi Eliezer declares him pure, and the Sages declare him impure.

The reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s view is

that Rabbi Eliezer used to say: Uncertainty concerning entry is pure.

If the uncertainty is whether he entered that field at all, he is pure, because this is a compound uncertainty.

It is uncertain whether he entered or not; and even if you say that he entered, perhaps he did not pass precisely over the place of the impurity and spread over it. In a compound uncertainty, even in a private domain, the uncertain case is pure. Only in the case of a single uncertainty—for example, he certainly entered that field, but

it is uncertain whether he came into contact with impurity,

as he does not know whether he touched or spread over the impurity—is the law that uncertainty concerning impurity in a private domain renders the person

impure.

And the Sages hold that even in a compound uncertainty, the law is that in a private domain the person is impure.

Here, with regard to the search for hametz, even the Sages will agree that we follow the lenient position, since the search for hametz is only rabbinic. Due to the uncertainty, there is no need to search the house again.

v.

The

mouse carrying hametz entered a checked house.

And the homeowner searched

after it

but found

none of the hametz. He need not search again, because this is

the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.

As we learned

in tractate Niddah: A pile of stones that is impure [because an olive-bulk of a corpse was there], which became mixed with two pure piles, and they searched all three but did not find the impurity in any of them—all of them are impure. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

According to that which

Rabbi Meir would say: Everything that

is

presumed impure remains

in

its

presumed

state of impurity until it becomes known to you

about

the impurity where it is.

As long as the impurity has not been found, we are concerned that it is still here, despite the fact that nothing was found during the search.

And the Sages say: One searches

every mound and digs beneath it,

until he reaches bedrock or virgin soil [hard soil that certainly was never moved from its place], from which point downward the impurity certainly cannot be found. And if he finds nothing, the mound is pure, because we assume that a raven or a mouse certainly came and took the olive-bulk of the corpse.

[hard ground that certainly has never been moved from its place], from which point downward the impurity certainly is not located. If he finds nothing, the mound is pure, because we assume that a raven or a mouse certainly came and carried away the olive-sized portion of the corpse.

In the search for chametz, which is only rabbinic, Rabbi Meir would also agree, since once one searched and found nothing, we assume that the mouse certainly ate the chametz that it had brought in.

7.

If

a mouse brought chametz into a house that had already been searched,

and the homeowner searched

after it,

and found

a piece of chametz, but does not know whether this is the piece that the mouse brought in, or whether it is another piece that remained despite the search, while the piece brought in by the mouse is still in the house, and he must continue searching the entire house—this matter depends on the

dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel.

As it was taught in a beraita: In a field in which a grave was lost,

whose location is unknown, everyone

who enters it

into the field

is impure,

lest he passed over the site of the grave and became impure through contact with it.

And if, after some time,

a grave is found in it,

and it is unknown whether this is the lost grave or not,

one who enters it

into the field and did not approach the grave that was found

is pure.

Because

I say:

the

grave that was lost is the

grave that was found; these are the words of

Rabbi.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says:

It is still not certain that this is the lost grave; rather,

the entire field must be searched,

and if no additional grave is found, we will assume that this is indeed the lost grave, and the rest of the field is pure.

Here too, with regard to the search for chametz, according to Rabbi we assume that this is the piece that the mouse brought in, and there is no need to continue searching the house. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, however, one must still be concerned that this is not the piece brought in by the mouse, and one is required to continue searching the entire house.

8. A person who

placed

in a house that had already been searched

nine

pieces of chametz,

and

afterward

found

there

ten

pieces—the law depends on the

dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who

If someone

placed a maneh

[one hundred zuz] of money of ma'aser sheni inside a chest,

and

afterward

found

there

two hundred

zuz—among these two hundred

ordinary funds and money of second tithe are intermingled,

as we do not know which maneh is the original ma'aser sheni maneh and which is the ordinary-funds maneh that was added. Therefore, he must take coins worth a maneh and say: The ma'aser sheni maneh among the two hundred shall be redeemed upon these coins, and he treats them with the sanctity of ma'aser sheni. The two hundred become ordinary funds—

the words of Rabbi.

Rashi. And Tosafot challenged this: Rashi himself wrote in Bava Metzia that it is impossible to redeem from one silver coin onto another silver coin, but only from silver onto copper. They further wrote that, according to Rashi’s position here that silver may be redeemed onto silver, he should not have said that he brings other sela'im and redeems the maneh upon them; rather, he could redeem it from within the amount itself. He should take one maneh of the two and say: If this is ma'aser, then well and good; and if the other is ma'aser, let it be redeemed upon this one. Tosafot on the phrase “ordinary funds.”

And the Sages say:

Since he did not find the amount that he had placed, we assume leniently that the original ma'aser sheni maneh was taken from here, while these two hundred were brought afterward, and

everything is ordinary funds.

Here too, with regard to chametz: According to Rabbi, we say that the nine pieces he placed are the same pieces now found, with one additional piece having been added to them. There is no need to return and search the house. According to the Rabbis, however, since he found more pieces than he had placed, we are concerned that all ten pieces now found are new ones, brought here by another person, while the nine original pieces were dragged into the house by rats, and he must return and search the entire house.

9. And if he

placed

in a house that had already been searched

ten

pieces of chametz

and

afterward

found

there only

nine

pieces,

that is

the law of the

conclusion

of that same beraita.

As it was taught in a beraita: He placed two hundred

zuz of ma'aser sheni,

and

afterward

found

there only

a maneh.

We say that

one maneh

of the two hundred that had been there is still

lying

here,

and only

the

maneh

that is missing has been

taken

[from here]—

the words of Rabbi.

And the Sages say: Everything is ordinary funds.

Since he found less than he had placed, we say that none of the original two hundred remained, and the present maneh is a different one, belonging to ordinary funds.

Here too, with regard to chametz, if he placed ten and found only nine, according to Rabbi he need search and look for only one piece. For the nine that were found are the same ones that had been there previously. According to the Rabbis, however, he must look for all ten pieces, because we are concerned that all of them were dragged into the house by a rat, and the nine pieces that were found are different ones.