Pesachim 10b — the Talmud in English

10.

He placed

the leaven that remained after he had searched

in this corner

of the house,

and

afterwards

found

leaven

in another corner,

and he does not know whether this is the same leaven that he had previously placed in the other corner, only that afterwards he transferred it here and forgot about it; or whether it is other leaven, while the earlier leaven was dragged into the house by a mouse—this is

the dispute between Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis.

For it was taught in a beraita: A hatchet that was lost in a house—

every

utensil in the house is impure,

because

I say:

perhaps

an impure person entered there and took it,

and in the course of doing so, he felt through all the utensils of the house and rendered them impure.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: The house is pure,

because

I say:

certainly he

lent it

the owner of the house,

to

another

person, and forgot

about it,

or

he himself

took it from this corner and placed

it

in another corner, and forgot

about it.

And we raise a difficulty:

“Corner”—

who mentioned it? What connection does a corner have here? After all, the hatchet was completely lost, and it was not placed in another corner.

And we answer:

And we resolve it:

The beraita is incomplete [

the beraita is missing a statement],

and this is what it teaches:

a.

A hatchet that was lost in a house—the house is impure, I say: An impure person entered there and took it.

b.

Or

the hatchet was not lost, but

he placed it in this corner

in the house,

and found it in another corner—

the house is impure.

Because

I say: An impure person entered there, took it from this corner, and placed it in another corner,

and meanwhile also felt through the other utensils of the house and rendered them impure.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says:

In either case

the house is pure.

For

if the hatchet was lost—

I say: He lent it

the owner of the house

to

a person

other than himself, and forgot.

Or

if it was found in another corner—I say:

that

he himself

took it from this corner,

where it had previously been,

and placed it in this corner,

where it is now,

and forgot.

And with leaven as well, according to the Rabbis, we are concerned that perhaps the mouse was the one that took the leaven from the earlier corner. If so, there is also concern that perhaps the leaven found here is not the leaven that was in the earlier corner, but rather is other leaven, while the earlier leaven was dragged by the mouse into the house, and he must search for it again. But according to Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, we attribute it to the fact that he himself transferred it from corner to corner and forgot. And he need not search again.

and he must search again. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, we assume that he himself moved it from one corner to another and forgot. He need not search again.

Rava said: A mouse

that

entered

a searched house

with a loaf

of leaven

in its mouth, and

the owner of the house

entered after it and found crumbs,

one may not attribute it to the claim that this is the loaf that the mouse brought in and crumbled into crumbs; rather, it still

requires a search

for that loaf,

because it is not the way of a mouse to crumble

the loaf, and presumably these crumbs are not from that loaf; rather, the loaf is still located elsewhere in the house.

And Rava said: A child

who

entered

a searched house

with a loaf in his hand, and he entered after him and found crumbs, he need not search

for that loaf,

because it is the way of a child to crumble

the loaf, and we attribute it to the fact that this is the loaf that he previously brought in, except that he crumbled it into crumbs.

Rava raised a question:

We saw

a mouse

that

entered

the house

with a loaf in its mouth.

And afterwards we saw

a mouse emerge

from the house

with a loaf in its mouth—what is the law?

Do we say: This is the same

mouse

that entered, and this is the same

mouse

that emerged,

that it is the same mouse that entered and emerged, and there is no need to search the house again?

Or perhaps,

the mouse that emerged is

another one,

while the loaf that was in the mouth of the first mouse is still in the house, and one must search for it?

And

if you should say

that in such a case we say

“This is the same one that entered, and this is the same one that emerged,”

and there is no need to search the house again, there is still a question in a case where we saw

a white mouse enter

the house

with a loaf in its mouth,

and afterwards we saw

a black mouse emerge with a loaf in its mouth—what is the law?

Do we say:

This

loaf that emerged

is certainly another one,

for another mouse brought it out?

Or perhaps,

it is the same loaf, but the first mouse

threw it from itself [

it threw it before itself], and the second mouse came and took it from there and brought it out?

And if you should say

that this may not be said, because

mice do not take from one another,

they are not accustomed to take their food from one another, there is still a question in a case where we saw

a mouse enter with a loaf in its mouth, and a weasel emerge

after it

with a loaf in its mouth—what is the law?

Do we say:

The weasel certainly took the loaf from the mouse

that entered;

it took it, since the weasel’s way is to prey upon mice?

Or perhaps,

the loaf in the weasel’s mouth is certainly

the loaf in the weasel’s mouth is certainly

another one,

and not the one that the mouse brought in, because

if it is so that it took it from the mouse,

if it had taken it from the mouse, it would have preyed upon the

mouse

itself as well, and it too

would have been found in its mouth,

together with the loaf?

And if you should say

that we adopt this side, that

if it is so that it took it from the mouse, the mouse would have been found in its mouth,

there is still a question when we saw

a mouse enter with a loaf in its mouth, and a weasel emerge, with a loaf and a mouse in the mouth of

the

weasel,

the loaf on one side of its mouth and the mouse on its other side,

what is the law?

Do we say:

Here it is certainly

demonstrated that

it is the same one,

this is the mouse that entered and this is the loaf that was in its mouth, since it is now holding both of them in its mouth?

Or perhaps,

they are certainly another mouse and another loaf, because

if it is so that it is indeed the same one,

that this is the same mouse that it preyed upon while it was holding the loaf in its mouth, then why is the loaf found in the weasel’s mouth? For when

a loaf is found in a mouse’s mouth,

in such a case,

it ought to have been found [there]?

Or perhaps,

therefore the loaf is not in the mouse’s mouth

because

through

fear,

from its great fear of the weasel,

it fell

from its mouth,

and it took it

the weasel and placed it in its mouth. In truth, this is the mouse that previously entered with the loaf.

And we conclude:

It is unresolved!

Rava raised a question: A loaf

of leaven that is found

on the ceiling beam,

placed on the beam in the ceiling above: does one

need

to bring

a ladder

on the eve of Passover in order

to bring it down

from there and burn it?

Or does he not need to?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say,

since the entire obligation of searching and burning is only rabbinic, so that one will not come to eat the leaven—for by Torah law, mere nullification is sufficient—therefore

to this extent [

to such a degree]

the Rabbis did not trouble him

to climb a ladder and bring down the leaven,

since it does not descend by itself,

because the loaf is not likely to fall by itself from the ceiling beam; therefore

we do not

fear that perhaps he will

come to eat it,

and he may rely on nullification alone.

Or perhaps, at times,

sometimes it nevertheless happens

that it falls

the loaf from above,

and he comes to eat it.

Therefore, must he also trouble himself to climb a ladder and burn the loaf?

And if you should say

that he must climb the ladder to the loaf, because

at times it falls and he comes to eat it,

there is still a question concerning a

loaf

that is found

in a pit.

Does one

need

to descend

by a ladder

into the pit and

bring it up

from there,

or does he not need to?

Do we say:

Here, certainly,

there is no concern that he will come to eat it,

for

after all,

it is not likely to rise by itself;

it is entirely impossible for the loaf to rise from the pit by itself.

Or perhaps, at times he descends to attend to his needs,

sometimes he descends into the pit for his needs,

and

while he is there,

he comes to eat it

from the loaf. And therefore he must bring it up from there and burn it?

The Rambam ruled that one need not bring it up from the pit [see the following note], but nullifies it in his heart and that is sufficient. And the Ra'avad challenged him that Rava did not raise any uncertainty at all as to whether it is initially permitted to place a loaf in a pit, that is, concealing it in pits, which they said above [5b] is prohibited. Rather, the uncertainty is when he searched and nullified, and after the time of its prohibition he found the loaf in the pit. And the Maggid Mishne wrote that even the Rambam did not intend that it should be initially permitted to conceal a loaf in a pit and nullify it; for although he does not transgress concerning it whenever he nullified it before the time of its prohibition, nevertheless it is prohibited to conceal it initially. Rather, it is speaking of a case in which the loaf fell into the pit by itself: he need not descend and bring it up, but it is sufficient that he nullify it in his heart. And this is ממש like leaven upon which a collapse fell, for it is considered burned, and nothing is required except to nullify it in his heart; nevertheless, he may not take leaven and initially cause a collapse to fall upon it. Rather, if it fell by itself, nullification is sufficient, and the same applies here. The Beit Yosef [ 438] explains the challenge of the Ra'avad: The word “initially” is like “before”; that is, whenever he learns before the time of the prohibition that there is a loaf in the pit, he must take it out, and it is not sufficient even if he had nullified it beforehand. If he did not take it out, this is like concealing it in a pit. For nullification is effective only for leaven of which he was unaware when the time of its prohibition took effect. The entire uncertainty is only when he searched and nullified, and after the time of its prohibition he learned of the loaf in the pit; then he does not transgress concerning it by Torah law, since when he learned of it, the leaven was no longer in his possession at all. The uncertainty is whether, by rabbinic law, he must take it out from there or not. And if you should say

that he must bring it up, because

at times he descends for his needs and comes to eat it,

there is still a question concerning a

loaf

that is found

in the mouth of a snake

in his house: does he

need

to hire

a specialist [

a person expert in this] in order

to remove

the loaf from the snake’s mouth and burn it,

or does he not need to?

Do we say: Only

with his person the Rabbis troubled him

to search for leaven and burn it, but

with his money,

to spend money for this purpose,

the Rabbis did not trouble him?

The Gemara above [4b] says, concerning one who rented a house from another with the presumption that it had been searched, and it was found not to have been searched, that even in a place where it is customary to hire people to search for leaven, and the tenant thereby suffers a monetary loss because the house was not searched, nevertheless this does not constitute a mistaken transaction, because a person is content to perform a mitzva with his money. But here it is said that perhaps the Sages did not obligate him at all to spend money on searching for leaven? The Tosafot explain: Specifically here, perhaps they did not obligate him to spend money to remove the loaf from the snake’s mouth, because it is possible that the snake will immediately take the loaf out of its mouth and he will be able to burn it, or perhaps it will eat it and he will not need to burn it. But where he certainly needs to search, he is obligated even to spend money for this. Tosafot s.v. “With his money.” Tosafot of Rabbeinu Peretz answer that indeed the person himself is content to spend money on the mitzva of searching for leaven, but the Sages did not obligate him to do so. The Maharsha answers that above he can search himself, except that the custom of the city is not to trouble themselves but to hire people to search in their place. Since the person is obligated to search, he is content even to spend money for this. But where he cannot search himself except by hiring another person, the Sages did not obligate him to spend money on searching for leaven. Since he is exempt from searching, he is not content to spend money for nothing. And Rabbeinu David wrote likewise.

Or perhaps it is not different,

that even if the matter entails a monetary expense, he is obligated to make an effort and burn the leaven?

And we conclude:

It is unresolved!

Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

At one of the following three times, one searches for leaven.

a. Initially,

one searches by candlelight

on

the fourteenth.

b.

And

if he did not search then, he searches

on the fourteenth in the morning.

c.

And

if he did not search even then, he searches

at the time of the burning,

that is, during the sixth hour of the fourteenth day. But if he did not search until then, he no longer searches; rather, he relies on the nullification, and if he finds leaven, he burns it.

And the Sages say:

even after these times he may still search.

For if

he did not search on the night of

the

fourteenth, he should search on the fourteenth

in the morning.

And if

he did not search on the fourteenth

in the morning,

he should search during the period

at the sixth hour, which is the period of removal.

And if

he did not search during the period, he should search after the period

of removal, that is, from six hours onward until nightfall, and from then onward he no longer searches.

And what he leaves

of the leaven after the search on the night of the fourteenth for the purpose of eating it until the next day, and for the removal of what remains,

he should place it discreetly

in a concealed place,

so that he will not need to search after it

if some of the leaven he left is missing. For example, if he leaves ten pieces and finds only nine, he will have to search again.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

What is the reason of Rabbi Judah?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda and Rabbah bar Rav Huna both say:

Rabbi Judah requires searching three times at three times,

corresponding to the three removals in the Torah.

Three expressions of removal that were stated concerning leaven in the Torah.

“No leaven of yours shall be seen, and no leavening of yours shall be seen.”

“For seven days leavening shall not be found in your houses.”

“But on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses.”

And these are the three expressions of removal: “seeing,” “finding,” and “removal.”

Whereas the Sages hold that one search alone is sufficient; only if he did not search at the first time, he should search at the second time, and so on.

Rav Yosef raises an objection

from this, as it was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Judah says: Anyone who did not search during these three periods

stated in the Mishna

no longer searches.

Apparently,

it is evident,

it is from “from then onward” that they disagree,

for the entire disagreement of Rabbi Judah with the Sages is whether one must also search after these three periods or not. But in any event, Rabbi Judah too does not require searching three times; rather, either at this time or at that time?

Mar Zutra teaches it

—he recites Rav Yosef’s objection—

as follows:

Rav Yosef raises an objection

from this, as it was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Judah says: Anyone who did not search during one of these three periods no longer searches.

Thus, Rabbi Judah explicitly holds that one of the three periods is sufficient.

Apparently, it is with regard to “no longer searches”

that they disagree,

and his entire disagreement with the Sages is whether one must search again even after the time of removal or not! And we conclude:

Rather, Rabbi Judah too

does not require searching three times; rather,

he says, “if he did not search,”

that if he did not search on the night of the fourteenth, he should search on the fourteenth in the morning. And if he did not search then either, he should search at the time of removal. And the Sages add that he may search even after the time of removal.

And here they disagree about this:

One master,

Rabbi Judah,

holds: Before the prohibition, yes,

only before the time of the prohibition—that is, until the end of the sixth hour—does one search for the leaven. But

after the prohibition,

after the sixth hour, when the leaven is already forbidden in eating and benefit,

no, he should not search. Because of

a decree, lest

he come to eat from it

while occupied with the leaven.

he come to eat from it.

And we challenge:

Did Rabbi Judah decree

that a person should not occupy himself with something forbidden to eat,

lest he come to eat from it?

But we learned

in tractate Menahot:

Once the Omer offering was brought,

immediately after the offering of the Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan, they would

go out and find

the

markets of Jerusalem filled with flour and parched grain

[grain that had been dried in an oven], from the new produce that had now become permitted for eating through the offering of the Omer.