Pesachim 11b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

there

in the case of a firstborn that was seized by blood,

since a person is agitated ![](pamud.bmp "

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over his property,

for the priest [the owner of the firstborn] fears lest the firstborn die. Therefore,

we say: if you permit him

to let blood

in a place where it does not make a blemish, he will come to do so

even

in a place where it makes a blemish.

But the Rabbis

hold: On the contrary, since he is agitated over his property,

all the more so

it should be permitted for him to let blood in a place where it does not make a blemish;

for if you do not permit him

to let blood

at all, he will come

to transgress our words and

perform

bloodletting. And then he will no longer distinguish between a place where it makes a blemish and a place where it does not make a blemish, for everything is equal in his eyes.

And we raise an objection:

And do we say to Rabbi Yehuda

that in a place where

a person is agitated over his property

there is reason to decree?

But we learned

in tractate Beitza:

Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not comb

[scratch]

the animal on a Festival

with an iron comb whose teeth are fine, in order to clean it of the mud upon it,

because he makes

in it

a wound

through the scraping. And making a wound in a living creature is a primary category of labor and is prohibited on a Festival.

But one may scrape

It is permitted to scrape it with a wooden comb whose teeth are coarse, and it does not make a wound.

And the Sages say: One may not comb

on a Festival, and

one may not even scrape,

a decree: scraping on account of combing.

And it was taught in a baraita: What is combing, and what is scraping?

Combing

is with a comb whose teeth are

small, and

they

make a wound.

Scraping

is with a comb whose teeth are

large, and they do not

make

make a wound.

Thus, although here too it is relevant to say “a person is agitated over his property,” for the mud upon the animal disfigures it and causes it distress, nevertheless Rabbi Yehuda did not decree that if we permit him scraping, he will come also to perform combing?

And we answer: Only

there,

in the case of the firstborn,

for if he leaves it

and does not let its blood

it will die—

we say,

“a person is agitated over his property.”

But

here,

in the case of scraping, even

if he leaves it

to the animal and does not scrape it at all, there is no concern that it will die; rather,

it is merely distress

to it from the mud that adhered to it.

We do not say

“a person is agitated over his property.”

And we examine the matter:

And Rabbi Yehuda,

although we explained that there is no reason to decree in the case of scraping because of “a person is agitated over his property,” nevertheless even without that he should have decreed, for

what is different with regard to leavened bread, that he decreed

not to inspect it after the time of its prohibition, lest one eat from it,

and what is different with regard to scraping, that he did not decree

lest one come to combing? [And after all, the labor of a Festival is not as severe as that of Shabbat, and it is similar to leavened bread, from which one does not separate himself]? And we answer:

Bread

after the time of its prohibition is

interchanged with bread

of the entire year;

it becomes confused.

Therefore Rabbi Yehuda decrees lest, since he is accustomed to eating bread throughout the year, he forget and come to eat now as well, after the time of its prohibition.

But

combing does not become confused with scraping,

and there is no concern that if we permit him scraping, he will come to perform combing as well.

And the Rabbis hold that combing does become confused with scraping as well, and therefore they prohibit even scraping.

Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: One eats

the hametz on the eve of Passover

all five

first hours of the day,

and burns

it

at the beginning

of the fifth

sixth

hour. And although by Torah law it is permitted to eat hametz until the end of the sixth hour, the Rabbis decreed and advanced by one hour the time of the prohibition of eating and benefiting from hametz, lest people err and think that the seventh hour is the sixth.

Rabbi Yehuda says: One eats

it

all four

hours only, because a person errs even by two hours, and he may think that the seventh hour is the fifth. But it is still permitted to benefit from it throughout the fifth hour.

And

therefore

one suspends judgment,

meaning that one does not eat it and does not burn it,

all five,

but he may feed it to his animal then.

And they burn

only

at the beginning of six,

for from then it is prohibited even to benefit from it by rabbinic law, as a decree on account of the seventh hour.

And Rabbi Yehuda further said: Two loaves of thanksgiving-offering

from the hametz loaves of the thanksgiving offering

that were disqualified,

that became disqualified from being eaten [and the Gemara will explain why they became disqualified], were

placed on top of the platform

[bench] on the Temple Mount, where people would gather and sit, and these loaves served them as a sign.

A.

As long as

the two loaves

are placed,

still

all the people eat

hametz.

B.

One was removed

from them—at the beginning of the fifth hour an agent of the court would come and remove one of the loaves—a sign that from now

one suspends judgment

concerning the hametz, that is,

one neither eats nor burns

it, since it is still permitted for benefit.

C.

Both were removed,

this was a sign that the sixth hour had arrived;

all the people began burning

their hametz.

Rabban Gamliel says:

Hametz foods of

ordinary produce are eaten

on the eve of Passover

all four

hours only. And this is the view of Rabbi Yehuda.

And

however, hametz foods of

teruma

are eaten even

all five

hours. For they did not decree concerning teruma as they decreed concerning ordinary produce, because it is prohibited to cause teruma to be lost by hand so long as it is possible to eat it.

And they burn

it

at the beginning of six,

for during the sixth hour they decreed concerning teruma as well, because most people err between the sixth and seventh hours.

Gemara:

Witnesses who came to testify in capital cases—for example, that a certain person killed someone—the court is obligated to conduct examination and inquiry of them, as it is stated: “And you shall inquire and investigate.” And they derive from the verses that they must examine them through seven investigations, such as: On which day of the month did the incident occur, on which day of the week, and at what hour?

And if the witnesses contradicted one another in one of the investigations, their testimony is null, as it is stated: “And you shall inquire and investigate, and behold, the matter is true and certain,” which indicates that their testimony must be precise and corresponding.

We learned there

in tractate Sanhedrin:

One

of the witnesses

says: On the second of the month

a certain person killed someone,

and one says

that the incident was

on the third of the month,

but both testify that it was on the same day of the week—for example, one says that it was Wednesday, which was the second of Heshvan, and the other says that it was Wednesday, which was the third of Heshvan—

their testimony stands,

for they both intend the same day; rather,

this one

who says “on the second of the month”

knows of the intercalation of the month,

that the preceding month had been made full, and the new month was established on the thirty-first day.

And this one

who says “on the third of the month”

does not know of the intercalation of the month,

and he thinks that the preceding month had been deficient, and the new month was established one day earlier. Therefore he mistook the second of the month for the third of the month. Since there are people who err in this matter, although in capital cases we are commanded to turn toward the merit of the accused, and to divide the testimony as far as possible so that it will be nullified and thereby save the life, as explained below in the discussion, here we do not have the power to divide it.

But if

one

of them

says: On the third

of the month the event occurred,

and one

says that

on the fifth

of the month it occurred—

their testimony is void,

since there is no basis on which to attribute their error, and they are found to contradict one another.

And if

one

of the witnesses

says: At the second hour

of the day the event occurred,

and one says: At the third hour

it occurred—

their testimony stands,

since it is usual for a person to err in this, and this is not a contradiction.

But if

one says

that the event was

at three

hours,

and one says at five

hours—

their testimony is void.

For it is not the way of people to err to such an extent, and they contradict one another.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says:

Even when one says three and the other says five,

their testimony stands,

for a person is liable to err even by such an amount. But if

one says

that the event was

at five

hours of the day,

and one says at seven

hours—

their testimony is void

even according to Rabbi Judah, because it is not possible to err in this,

for

behold,

at five, the sun

stands

in the east

of the firmament,

whereas

if

at seven

it stands—the

sun in the west

of the firmament. And this can be discerned by means of the shadow: if he extends his hand when the sun is in the east, the shadow will be toward the west, and when the sun is in the west, the shadow will be toward the east.

Abaye said: When you examine the matter,

if you scrutinize the words of the disputing tannaim, you will find:

According to Rabbi Meir, a person does not err at all.

According to Rabbi Judah, a person errs

by

half an hour.

And Abaye explains:

According to Rabbi Meir, a person does not err at all,

and one who does not state the exact hour is a liar. Rather, this is why Rabbi Meir upholds the testimony when this one says two hours and that one three hours: we attribute it to the fact that both are testifying about the same moment. For the

event, when it occurred,

it happened

at the going out of two and the entering of three,

when the second hour goes out and the third hour enters.

But this

witness

who says

that the event was at

two,

his intention

was at the end of two.

And this

witness

who says three,

his intention

was at the beginning of three.

It follows that both were precise in their testimony.

And

according to Rabbi Judah, a person errs

by

half an hour,

and therefore even when this one says three and that one five, their testimony stands. For we attribute it to the fact that the

event, when it occurred, was at half of four

at three and a half hours

it occurred.

And this

witness

who says

“three,”

his intention

was at the end of three.

And

it follows that he

erred

only by

half an hour earlier,

having advanced by half an hour from the actual time.

And this

witness

who says five,

his intention

was at the beginning of five.

And he too

erred

by

half an hour later,

for he delayed the time by half an hour.

And below the Gemara will ask: Why should we attribute it to the fact that their intentions were one to the end of the hour and the other to the beginning of the hour? On the contrary, because of the doubt we should have said the reverse, so that the difference between them would be greater than the amount by which they are liable to err, and thereby the testimony would become void and that man would be saved from execution by the court?

There are those who say: Abaye said: When you examine the matter, according to Rabbi Meir, a person errs

by

something.

And according to Rabbi Judah, a person errs

by

an hour and something!

According to Rabbi Meir, a person errs

by

something,

and when one says two and one says three, we say that this one intended the end of two, and that one the beginning of three. And the

event, when it occurred, was either at the end of two or at the beginning of three, and one of them erred

by

something: if the event was at the end of two, the one who said three erred by something; and if the event was at the beginning of three, the one who said two erred by something.

if the incident occurred at the end of two, the one who said three was mistaken by a small amount; and if the incident occurred at the beginning of three, the one who said two was mistaken by a small amount.

And according to Rabbi Judah, a person errs

by

an hour and something.

And when one says three and the other says five, we attribute it to the fact that the intention of this one was the end of three, and the intention of that one the beginning of five.

And the event, when it occurred, was either at the end of three or at the beginning of five.