Pesachim 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

And this statement

was not in accordance with the will of the Sages

(they acted),

because they certainly harvested and ground this grain before the Festival, when the grain was still forbidden for consumption. The Sages were concerned that, while handling the grain, they might come to eat from it, thereby transgressing the prohibition against eating chadash before the Omer.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: They acted in accordance with the will of the Sages

thus.

It follows that

Rabbi Yehuda did not decree

that one may not handle grain that is forbidden for consumption

lest one come to eat from it.

And why, then, does he decree this with regard to leaven? And we answer:

Rabba said: Chadash is different

from

because there is no concern that one will come to eat from the new grain while harvesting it:

since he was not permitted

to harvest it in the usual manner with a sickle,

but only

in an unusual manner,

by plucking

it by hand. For by Torah law it is forbidden to harvest any grain before the harvesting of the Omer, as it is stated: “And you shall bring the Omer, the first of your harvest, to the priest”; this indicates that the harvesting of the Omer must be the first harvesting of the new crop. Only by means of an unusual procedure is it permitted to harvest beforehand. Consequently,

he remembers

that this grain is chadash and forbidden for consumption, and he will not come to eat it.

Abaye said

to Rabba:

Granted

that there is no concern lest one eat from the grain

at the time of plucking,

since, as stated, he remembers because of the unusual procedure; but at the time of

grinding and sifting

the flour, when there is no prohibition against performing them in the usual manner [since the Torah did not prohibit grinding and sifting before the Omer],

what can be said

—how will he remember, while performing them, not to eat from it? After all, the flour in the markets of Jerusalem was ground and sifted before the Omer. How could Rabbi Yehuda permit them to do this?

Rava answers:

This is not difficult,

because they performed these labors as well by means of an unusual procedure [so that the prohibition would be remembered]—

Grinding

was performed

with a hand mill

[a millstone]

of this kind,

rather than in the usual manner with a water mill. And

sifting

was performed

on top of a sieve,

by turning the sieve over and sifting from the other side.

The difficulty nevertheless remains:

But that which we learned: One may harvest

before the Omer [even without an unusual procedure]

a field requiring irrigation

—a field that requires irrigation by human effort—

and fields in the valleys,

grain that grows in a valley. The reason is that grain grown there is not of superior quality, and the Omer offering is not brought from it. The Torah prohibited harvesting before the Omer only grain suitable for bringing as the Omer.

And this is derived from the contradiction between the verses. In one place it says: “When you come into the land that I give you, and you reap its harvest and bring the Omer”; this indicates that it is permitted to harvest before the Omer even when not for the purpose of the Omer. But at the end of the verse it says: “And you shall bring the Omer, the first of your harvest, to the priest”; this indicates that the harvesting of the Omer must be the first of all harvests. How is this resolved?

Rather, we interpret the verses as follows: From a place from which you bring the Omer, you may not harvest other grain before it. But from a place from which you do not bring the Omer, you may harvest even before it.

But one may not pile it into a stack

It is forbidden to make a stack of the grain until after the bringing of the Omer. The Sages permitted only harvesting, because the grain is liable to spoil if one waits to harvest it until after the Omer. But regarding a stack, where there is no concern of loss if one waits until after the Omer, they did not permit making it before the Omer.

And we established

this Mishna in tractate Menachot

as the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

What can be said

—why did Rabbi Yehuda permit harvesting from a field requiring irrigation even without an unusual procedure, and not fear that one might come to eat from the grain while harvesting it?

And we answer:

Rather, Abaye said: Chadash—

one distances himself

from it

from it.

For people are not accustomed to eating it throughout the year, and people do not normally reach out, take it, and put it in their mouths. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda did not decree lest one forget now and come to eat it.

But

leaven—

one does not distance himself

from it

from it.

For people are accustomed to eating leaven throughout the year. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda is concerned that, while searching, one may forget and eat from the leaven.

Rava said: Is it only

Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling

regarding leaven

that conflicts with Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling

regarding chadash

that is difficult, while

the ruling of

the Sages conflicts with the ruling of the Sages and is not difficult?

After all, one can also ask about them: Why did the Sages in our Mishna require one to search even after the time of the prohibition, without fearing that one might come to eat from the leaven, whereas with regard to chadash, Rabbi Meir [who is one of the Sages disputing Rabbi Yehuda] prohibited handling the new grain lest one come to eat it?

Rather, Rava said: Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling regarding leaven and Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling regarding chadash are not difficult—

as we answered

above, that there is greater reason for concern with leaven than with chadash, because one does not distance himself from it.

The Sages’ ruling regarding leaven and the Sages’ ruling regarding chadash are also not difficult,

because in their view there is indeed concern, with regard to every matter forbidden for consumption, that one may come to eat it while handling it. But there is no such concern during the search for leaven. For

he himself is seeking it

after the leaven

in order to burn it;

this is the entire purpose of the search. How, then, can we be concerned,

“perhaps he will eat from it?”

The search itself reminds him that leaven is forbidden for consumption.

Rav Ashi said: Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling regarding leaven and Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling regarding chadash are not difficult,

for

“flour and parched grain”

we learned,

that they were found in the markets of Jerusalem, and these are not fit for consumption. [Flour is not edible as it is, and parched grain is likewise not fit for consumption, as will be explained below.] Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda did not fear that people might come to eat them, unlike leaven, which is fit for consumption.

The Gemara rejects this:

Rav Ashi’s explanation is nonsense!

It is not correct.

For

granted from

the time when it has been made

parched grain and thereafter,

after the grain has been dried in an oven, at which point it is certainly not fit for consumption. But

initially,

before it was dried, while the grain was still soft,

until

he made it

parched grain,

for example, at the time of harvesting, when it is fit for consumption,

what can be said—how did Rabbi Yehuda permit handling it then?

And if you would say

that since they permitted harvesting it only

by plucking,

he remembers that the grain is forbidden, and there is no concern that he will come to eat it—and

as

Rava

explained above. [But the difficulty against him was how they permitted grinding and sifting; Rav Ashi came to explain that by then it is no longer fit for consumption.]

The difficulty nevertheless remains:

But

that which we learned,

“One may harvest fields requiring irrigation and those in the valleys”,

even without an unusual procedure,

and we established

this Mishna

as the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda—what can be said? Why did Rabbi Yehuda permit harvesting, when at the time of harvesting the grain is still fit for consumption!?

And we conclude:

Rather, Rav Ashi’s explanation is nonsense!

We are compelled to accept Abaye’s explanation: people distance themselves from chadash, unlike leaven, from which people do not distance themselves.

We raise another difficulty:

And

if

whenever one does not distance himself from something, does Rabbi Yehuda decree?

But we learned

in tractate Shabbat:

A person may not pierce

[make a hole in]

an eggshell,

[the shell of an egg,]

fill it with oil, and place it

on Shabbat eve

beside a lamp,

[a small earthenware lamp containing oil,]

so that it will drip

drop by drop from the oil into the lamp, so that the lamp will continue burning for a long time. The reason is that we are concerned that one may take oil from the shell on Shabbat for consumption and thereby become liable for extinguishing. Since he designated the oil for the lamp, by taking oil from the shell he hastens the extinguishing of the lamp.

Even

if the shell

is earthenware,

he may not place it beside the lamp. Although it is repulsive, we are concerned that he may take some of the oil inside it for consumption.

But Rabbi Yehuda permits

placing a pierced shell filled with oil beside the lamp.

It follows that Rabbi Yehuda does not decree lest one come to eat something forbidden, even with regard to something from which people do not distance themselves, such as oil, which people regularly use.

Why, then, does he decree in our Mishna with regard to leaven lest one come to eat it? [But the Sages’ ruling regarding leaven and the Sages’ ruling regarding the other matter are not difficult. For it was explained above that the Sages always decree, except with regard to leaven, because he himself is seeking it in order to burn it, and will not come to eat it.]

And we answer:

There,

with regard to oil,

because of the stringency of Shabbat, people distance themselves from it

and therefore Rabbi Yehuda did not decree there lest they come to eat from it.

And we raise

[and seemingly contradict one matter with another]

Shabbat against Shabbat.

For it was taught: If the rope of a bucket is severed

in its middle,

one may not tie it

on Shabbat, because this is a permanent knot, as it is made to remain forever, and one is liable for the labor of tying.

Rather, he may make a bow

and make only a bow.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

He joins the two severed ends of the rope one over the other

and wraps a belt around it

[a belt]

or a sash

[a strap].

Provided that he does not make a bow on it

[the severed rope], since, while occupied with making the bow, there is concern that he may come to make a knot.

Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling conflicts with Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling

for with regard to oil he does not decree, whereas with regard to a rope he does decree, although both cases concern Shabbat?

The Sages’ ruling conflicts with the Sages’ ruling

for with regard to oil they decreed, whereas with regard to a rope they do not decree against making a bow?

And we answer:

The Rabbis' ruling in one case does not contradict their ruling in the other.

Because

when the oil

placed in a tube beside the lamp,

with ordinary oil

the ordinary person

confuses it,

therefore they decree that perhaps he will forget and take some of the oil in the tube, since it resembles ordinary oil. But

a loop is not confused with a knot,

and therefore they do not decree, since if he is permitted to make a loop, he will not come to make a knot.

Rabbi Judah's ruling in one case does not contradict Rabbi Judah's ruling in the other

either;

it is not difficult.

Because

the reason for Rabbi Judah's ruling,

who prohibits making a loop on Shabbat,

is not that he decrees against a loop because of a knot; rather, he maintains that a loop itself is a knot.

And it is prohibited by Torah law.

We raise another objection:

And do the Rabbis' rulings contradict one another?

As we learned

in tractate Shabbat:

One may tie

on Shabbat

a bucket with a belt

in order to draw water from the well. This is because he does not intend to damage the belt and leave it there permanently. Thus, it is a knot that is not permanent.

But one may not

tie the bucket

with a rope.

The Gemara will immediately explain the reason.

And Rabbi Judah permits

even tying the bucket with a rope.

And we inquire about this:

What kind of rope

is being discussed?

If you say an ordinary rope,

a regular rope intended for this purpose, is it possible that

Rabbi Judah permits

tying with it? Surely

it is a permanent knot, as he will certainly leave it there permanently

and thereby violate the labor of tying?

Rather, it is obvious

that the reference is to a rope

of weavers [of weavers],

which is not suitable for drawing water on a permanent basis. It is not a permanent knot.

And

even so,

the Rabbis decreed

not to tie with

a weavers' rope, due to an ordinary rope,

which people tie and leave permanently. Yet we said that the Rabbis do not decree against a loop because of a knot; why, then, do they decree against a weavers' rope because of an ordinary rope?

And we answer:

Indeed, one rope is confused with another,

as a weavers' rope resembles an ordinary rope; therefore, one must decree against this because of that. But

a loop and a knot

are not similar; therefore

they are not confused,

and there is no concern that, by permitting him to make a loop, he will come to make a knot as well.

We raise another objection:

And

because

whenever a person refrains from it,

does Rabbi Judah not decree?

And we learned

in tractate Bekhorot:

A firstborn

of a kosher animal

that was seized by blood,

having become ill due to an excess of blood, and whose treatment is to have its blood let,

even if it will die,

meaning that it is liable to die if its blood is not let,

its blood may not be let,

even in a case where letting the blood does not cause a blemish, that is, where the animal will recover,

the statement of Rabbi Judah,

who decrees against it because of letting blood in a case where a blemish is caused, and it is prohibited by Torah law to cause a blemish in a firstborn.

And the Sages say: He may let its blood

it is permitted to let its blood,

provided that he does not cause it a blemish,

that he does not do so in a manner from which it will not recover, such as by cutting a bone or damaging its lip or ear.

Yet in the case of consecrated animals, everyone refrains from them, and nevertheless Rabbi Judah decrees in the case of a firstborn that its blood may not be let at all, because of a case where a blemish is caused.