Pesachim 10b (י:) — the Talmud in English

10.

He placed

the chametz that remained after he had conducted the search

in this corner

of the house,

and

afterward

found

chametz

in another corner,

and he does not know whether this is the same chametz that he had previously placed in the other corner, except that afterward he moved it here and forgot about it; or whether it is different chametz, while the earlier chametz was dragged into the house by a mouse—this is

the dispute between Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis.

As it was taught in a baraita: If an ax was lost in a house—

every utensil

in the house is impure,

because

I say:

perhaps

an impure person entered there and took it,

and in the process he felt his way among all the utensils in the house and rendered them impure.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: The house is pure,

because

I say:

certainly

the owner lent it

to another person,

to

a person

other than himself, and forgot

about it,

or

he himself

took it from this corner and placed

it

in another corner, and forgot

about it.

And we raise a difficulty:

“Corner”—

who mentioned it? What does a corner have to do with this? The ax was entirely lost, and was not placed in another corner.

And we answer:

“The baraita is incomplete”

and this is what it teaches:

[The baraita is missing material.]

And this is what it teaches:

a.

If an ax was lost in a house, the house is impure, as I say: An impure person entered there and took it.

b.

Or

the ax was not lost, but

he placed it in this corner

in the house

and found it in another corner—

the house is impure.

Because

I say: An impure person entered there, took it from this corner, and placed it in another corner,

and meanwhile also felt his way among the other utensils in the house and rendered them impure.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says:

In either case,

the house is pure.

For

if the ax was lost,

I say: The owner lent it

to

a

person

other than himself, and forgot

or

if it was found in another corner, I say:

that

he himself

took it from this corner,

where it had previously been,

and placed it in this corner,

where it is now,

and forgot.

With regard to chametz as well, according to the Rabbis, we are concerned that perhaps the mouse took the chametz from the earlier corner. If so, we must also be concerned that perhaps the chametz found here is not the chametz that had been in the earlier corner, but is different chametz, while the earlier chametz was dragged into the house by the mouse. One must therefore conduct the search again. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, we assume that he himself moved it from one corner to another and forgot. He need not search again. Rava said: If a mouse

and he must search again. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, we assume that he himself moved it from one corner to another and forgot. He need not search again.

entered

a checked house

with a loaf

of chametz

in its mouth, and the homeowner entered

after it

and found crumbs,

one may not assume that this was the loaf the mouse brought in and crumbled into crumbs; rather, he

still needs to search

for that loaf,

because it is not the way of a mouse to crumble

a loaf,

and presumably these crumbs are not from that loaf; rather, the loaf is still somewhere else in the house.

a loaf. Presumably, these crumbs are not from that loaf; rather, the loaf is still somewhere else in the house.

And Rava said: If a child

who

entered

a searched house

with a loaf in his hand, and one entered after him and found crumbs, he need not search

for that loaf,

because a child usually crumbles

a loaf, and we assume that this is the loaf he brought in earlier, but that he crumbled it into pieces.

Rava raised a dilemma:

We saw

a mouse

that

entered

a house

with a loaf in its mouth.

Afterward, we saw

a mouse emerge

from the house

with a loaf in its mouth. What is the halakha?

Do we say: This is the one

mouse

that entered, and this is the one

mouse

that emerged, meaning that it was the same mouse that entered and emerged, and there is no need to search the house again?

Or perhaps

the mouse that emerged is

a mouse

different, while the loaf that was in the mouth of the first mouse is still in the house,

and one must search for it? And

if you say

that in such a case we say,

“This is the one that entered, and this is the one that emerged,”

and there is no need to search the house again, there is still a dilemma in a case where we saw

a white mouse enter

the house

with a loaf in its mouth,

and afterward we saw

a black mouse emerge with a loaf in its mouth. What is the halakha?

Do we say:

This

loaf that emerged

is certainly different,

since a different mouse brought it out?

Or perhaps

it is the same loaf, but the first mouse

threw it away from itself,

[it cast it down from before itself], and the second mouse came, took it, and brought it out?

And if you say

that this cannot be said, because

mice do not take from one another,

mice do not take food from one another,

they are not accustomed to take one another’s food, there is still a dilemma in a case where we saw

a mouse enter with a loaf in its mouth, and a weasel emerge

after it

with a loaf in its mouth. What is the halakha?

Do we say:

The weasel certainly took it from the mouse

that entered;

it took it, the loaf,

since it is the way of a weasel to prey upon mice?

Or perhaps

the loaf in the weasel’s mouth is certainly

different,

and is not the one that the mouse brought in, because

if it is so that it took it from the mouse,

had it taken it from the mouse, it would have preyed upon the

mouse

itself, and it too

would have been found in its mouth,

together with the loaf?

And if you say

that we adopt this possibility, that

if it is so that it took it from the mouse, the mouse would have been found in its mouth,

there is still a dilemma when we saw

a mouse enter with a loaf in its mouth, and a weasel emerge, with a loaf and a mouse in the mouth of

the

weasel,

the loaf on one side of its mouth and the mouse on the other side,

what is the halakha?

Do we say:

Here, certainly

it is demonstrated that

it is he, the mouse that entered and the loaf that had been in its mouth, since the weasel is now holding both of them in its mouth?

Or perhaps

the mouse and the loaf are certainly different, because

if it is so that it is indeed he,

the mouse that the weasel preyed upon while it was holding the loaf in its mouth, then why was the loaf found in the weasel’s mouth? For when

a loaf is found in the mouth of a mouse,

in such a case,

it should have been found

in this manner—that is, in the mouse’s mouth.

Or perhaps

the loaf is therefore not in the mouse’s mouth

because

as a result of

fear,

from its great fear of the weasel,

it fell

from its mouth, and the weasel

took it

and placed it in its own mouth. In fact, this is the mouse that entered earlier with the loaf.

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rava raised another dilemma: A loaf

of chametz found

on a ceiling beam,

placed on the beam in the ceiling above: does one

need

to bring a

ladder

on the eve of Passover in order

to lower it

from there and burn it?

Or does he not need to?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say: Since the entire obligation to search for and destroy chametz is only rabbinic, so that one will not come to eat the chametz—for according to Torah law, mere nullification suffices—therefore

the Sages did not trouble him to such an extent

to such an extent [

[to that degree]

as to require him

to climb a ladder and lower the chametz,

since it does not descend on its own,

as the loaf is not likely to fall from the ceiling beam by itself; therefore

we do not

need to be concerned that perhaps he will

come to eat it,

and he may rely on nullification alone.

Or perhaps, sometimes

it nevertheless happens that

it falls,

the loaf from above,

and he comes to eat it.

Therefore, must he also trouble himself to climb a ladder and destroy the loaf?

And if you say

that he must climb a ladder to the loaf, because

sometimes it falls and he comes to eat it, there is still a dilemma concerning a

loaf

that is found

in a pit

: does one

need

to descend

with a ladder

into the pit and

raise it

from there,

or does he not need to?

Do we say:

Here, certainly,

there is no concern that he will come to eat it,

for

it is

not possible for it to rise on its own

from the pit; it is entirely impossible for the loaf to rise by itself from the pit.

Or perhaps, sometimes he descends to attend to his needs,

at times he descends into the pit for his own purposes,

and

while he is there

he comes to eat it

from the loaf. Therefore, must he raise it from there and destroy it?

from the loaf. Therefore, must he bring it up from there and destroy it?

And if you say

that he must raise it, because

sometimes he descends for his needs and comes to eat it,

there is still a dilemma concerning a

loaf

that is found

in the mouth of a snake

in his house: does one

need

to hire an

expert

[a person skilled in this matter] in order

to remove

the loaf from the snake’s mouth and burn it,

or does he not need to?

Do we say that the Sages troubled him only with his person to search for and destroy the chametz, but with his money, meaning that he must spend money for this purpose,

the Sages did not trouble him?

Or perhaps it is no different, and even if the matter entails a monetary expenditure, he is obligated to make the effort to destroy the chametz?

with regard to his money,

that is, requiring him to spend money for this purpose,

the Sages did not trouble him?

The Gemara above [4b] says, concerning one who rented a house from another with the presumption that it had been searched, and it was found not to have been searched, that even in a place where it is customary to hire people to search for leaven, and the tenant thereby suffers a monetary loss because the house was not searched, nevertheless this does not constitute a mistaken transaction, because a person is content to perform a mitzva with his money. But here it is said that perhaps the Sages did not obligate him at all to spend money on searching for leaven? The Tosafot explain: Specifically here, perhaps they did not obligate him to spend money to remove the loaf from the snake’s mouth, because it is possible that the snake will immediately take the loaf out of its mouth and he will be able to burn it, or perhaps it will eat it and he will not need to burn it. But where he certainly needs to search, he is obligated even to spend money for this. Tosafot s.v. “With his money.” Tosafot of Rabbeinu Peretz answer that indeed the person himself is content to spend money on the mitzva of searching for leaven, but the Sages did not obligate him to do so. The Maharsha answers that above he can search himself, except that the custom of the city is not to trouble themselves but to hire people to search in their place. Since the person is obligated to search, he is content even to spend money for this. But where he cannot search himself except by hiring another person, the Sages did not obligate him to spend money on searching for leaven. Since he is exempt from searching, he is not content to spend money for nothing. And Rabbeinu David wrote likewise.

And we conclude:

Teyku!

The Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The chametz is searched for at one of the following three times.

a. Initially,

one searches by candlelight

on

the fourteenth.

b.

And

if he did not search then, he searches

on the fourteenth in the morning.

c.

And

if he did not search then either, he searches

at the time of the destruction,

that is, during the sixth hour of the fourteenth day. But if he did not search by then, he no longer searches; rather, he relies on nullification, and if he finds chametz, he destroys it.

at the time of the removal,

that is, during the sixth hour of the fourteenth day. However, if he did not search by then, he should no longer search; rather, he relies on nullification, and if he finds leaven, he destroys it.

And the Sages say:

even after these times, one may still search.

For if

he did not search on the night of

the

fourteenth,

he should search on the morning of the fourteenth.

And if

he did not search on the fourteenth

in the morning,

he should search during the period

when the prohibition takes effect, namely, during the sixth hour, which is the time designated for the removal of leaven.

And if

he did not search during the period, he should search after the period

of removal—that is, from the sixth hour onward until nightfall; from that point onward, he no longer searches.

And whatever he leaves over

from the leaven after the search on the night of the fourteenth for his consumption until the following day, and for the removal of what remains,

he should place it discreetly

in a concealed place,

so that he will not need to search for it again

if some of the leaven he left becomes missing. For example, if he leaves ten pieces and finds only nine, he will have to search again.

Gemara:

We raise a question concerning it:

What is Rabbi Yehuda’s reason?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna both say:

Rabbi Yehuda requires one to search three times, at three different times,

corresponding to the three verses concerning removal in the Torah.

These are the three expressions of removal stated in the Torah with regard to leaven:

“No leaven shall be seen in your possession, and no leavening shall be seen in your possession.”

“For seven days no leaven shall be found in your houses.”

“But on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses.”

Thus, there are three expressions of removal: “seeing,” “finding,” and “removing.”

The Sages, by contrast, hold that one search alone is sufficient; rather, if he did not search at the first time, he should search at the second time, and so on.

Rav Yosef challenges

this from a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who did not search during these three periods

mentioned in the Mishna

may no longer search.

Apparently,

it is evident that

they disagree only with regard to what follows,

that the entire dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages concerns whether one must also search after these three periods or not. In any event, Rabbi Yehuda too does not require three searches; rather, one searches either at this time or at that time?

Mar Zutra teaches it

as a reformulation of Rav Yosef’s question

as follows:

Rav Yosef challenges

this from a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who did not search during one of these three periods may no longer search.

Thus, it is explicit that Rabbi Yehuda holds that one of the three periods is sufficient.

Apparently, it is with regard to “may no longer search”

that they disagree,

and his entire dispute with the Sages concerns whether one must search again even after the time for removal, or not. And we conclude:

Rather, Rabbi Yehuda too

does not require one to search three times; rather,

when he says “if he did not search,”

he means that if he did not search on the night of the fourteenth, he should search on the morning of the fourteenth; and if he did not search then either, he should search at the time of removal. The Sages add that he may search even after the time of removal.

And here they disagree about this:

One master—

Rabbi Yehuda—

holds: Before the prohibition takes effect, yes;

only before the time of the prohibition, namely, until the end of the sixth hour, does one search for leaven. But

after the prohibition takes effect,

after the sixth hour, when the leaven is already prohibited for both eating and benefit,

no,

he should not search. This is because of

a decree, lest

while occupied with the leaven

he come to eat from it.

And we challenge this:

Did Rabbi Yehuda decree

that a person may not handle something prohibited for eating

lest he come to eat from it?

But we learned

in Tractate Menahot:

Once the omer offering has been brought,

immediately after the offering of the omer on the sixteenth of Nisan, they

would go out and find

the

markets of Jerusalem filled with flour and roasted grain [

grain that had been dried in an oven ] from the new produce, which had now become permitted for eating through the offering of the omer.