Pesachim 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

There

the case is a firstborn animal that was seized by blood.

Since a person is anxious

about his property,

as the koen [the owner of the firstborn] is afraid that the firstborn might die, therefore

we say: If you permit him

to let blood

in a place where it does not cause a blemish, he will come to do so

also

in a place where it does cause a blemish.

And the Rabbis

hold: On the contrary, since he is anxious about his property,

all the more so

he should be permitted to let blood in a place where it does not cause a blemish,

for if you do not permit him

to let blood

at all, he will come

to violate our ruling and

perform

bloodletting. And then he will no longer distinguish between a place where it causes a blemish and a place where it does not cause a blemish, since everything is equivalent in his eyes.

And we challenge this:

Do we say to Rabbi Yehuda

that in a situation where

a person is anxious about his property

a decree should be enacted?

But we learned

in tractate Beitza:

Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not card

[scrape]

an animal on a Festival

with an iron scraper whose teeth are fine, in order to clean it of the mud adhering to it,

because he makes

in it

a wound

by means of the scraping. Causing an injury to a living creature is a primary category of labor and is prohibited on a Festival.

But one may comb

it; it is permitted to scrape it with a wooden scraper whose teeth are coarse, and it does not make a wound.

And the Sages say: One may not card

on a Festival,

and one may not even comb,

as a decree prohibiting combing on account of carding.

And it was taught in a baraita: What is carding, and what is combing?

Carding

is performed with a scraper whose teeth are

small, and

they

make a wound.

Combing

is performed with a scraper whose teeth are

large, and they do not

make

a wound.

Thus, although here too it is appropriate to say that a person is anxious about his property, since the mud on the animal weakens it and causes it distress, nevertheless Rabbi Yehuda did not decree that if we permit him to comb it, he will come also to card it?

And we answer: Only

there, in the case of a firstborn animal,

in the case of a firstborn animal,

for if he leaves it

and does not let its blood

it will die—

we say,

“A person is anxious about his property.”

But

here, with regard to combing, even

if

he leaves it

and does not comb the animal at all, there is no concern that it will die; there is only

mere distress

from the mud adhering to it. Therefore

we do not say

“A person is anxious about his property.”

And we inquire:

And as for Rabbi Yehuda, although we have answered that there is no reason to enact a decree with regard to combing on account of “a person is anxious about his property,” even without that consideration he should have enacted a decree, for

what is the difference between the case of leaven, where

he enacted a decree

not to search for it after the time when its prohibition begins, lest one eat it,

and what is the difference between the case of combing, where he did not enact a decree

lest one come to card? [After all, Festival labor is not as stringent as Shabbat, and this case resembles leaven, from which one does not ordinarily distance himself]? And we answer:

Bread

after the time of its prohibition

is confused with bread

of the entire year;

it is interchangeable.

Therefore Rabbi Yehuda decrees lest, because a person is accustomed to eating bread throughout the year, he forget and come to eat it now as well, after the time of its prohibition.

But

carding is not confused with combing,

and there is no concern that if we permit him to comb, he will come to card as well.

And the Rabbis hold that carding is indeed confused with combing, and therefore they prohibit even combing.

Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: One may eat

leaven on the eve of Passover

through all five

of the first hours of the day,

and one burns

it

at the beginning

of the fifth

sixth

hour. Although by Torah law it is permitted to eat leaven until the end of the sixth hour, the Rabbis decreed and advanced by one hour the time when eating and deriving benefit from leaven become prohibited, lest people err and think that the seventh hour is the sixth.

Rabbi Yehuda says: One may eat

it

through all four

hours only, because a person may err even by two hours and may think that the seventh hour is the fifth. But it remains permitted to derive benefit from it throughout the fifth hour.

And

therefore

one suspends judgment,

meaning that one neither eats nor burns it,

through all five

hours, but one may feed it to one’s animal at that time.

And one burns it

only

at the beginning of the sixth,

when it becomes prohibited even to derive benefit from it by rabbinic law, as a decree on account of the seventh hour.

And Rabbi Yehuda further said: Two loaves of the thanksgiving-offering

from the leavened loaves of the thanksgiving-offering

that were disqualified,

having become unfit to eat [and the Gemara will explain why they were disqualified], were

placed on top of the platform

[a bench] on the Temple Mount, where people would gather and sit, and these loaves served as a sign for them.

a.

As long as

the two loaves

remain in place,

still

all the people eat

leaven.

b.

One was removed

from them: at the beginning of the fifth hour an agent of the court would come and remove one of the loaves. This was a sign that from then on

one suspends judgment

concerning the leaven, meaning that

one neither eats nor burns

it, since it was still permitted to derive benefit from it.

c.

Both were removed

This was a sign that the sixth hour had arrived;

all the people began burning

their leaven.

Rabban Gamliel says:

Leavened foods of

non-sacred produce are eaten

on the eve of Passover

through all four

hours only. This is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s view.

But

leavened foods of

teruma

may be eaten even

through all five

hours. This is because they did not impose the same decree on teruma as on non-sacred produce, since it is prohibited to destroy teruma deliberately as long as it is possible to eat it.

And one burns

it

at the beginning of the sixth hour,

for during the sixth hour they imposed the decree on teruma as well, because most people err between the sixth and seventh hours.

Gemara:

Witnesses who come to testify in capital cases—for example, that a certain person killed someone—must be subjected by the court to examination and interrogation, as it is stated: “And you shall inquire and investigate.” The verses teach that they must be examined through seven interrogations, such as: On what day of the month did the incident occur, on what day of the week, and at what hour?

If the witnesses contradict one another in one of the interrogations, their testimony is invalid, as it is stated: “And you shall inquire and investigate, and behold, the matter is true and certain,” which indicates that their testimony must correspond precisely.

We learned there

in tractate Sanhedrin:

One

of the witnesses

says: On the second of the month

the certain person killed someone,

and one says

that the incident occurred

on the third of the month,

but both testify that it was on the same day of the week—for example, one says that it was on Wednesday, which was the second of Heshvan, while the other says that it was on Wednesday, which was the third of Heshvan—

their testimony stands,

because they are both referring to the same day. Rather,

this one

who says “on the second of the month”

knows that the month was intercalated,

that the previous month had been made full, and the new month was established on the thirty-first day.

And this one,

who says “on the third of the month,”

does not know that the month was intercalated,

and he thinks that the previous month was deficient and that the new month was established one day earlier. Therefore he mistakenly calls the second of the month the third. Since there are people who make this mistake, although in capital cases we are commanded to seek every possible argument in favor of the defendant, and to divide the testimony as far as possible so that it will be invalidated and the person’s life thereby saved, as will be explained below in the discussion, here we have no power to divide the testimony.

But if

one

of them

says: The incident occurred on the third

day of the month,

and one

says that it occurred

on the fifth

day of the month—

their testimony is invalid,

since there is no basis for attributing their error to anything, and it turns out that they contradict one another.

And if

one

of the witnesses

says: The incident occurred at two hours

of the day,

and one says: At three hours

it occurred—

their testimony stands,

since a person is accustomed to err in this matter, and this is not considered a contradiction.

However, if

one says

that the incident occurred

at three

hours,

and one says at five

hours—

their testimony is invalid.

For it is not customary for people to err to such an extent, and they contradict one another.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Even when one says three and the other says five,

their testimony stands,

since a person is liable to err even by such an amount. But if

one says

that the incident occurred

at five

hours of the day,

and one says at seven

hours—

their testimony is invalid

even according to Rabbi Yehuda, because it is not possible to err in this matter,

for

indeed,

at five, the sun

stands

in the east

of the firmament,

and

if

at seven

the

sun is in the west

of the firmament. This can be discerned by means of the shadow: If one extends his hand when the sun is in the east, the shadow will be toward the west, and when the sun is in the west, the shadow will be toward the east.

Abaye said: When you examine the matter carefully,

if you scrutinize the words of the disputing tannaim, you will find:

According to Rabbi Meir, a person does not err at all.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs

by

half an hour.

And Abaye explains:

According to Rabbi Meir, a person does not err at all,

and one who does not state the precise hour is a liar. Rather, Rabbi Meir upholds the testimony when one says two hours and the other says three hours because we attribute it to both of them testifying about the same moment. For

when the incident occurred,

it took place

as the second hour was departing and the third was entering,

when the second hour was ending and the third hour was beginning.

But

this witness

who says

that the incident occurred at

two,

his intention

was—

and this

witness

who says three,

his intention

was—at the beginning of three.

It follows that both of them were precise in their testimony.

And

according to Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs

by

half an hour,

and therefore even when one says three and the other says five, their testimony stands. For we attribute it to the fact that

when the incident occurred, it was at the midpoint of four

at three and a half hours,

it occurred.

And this

witness

who says

“three,”

his intention

was—

at the end of three.

And it follows that he

erred

only by

half an hour earlier,

having advanced the time by half an hour from the actual time.

And this

witness

who says five,

his intention

was—

at the beginning of five.

And he too

erred

by

half an hour later, having delayed the time by half an hour.

The Gemara will ask below: Why do we assume that their intentions were, respectively, the end of the hour and the beginning of the hour? On the contrary, we should have said, because of the doubt, the reverse, so that the difference between them would be greater than the amount by which they are liable to err, thereby invalidating the testimony and saving the condemned person from execution by the court?

Some say: Abaye said: When you examine the matter carefully, according to Rabbi Meir, a person errs

by

something.

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs

by

an hour and something!

According to Rabbi Meir, a person errs

by

something,

and when one says two and the other says three, we say that this one intended the end of two, and that one the beginning of three.

When the incident occurred, it was either at the end of two or at the beginning of three, and one of them erred

by

something: If the incident occurred at the end of two, the one who said three erred by something; and if the incident occurred at the beginning of three, the one who said two erred by something.

if the incident occurred at the end of two, the one who said three was mistaken by a small amount; and if the incident occurred at the beginning of three, the one who said two was mistaken by a small amount.

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs

by

an hour and something.

And when one says three and the other says five, we attribute it to the fact that the intention of one was the end of three, and the intention of the other was the beginning of five.

And the incident occurred either at the end of three or at the beginning of five.